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“Raskolnikov deftly shows how gender is staged in the context of allegorical debates 
on death and life. Raskolnikov’s brilliance is to show how voices are split and allocated 
to various figures, often personified as male and female, and how these talking figures 
debate not only the place and meaning of the body, but questions of moral harm and 
the possibility of true knowledge. These debates are hardly philosophy in a recogniz-
able sense, but they do engage philosophical questions through giving voice to various 
gendered characters. What emerges time and again is a self in a distanced relation to 
itself, often embattled, often split, for these dialoguing characters are and are not sepa-
rate. What becomes clear throughout these debates is that the action involved is often 
capricious and arbitrary, and so the question of free will, of the efficacy of human action 
in the face of contingency, is posed again and again in a dramatic and dialogic genre 
whose action or plot lacks all signs of Aristotelian likelihood and probability. The book 
works in a subtle and surprising way to locate gender as a point of view, showing how 
personifications essential to the debate genre show the contours of gender and subjec-
tivity as they are assumed through speech. This is a disorientingly smart and engaging 
text, essential to the early modern understanding of gender.”
—Judith Butler, Maxine Elliot Professor at the University of California, Berkeley
“In Body Against Soul: Gender and Sowlehele in Middle English Allegory, Masha Raskol-
nikov offers a theoretically bold and historically responsive understanding of the self 
in medieval English allegorical literature. As a historical alternative to modern psycho-
analysis, sowlehele allows her to make brilliant sense of Foucault’s famous inversion of 
the Platonic dictum: ‘the soul is the prison of the body.’ As a literary preoccupation, 
sowlehele brings Raskolnikov closer than others have gotten to the strange operations of 
medieval prosopopeia. Persistently engaging and finely discriminating, Raskolnikov’s 
book-long treatment of allegory exhilaratingly shows what is so abundantly productive 
and useful about this hoary form.” 
—Carolyn Dinshaw, professor of English and social and cultural analysis, New York 
University
“A fresh, smart look at some medieval English allegories that focus on the split self. Full 
of subtle readings and challenging insights.” 
—Barbara Newman, Northwestern University
In medieval allegory, Body and Soul were often pitted against one another in debate. 
In Body Against Soul: Gender and Sowlehele in Middle English Allegory, Masha Raskol-
nikov argues that such debates function as a mode of thinking about psychology, gen-
der, and power in the Middle Ages. Neither theological nor medical in nature, works 
of sowlehele (“soul-heal”) described the self to itself in everyday language—moderns 
might call this kind of writing “self-help.” Bringing together contemporary feminist and 
queer theory along with medieval psychological thought, Body Against Soul examines 
Piers Plowman, the “Katherine Group,” and the history of psychological allegory and 
debate. In so doing, it rewrites the history of the Body to include its recently neglected 
fellow, the Soul.
The topic of this book is one that runs through all of Western history and remains of 
primary interest to modern theorists—how “my” body relates to “me.”  In the alle- 
gorical tradition traced by this study, a male person could imagine himself as a being 
populated by female personifications, because Latin and Romance languages tended to 
gender abstract nouns as female. However, since Middle English had ceased to inflect 
abstract nouns as male or female, writers were free to gender abstractions like “Will” 
or “Reason” any way they liked. This permitted some psychological allegories to avoid 
the representational tension caused by placing a female soul inside a male body, instead 
creating surprisingly queer same-sex inner worlds. The didactic intent driving sowle-
hele is, it turns out, complicated by the erotics of the struggle to establish a hierarchy 
of the self ’s inner powers.
Masha Raskolnikov is associate professor in the Department of English at Cornell 
University.
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whose listening ears were invaluable as this book came together. An earlier 
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Soul:	 I	wish	I	could	afford	to	live	alone!
	 	 what	would	I	give	to	move	my	bed	around,
	 	 or	moon	about	in	music	till	eleven
	 	 with	none	to	care	if	I	was	off	the	ground?
	 	 It	would	be	heaven!
Body:		 I	wish	I	could	afford	to	live	alone!
	 	 what	would	a	little	privacy	be	worth!
	 	 A	place	with	a	garden.	o,	a	little	earth
	 	 to	call	my	own!
—“Debate	of	the	Body	and	the	Soul:	a.d.	1949”	
The contending forces that constitute a self have been named, vari-
ously, flesh and spirit; ego, id, and superego; appetites and rational 
will; body and soul. The connection between these forces is simul-
taneously quotidian and utterly mysterious. Often, the speaking “I” 
expresses its relation to the body as if it were a subject addressing a 
mysterious, unpredictable object. Although it’s easy to say that we 
live our entire lives within or as bodies, the body itself (organs, arter-
ies, strange liquids within) has no voice with which to express its 
materiality; its voice is produced by physical organs but expresses the 
thought of a nonmaterial being, variously called “soul,” “self,” or “sub-
ject” at different historical moments. That soul, the part that wields 
our voices, has depths that various kinds of soul-doctors, from psy-
chologists to poets, must plumb, but its relationship with the material 
world has always been in question.
 The works discussed in this book—medieval allegories that 
explore the relationship between the body and the soul—explore a 
kind of self whose very capacity for thought depends on placing these 
two hard-to-reconcile aspects of personhood into dialogue. In order 
to have such a dialogue, these works grant the Body a voice, while 
 1. Marcia Lee Anderson, What Time Is It? And Other Poems (Memphis, TN: 
Stafford Books, 1997), 30, lines 37–45. Further citations are parenthetical, with line 
numbers.
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granting the Soul embodiment. The resulting dialogue is anything but harmo-
nious: the self, as described in debates between the Body and the Soul, is often 
divided and self-critical to the point of beratement, as when the Soul lambastes 
the Body for indulging its appetites—a standard trope repeated in every poem 
in this tradition. Medieval Body/Soul debates ask questions about the origins 
of, location of, and preventive measures against sin, understood as the most 
significant disease from which a self could suffer. These works explore as well 
how the workings of power produce, prohibit, and delimit the possible mani-
festations of personhood.
 Continuation of the medieval tradition of debates between the Body and 
the Soul was scattered after the Middle Ages: Andrew Marvell, W. B. Yeats, and 
Anne Bradstreet wrote much shorter versions of the debate, for instance. But, 
but among these few postmedieval examples, Marcia Lee Anderson’s “Debate 
of the Body and the Soul: a.d. 1949” (this Introduction’s epigraph) might best 
capture the nature of this relationship. In the poem, Body and Soul seem to 
share a squalid tenement. The Soul annoys the Body by playing “celestial” 
music until all hours. The sounds of the Body’s “infernal plumbing” irritate 
the Soul and interrupt its attempts to meditate on spiritual matters. In the end, 
the Soul and the Body can agree only on moving out and finding their own 
homes apart from one another, homes described in terms that clearly show 
them to be, respectively, heaven and a grave. In other words, the nature of 
their conflict has so exhausted these two beings inhabiting the same space that 
this Body and this Soul can agree only on desiring death. The main difference 
between this modern poem and the medieval works it imitates lies precisely 
there. Anderson situates the two as living together, however unhappily: “Soul: 
I loathe this tenement. Such a façade / must have had a union architect. / It 
can’t have been God” (Anderson, lines 1–3), whereas medieval authors imag-
ined Soul and Body as possessing the capacity or desire to dialogue only after 
death has separated them.
 Medieval debates between the Body and the Soul do not really belong to 
any doctrine or school. Instead, they seem to rely on some notion of common 
sense to produce persuasive didactic approaches to the self. This book inquires 
into what passes for psychological common sense in these medieval works, 
and into the ways received ideas are systematized in them, for isn’t querying 
what it is that passes for common sense the very essence of contemporary cul-
tural studies? Such allegories as the Middle English and Latin debates between 
Body and Soul, the Katherine Group’s “Sawles Warde,” and Piers Plowman take 
on philosophically and theologically abstruse topics such as the relationship 
between the soul and the body as if a good dose of common sense could really 
explain everything about materiality, discipline, and sin. Debates between the 
body and the soul and allegories like them dramatize the workings of the self 
through personification allegory, creating dynamic narratives where rather 
static concepts had been. In such debates, the body is literally against the soul, 
meaning both that the two are pitted against one another and that they are 
figuratively placed side by side, as partners inexorably bound together, either 
by ties of love or shackles of obligation (and often, in these poems, both).
 Body/Soul debates stage the intertwined philosophical, theological, and 
psychological topics of human nature as a personal relationship, acting out the 
quotidian medieval struggle of mastering one’s appetites or organizing one’s 
sins for purposes of thorough confession. In their own contexts, such debates 
offer homely, commonsensical scenarios, all the better to render natural and 
inevitable the relationships of power and mutual contention within the self 
that they describe and, by describing, create. In these debates, allegory works 
as a privileged mode for thinking about power and hierarchy in the Middle 
Ages. For instance, in the thirteenth-century “Als I Lay in a Winteris Nyt,” 
the most popular of the Middle English Body/Soul debates, Soul and Body 
bicker over why they occasionally missed church when they were living and 
united.2 The Soul claims that it was trapped inside the Body and carried off 
to go hunting by its brute force. In its defense, the Body claims just the oppo-
site, that it could not manage the smallest sound or movement without the 
 2. The debates that are considered to constitute the medieval English Body/Soul debate 
canon consist of eleven disparate versions that appear in twenty-seven different manuscript 
renditions. The taxonomic imagination of Francis Lee Utley, whose chapter “Dialogues, De-
bates, and Catechisms,” in A. E. Hartung’s A Manual of the Writings in Middle English, Vol. 3 
(Hamden, CT: Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1972), 669–745, helped confine 
the dialogues discussed within the boundaries that have kept debate poems apart from other 
forms of literature, linking them with the sermon tradition to which they are certainly related, 
topically as well as thematically. Utley devotes an entire section to Body/Soul debate, and his 
organization of the dialogues in chronological order lends an air of genealogical science to the 
traditional approach that reified them as an ever-improving subgenre, which includes a total of 
thirteen dialogues (he includes both Old English and Middle English), all ascending toward “Als 
I Lay in a Winteris Nyt,” the poem I discuss in chapter 3. There are two Body/Soul debates in 
Anglo-Saxon—“Soul and Body I” from the Vercelli Book and “Soul and Body II” in the Exeter 
Book—along with some fragments from Worcester Cathedral. These, however, tend to be con-
sidered as part of the Anglo-Saxon canon and are not included in the few extant discussions of 
Middle English Body/Soul debates except as evidence of the topic’s ubiquity. The “Body/Soul” 
tradition usually identified in Middle English poetry includes the 23-line Early Middle English 
“The Grave”; an address by the Soul to the Body (with the Body lying mute) known by its first 
lines as “Nou is mon hol and soint”; the two poems considered in the following two chapters; 
and the fifteenth-century “A Disputation Between the Body and the Worms,” which, though not 
strictly a Body/Soul debate, seems to derive from that genre and is included, accordingly, in the 
Body/Soul debate section of John Conlee’s Middle English Debate Poetry: A Critical Anthology 
(East Lansing, MI: Colleagues Press, 1993). In addition, there are a few fifteenth-century works, 
including a Body/Soul debate in the Porkington Ms. and both a prose disputation and a debate 
between the Body and the Worms in BL Addit. 37049. It might be remarked that only the two 
poems considered in chapters 2 and 3 are properly “debates” between Soul and Body, since only 
in these two does the Body “talk back” to the Soul. 
Soul’s help. The persistent question is about who has the power within the 
self, and, secondarily, about the nature and ethics of the relationship between 
its aspects. There is no resolution to this disagreement, only the inevitability 
of punishment, since both the Body and the Soul of the dead knight described 
in “Als I Lay” had refused to confess and repent in life. The sheer literalness of 
Body/Soul debates reduces the dualistic thinking that structured Enlighten-
ment rationalism to the level of a sock-puppet farce, akin to a Punch and Judy 
show put on by a squabbling conjoined pair.
 In modern times, the dualistic tendency to divide the soul (later “mind”) 
from the body and to establish a hierarchy wherein the latter is deceptive 
and only the former has access to eternal truths has been called Cartesian. In 
studying medieval texts, one encounters a version of this dualism centuries 
before Descartes, but these categories are less rigid and self-evident, perhaps 
even playful. Of course, dualisms of different sorts existed in the Middle Ages: 
for instance, one form of it appeared in such revered texts as Romans 7:14–18, 
“I am of the flesh, sold into slavery under sin . . . nothing good dwells within 
me, that is, in my flesh . . . .”3 In any translation, the grammar of Paul’s sen-
tence implies that “I” am a being distinct from but implicated in “my” own 
body; in his Letter to the Galatians, Paul enjoins Christ’s followers to choose 
spirit over flesh, stating, “what the Spirit desires is opposed to the flesh; for 
those are opposed to each other, to prevent you from doing what you want” 
(Gal. 5:17–26). However important this dualism proved to be, another dual-
ism, Gnosticism, which viewed the material world to be evil, was considered 
a heresy and persecuted; a number of later medieval heresies shared in this 
antimaterialist bias. The authors of Body/Soul debates seem to have kept the 
multiple dualisms in mind, blaming some evils on bodily appetites but care-
fully avoiding an outright condemnation of all flesh.
 This dualist understanding of the self insists on the dueling nature of 
its components; thus, if medieval writers define the self as a soul yoked to 
a body, their interaction must be dramatized as conflict. As medieval think-
ers imagined—and in so doing worked to discipline the possibilities for—the 
“self,” allegory took up the function of organizing the conflicted relationship 
between bodies and souls. In other words, the allegories discussed in this book 
envision the self as divided into component parts and examine those parts and 
how they come together, at times characterizing their union as a kind of vio-
lence done to both. Despite the yoking of incongruous powers that it describes 
by positing the self through its parts, the psychological allegory of Body/Soul 
debate at times claims a retrospective vision of a whole being, an integrated 
 3. All citations from the New Testament are from the New Revised Standard Version Bible 
(NRSV) in the edition The New Testament and Other Early Christian Writings: A Reader, 2nd 
ed., ed. Bart D. Ehrman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
self that may never have existed before its component parts were examined in 
this way.
 In this book, I claim that at least some medieval allegories produce and 
express an immanent psychological theory, and that it is precisely the alle-
gorical mode that enables a kind of flexible theorizing of the self that formal 
treatises cannot offer. What critics call, and teachers teach as, the genre of 
medieval allegory is not really a genre consistently concerned with obscure 
meanings, despite the fact that most writing about allegory assumes its figu-
rative or hidden meaning is what matters.4 The influential Latin allegories 
of the Middle Ages give flesh to various ideas and ideals, turning them into 
personified speakers, and dramatizing their actions to demonstrate a moral 
meaning or a theory about the world: If a personified speaker “wins” (most 
literally, in the pitched battle of Prudentius’ Psychomachia, discussed in chap-
ter 1), the idea that he or she personifies wins as well. This aspect of allegory 
is quite correctly understood as a function of allegory-as-personification and 
characterized by a trope that might or might not constitute a subsection of 
allegory—prosopopeia, a concept discussed in chapter 3.5 As examples of this 
kind of medieval allegory, Body/Soul debates do not point to a hidden mean-
ing. The Body in the debate represents all bodies and an individual’s body at 
the same time, and also points toward sinners who may prioritize their bodily 
needs over the needs of the soul—honoring, in the author’s opinion, the wrong 
part of the self. In some of the Latin and Anglo-Norman allegorical debates 
discussed in this book, this moral message is dramatized through gender dif-
ference: If Soul and Body are male and female, it becomes clear which of the 
two is meant to be in the wrong. In others, primarily in the Middle English 
tradition that includes “Als I Lay,” the absence of gendered hierarchy itself 
becomes a marked issue, complicating any attempt to adjudicate between Soul 
and Body. The much better-known and more complex fourteenth-century 
work Piers Plowman brings these traditions together, making use of both ways 
to dramatize relationships between personifications over the course of its long 
narrative of self-seeking and soul-mending—what at least one scribe, in copy-
ing the Vernon manuscript, termed sowlehele.
 4. Allegory, defined as extended metaphor or as something that means something other 
than what it says, is at least as old as the Rhetorica ad Herennium. “Allegory is a manner of 
speech denoting one thing by the letter of the words, but another by their meaning” (“Permuta-
tio est oratio aliud verbis aliud sentential demonstrans”) in Loeb Classical Library, trans. Harry 
Caplan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954), 344–45. See Appendix I, “On the 
History of the Term ‘Allegory,’” and Appendix II, “On the History of the Term ‘Personification,’” 
in Jon Whitman’s Allegory: The Dynamics of An Ancient and Medieval Technique (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 269–72.
 5. For a study that focuses on precisely this aspect of allegory, reorganizing previous 
understandings of “allegory” as genre, see James J. Paxson, The Poetics of Personification (Cam-
bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
 Debates that literally pit body and soul against one another exist in a num-
ber of languages and are a useful index of regional and period differences in 
medieval allegorical writing, but they seem to have been particularly popular 
in England.6 Middle English Body/Soul debates appeared in many kinds of 
manuscript contexts, from the small miscellany apparently compiled by John 
Norwood circa 1400 for his own personal use, to the Vernon and Simeon man-
uscripts, vast works that described themselves as devoted to sowlehele.7 These 
debates were relatively short, and therefore comparatively simple, works, but 
they attempted to query, in a mostly systematic and certainly thoughtful man-
ner, how the divisions of the self functioned.8
 This book argues that allegorical personifications, particularly those of the 
soul and the body, participate in a narrative mode of doing psychology in the 
Middle Ages, anatomizing the self in a way that explicitly genders relationships 
between the self ’s different aspects. While this tradition can be traced back to 
the warring personified virtues and vices of Prudentius’ Psychomachia, some 
of its richest examples come from didactic Middle English writings of the thir-
teenth and fourteenth centuries. I call these psychological narratives sowlehele, 
a Middle English term used here to describe a medieval phenomenon, which 
is discussed in detail in the next section. Works of sowlehele construct a notion 
of the self by dramatizing the relationships between its personified parts. In 
this book, I trace how works of this kind written in Middle English, a language 
 6. Theodore Batiouchkoff claimed that versions of the Body/Soul debate survive in Old 
and Middle English, Latin, Greek, French, Provençal-Catalan, Italian, Czech, “White Russian,” 
Polish, Armenian, and Syriac, with prose exemplars in Latin, Old Norwegian, Old Icelandic, 
Old Castilian, and Hungarian, and that such debates probably originated in Egypt during the 
second millennium. See his “Le Débat de l’âme et du corps,” Romania 20 (1891): 1–55; 513–78. 
Thomas Wright, in his The Latin Poems Commonly Attributed to Walter Mapes (London: Cam-
den Society, 1841), lists Latin, Anglo-Norman, English, Greek, Provençal, French, German, 
“Netherlandish,” Spanish, Italian, and Danish versions in the notes to his edition of the “Dia-
logus inter Corpus et Animam,” which is discussed in chapters 1 and 3 under the title “Visio 
Philiberti.”
 7. The first was edited by Nita Scudder Baugh as A Worcestershire Miscellany, Compiled by 
John Northwood, c. 1400. Edited from British Museum Ms. Add. 37, 787 (Philadelphia, 1956); the 
latter is one of the most studied medieval manuscripts and weighs at least fifty pounds. Yet the 
two have no fewer than twenty of the same pieces (poems, etc.) in common, almost all of them 
in Middle English. This is particularly noteworthy since BL Additional 37787, the small hand-
book, contains only twenty pieces in English and shares fifteen of those with the Vernon. Some 
of the works contained in the Vernon were edited as The Minor Poems of the Vernon Manuscript 
(London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. for the Early English Text Society, 1892–1901), 37 
and passim.
 8. See the taxonomy by Francis Lee Utley, in “Dialogues, Debates, and Catechisms,” in 
Hartung, Manual of the Writings in Middle English. Having divided the category “Religious 
and Didactic Dialogues” into (I) Supernatural Figures and (II) Abstractions, he finds thirteen 
dialogues (he includes both Old English and Middle English) under the general rubric “Death” 
and the specific rubric “The Debate Between the Body and the Soul.”
that does not gender abstract nouns as male or female, were particularly free to 
experiment with allegorical gender in expressing tensions within the self, and 
therefore produced a unique kind of psychological thought.
 Why does gender turn out to be central to this discussion of the psycho-
logical personifications of the self ’s parts? Because it is important—perhaps 
surprisingly so—to the authors of these allegories, particularly when they were 
dramatizing hierarchies within the self.9 As an abstract concept, “the body” is 
neuter, but when it is personified, “Body” ceases to be an “it” and becomes 
a “he” or a “she.” Functioning as a person means being designated as one or 
the other.10 Much as in the interpellating moment when the doctor tells the 
newborn’s parents “it’s a girl,” when an abstraction begins to speak in a medi-
eval allegory it is immediately sexed, speaking as a female or as a male being.11 
The sort of narrative allegory that stages disagreements between abstractions 
is an excellent vehicle for enacting and reinforcing the realities of hierarchy, 
and assigning gender to allegorical persons becomes a virtue when it helps 
clarify relationships between concepts. But gendering abstract concepts female 
results in all kinds of problems within these allegories. From the authors’ 
medieval perspective, populating the innermost self of men as well as women 
with female beings was a problem; so, too, extending the metaphor of Body 
and Soul as a married couple meant straying into the vexed realm of marital 
sexuality. Sowlehele allegory thus comes to figure an anxiety about conceptual-
izing aspects of the self and placing them in relation to one another.
 In “Gender and Personification in Piers Plowman,” Helen Cooper 
describes the situation of medieval personification allegory: Countless medi-
eval allegories seem to have used female personifications to embody major 
 9. At the conclusion of Paxson’s Poetics of Personification, he goes over several answers to 
the simple question: Why are so many allegorical personifications gendered female? Without 
solving the mystery, he nevertheless brings his own study to a close by suggesting further in-
quiry into the matter: “Personification, understood according to such a feminist program of 
critical analysis, might perhaps turn out to be at the figural heart of cultural issues regarding 
representations of sexuality and gender” (174). Such statements as these underlie the necessity 
for the present study.
 10. While this could be substantiated by reference to the past few decades’ work on the 
cultural abjection of nonconforming persons, at least some literary critics see this in looking 
at medieval allegory: “the very process of personification, of making into a person, invites that 
person to be imagined in human and therefore gender-specific terms, to be given actions and 
attributes appropriate to a woman, or, as most often in Langland, a man.” Helen Cooper, “Gen-
der and Personification in Piers Plowman,” Yearbook of Langland Studies 5 (1991): 31–48, 34.
 11. Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Inves-
tigation),” in Lenin and Philosophy, trans. Ben Brewster (London: New Left Books, 1971). See 
also Judith Butler, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative (New York: Routledge, 1997), 
for discussions of how the theory of the speech act can be read with Althusserian interpellation: 
Being named as something can be being made to be something, and of course performative 
speech acts can be understood as exceeding the limits of verbal speech.
concepts because most abstract nouns in Latin and the Romance languages are 
gendered as feminine. When English lost the gender structure that had char-
acterized Anglo-Saxon, “for the first time in the history of Western culture, 
personification allegory was able to define the nature of the human form its 
concepts might take without grammatical constraint.”12 This study traces some 
of the effects of this freedom on the psychological work done by Middle Eng-
lish allegory, starting with the Latin- and Romance-language context, and pro-
ceeding through a number of thirteenth-century English allegories that made 
use of the lack of grammatical constraint Cooper describes, before returning 
to Cooper’s analysis of Piers Plowman and a reexamination of its relationship 
to gender and the nature of the self.
 Analyzing debates between the Body and the Soul and other allegories that 
participate in that tradition helps us define what was meant by “the soul” in the 
Middle Ages and understand it in relation (specifically, with “the body”) rather 
than in isolation. To account for the soul as a full participant in the body-soul 
pairing brings up the issue of the self ’s composite nature. Such an accounting 
frames a relationship between parts of the person rather than isolating and, 
at times, idealizing the body in its inscrutability, as if it were possible to posit 
pure materiality as an object of study. Instead, I look at the idea of the self at 
a particular time and place, focusing on a specific tradition that was popular 
in England during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, in order to query 
how the self was being gendered, divided, and dramatized, to what ends and 
with what implications. Examining the medieval version of body/soul dualism 
promises to put the soul back where it belongs, into “body studies.”13
 Middle English allegory theorizing relationships between souls and bodies 
participates in the construction of a discourse about the workings of the per-
son. I examine this range of discourses as a branch of medieval psychology that 
is a background neither to the modern self nor to contemporary disciplines of 
the self such as psychoanalysis and that does not fit comfortably within Latin 
philosophical and theological writings. Such an approach offers a return to the 
question of the self with a new twist, neither presenting a prehistory of that 
vague entity “the subject” nor describing the uncontested dominance of Latin 
clerical thought over all of medieval culture. Instead, it explores the varied and 
fertile literary and cultural development that I term sowlehele.
 12. Cooper, 33.
 13. What I call body studies was a wide-ranging field of study in the 1980s and 1990s: In 
medieval studies, it, and my work on the body, owes the greatest debt to the writings of Caroline 
Walker Bynum, particularly the essays collected in Fragmentation and Redemption: Essays on 
Gender and the Human Body in Medieval Religion (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Zone Books, 
1992), and the volume The Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity, 200–1336 (New 
York: Columbia University Press 1995).
In his index to the manuscript, one of the scribes who copied out the famous 
Vernon manuscript names this compilation “Salus Anime or Sowlehele.” This 
study takes up the Middle English part of this term to account for certain 
uniquely medieval ways of describing and acting on the self. Sowlehele is a 
mode of didactic writing that makes use of allegorical narrative to educate 
sinners about the nature of their own sinning selves. Works of sowlehele 
anatomize the self—dividing it, naming its parts, and placing those parts in 
dialogue with one another. This term was regularly used in the Middle Ages, 
although not always to describe the writings considered works of sowlehele.14 
Present-day critics often understand sowlehele in terms of a hybrid of medical 
and pastoral uses, as a sort of figurative medicine; for instance, in an arti-
cle about devotional poetry, Susanna Fein writes that “in reading this poem 
of ‘sowlehele,’ we swallow the medicine, and each time we reread the poem 
meditatively, discovering more of its embedded meaning, we increase the 
dosage and improve its effect.”15 The Vernon manuscript, which has the term 
sowlehele in its title, contains a range of works that have variously been under-
stood as a collection intended for a monastic community, for novices, and 
for religious women. It contains many short devotional works, saints’ lives, 
a number of debate poems, and several long works, including the “Northern 
 14. The Middle English Dictionary defines the word as meaning: “(a) Spiritual well-being; 
the health of the soul; the good of the soul; (b) healing of the soul, salvation; ben releved of ~, 
to be healed spiritually; (c) that which brings health to the soul; also, one who brings salvation; 
(d) pastoral care, cure of souls; (e) in oath and pious exclamation.” In the MED, the first use 
of the word, in its meaning of “spiritual well-being,” spelled “soule-hele or swolehele,” is in a 
homily that appears in Vespasian D. XIV, published as Early English Homilies from the Twelfth 
Century Ms. Vesp. D. XIV., ed. R. D-N. Warner, EETS 152. 1917 (New York: Kraus Reprint Co., 
1971). An alternate spelling receives its own entry: Soule-heil is defined as “(a) The good of the 
soul; (b) healing of the soul, salvation,” with its first use in a manuscript of an A-Text of Piers 
Plowman, “I haue walkid wel wide in wet & in dri3e and sou3t goode seintes for my soule hele.” 
Dublin, Trinity College 213 (D.4.12) 6:19. Obviously, the word bears a relation to the Latin “cura 
animarum,” but, like so many theological terms in vernacular translation, it takes on a life and 
a meaning of its own.
 15. Fein describes the reading process in this way: “This poetry was not merely to be read 
(as we might be prone to think of reading as a simple straight-once-through process), but rather 
consumed in a metaphysical sense, so that it might bring “sowlehele” to the devout, penitent 
user. One needs to picture the meditant man or woman retreating regularly to a private spot, 
reading a text through many times over an extended period, quite likely committing it to 
memory, and pausing over its words and verbalized images to make connections, find patterns, 
discover signs and meanings, participate with compassion in its depiction of holy suffering, 
and absorb its objectified shape, that is, what it becomes when perceived whole rather than as a 
series of discrete signifiers” (“Herbs, Birds, and Cryptic Words for English Devotional Readers,” 
Essays in Medieval Studies 15 [1998]: 35–44).
Homily Cycle,” and an A-text of Piers Plowman, all of which lend themselves 
to meditative reading for the soul’s benefit.16
 Using the term sowlehele has the benefit of allowing us to think in medi-
eval terms about psychology. After all, psychology claims to study the psyche, 
whereas sowlehele claims to heal the soul, a difference between studying an 
object and acting on it. The medieval term focuses on the performative aspect 
of works like the Body/Soul debates; works of sowlehele enact and produce the 
very thing they describe. All the works discussed in this study can be put in 
this category, whether they were written in Latin, French, or English, but the 
Englishness of the term privileges, as does this study, the Middle English tra-
dition. The implicit audience for works of sowlehele consists of laypeople and 
the clergy that minister to laypeople. This is not a type of writing confined to 
the university or the monastery, but neither is it a set of “folk” theories about 
the self. It is popular in that it is intended for the people, but not necessarily 
by or from them. Works of sowlehele cross the artificially constructed bound-
ary between the academic discipline of psychology and the cultural studies 
of quotidian understandings of the self. Moderns might recognize aspects of 
what we now call self-help in these works, although this study discusses works 
that might be called “literary” in a way that few modern self-help books aspire 
to be.
 The term sowlehele describes works that produce a performative, didactic, 
and pastoral discourse aimed at explaining the self to itself. The discourse is 
performative in that it enacts the very relations it describes; it is didactic in 
that its overt intention is a pedagogical one; and it is pastoral, particularly in 
its thirteenth- and fourteenth-century manifestation, in that this discourse is 
intimately implicated in the work of confession. These three characteristics of 
sowlehele are sometimes subverted by two factors. First, as manifested in medi-
eval personification allegory, sowlehele is a gendered discourse, one haunted 
by the possibilities of sexuality, whether it be manifested as courtly love, mar-
riage, or, surprisingly, depictions of same-sex bonds. Gender and sexuality are 
everywhere and nowhere in the poems discussed in this book. The gendering 
of personifications is essential for positing hierarchy and describing the love 
and hate of the self for itself, but it often proves problematic for the didactic 
project being enacted in these poems. Second, the dramatic narrative drive of 
these works also sometimes seems to subvert the didactic and pastoral pur-
poses. These poems are not sermons, after all. They enact an unfolding story, 
whose events may at any moment distract from the message or even overturn 
 16. For a detailed overview of the manuscript and its criticism, see J. Robert Duncan, “The 
Textual Context of the Vernon Manuscript” (PhD diss., University of Saskatchewan, 2000) and 
the collection of essays edited by Derek Pearsall as Studies in the Vernon Manuscript (Cam-
bridge, UK: D. S. Brewer), 1990.
it, as when a reader might sympathize with the Body’s arguments for its inno-
cence and not move forward into the ultimate condemnation the poem sug-
gests.
 Using the term sowlehele gestures toward the concerns this book has in 
common with the new approaches to lay devotion that have so enlivened 
medieval studies over the past decades, yet shows how it approaches a some-
what different object of study: the relationship of the self to itself in the Middle 
Ages.17 Works of sowlehele proliferated particularly in the wake of the decision 
to require annual confession of all practicing Christians. The Fourth Lateran 
Council of 1215 instituted a new requirement, generally known by its incipit 
as Omnis utriusque sexus. Each and every baptized Christian who hoped for 
heaven had to confess his or her sins at least once a year, a practice that had 
previously been reserved for the privileged few and for particularly spectacu-
lar sinners.18 Confession as a practice antedated this historical moment, but 
the decision in 1215 anchored confession in time (as part of the annual cycle 
of the church year) and diffused it across all ranks. Numerous new texts were 
needed to aid in the organization and thinking of confession, texts written for 
priests and for literate laypersons in a number of modes. Laymen and women, 
specifically, needed guidance for the very important process of preparation for 
 17. See Jim Rhodes, Poetry Does Theology: Chaucer, Grosseteste, and the Pearl-Poet (Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001), for a succinct summary of developments 
in the relationship lay populations and poets had to the significant theological debates of the 
fourteenth century, in the context of a study that never reduces poetry to a mere symptom of 
culture.
 18. “All the faithful of both sexes shall after they have reached the age of discretion faith-
fully confess all their sins at least once a year to their own (parish) priest and perform to the 
best of their ability the penance imposed, receiving reverently at least at Easter the sacrament 
of the Eucharist, unless perchance at the advice of their own priest they may for a good reason 
abstain for a time from its reception; otherwise they shall be cut off from the Church (excom-
municated) during life and deprived of Christian burial in death. Wherefore, let this salutary 
decree be published frequently in the churches, that no one may find in the plea of ignorance 
a shadow of excuse. But if anyone for a good reason should wish to confess his sins to another 
priest, let him first seek and obtain permission from his own (parish) priest, since otherwise he 
(the other priest) cannot loose or bind him. Let the priest be discreet and cautious that he may 
pour wine and oil into the wounds of the one injured after the manner of a skilful physician, 
carefully inquiring into the circumstances of the sinner and the sin, from the nature of which 
he may understand what kind of advice to give and what remedy to apply, making use of differ-
ent experiments to heal the sick one. But let him exercise the greatest precaution that he does 
not in any degree by word, sign, or any other manner make known the sinner, but should he 
need more prudent counsel, let him seek it cautiously without any mention of the person. He 
who dares to reveal a sin confided to him in the tribunal of penance, we decree that he be not 
only deposed from the sacerdotal office but also relegated to a monastery of strict observance 
to do penance for the remainder of his life” (H. Schroeder, Disciplinary Decrees of the General 
Councils: Text, Translation and Commentary [St. Louis: B. Herder, 1937], 236–96; also in The 
Medieval Sourcebook: Twelfth Ecumenical Council: Lateran IV 1215. (http://www.fordham.edu/
halsall/basis/lateran4.html).
confession: the organization of a coherent narrative about a life characterized 
by sin. Such texts included popular manuals and guides to sin and the self; 
they also included works of literature concerned with the nature of the self and 
how it became entangled in the web of sin in the first place. These provided 
an alternative psychological discourse to layfolk as well as to those priests who 
labored far from the dizzying heights of medieval theology.
 Everyday people needed tools and models to help frame their own con-
fessions and to help them think narratively about their own selves. Works of 
sowlehele were distinct in their practical transformation of academic philo-
sophical, theological, and medical theories into narratives, in their emphasis 
on applicability, and, because they relied on personification allegory to under-
stand the self, their dynamic use of character to advance plot. Jerry Root has 
argued that “confessional practice made widely available a technical language 
and an institutional apparatus dedicated to individual salvation. Together the 
technical language of confession and its institutional backdrop constituted a 
new cultural construction of the self.”19 My contribution concentrates on the 
specifics of this process as they are expressed in a particular poetic mode, that 
of allegories that stage debates between aspects of the self—a mode suited to 
discussing the embodied self and also to using the rhetorical and philosophi-
cal resources that are becoming available in Middle English.
 As this book will argue, some specific aspects of English grammar—par-
ticularly its gender neutrality—make a real difference to the kind of allegorical 
disputation being written in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Some 
English authors took advantage of the freedom afforded by not having most 
abstract nouns already gendered female, as they are in Latin and in most Euro-
pean vernaculars, to transform the tradition of populating the self with female 
allegorical figures. This made English-language allegories about the self dis-
tinctive and interesting, but that specificity does not render the kind of psy-
chology being discussed in this book an exclusively English psychology. Just 
as in many medieval manuscripts Latin-language, French, Anglo-French, and 
Middle English texts were not rigidly segregated, there is no clear and distinct 
line one can draw to claim that only texts not written in Latin are capable of 
doing a certain sort of work.
 What this book describes is a new twist on something that literary critics 
since (at least) Charles Muscatine’s 1953 essay “The Emergence of Psycho-
logical Allegory in Old French Romance” have termed psychological allegory.20 
Muscatine’s article makes its claim about the psychological allegory of the 
 19. Jerry Root, “Space to Speke”: The Confessional Subject in Medieval Literature (New York: 
Peter Lang Publishing, 1997), 1.
 20. See Charles Muscatine, “The Emergence of Psychological Allegory in Old French Ro-
mance,” PMLA 68 (Dec. 1953): 1160–82.
Roman de la Rose. Closer to the Middle English corpus discussed in most of 
this study, Robert Ackerman’s 1962 examination of “Als I Lay,” the most popu-
lar Body/Soul debate, makes repeated use of the term psychological realism, 
which may derive from Muscatine’s examination of psychology in allegory. 
More recently, Elizabeth Robertson’s 1990 study of the Katherine Group also 
relies on the concept of psychological realism, specifically defined by Robert-
son as a quality of “texts [that] detail the circumstances of the everyday life of 
a specific audience, anchoresses, in order to explore the psychological con-
flicts inherent in that life.”21 There are others, of course, but these critics use 
such terms about works that will be discussed in subsequent chapters of this 
book. Like the literal dualism personified in the Body/Soul debates it exam-
ines, my study literalizes a conventional claim: that some medieval allegories 
are psychologically realistic. By literalizing it, I permit it to become the object 
of detailed examination. Body/Soul debates make literal the combination of 
contentiousness and connection implied by the conventions of how body/soul 
dualism is usually discussed, by staging a debate between the two. Consider-
ing these debates as works of sowlehele does not force them to exemplify a 
systematic philosophical or psychological approach, but permits them to func-
tion, perfomatively, as a significant way to theorize the self—an alternative to 
Aristotle, Galen, and theological debates and treatises about the soul.
 In taking the psychology of allegory seriously, my study is vastly indebted 
to scholars such as Muscatine, Ackerman, Angus Fletcher, C. S. Lewis, and 
Michel Zink, as well as to Robertson and many others. At the same time, 
it attempts to refocus the “allegory as psychology” question on the specifics 
of confessional culture’s approach to body, soul, and will. Additionally, this 
study strives to avoid treating the kind of psychology done by the allegories 
under discussion as realistic representations of how medieval persons actually 
thought, focusing instead on the ways in which psychological allegory pre-
scribes and performs norms rather than describes persons.
 A tension between contending forces such as soul against body is some-
thing that allegorical disputation captures particularly well. Such tension is 
also a central feature of almost any psychology, from Aristotelian faculties to 
Freudian ego, id, and superego.22 Angus Fletcher’s introduction to his influ-
 21. Elizabeth Robertson, Early English Devotional Prose and the Female Audience (Knox-
ville: University of Tennessee Press, 1990), 3 and passim. See also Robert Ackerman, “The 
Debate of the Body and the Soul and Parochial Christianity,” Speculum 37 (1962): 541–56.
 22. Barbara Newman, as part of a discussion of “allegorical goddesses” that is crucial to 
this book’s first chapter, writes that “it is a rare psychological theory that can dispense with per-
sonification figures. Psychologists of the most diverse schools, from Prudentius onward, have 
attempted to clarify inner conflicts by representing them as struggles for dominance among 
competing forces within the psyche.” Newman, God and the Goddesses (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 43.
ential study Allegory: The Theory of a Symbolic Mode—in which he imagines 
allegorical personifications as something akin to obsessive-compulsives com-
pelled to enact certain traits—claims that “we live in an age of psychological 
and psychoanalytic speculation, and we need to return periodically to earlier 
stages of that speculation, where perhaps we can find the starting point for 
both our more profitable and our more dubious explorings.”23 This project 
takes up Fletcher’s challenge and extends it to a consideration of the psychol-
ogy of gender in the allegorical representation of soul/body dualism.24 With-
out making strong claims about how medieval persons actually lived their lives 
and thought about their selves, I attempt to trace how they were instructed to 
think about themselves, asking after the psychological norms and categories 
available to those ultimately unknowable medieval persons.
 The representations of the self available to medieval thinkers were largely 
based on models developed in ancient Greece and, as such, could not account 
for some of the problems posed by medieval Christianity. The other major 
source for psychological thinking was, of course, the Bible. The Pauline let-
ters in particular had a vast and complex influence (of course, these were also 
inflected by Paul’s wide education in Platonic and neo-Platonic thought), but 
were never crystal clear about the nature of the self, generally using personal 
relations as metaphor for relationships between self and God or Christ and 
Church. Among the influential pagan psychologies, the most important is 
Aristotelian faculty psychology. This psychology names aspects of the self in 
terms of their activities: the term faculty is based on the Latin facere, “to do.” 
Although the aspects of the self that are described vary with different com-
mentators and with later medieval revisions, what the different faculties gener-
ally “do” is cause the body to remain alive (the “vegetative” faculty), to desire 
and to do good (the “appetitive” faculty), to perceive external stimuli (the 
faculty of sense perception), or to move the body (the “locomotive” faculty). 
This division of the parts of the self into forces capable of action undergirds 
much of how we comprehend medieval psychology.
 23. Angus Fletcher, Allegory: The Theory of a Symbolic Mode (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1964), 13–14.
 24. Psychoanalytic theory examines depictions of the mind, not that religious remnant, 
“the soul,” even if the Greek word psyche remains the discipline’s name. It’s possible to read the 
Body/Soul debate as a straightforward precursor to Freud. The expression of hysterical symp-
toms like psychosomatic illness could be understood as the scientific equivalents of the Body’s 
speech in the debates, and the Soul’s tutelary position could be understood as somehow similar 
to the complex, transferentially implicated position of the therapist vis-à-vis the patient. In-
stead, I argue that similarly schematic, similarly therapeutic, but actually quite different systems 
existed in the Middle Ages for organizing and helping the soul, the body, the self in the journey 
through life. This book asks after those systems, to the extent possible from the contemporary 
vantage point, in their own terms rather than in ours, a project already underway when Angus 
Fletcher posited the similarity between allegory and psychoanalysis in 1964.
 Aristotle wrote about the relationship of the body and the soul in com-
plex and contradictory ways. In The Politics, he famously wrote that women 
should be ruled by men: “it is clear that the rule of the soul over the body, 
and of the mind and the rational element over the passionate, is natural and 
expedient . . . again, the male is by nature superior, and the female inferior; 
this principle, of necessity, extends to all mankind . . . the one rules, and the 
other is ruled. . . . The courage of a man is shown in commanding, of a woman 
in obeying.”25 However, his most important work on body and soul, the De 
Anima (a work on which many medieval philosophers wrote commentaries, 
and quoted in their own arguments about the soul) made a complex claim: 
“that, therefore, the soul or certain parts of it, if it is divisible, cannot be sepa-
rated from the body is quite clear. . . . Not that anything prevents at any rate 
some parts from being separable. . . . [I]t is not clear whether the soul is the 
actuality of the body in the way that the sailor is of the ship.”26 In other words, 
according to Aristotle, body and soul are not separable—except when they 
are. We might want to look at the results of these words, since the statements 
themselves are so confusing. Aristotelian theory, as understood in the Middle 
Ages, certainly seemed to see the body as a valid source of knowledge, but 
perhaps one that could be separated at some moments from the soul—an idea 
supported by Paul’s statements about the flesh, in the aforementioned passages 
in his letters to the Romans, Galatians, and Ephesians.
 Perhaps it was precisely the lack of clarity in Aristotle’s statement, and even 
in his sailor/ship analogy (which appears in the twelfth-century Latin Body/
Soul debate discussed in chapter 1, the “Visio Philiberti,” and is also discussed 
in chapter 2 as part of a more extensive engagement with medieval philoso-
phy), that made Body/Soul debate poems so important in the Middle Ages. 
After all, faculty psychology as imagined by Aristotle and reimagined by his 
medieval followers subdivides the soul or mind into faculties—even including 
some that pertain to bodily appetites—but never explains which part of the 
self is immortal. As a consequence, Aristotelian psychology fails to address 
the most urgent questions that Christians might want to pose in confession, 
questions that medieval persons, especially laypeople, might need answers to 
in order to construct a workable psychology: an understanding of the self that 
would be in line with the rest of Christian doctrine.
 A second major theory at work in the Middle Ages was the medical model 
of the self, derived from Galen and his many academic followers or would-be 
followers. This is a largely physical model, with roots in the Stoic philosophical 
 25. Aristotle, The Politics, trans. Stephen Iverson (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), 7, 16. 
 26. Aristotle, Aristotle’s De Anima Books II, III, trans. D. W. Hamlyn (Oxford, UK: Claren-
don Press, 1968), at 413A3.
writings that claimed the soul was an imperceptible substance extant in every 
member of the body—that the soul was, in fact, a “mixing” of the body’s 
humors.27 Humoral theory is an ancient Greek medical view that described 
the body as a balance of four substances (blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and black 
bile). When these substances were out of balance, the body was ill. Medieval 
and early Renaissance medicine explained many problems and described the 
human personality in terms of the humors (melancholy was caused by an 
excess of black bile, and so on), although it is unclear how these bodily fluids 
could combine to form, or even strongly influence, the putatively immortal 
soul, sent from Heaven and only briefly inhabiting the body.
 Humoral theory’s skepticism about the metaphysical, though useful in 
some aspects of medieval medicine, did not respond to the fundamentally 
theological questions posed by seeing “the flesh” as one of the three great 
temptations, along with “the world” and “the devil.” In other words, it is also 
too Greek for medieval Christianity. Some commentators found that it vio-
lated Aristotle’s logic as well; because two (material) bodies could not occupy 
the same space at the same time, a material soul filling up a material body, 
though elegant and relatively practical, was an unsound proposition.28 In a 
system fundamentally concerned with the search for salvation and the attempt 
to overcome sin, neither Aristotle nor Galen could offer a full account of the 
self ’s complex workings that would be satisfactory at the level of priest and 
parishioner. Sowlehele could not be accomplished by balancing the body’s 
humors, but only by working on the memory in confession and the soul’s 
control over the body in the renunciation of sin. Although these Greek think-
ers were mediated for Christian culture by Cicero and then Augustine—and 
thence into the enormous trail of adaptations of his writings for all manner 
of purposes in Christian culture—they were still not suitable at the level of 
the everyday examination of one’s own motives and actions necessary for the 
smooth functioning of a confessional culture.
 A third major tradition of medieval psychology relates directly to the Aris-
totelian model, but with a Christian twist. This is Augustinian Trinitarianism, 
 27. See, for instance, “The Soul’s Dependence on the Body,” in Galen, Selected Works, ed. 
and trans. P. N. Singer (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
 28. This account is largely derived from E. Ruth Harvey’s The Inward Wits: Psychological 
Theory in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance (London: The Warburg Institute, 1975). Accord-
ing to Harvey, the history of medical descriptions of the soul (from the Stoics to Galen and on to 
Renaissance physicians) imagined it as a material element, composed of water or fire or blood. 
“However indispensable for the doctor, the material spirit was less satisfactory to the philoso-
pher as a solution to the problem of the soul. It was argued that the soul must be in every part 
of the body imparting movement, life, and sensation to it; a material soul would then have to 
occupy exactly the same space as the body, which is impossible, for two bodies cannot occupy 
the same space at the same time” (31). Instead of a Stoic view of the soul, medieval theologians 
tended to adopt a post-Platonic one, which is strongly dualistic—the soul uses the body as a sort 
of “mortal dress” (32).
which divides the unified Trinity of God into memory, will, and understand-
ing, and finds in the human mind a microcosm of this same unified trinity of 
capabilities. In works such as On the Trinity, Augustine produces a psychology 
out of his neo-Platonic theology, showing how, in order to reach God, the soul 
must learn about itself, for it is made in God’s image. In some of his other writ-
ings, Augustine stages a highly personal accounting by the self of the circum-
stances and forces that have driven it to sin and, out of sin, toward redemption. 
Like sowlehele psychology, Augustinian Trinitarianism is a performative dis-
course that is at least sometimes (as in his Confessions and Soliloquies) pro-
duced in the form of a narrative. In essence, works of sowlehele democratize 
for general use that which Augustine performs as part of an exclusive, per-
sonal, and privileged relationship with God. This difference, however, is one 
that matters: The personal accounting of the Confessions proves unique in the 
history of medieval psychology, and not one that can be generalized to other 
writers. Trinitarianism proves too esoteric to be applicable to the pattern of sin 
and redemption in writings of pastoral care and lay instruction such as those 
that proliferated after the Fourth Lateran Council.29
 Augustine and the long tradition following him adapted his teachings 
on Trinitarian faculty psychology to practical instances, but the closer to the 
needs of vernacular culture such traditions came, the less they retained their 
specific connections between human beings and the pattern of the divine Trin-
ity.30 The confessional tradition assumes that proper teaching precedes proper 
actions, and tends to proceed directly toward the particular and distinctive 
species of sins requiring understanding. That tradition, however, rarely sug-
gests as directly as Augustine does that the individual penitent—especially the 
individual lay penitent—carries a model of the divine with her every thought, 
memory, and will.
 29. See, for contrast, two works written before Lateran IV, Guibert of Nogent’s Monodiae, 
a very odd imitation of Augustine that culminates in the history of the writer’s abbey, and 
Abelard’s Historia Calamitatum, which, for all its charm, delves none too deeply into the sources 
of sin.
 30. Andrew Galloway, in his article “Intellectual Pregnancy, Metaphysical Femininity, and 
the Social Doctrine of the Trinity in Piers Plowman,” The Yearbook of Langland Studies 12 
(1998): 117–52, makes a similar point; see 125. He also offers three “complexly overlapping 
spheres or cultural horizons of reception and dissemination of Augustine’s Trinitarian ideas” 
(128), including that of academic commentators, Latin sermons on Trinity Sunday, and Middle 
English or Anglo-Norman homiletic materials and sermons. Particularly the third (but also the 
second) of these would have contributed to the body of texts that might be organized under the 
rubric of “sowlehele.” Interestingly, Galloway notes that the vernacular texts “usually treat the 
Trinity more cautiously and briefly, and (unsurprisingly) do not reproduce Augustine’s most 
subtle psychological analogies” (131); indeed, Piers Plowman avoids making use of Trinitarian-
ism for psychological purposes, because its author is more interested in examining “immediate 
social experience as well as social endeavor” (134). I cite this in support of my argument that, 
although Trinitarian psychology was clearly important in the Middle Ages, it did not necessarily 
reach the lay and the less-educated clerical audiences.
 Each of these models—the Aristotelian, the Galenic, and the Augus-
tinian—can account for the workings of the mind and certainly contain a 
place for emotion, or, to use the psychological term that distinguishes it from 
thought or action, affect. However, each of these models is very technical and 
complex, and the very proliferation of medieval works that did not make use 
of them may prove that they were ultimately more useful for theologians writ-
ing in Latin than for priests seeking to understand the souls of those they con-
fessed. Partly in the course of transmitting such traditions to pastoral uses, and 
without always presenting rigid lines for its emergence, the Middle Ages could 
and did produce an alternative in works of sowlehele. Such works, rather than 
viewing all affect under the general rubric of the appetites, deal with the divi-
sions within the self through a dramatic encounter between them. Works of 
sowlehele form an alternative, confession-oriented psychological mode to the 
more formal, Aristotelian-or-Augustinian mode, primarily written in Latin.
 What makes the texts discussed in this book works of sowlehele, then, is 
that they served as part of the communication between priest and layperson—
as part of a layperson’s individual and private devotion, or a priest’s search for 
models that might help communicate to parishioners—rather than as a dis-
course among members of the clerical class.31 Body/Soul debates were being 
written for centuries before Lateran IV, but their popularity soared in the 
thirteenth century. My premise is that in the aftermath of Lateran IV, medi-
eval Christians were faced with the formidable organizational task of making 
coherent narratives out of their lives.
 This task was not immediately clear to all; it was almost fifty years later 
that the real proliferation of manuals intended to be helpful in the creation of 
these narratives began, and then there was no stopping them. The requirement 
to confess was a requirement on the memory, which—as Mary Carruthers’s 
and Frances Yates’s magisterial studies demonstrated some time ago—often 
relies on the vividness of imagery for its functioning.32 The self and its sins had 
to be reified and organized into memorable categories. The categories prolifer-
ating out of the tradition of the French Somme des Vices et des Vertus (ca. 1279) 
by the Dominican friar Lorens d’Orléans, such as the Middle English Ayenbite 
of Inwit (ca. 1340) and the Book of Vices and Virtues (ca. 1375), may, at first, 
 31. Any list of such texts would have to include the Pricke of Conscience, Handlyng Synne, 
and the Ayenbite of Inwit, popular handbooks of sin that include stories as well as categories and 
subcategories of sinning; it would also have to include more explicitly literary works that stage 
the new interest in and understanding of the self, such as the debates between the Body and the 
Soul, the writings of the Katherine Group, and Piers Plowman.
 32. See Frances A. Yates, The Art of Memory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 
and Mary Carruthers, The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture (Cam-
bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
seem Borgesian in their complexity.33 Medieval authors concerned with con-
fession produced multiple, intersecting psychological systems. These systems 
were at once descriptive and normative. They described how a particular sin 
might be functioning in human life and, at the same time, served a delimiting, 
normative function organizing the range of sins considered possible, leaving 
some sins radically outside and beyond the pale.34
 In treating the psychological theories posited in these medieval works as 
deserving of study in their own right, this book aims to find an alternative 
to the fascinating but necessarily limited rubric of faculty psychology, which 
has long been used to explain virtually all medieval psychological thought. 
Faculty psychology and, to a degree, humoral theory were certainly impor-
tant discourses for the Middle Ages, but they were not the only discourses, 
and they do not really explain the underlying thought that structures popular 
works like debates between the Body and the Soul. This book is not a psy-
choanalytic study of medieval psychology, although several of the models I 
discuss invite comparisons with Freud’s more topographical models, such as 
the ego/id/superego. Neither does this study argue that the medieval works I 
discuss influenced later psychological models. Rather than viewing Body/Soul 
debates in the place of ancestors in some genealogical schema that delineates 
the history of psychology, I am ultimately concerned with literary analysis, 
specifically with analyzing the ways in which the dynamic narrative drive and 
characterizations in staged encounters between aspects of the self bring new 
dimensions to the work of sowlehele, and examining medieval popular culture, 
with its blend of piety and playfulness.
 Despite the attention I pay to the historical context of medieval Christianity 
and to the contribution that reading medieval allegories as works of sowlehele 
makes to its history, these allegories are works of literature, not just historical 
 33. See Dan Michel, The Ayenbite of Inwit or Remorse of Conscience, ed. R. Morris, EETS 
Original Series 23 (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, and Trubner, 1866), and The Book of Vices 
and Virtues, ed. W. Nelson Francis, EETS Original Series 217 (Oxford and London: Oxford 
University Press, 1942). A genealogy of vernacular treatises on the vices and virtues is to be 
found in W. A. Pantin, The English Church in the Fourteenth Century (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1955), in a chapter titled “Manuals of Instructions for Parish Priests.” See also 
Leonard Boyle, “The Fourth Lateran Council and Manuals of Popular Theology,” in The Popu-
lar Literature of Medieval England, ed. Thomas Heffernan (Knoxville: University of Tennessee 
Press, 1985), 30–43, and Richard Raymo, “Works of Religious and Philosophical Instruction,” in 
Albert Hartung, gen. ed., A Manual of the Writings in Middle English, 1050–1500 (New Haven: 
The Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1986).
 34. The obvious example here is the much-discussed prohibition on discussing even the 
possibility of homosexual desire/practice with parishioners in texts such as John Mirk’s Instruc-
tions for Parish Priests, ed. Edward Peacock. EETS (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, and Trubner, 
1868), but it is difficult to say what other life possibilities were foreclosed by remaining point-
edly unnamed.
documents. Their narrative arcs—meaning that the relationships they depict 
take place over a period of time (however brief) and have an opportunity to 
develop—prevent these works from functioning as static didactic phenomena. 
Works of sowlehele are not just a simplification of faculty psychology, in part 
because my term describes a process of self-making and self-healing as much 
as a category of medieval writings. Sowlehele is allegorical writing about the 
self that lends itself to literary interpretation rather than a psychological, phil-
osophical, and/or theological one because its analysis of the self necessarily 
relies on figural language, narrative temporality, and conventionally gendered 
language for discussing embodiment.
what Gender does to alleGory, 
and alleGory to Gender
Examining the relationship between the body and the soul necessitates an 
awareness of the kind of metaphors that structured their relationship as a 
conflict.35 Allegories portraying the self ’s internal hierarchies often used the 
rule of men over women to depict the relationship of soul and body. This 
is an Aristotelian homology, but it is also a conceit reiterated by Augustine, 
Jerome, and many others: Jerome wrote, famously, that “as long as a woman 
is for birth and children, she is different from man as body is from soul.”36 To 
understand spirit as male and flesh as female is already to enter the realm of 
allegory—after all, this move demands that one perceive material signifiers as 
pointing to a meaning beyond themselves.
 But who’s signifying whom? In statements such as Jerome’s, “woman” 
seems to be functioning as a metaphor for bodiliness, and “body” seems to 
 35. For examples of some of the broad uses to which the metaphor of the body in the early 
modern period could be put, see Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan, ed. C. B. MacPherson (London: 
Penguin Books, 1982); Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Po-
litical Theology (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957); and the collection The Body 
in Parts: Fantasies of Corporeality in Early Modern Europe, ed. David Hillman and Carla Mazzio 
(New York: Routledge, 1997).
 36. The full quotation is a little more forgiving, but it is the first section that gets cited again 
and again: “as long as a woman is for birth and children, she is different from man as body is 
from soul. But when she wishes to serve Christ more than the world, then she will cease to be a 
woman, and will be called man.” St. Jerome, Commentarius in Epistolam ad Ephesius III 5, in PL 
26: 567a, cited in Vern Bullough, Sexual Variance in Society and History (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press: 1976), 365. See also Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals, Loeb Classical 
Library, trans. A. L. Peck (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953), 18. In Corinthians 
11.3, St. Paul wrote that “Christ is the head of every man, and the husband is the head of his 
wife.” See also Ephesians 5.22: “the husband is the head of the wife just as Christ is the head of 
the church, the body of which he is the Savior.”
have become the thing being signified, the thing that femininity attempts to 
explain. Caroline Walker Bynum writes that “male and female were contrasted 
and asymmetrically valued as intellect/body, active/passive, rational/irrational, 
reason/emotion, self-control/lust, judgment/mercy and order/disorder. In the 
devotional writing of the later Middle Ages, they were even contrasted in the 
image of God—Father or Bridegroom—and soul (anima)—child or bride.”37 
This mode of paired thinking is so ancient that it is virtually impossible to 
pinpoint its origins.
 The medieval homology stating that body is to soul as woman is to man, 
and the demand for some conventional source for the eternal but loving con-
flict between both pairs, led medieval thinkers to an analogy: Not only are 
Soul and Body just like a man and a woman, they are also a husband and a 
wife. Such an analogy both posits a split (the Body loves its other) and mends 
that fissure in the same gesture. These things are united, albeit in a very medi-
eval way, through and because of a hierarchal relationship. The homology 
also understands the necessity to discipline the speaking Body through the 
necessity of disciplining the chatty woman, and, perhaps, vice versa. The most 
famous of the analogies of body to wife is that of St. Paul in his Letter to 
the Ephesians (5:28–30): “Husband should love their wives as they do their 
own bodies. He who loves his wife loves himself. For no one ever hates his 
own body, but he nourishes and tenderly cares for it, just as Christ does for 
the church because we are members of his body.” These words proved very 
influential. In City of God, Augustine argues that, since Adam and Eve were 
originally created to live together in a harmonious order of authority and obe-
dience, a husband was therefore “meant to rule over his wife as the spirit rules 
the flesh.”38 It is not a great leap from this sort of analogy to allegories that 
stage the domestic squabbles between Body and Soul as the relationship of a 
 37. Bynum, Fragmentation and Redemption, 151. However, she then goes on to trace the 
great increase in “positive female figures” between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries, which she 
attributes to the desire, by male writers of devotional texts, to humble themselves, becoming 
subservient to Christ by becoming female: “the male writer who saw his soul as a bride of God 
or his religious role as womanly submission and humility was conscious of using an image of 
reversal. He sought reversal because reversal and renunciation were at the heart of a religion 
whose dominant symbol is the cross—life achieved through death” (171).
 38. Augustine, City of God, trans. Henry Bettenson (London: Penguin Books, 1972), XV, 
7. In Latin, “ubi intellegendum est uirum ad regendam uxorem animo carnem regenti similem 
esse oportere” (De civitate Dei, ed. B. Dombart and A. Kalb, 2 vols. Stuttgart: Teubner, 1981; 
1993). Interpreting 1 John 2.15, Augustine understands “taking a wife” as an excessive attach-
ment to the flesh. In his Sermons on Selected Lessons of the New Testament, Augustine describes 
the conflict of body and flesh as “just as if a husband and wife have a dispute with one another 
in one house; the husband ought to labor to this end, to tame the wife,” translated in A Library of 
Fathers of the Holy Catholic Church (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1845), 2:719. All of these 
are cited in John A. Alford, “The Role of the Quotations in Piers Plowman,” Speculum 52 (1977) 
80–99; see fns. 30 and 31.
married couple, and it is not surprising that allegory, a mode that gives voice 
and flesh to abstractions, can be used to capture the complicated interactions 
between such a pair.
 Although Christianity has a reputation for body/soul dualism and for 
denigrating the body, which feminist critics often take up in deploring dual-
ism, in fact the promise of bodily resurrection and faith in Christ’s incarna-
tion meant that the body was more respectable in Christianity than in other 
Mediterranean religions.39 Philosophies declared heretical—like those of the 
Cathars, Gnostics, Docetists, Eutycians, and, earlier, the Manicheans (among 
others)—had argued that Christ was never enfleshed, but the Church Fathers 
asserted the human bodiliness of Christ, even as they decried venial sin, the 
sin of the flesh. The Council of Chalcedon, held in 451, declared that Christ 
was both fully human and fully divine.
 Despite a high-level theology that knew better, the relationship that was 
used to explain the workings of the self in early works of sowlehele remained 
hierarchical dualism: good soul, uncomprehendingly trapped for a time in bad 
body. More often than not, the model of the body as debased also understood 
the body as feminine. Sometimes, however, perhaps because of the tendency 
of Latin allegory to present abstractions as “allegorical goddesses,” it was the 
Soul that was female, lifted to the status of unattainable courtly lady vis-à-vis 
the Body as her rough and unworthy courtier. However, and this is a crucial 
point for understanding the poetry discussed in this book, designating the 
Body as purely “bad” remained theologically problematic. Avoiding the vari-
ous antiembodiment heresies necessitated that depictions of the relationship 
between souls and bodies included at least a gesture toward love and coop-
eration between the two, or something other than all-out war within the self, 
although the inferiority of the body and flesh were largely beyond questioning. 
In some early poems (like the Old English homilies), working through the 
tensions between making sure that the Body was lower on the hierarchy and 
yet maintaining that Body and Soul love one another was not a priority, but in 
the works of later medieval sowlehele discussed in this book, these issues seem 
to have fired the imaginations of the poems’ various authors, and became the 
basis for the kinds of elaborations and rewritings of a basic “Soul versus Body” 
model that took place.
 To gender the soul female implicates Body/Soul debates in the tendency to 
produce idealized female figures as interlocutors for male philosophers. Such 
female figures get to transcend their gender rather than be debased by it. For 
later authors such as Jean de Meun, the gender of the female personifications 
 39. See St. Augustine, City of God XIV: 3, 550–51, for a discussion under the heading “the 
cause of sin arises in the soul, not in the flesh.” See also Brown, Body and Society, and Caroline 
Bynum, The Resurrection of the Body.
of such abstract concepts as Reason permits some ironic play with the limits 
of their characters’ female authority. Surprisingly, the strong heteronormative 
and sexist bias in the metaphors that figure the relationship of body and soul 
comes to be troubled and undone in the course of the centuries, specifically in 
the English language.
 One of the reasons for this surprising turn is specific to the English lan-
guage: the freedom from grammatical constraint referred to in Helen Cooper’s 
article, mentioned earlier. In Latin writings, the selection of an allegory’s sex 
or gender may seem arbitrary in the way that grammar is arbitrary—a given 
noun is, after all, feminine, masculine, or neuter in Latin. Our authors inevi-
tably know this, and abstractions tend to be grammatically female, so they 
may as well be described as towering female figures. English, however, does 
not arbitrarily assign the male or the female gender to inanimate nouns like 
“chair” or to abstractions like “philosophy.” Chairs or churches are neuter, and 
only become male or female when they begin to function as persons, to speak; 
thus, no grammatical necessity dictates that the English church be represented 
as female, since the noun had not implied this representation.
 Curiously, Anglo-Saxon possessed a full set of noun genders, which all 
but disappeared in Middle English, although some lingering echoes of this 
grammar remained.40 Middle English thus finds itself free of the grammatical 
constraints that shape the conventions of personification allegory in other ver-
naculars. A number of medieval allegories—from the Latin works discussed 
in chapter 1 to Piers Plowman, discussed in chapter 5—use grammar as a 
metaphor, often for the problems associated with gender and sexuality. It is 
clear from the use of grammar as metaphor in Piers Plowman that, at least 
for the poet we call Langland, grammar is capable of signifying at the level 
of ontology, and grammatical gender is far from arbitrary. At one point, one 
of the characters declares that the study of grammar is “the grounde of al,” 
meaning by this, it seems, the ground of all education, and, through education, 
of discourse itself.41 Grammar is capable of both describing and establishing 
hierarchies between speakers and is thus a way of doing philosophy through 
allegory, or of writing allegory philosophically.
 Some debates written in English replaced the hierarchies created by the 
relationship between husband and wife in Latin and Romance allegories of 
 40. Charles Jones, in Grammatical Gender in English: 950–1250 (London: C. Helm/Methuen, 
1988), describes the persistence of noun gender’s remnants in English, changing the story from 
one of loss to one of diminution. In his Introduction, he claims that “any comment available in 
standard handbooks on the history of English led the student to the assumption that grammati-
cal gender was catastrophically and suddenly ‘lost’ from the language’s rule system sometime 
‘around’ the eleventh century” and argues, instead, that what he calls “echoes” of the gender 
classification of nouns endure for about 300 years.
 41. William Langland, Piers Plowman: The C-Text, ed. Derek Pearsall (Exeter, UK: Univer-
sity of Exeter Press, 1994), XVII, 107.
Body and Soul with a multiplicity of other, frequently same-sex, models for 
hierarchy. Pointedly avoiding personifying either body or soul as female, they 
instead explored various forms of same-sex affiliation (teacher-student, foster 
brothers, mirror images) between male personifications in depicting the rela-
tionship of the self to itself. Such homosocial relationships model a same-sex 
power struggle within the self, which might be understood as both a depic-
tion of certain misogynist norms (eliminating the female from the self) and 
an opening for contemporary critics to see the possibility for a queer reading. 
“Queerness” helps to describe, within the terms of this argument, the surpris-
ing turn away from loving and contentious differently gendered relationships 
to loving and contentious same-sex relationships within the self. The troubling 
of the heterosexual bonds between allegorical speakers, however, does not 
come out of any happy impulse on its authors’ parts to liberate the stodgily 
normative Body-Soul relation of the Latin- and Romance-language tradition. 
Liberation from those languages is not the goal, although many critics (Musca-
tine, Ackerman) have implied that it is. Ridding the self of female personifica-
tions, in Middle English writings, works in the service of medieval misogyny. 
After all, one may assume (and, indeed, certain textual details discussed in 
future chapters demonstrate) that it was troubling for medieval authors to 
imagine the self as filled or framed by female persons or personifications, even 
ones subordinate to male rule. The necessity of overcoming this weakness 
seems to have trumped even the centuries-old conventions of personification 
allegory inherited from late antiquity.
This study aims above all for an intervention in medieval studies; however, 
examining the prehistory of bodies and souls in relation to one another is a 
project that engages the energies of a variety of scholars in myriad disciplines, 
and complicating and deepening that broader field of inquiry is part of my aim 
here as well. Some of the credit or blame for rendering “the body” such a rich 
topic for scholars goes to Michel Foucault, whose Discipline and Punish and 
subsequent writings are crucial to the contemporary aspect of this project.
 In his lifetime, Foucault never actually completed his project on the Middle 
Ages, and even if he had, the project had shown every sign of focusing on an 
earlier period than the one this study examines. However, his work has proven 
to be a continuing provocation and encouragement to medievalists and others 
interested in working out the genealogy of the modern self, which, for him, 
was always implicated in techniques for disciplining the body. This study of 
allegory and medieval poetry stands at the intersection of two related projects 
of Foucault—the project that he helped inaugurate of historicizing the body, 
and his later interest in the history of confession—two interests that Foucault 
himself never quite brought together. To think of body and soul intertwined, 
after Foucault, is to think of both as effects of the workings of power, acting to 
create the self as its effect. In fact, chapter 3 of this study examines Foucault’s 
importance in theorizing sowlehele at some length. However, Foucault’s work 
elided the specifically gendered dimensions of how power works to organize 
bodies and souls.
 Femininity’s association with embodiment goes back at least as far as Pla-
to’s Timaeus (the single Platonic dialogue that seems to have been available 
and popular throughout the Middle Ages), where matter is created in a female 
womb or “matrix.”42 Feminist critics have had a great deal to say about body/
soul dualism as such, and particularly about what it has meant for women 
to be reduced to the synecdoche of the womb, to being merely and eternally 
on the side of “the body.” At first, feminist scholars writing in the 1970s and 
1980s turned the ancient association of woman with flesh into a project of 
valorizing the body and women, insisting that attention be paid to these two 
previously silent and denigrated entities.43 This was a claim that posited the 
 42. The tradition of the Timaeus is rendered more complex and interesting in its rewritings 
within medieval allegory. Plato’s cosmogeny is the only one of his dialogues to be disseminated 
in the Middle Ages, and it is the part of Plato that is meant when medievalists speak of medi-
eval “neo-Platonism”; this can be unfortunate, since the Timaeus is an odd duck in the Platonic 
corpus and has very little to do with Plato’s other, more interesting dialogues. However, it also 
happens to be the one that feminists such as Irigaray and Butler (and also thinkers such as Der-
rida) feel a particular need to discuss as one of the big justifications for sexism that resounded 
through the ages. An interesting article about the equation of woman with body in Plato, which, 
however, draws on Platonic dialogues that would not have been available for medieval think-
ers to consult, is Elizabeth Spelman’s “Woman as Body: Ancient and Contemporary Views” in 
Feminist Studies 8;1 (1982): 109–31. The Timaeus is essentially a “flat” allegory, one with very 
little temporal movement—it isn’t a story but a description, an alternative cosmogeny. Arguably, 
the allegories that were written under its explicit influence (Bernardus’ Cosmographia is an ob-
vious example) add to this allegory the element of action, narrative—and thereby, temporality. 
With Bernardus, for instance, female characters are no longer just lying there being wombs for 
matter; they are acting, even if in odd ways.
 43. In the “Introduction” to Feminism and the Body (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), which contains many gestures of summarizing the discipline, Londa Schiebinger writes, 
“In the 1970s, feminists reinserted the body into history, bringing to light issues that had 
previously been considered too vulgar, trivial, or risqué to merit serious scholarly attention. 
. . . The mind/body dualism that long underpinned Western culture made males the guardians 
of culture and the things of the mind, while it associated females with the frailties and contin-
gencies of the mortal body. Females, subject to unruly humours, unpredictable hormones, and 
other forces, have been identified so closely with nature that nature itself is often called ‘Mother 
Nature’” (1). Later, she writes, “In efforts to check the increasingly popular biological determin-
ism, feminists in the 1960s introduced the term ‘gender’, distinguishing culturally specific forms 
of masculinity and femininity from biological ‘sex,’ construed as anatomy, physiology, and 
body as the “real” and language as a mediating (productive, disciplinary) force, 
and created a distinction between “sex” (the putatively unalterable material 
embodiment as male or female) and “gender” (a linguistically mediated social 
construction, open to adjustment by cultural change).
 This version of feminist theory about the body came to be reevaluated: 
The firm association of “woman” with “body” (and the understanding of “sex” 
as a true material ground for existence) demanded a language of authenticity 
and immediacy that trapped women into particular modes of life and under-
standings of themselves. In the 1990s, feminist critics such as Judith Butler and 
Elizabeth Grosz argued that the body is neither the passive object of cultural 
inscription nor the unmanageable and unknowable representative of predis-
cursive reality. The constructivist position in feminist theory maintains that 
the sex/gender distinction cannot hold because all that we can know about 
“sex” comes to us mediated through language and culture; the body and its 
materiality may or may not be “real,” but the very question we ask about that 
reality comes courtesy of a discourse that posits the real and the linguistic/cul-
tural as opposites, in a circular argument without end.44
 The first chapter of Judith Butler’s Bodies That Matter consists of a series 
of considerations about matter, materiality, and the connection between those 
things and the performative nature of sex and gender. As part of elucidat-
ing what materiality means for feminist theory, Butler turns to an originary 
moment for Western conceptions of the self, Aristotle’s De Anima, citing the 
philosopher’s view that “the soul is the first grade of actuality of a naturally 
organized body,” and that they are as united as “the wax and the shape given 
to it by the stamp.”45 This language of the stamp, translated from the Greek 
schema, is a language of form, shape, and organization. Butler argues that a 
logical consequence of Aristotle’s thinking is that matter does not and cannot 
exist without a schema or stamp. The schemata of bodies can be understood 
as “a historically contingent nexus of power/discourse.” The consequence fol-
lows, just a few pages later, that not only cultural performance (gender, but I 
might also say the stuff of the soul) but also “sex” as an attribute of the body 
can and must be understood as performative.
chromosomes. The primary force of body history ever since has been to show that universal, 
transhistorical masculine and feminine bodies do not exist apart from culture” (2).
 44. See Moira Gatens, Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, Power and Corporeality (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1996); Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994); Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the 
Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990); and Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive 
Limits of “Sex” (New York: Routledge, 1993).
 45. Butler, Bodies That Matter, 32, quoting Aristotle, “De Anima,” The Basic Works of Aris-
totle, trans. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), Bk. 2, ch. 1, 412b7–8.
 This discussion of how matter matters is no neutral addition to the debate 
between idealism and “realism” that has raged for at least ten centuries: But-
ler’s argument is ultimately in the service of a political point. According to her 
reading, Aristotle’s thinking about the relationship of soul and body was radi-
cally rewritten by Foucault’s critique of disciplinarity, where what Foucault, 
also, calls “the soul” functions as the “materialization” of the prisoner’s body. 
The soul, Butler writes, “produces and actualizes the body,”46 or, as Foucault 
famously expressed it, “the soul is the prison of the body.”47 The study of the 
soul—whether as psychoanalysis in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries or 
as viewed in relationship with the body in the Middle Ages—is a way into the 
knowable and describable experience of living in a body. The third chapter of 
the present study is concerned with this argument, particularly with its inher-
ently medieval quality and how specific Middle English texts might be used to 
return to and rewrite these important concepts.
 In important works that helped inaugurate “body studies,” such as Elaine 
Scarry’s The Body in Pain, the body’s voicelessness is cause for concern, as if 
the body is a constituency with no vote in the democratic process. Critics of 
the constructionist position in feminist and queer theory find it problematic 
that if the body is understood as discursively constituted, it seems to lose some 
of its intractable realness by also being understood as a participant in language 
and culture. Such critics wonder if understanding bodily being as discursive 
will reduce claims about injury to the status of “mere” discourse, leaving no 
room to distinguish between symbolic and physical violence (the latter pre-
sumably far more serious than the former). I would suggest that medieval 
writings help show that such distinctions are already hard to come by.
 The imagination of the later Middle Ages conceived all of this quite differ-
ently. Certainly, by the twelfth century, allegorical thinking (discussed at some 
length in chapter 1) saw the physical world and, indeed, historical events as 
standing in for and pointing toward less material, transcendent, divine reali-
ties. The discursive was never the merely discursive; it was the most real of 
realities. As the tradition of Body/Soul debates developed, the Body talked 
back to the Soul (as do, in other debates, subsections of the body such as the 
Heart, the Eye, the Hands, and so on), arguing in a markedly corporeal way, 
blending the discursive and the material in a way that seemed to be treated as 
largely unproblematic in other medieval writings.
 Centuries before the experiments in bodily speech by such French femi-
nists as Hélène Cixous and Luce Irigaray, the medieval body had already 
established its own scandalous speaking style (to paraphrase Shoshana 
 46. Butler, Bodies That Matter, 33.
 47. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 29.
Felman).48 Indeed, the medieval body-as-woman was positively chatty, as 
some of the debates between the Body and the Soul discussed in this book will 
show. Unfortunately, chattiness is a negative trait associated with women in 
the Middle Ages, a trait that disciplinary works such as “Sawles Warde” seek 
to constrain. The metaphorical and allegorical language used to describe the 
nature of and relationship between souls and bodies is, as it turns out, a gen-
dered one. This book examines the consequences of this gendered language 
both for the emergence of a self-consciously literary tradition of Middle Eng-
lish writings and for medieval understandings of the self.
In order to trace the workings of sowlehele, this book reaches back to alle-
gories that predate the Fourth Lateran Council and as far forward as the 
late fourteenth-century Piers Plowman. Chapter 1 explores works that were 
central to the history of medieval allegory in the Middle Ages, Prudentius’ 
Psychomachia and Boethius’ The Consolation of Philosophy. Prudentius and 
Boethius each set up a problem that increasingly troubled writers over the 
centuries following: Abstract concepts describing the qualities that inhabit 
the self speak in female voices and often inhabit female bodies. It seems odd 
to some later writers that such powerful roles are permitted to female figures. 
The last section of the chapter turns to two twelfth-century Latin debates 
between the Body and the Soul that can be read as responding to the prob-
lems of allegorical gender and proper hierarchies within the self. The two 
Latin Body/Soul debates—one anonymous, the “Visio Philiberti,” and one 
by Hildebert of Lavardin, the “Liber de Querimonia”—repeatedly pose the 
question of how two elements as disparate in value and quality as soul and 
body could ever have been brought together, and how they might function in 
appropriate harmony.
 Chapters 2 and 3 focus on two thirteenth-century Middle English debates 
between the Body and the Soul. Chapter 2 shows how “In a Thestri Stude I 
Stod” (“In a Dark Place I Stood”) functions as a work of sowlehele, exemplify-
ing how the poem’s temporality contributes to its didacticism. In this debate, 
the Body talks back to the accusing Soul, refusing the Soul’s theory that all 
sin is the fault of the flesh. I argue that the contending theories of blame that 
comprise this poem’s matter are engaged in the production of a technology of 
sowlehele in part because other psychological models provided in the biblical, 
 48. Shoshana Felman, The Scandal of the Speaking Body: Don Juan with J. L. Austin or 
Seduction in Two Languages, trans. Catherine Porter (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1983).
patristic, and ancient Greek writings about the soul that came down to the 
thirteenth century cannot fully account for this debate’s dynamics.
 Having begun to examine the possibilities of sowlehele as a model for 
understanding representations of the divided self, I then turn in chapter 3 
to the surprisingly homosocial nature of the Middle English version of the 
relationship of the self to itself in the most popular of the medieval debates 
between the Body and the Soul, the thirteenth-century “Als I Lay in a Winteris 
Nyt,” also known as “The Debate Between the Body and the Soul.” This chap-
ter exemplifies the workings of pastoral power in sowlehele writings and shows 
how that power sometimes cannot help functioning in a queer way. By com-
parison with its Latin and Anglo-Norman counterparts, “Als I Lay” makes use 
of the specific grammatical possibilities available to English-language writers 
by establishing both Soul and Body as male, eliminating the female personi-
fication of the Soul from the conversation, and portrays its Body/Soul bond 
as one based in powerful same-sex affect. The poem can be read to exemplify 
Foucault’s famous phrase that “the soul is the prison of the body,” but, I argue, 
“Als I Lay” also complicates his metaphor by portraying Body and Soul as 
locked in a queerly loving ambivalence.
 Chapters 2 and 3 show how Body/Soul debates offer a performative theory 
of the self, both in the sense that they dynamically stage the different pos-
sible relationships within that self and in the sense used by philosophers of 
language that these poems work to produce the selves they describe. How-
ever, the relatively brief poems cited here are just some among many works 
to appear in manuscripts such as the Vernon to give instruction and occasion 
for meditation. The book’s final chapters consider how the attempt to produce 
sowlehele functions in writings that are better known within medieval English 
studies. Chapter 4 looks at the early thirteenth-century personification alle-
gory “Sawles Warde,” a prose section of the collection known as the Katherine 
Group, in which the highly gendered tensions of ensoulment and embodiment 
are described for an audience of religious women. In a reversal of the dynam-
ics in “Als I Lay in a Winteris Nyt,” but not quite in a return to Prudentius’ 
war of female vices with female virtues, this work is populated almost entirely 
by female personifications. “Sawles Warde” transforms the contentiousness of 
the Body/Soul debate into a domestic scene, imagining the self as a household 
besieged by danger. Within the home of the Body, Wit’s wife, Will, threat-
ens to stir up trouble, while visitors from without, such as Fear and Love of 
Life, undermine any sense in which this self might be considered hermetically 
sealed or safely closed off from the world outside its “house.” This allegory is 
an instance of sowlehele as a mode of writing specifically aimed at disciplining 
women.
 Chapter 5 turns from the explicitly female-gendered character of “Will” 
in “Sawles Warde” to Piers Plowman, where Will is instead figured as a man. 
In this concluding chapter, I consider Piers Plowman as a Middle English text 
that looks back to the questions of gendered representation in allegory posed 
by the early Latin allegories discussed in the first chapter. It is also a work that 
figures the problem of interdependence as an issue of gender and power, like 
yet unlike the thirteenth-century Body/Soul debates. Piers Plowman marks a 
crisis in the figurations of abstract ideas in female bodies (a tradition at least 
as old as Prudentius, if not Plato), a crisis intimately related to the develop-
ment of sowlehele in medieval writings. It is a text that famously exceeds any 
and all generic descriptions, as it exceeds any pat conclusions reached by its 
own characters. However, reading Piers Plowman as a work of sowlehele opens 
up new ways of understanding the workings of gender, power, and discipline 
in the poem and, if it does not presume to resolve the questions it poses, helps 
resolve the questions posed by this book.
Barbara Johnson’s published lecture “Women and Allegory” poses the 
question, “What does it mean to personify theory as a woman?,”1 as 
part of a larger critique of how contemporary critical theory gets per-
sonified by its critics (frequently as “dead” or as “dying”). Johnson’s 
discussion of allegory is prompted by an eighteenth-century allegori-
cal painting that depicts “Theory” as a female form, prompting her to 
ask whether what we currently tend to call critical theory or poststruc-
turalist theory is consequently a particularly female practice. This 
sighting of an allegorical image on the wall of the London Academy 
of Art represents one of those infrequent encounters between medi-
eval literary studies and contemporary critical theory that enriches 
both, thanks to Johnson’s use of an epigraph from Carolyn Dinshaw’s 
Chaucer’s Sexual Poetics that describes the convention by which the 
allegorical text is depicted as a veiled woman upon whose body vari-
ous “masculine acts” of reading and glossing are performed. Johnson 
thus situates herself in relation to a centuries-old allegorical tradition 
 1. Barbara Johnson, The Wake of Deconstruction, in The Bucknell Lectures in 
Literary Theory; ed. Michael Payne and Harold Schweizer (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 
53; the lecture that immediately precedes this one notes the necessity of personifica-
tion as such in discussions of the so-called death of theory, asking, “What does it 
mean to treat a theory as an animate being? More precisely, what does it mean to 
personify deconstruction as animate only by treating it as dead, giving it life only in 
the act of taking that life away?” (17), without yet specifying how often that personi-
fied being is female.
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1and queries what it might tell us about the possibilities and limitations of what 
our culture imagines about women. How can women be irrational if Rational-
ity is a woman? How can women be anything other than willful and capricious 
given that Will is a woman, too?2 How is gender distributed and instituted in 
allegorical texts, and what are the implications of these institutions for think-
ing about the embodied, ensouled self? What, in short, is the gender of the 
allegorical Soul and Body in Latin-language works, those that most directly 
inform the Middle English tradition?3 This chapter looks at how the use of 
female figures in some important medieval Latin allegories, including those of 
Prudentius and Boethius, installed gender hierarchy as an issue to be resolved 
in later medieval conceptions of selfhood.
 One of the key preconditions of personhood in allegory is actually gender, 
since by beginning to speak, an abstraction ceases to be an “it” and clearly 
becomes a “he” or a “she.” It is both a truism and an abiding mystery to 
present-day readers of late antique and medieval literature that allegorical rep-
resentations of abstract concepts are almost always female. This is no accident, 
scholars note: At the most basic level, Latin and Romance languages tend to 
gender abstract concepts as feminine nouns, from the “goddesses” Natura and 
Ecclesia (Nature and the Church) to incarnations of the vices and sins like Lux-
uria or Superbia (Indulgence, Pride). Critics have often emphasized the view 
that the literary convention of a female tutelary figure, such as Boethius’ Lady 
Philosophy, representing the abstraction Philosophia is an accident of gram-
mar and therefore to be dismissed as mere accident.4 Similarly, Johnson’s essay 
 2. Ruth Mazo Karras describes an exemplum about a scolding wife and a drunken, mis-
behaving husband. In this case, John Bromyard reads the story as an allegory of humanity’s 
relationship with God, with God as the ineffectively scolding wife, whose admonishment “man” 
ignores at his peril. Karras adds, “The theological moral does not prevent the story from rein-
forcing the image of woman as scold (or of man as drunkard). But if the scolding woman stands 
for God, can she be all bad?” (238). “Gendered Sin and Misogyny in John of Bromyard’s Summa 
Predicantium,” Traditio 47 (1992): 233–57.
 3. James J. Paxson summarizes the problem of allegory in relation to gender toward the 
end of his Poetics of Personification, noting that although the argument from grammatical gen-
der has a great deal of scholarly authority (he dates it back to Joseph Addison), “in the classical 
rhetorical tradition, the female body itself, as well as female social and cosmetic practices, are 
the figural images of figuration.” James J. Paxson, The Poetics of Personification (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 173.
 4. This is particularly true of the critics who write about the Old French Roman de la Rose. 
The gender of Bel Acueil, a subsidiary love object for the narrator’s quest, would be troubling 
and undercut the heterosexual love story with the possibility of homosexual attachment if it 
were not repeatedly emphasized that the gender of “Fair Welcome” is male merely by accident. 
See the discussions by Douglas Kelly (for the “mere accident”) side, in Internal Difference and 
Meanings in the “Roman de la Rose” (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), esp. 
105–22, and Simon Gaunt’s direct response to Kelly, in “Bel Acueil and the Improper Allegory 
of the Romance of the Rose,” New Medieval Literatures 2 (1998): 65–93 (see especially 68 and 
84–85). For general studies of female tutelary figures in the writings and imagery of the Middle 
comes to an impasse: She discovers that Reynolds’s painting closely echoes 
“Theory” in a Renaissance compendium of allegorical images by the painter 
Cesare Ripa, and is therefore not an original idea or invention by Reynolds. 
Ripa’s Iconologia, in turn, is not making a comment on culture: He assigns 
genders to abstract nouns according to those nouns’ grammatical gender in 
Italian. Like medievalists today, Johnson asks, is the odd appearance of this 
female figure at the Royal Academy of Art in London “mere” grammar, after 
all? Johnson concludes that the idea that grammatical convention underlies 
allegorical gender does not negate the possibility that such images “shaped 
the cultural messages addressed both to women and to men. It is just that the 
‘cause’ of the cultural messages cannot easily be tied to intentions.”5 How these 
messages were shaped by the “mere grammar” of allegory and what they actu-
ally were remain questions.
 Grammar alone cannot fully explain the prevalence of female personifica-
tions, but their dominating presence in medieval literature remains a familiar 
aspect of allegorical writing that deserves defamiliarization. Such figures are, 
of course, tokens: Lady Liberty on the New York City skyline does not guaran-
tee American women’s freedom, and it is unlikely that the existence of a Lady 
Philosophy in the realm of representation made any difference for medieval 
women wishing to learn philosophy.6 Johnson doesn’t quite tell us what differ-
ence the female representation of Theory makes. But she notes her existence, 
there on the wall of the London Academy of Art, and in medieval literature 
are her relatives Reason, Nature, Holy Church, and Scripture.7 The oddness 
of these powerful female figures is this: They represent the very essence of 
Ages, see Marina Warner’s Monuments & Maidens: The Allegory of the Female Form (New York: 
Atheneum, 1985), and Barbara Newman’s God and the Goddesses (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2004), and her earlier work, From Virile Woman to WomanChrist: Studies 
in Medieval Religion and Literature (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995).
 5. Johnson, The Wake of Deconstruction, 73.
 6. Helen Solterer’s The Master and Minerva, like Johnson’s essay, begins with an allegorical 
depiction of a woman, this time a woman writing a response to a man’s words. Solterer notes the 
important role played by figurations of women responding to, disputing with, and ultimately 
yielding to the authority of learned men. These women are only sometimes allegorical, but al-
ways useful as representations of (male) intellectual mastery: “If these texts include women in a 
version of the master/disciple disputation, they do so in a manner that ultimately counts them 
out. By projecting women as privileged mouthpieces of clerical wisdom, [they] make them 
party to clerical claims on the knowledge of women.” Helen Solterer, The Master and Minerva: 
Disputing Women in French Medieval Culture (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 
1995), 33.
 7. Barbara Newman, in her book God and the Goddesses (see above), argues that these 
female tutelary figures represented the continuation of a pagan pantheon of female gods, which 
Christianity had all but erased (with the exception of Mariolatry). In other words, “allegorical 
goddesses” offer a challenge to a monotheistic male-centered Godhead, and, in the writings of 
mystics and certain poets, manage to do so without ever being accused of blasphemy.
1rationality in a world where women are routinely equated with the irrational, 
the bodily, the appetitive, and, most especially, the capricious and badly dis-
ciplined will.
 It is conventional to understand the European Middle Ages as a profoundly 
misogynist time and place (often figured as such in contrast to our own pre-
sumably more enlightened time). The medieval period left behind very few 
records of writings by women and produced a literature in which female char-
acters appeared in almost exclusively romantic functions and almost never as 
full-fledged protagonists. Yet, within the Latin canon that informed all others, 
there existed this surprisingly self-conscious tradition of powerful, intellectu-
ally intimidating female figures, a tradition that did not fit with any assump-
tions that medieval society seemed to hold about women. Does this tradition 
subvert the famous misogyny of the Middle Ages, or does it recuperate and 
strengthen it? And must those options be the only ones for thinking about 
gender and allegorical embodiment?
 This chapter looks at how the gender of allegory mattered to the Latin 
works that established the tradition of medieval allegory. As the rest of this 
book discusses, the female figures of Reason, Philosophy, and various Vir-
tues that harangue and educate the narrators of allegory largely give way, in 
Middle English works written in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, to 
an economy of male-male instruction, an economy that reflects the “reality” 
of the pedagogical scene and also permits the female to be anxiously excluded 
from the psychological battles waged within the (male) narratorial subject. 
The Middle English works do not exist in a vacuum, however, and this chap-
ter examines early Latin and later French works together, as interdependent 
strains of a single allegorical tradition that influences writers in medieval Eng-
land, if only to reverse or transform certain tendencies in their precursors. 
The tradition traced here, however, cannot claim positive knowledge of direct 
influence. Granted, without the Latin models neither personification allegory 
nor its gender conventions would have become such significant issues in ver-
nacular writings. Thus, this chapter does not adopt an evolutionary model 
which demonstrates that the discussion of the self in Middle English debates 
between the Body and the Soul had the allegories of Boethius and Prudentius 
as their ancestors. Instead, an examination of these important antecedents 
permits us to see how the tradition of female allegorical figures speaking with 
male narrators informs the way gender is written into the production of works 
from the Body/Soul debates to Piers Plowman. This, in turn, becomes the basis 
of this book’s argument that understanding quotidian psychological thinking 
in the Middle Ages requires critics to consider how its underlying structures 
were affected by allegorical gender, a detail that only seems to be arbitrary in 
medieval allegories describing the self to itself.
 Although a number of medieval works of philosophy are written as alle-
gories, criticism for the most part makes the mistake of refusing to consider 
allegory itself as a philosophical mode; contemporary medievalists recognize 
and adhere to disciplinary boundaries that would not have occurred to the 
medieval writers we study. Contemporary writings about allegory have con-
sidered it as a psychological mode, at times by counterintuitively insisting on 
the psychological realism of some allegorical characterizations. Statements 
about the “psychological realism” of various medieval works imply that those 
works resemble present-day representations of the psyche, or even that they 
are in line with present-day psychological theories or, perhaps, simply with 
generally agreed-upon understandings of the self, things known by “common 
sense.”8 Philosophy and what we now call psychology were no more sepa-
rable in medieval thought than allegory was from either of the other two. This 
chapter, therefore, examines works in which philosophy, psychology, and what 
comes to function as narrative drive or the development of events and charac-
ters over a period of time are all mixed together for purposes of what at least 
some medieval writers call sowlehele.
the hIstory oF alleGory as a hIstory oF psyCholoGy
When critics look at the beginning of medieval personification allegory, they 
turn to a fourth-century Latin poem, Prudentius’ Psychomachia, the first fully 
developed personification-based narrative fiction.9 The work’s title is some-
 8. An exception to this statement is the sensitive reading of allegory in general and the 
Roman de la Rose in particular by Michel Zink in “The Allegorical Poem as Interior Memoir,” 
Yale French Studies 70 (1986): 100–126. Zink makes a connection between “allegory and sub-
jectivity,” which he distinguishes from “allegory and the expression of psychological realities” 
(101). But even when Zink considers the development of subjectivity in French romance, he 
understands psychology to mean something familiar from this century’s psychological theories; 
he is looking for how “they” were really always just like “us,” which is what Fletcher also does. 
Although this study does not call for a politics of radical otherness about the Middle Ages, I 
would like to suggest that we pay just a little more attention to how we understand their modes 
of representing the self as specific to their own moment: Zink does this when he makes con-
nections between allegory and medieval theories about dreams and memory. See also James 
Simpson’s Sciences and the Self in Medieval Poetry, which traces the different kinds of psycho-
logical hierarchy the two authors use in depicting the education of a single soul. James Simp-
son, Sciences and the Self in Medieval Poetry: Alan of Lille’s “Anticlaudianus” and John Gower’s 
“Confessio Amantis” (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 13.
 9. For instance, Jon Whitman also gives the Psychomachia as the first example of personi-
fication allegory in Allegory: The Dynamics of an Ancient and Medieval Technique (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1987). Of course, “the technique [of allegorical personification] 
goes back at least as far as the figures on the shield of Achilles in Iliad 18, in which Strife, 
1times used to define the entire genre, and, along with The Consolation of Phi-
losophy, the Psychomachia stands as a model for and origin of the tradition 
of allegorical personification in the Middle Ages.10 This work inaugurates 
allegory’s involvement with the unsystematic psychological thought that this 
study terms sowlehele. It also posits the intimate involvement of all medieval 
personification allegory with the doctrine of Christ’s Incarnation. By mak-
ing nonmaterial concepts appear as physical bodies, personification allegory 
was a way of thinking (in an acceptably nonblasphemous mode) about the 
complex implications of Christ’s incarnation as a man. After all, in the begin-
ning of the Gospel of John, the Word was made flesh; personification allegory 
repeats this process again and again, albeit with lowercase-letter words such 
as will, or philosophy. While the Word assumes male flesh in biblical narra-
tive, abstract concepts tend to become incarnate in female bodies. The female 
allegorical personifications invented by Prudentius help inaugurate the odd 
tendency of allegorical personifications to engage in activities (in this case, 
waging war) that contradict any literal understanding of what women actually 
did or could do in that period. But these personifications do more than this: 
By standing in, by virtue of their femininity and also by their own admission, 
for fleshliness-as-such, Prudentius’ virtues and vices permit Prudentius to 
work out the relationships between gender, psychology, allegory, and incar-
national theology.
 In the poem, personified virtues engage personified vices on a field of bat-
tle, the outcome in the virtues’ favor clear from the start. The battle is waged 
in a series of one-on-one conflicts ending with the vices’ defeat and concludes 
with the sisters Faith and Concord working together to build a temple in 
honor of Christ. The figure of Christ, whose incarnation in a human body and 
status as both human and divine are invoked repeatedly, is implicated in how 
Uproar, and Fate are shown participating in a battle scene. More elaborately, Xenophon [in 
Memorabilia 2.1] shows Heracles forced to choose between Pleasure and Virtue, two abstrac-
tions personified as women”; see Martha A. Malamud, A Poetics of Transformation: Prudentius 
and Classical Mythology (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 55. More important and 
even more influential, Vergil’s Aeneid 6 allegorizes various evils, and Statius’ Thebaid has “gods, 
humans, and personified abstractions mix indiscriminately” (Malamud, Poetics, 56). Despite 
these examples of earlier allegory-like writing in Latin, Malamud joins most critics who discuss 
the history of allegory in saying that that “Prudentius appears to have created a new genre of 
poetry[;] . . . his choice of the sustained personification allegory directs the reader’s attention to 
his treatment of characters not as people or as symbols whose meaning is always fixed, but as 
signs whose meaning is variable and inconstant” (Malamud, Poetics, 57). James Paxson offers 
an excellent summary of the critical tradition around the Psychomachia, which has often been 
underestimated as a “poetic or formal failure.” See Paxson, Personification, 63.
 10. Michel Zink’s elegant definition of a psychomachia is that it is “understood in the broad-
est sense as a description of the movements and the conflicts within psychological as well as 
moral consciousness.” See Zink, 100.
the poem posits the relationship between the body and the soul, between the 
material world and its transcendence. Not only does the poem subdivide the 
self into new categories; the Psychomachia, whose title is Greek for “battle of/
for the psyche,” inaugurates a tradition of allegorical approaches to psychology 
that are neither formal nor fully systematized.11
 From the beginning, the Psychomachia works to establish the dominance 
of the soul (a virtuous soul, of course) over the body, as if this dominance 
were not already a given. The supremacy of the soul is supported by analogies 
that connect it with the seemingly obvious dominance of the New Testament 
over the Old. Prudentius uses the Hebrew Testament as an allegorical pre-
figuration of the Gospels, performing his own act of allegoresis in the course 
of his personification allegory. The poem begins with a description of the life 
of Abraham, whose job is entirely one of prefiguration. This Old Testament 
patriarch stands in for the injunction “that every part of our body . . . must 
be set free by gathering our forces at home,” and an extended analogy fol-
lows between the rescue of Lot from Sodom as a predecessor for the rescue 
of the soul from sin.12 The “setting free” of the body in the Psychomachia is 
accomplished by a (temporary?) defeat of fleshly appetite. Although the flesh 
is defeated, however, the logic of the poem demands the cooperation of vic-
tors and losers—Concord, the penultimate speaker, voices the paradoxical 
peace-making impulse within the warlike poem when she insists on looking 
for a way to coordinate and unite the warring aspects of the self, insisting that 
“where there is separation there is no strength.”13
 The achievement of a coherent, unified self seems to be the poem’s goal, 
and to achieve this, Prudentius needs (allegorical) bodies. One line of devel-
opment in the poem makes use of biblical patriarchs, but the more domi-
nant theme—the poem’s plot—hinges on a battle between embodied vices and 
 11. A key to understanding the poem lies in the question of its title: Where does the battle 
of vices and virtues take place? Is the Psychomachia a battle within the “psyche” (is the immate-
rial space of soul turned into a battleground for the damaged and killed bodies of vices) or is 
it waged for the soul, winner take all? Critics cannot decide, and the ambiguity enriches the 
poem. See Brenda Machosky, “The Face That Is Not a Face: The Phenomenology of the Soul in 
the Allegory of the Psychomachia,” Exemplaria XV: 1 (Spring 2003): 1–38. Machosky discusses 
what it means to understand the Greek title of this Latin work as a battle “for the soul’s salva-
tion” and points out that “the battle is for the soul, and yet occurs in the soul” (3, see also fn 6). 
The use of the Greek psyche resolves the tension between the Latin animus (as discussed later, 
largely intellect) and anima (largely, as Machosky puts it, “the principle of life” [4]) and the soul’s 
“noumenal form,” the passive division of the soul, which “responds to objects that assault the 
senses of perception” (20).
 12. Prudentius, Psychomachia, ed. and trans. H. J. Thomson (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1949), 279. In Latin on the opposite side of the page, “omnemque nostri por-
tionem corporis . . . domi coactis liberandam viribus” (lines 53, 55).
 13. “Nil dissociabile firmum est,” Prudentius, 333, line 763.
1virtues that, for whatever reason (grammar, a distancing effect from any “real” 
scene of warfare, the pleasure of reversing the regular order of things), turn out 
to inhabit female bodies. These bodies are not just passive receptacles hous-
ing abstractions: They are flung about in battle and injured, their boundaries 
violated by other bodies.14 To get to the point where concord between aspects 
of the self is possible, the poem’s logic demands both the mangled bodies of 
the vices and the indomitable bodies of the virtues that did the mangling, a 
concord between flesh and spirit (with spirit, of course, functioning as a first 
among equals).
 Perhaps because he had no clear models of extended personification alle-
gory to draw from, Prudentius is remarkably self-reflective about the sort of 
fiction he is crafting, the type of allegorical writing inaugurated with the poem. 
He attempts to keep the behavior of his virtues consistent with their named 
natures, but, when pressed, he seems to choose the battle aspect of the allegory 
over maintaining the strict boundaries of his characters’ identities. While vir-
tues such as Patience triumph by enacting their virtuousness (Patience stands 
still and lets Wrath exhaust herself; perhaps uncharacteristically full of shame 
and expressing it as anger, Wrath commits suicide, leading to Patience’s vic-
tory), other virtues seem to go against or at least beyond their function by 
committing graphic violence against the vices, as when Faith causes Discord 
to be torn apart bodily, or Sobriety goes a little over the top by making Indul-
gence eat her own bloody tongue as restitution for having lived on sweet and 
luxurious foods (the punishment that the vices suffer, by contrast, tends to 
fit their named natures perfectly, prefiguring Dantean contrapasso). When a 
meek female Virtue causes violent “bodily” injury to a Vice, Prudentius seems 
to worry about how a female character could act so violently. He worries more 
about the character’s femininity than about the contradictory model of an 
incarnation of virtue committing truly grotesque acts of violence.
 In one such encounter, something surprising and useful is going on at the 
intersection of gender and incarnation in Prudentius’ allegory. Immediately fol-
lowing the violent sword-thrust with which the modest maiden Chastity kills 
“Lust the Sodomite,” Chastity makes a victory speech comparing her achieve-
ment with that of Judith killing Holofernes, here imagined as the very spirit of 
lechery. Having committed an act whose violence contradicts her meek alle-
 14. James Paxson observes that the graphic goriness of the battle scenes in the poem 
concentrate on violence inflicted on the teeth, tongue, and face: “Prudentius’ focus upon the 
imagery of the destruction of the face, therefore, is a literalized reverse of prosopopeia. It is the 
symbolic dismantling of the trope by which the text invents the figural characters who inhabits 
its actantial narrative” (Paxson, Personification, 69). Paxson uses this aspect of the poem’s car-
nage as a way into the exciting argument that this first personification allegory actually undoes 
personifications in the very place where they speak and personify, literally deconstructing the 
speaking self at the very moment of inaugurating medieval allegory as we know it.
gorical personality, Chastity must justify her own violence through reference 
of a biblical precedent. Prudentius seems fascinated by these moments when 
his characters violate their own named natures. Chastity must also emphasize 
just how far against her own necessary modesty she has gone, by pointing 
out that, yes, both she and Judith are women (“woman as she was [she] won 
a famous victory over the foe with no trembling hand”).15 Immediately after 
equating herself with Judith to justify her own violence, Chastity must then 
differentiate her own killing force from Judith’s, and the two turn out to differ 
in the same way as the Gospels differ from the Hebrew Testament.
 What is extraordinary about this passage follows immediately, through a 
surprising digression. Chastity ignores the bloody battle being waged around 
her to speculate, “but perhaps a woman still fighting under the shade of the 
[Hebrew] law had not force enough, though in so doing she prefigured our 
time.”16 She, a fighting female personification, is surprised that a woman could 
fight (perhaps because that woman is not a personification?) but moves to 
resolve this surprise by describing the “our times” that Judith prefigured. The 
transformation that marks the possibilities of regenerative violence in “our 
times” also goes to the larger, stranger argument that Prudentius seems to 
be making in writing the first personification allegory: the new possibilities 
for embodiment, for a new compact between soul and body inaugurated by 
Christ’s incarnation as a man described by Chastity:
Since a virgin bore a child, since the day when man’s body lost its primeval 
nature, and power from on high created a new flesh, and a woman unwed-
ded conceived the God Christ. . . . From that day all flesh is divine, since it 
conceives Him and takes on the nature of God by a covenant of partnership. 
For the Word made flesh has not ceased to be what it was before, that is, 
the Word, by attaching to itself the experience of the flesh; its majesty is not 
lowered by the experience of the flesh, but raises wretched men to nobler 
things.17
In this brief passage, we have moved from an act of violence by a woman to the 
contextualization of that violence within a biblical narrative, but now we have 
 15. Prudentius, 283, “famosum mulier referens ex hoste tropaeum non trepidante manu” 
(lines 64–65).
 16. Prudentius, 283, “at fortasse parum fortis matrona sub umbra / legis adhuc pugnans, 
dum tempora nostra figurat” (66–67).
 17. Prudentius, 284, “. . . .post partum virginis, ex quo / corporis humani naturam pristine 
origo / deseruit carnemque novam vix ardua sevit, / atque innupta Deum concepit femina 
Christum . . . / Inde omnis iam diva caro est quae concipit illum / naturamque Dei consortis 
foedere sumit. / Verbum quipped caro factum non destitit esse quod fuerat, Verum, dum carnis 
glutinat usum, / carnis, / sed miseros ad nobiliora trahente” (71–74, 76–81).
1digressed—because the violence was a woman’s, because woman is consistently 
equated with the flesh—into the realm of incarnational theology. What enables 
Chastity’s digression? The female body, committing violence, is shown to have 
been sanctified by Mary’s virgin birth and therefore licensed to struggle vio-
lently in the name of virtue, as Chastity has done. Mary is a typological ante-
cedent for Chastity, just as Judith is Chastity’s pre-allegorical antecedent, and 
these two “real” female bodies help justify the female form taken by Chastity. 
The purpose of this typological genealogy is to produce the Word incarnate as 
flesh through a female intervention, thereby sanctifying both (some forms of) 
femininity and corporeality, concepts so often yoked together.
 In the preceding passage, the divine remains unchanged by its encounter 
with the female body, but the body is utterly changed by encountering the 
divine. The mode of personification allegory that he is inventing as he goes 
along enables Prudentius to think through the implications of a flesh that is 
both human and divine. At least for Prudentius, to say that “the Word was 
made flesh” is an essential utterance permitting allegorical writing. Personifi-
cation allegory always makes the word into flesh, gives the concept its proso-
pon or face; and though Homeric literature prefigured this kind of allegory, 
it is essentially a genre invented in the centuries after Christ’s life and death 
became significant to Western culture. It might be speculated, indeed, that this 
allegorical mode was invented in order to respond to the sheer surprising odd-
ness of Christ’s incarnation. Personification allegory is a mode so intimately 
connected with incarnation that its purview must also include the question of 
how any soul, by definition a transcendent, nonmaterial being, can come to be 
incarnated in any body.18
 Even at its supposed point of origin, Prudentius’ poem, this sort of allegory 
is centrally concerned with psychological questions such as the relationship of 
body and soul. In Boethius’ Consolation, Lady Philosophy argues that “human 
souls are of necessity more free when they continue in the contemplation of 
the mind of God and less free when they descend to bodies, and less still when 
 18. Jon Whitman, in his book Allegory: The Dynamics of an Ancient and Medieval, offers 
a history of the connection between incarnational thinking and allegorical writing in terms of 
Origen’s philosophy and its incorporation of “Jewish, Platonic and Gnostic legacies” (69). Casey 
Finch, in the introduction to his edition of the works of the Pearl poet (an author whose work is 
outside the purview of this study), writes something very similar about his reading of the intel-
lectual context of Pearl: “The act of incarnation fuses the divine and the human into an absolute 
contiguity. Similarly, the didactic purpose of the Pearl poet depends on the way in which literal 
and figurative poles of language are collapsed in his poetics . . . but at the same time [ . . . ] the 
fundamental theological separation of the earthly and the divine, of horizontal and vertical 
language, is paradoxically underscored in this process.” Casey Finch, The Complete Works of 
the Pearl Poet (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 19. And later, Finch writes that 
what the reader of the Pearl learns is that “the physical is both separate from and a part of the 
metaphysical” (21).
they are imprisoned in earthly flesh and blood.”19 This represents a fairly com-
mon medieval view, but it subjects its proponents to the dangers of a Mani-
chean dualism and must be expressed carefully, with full acknowledgment that 
soul and body must ultimately accept their union. In the Psychomachia, how-
ever, embodiment is described as itself capable of achieving a kind of sanctity. 
The body is clearly an effect of historical forces: After the Virgin Birth, it is 
different from what it had been before. In the narrative, Chastity tells the story 
of this transformation and, in so doing, also redescribes her own victory over 
Lust—the Virgin Birth, the birth capable of enacting such a transformation 
in the status of the flesh, is, for her, necessarily chaste, a birth accomplished 
without lust. Later in the Psychomachia, we are reminded that “Jesus mediates 
between man and God, uniting mortality with the Father so that the fleshly 
shall not be separated from the eternal Spirit and that one God shall be both.”20 
The birth of Christ thus guarantees that the flesh, too, shall have someone who 
will speak for it in the court of heaven.
 Brenda Machosky has argued that the whole point for Prudentius of 
inventing personification allegory and producing the Psychomachia had been 
“a need to present something that could not otherwise appear, the soul.”21 
This is a wonderful phrase, partly because it is so counterintuitive. Is not the 
person of every human being, his or her gait and voice and personality, an 
appearance of the soul in the physical world? Are not the eyes, at the very least, 
the clichéd “windows of the soul”? But no: In the Middle Ages, the soul is far 
more mysterious and more difficult to manifest than that, especially if it is the 
soul in general (“Fight for Mansoul,” as Thompson’s Loeb translation titles the 
Psychomachia) rather than some specific person’s soul.
 The Psychomachia does the work of sanctifying the body as a vessel for 
divine Incarnation and for allegorical incarnation, as the proper vessel for the 
soul. However, all of this changes at the poem’s end. There, the final dedication 
of the poem, addressed to Christ, explains:
 19. Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. V. E. Watts (London: Penguin Books 
1969), 149. “Humanas uero animas liberiores quidem esse necesse est cum se in mentis diuinae 
speculatione conseruant, minus uero cum dilabuntur ad corpora, minusque etiam cum terrenis 
artubus colligantur.” Latin text from Boethius: The Theological Tractates and the Consolation of 
Philosophy, ed. E. K. Rand, trans. H. F. Stewart and S. J. Tester (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1973).
 20. Prudentius, 333, “Utque homini atque Deo medius intervenit Iesus, / qui sociat mortale 
Patri, / ne carnea distent / Spritui aeterno sitque ut Deus unus utrumque . . .” (764–66). In “The 
Face That Is Not a Face,” Machosky argues that “spiritus designates the conjoinment of the body 
and soul” (22), which permits her to argue that “the persona or mask of spiritus is psychomachia, 
the image of a soul in the figures of conflict,” and goes on to argue that spiritus resembles Jesus 
in also being a persona, a “‘face’ which unites the divine with the mortal”(23), with the differ-
ence between them being that “God can be figured as Christ but . . . there is no figure adequate 
to the human soul” (30).
 21. Machosky, 17.
1Savage war rages, hotly, rages within our bones, and man’s two-sided nature 
is in an uproar of rebellion; for the flesh that was formed of clay bears down 
upon the spirit, but again the spirit that issued from the pure breath of God 
is hot within the dark prison-house of the heart, and even in its close bond-
age rejects the body’s filth. Light and darkness with their opposing spirits are 
at war, and our two-fold being inspires powers at variance with each other, 
until Christ our God comes to our aid.22
As it turns out, in spite of the assertions of the good of incarnate existence, the 
body is the prison of the soul; actually, the heart is (the spirit is buried in the 
carcere cordis), and the flesh made of clay (viscera limo effigiata) is the prison 
where the soul (Prudentius alternates the two Latin terms for “soul,” spiritus 
and anima, without apparent consistency) is incarcerated. The language of the 
prison house seems unavoidable, even in this poem, which had challenged 
that language early on.
 Toward the end of Psychomachia, Man’s nature is understood as double—
body and soul warring with one another. The war between them rages within 
man’s very bones, one of the few textual indications of the battle’s location. 
Both sides of man’s nature are in rebellion, and it is their split that keeps man 
from peace and joy. The thing Prudentius’ virtues dread is division. Concord, 
whose very name demands unity, says “a divided will creates disorder in our 
inmost nature, making two parties in a heart at variance,”23 even as this conflict 
guarantees both the narrative dynamism of the battle plot and the possibility 
that, divided from it, the good will overpower the bad. What is so odd about 
this process is that the poem had begun with a multifarious split—a battle 
between many speaking and acting characters with the stated aim of freeing 
the body—but it ends with dualism, as if the virtues’ victory ultimately closes 
down the efflorescence of the self ’s many aspects. Along the way, however, 
the Psychomachia seems uncertain as to whether it is the bad body or the bad 
(divided) will that is at fault for the capacity for sinfulness that remains even 
after the virtues have slaughtered the vices.
 Although it is not yet a debate between Body and Soul, this Latin poem is 
a battle within and for the soul staged in a manner that repeatedly thematizes 
the problem of embodiment. The body appears as both a site for corporeal 
 22. Prudentius, 343. “Fervent bella horrida, fervent / ossibus inclusa, fremit et discordibus 
armis / non simplex natura hominis; nam viscera limo / efigiata premunt animam, contra ille 
sereno / editus adflatu nigrantis carcere cordis / aestuat, et sordes arta inter vincla recusat. / 
Spiritibus pugnant variis lux atque tenebrae, / distantesque animat duplex substantia vires, / 
donec praesidio Christus Deus adsit . . .” (902–10).
 23. Prudentius, 333. “Ergo cavete, viri, ne sit sentential discors / sensibusin nostris, ne secta 
exotica tectis nascatur conflataodiis, quia fissa voluntas / confundit variis arcane biformia fibris” 
(758–61).
violence and a stage for female allegorical figures who are enfleshed enough 
to inflict hurt and to be hurt. Ultimately, the Psychomachia does not capture 
or represent a literal “psychology,” but rather posits precisely the problem that 
the rest of this book addresses: that the formal theological and scientific psy-
chology of the Middle Ages cannot and does not address the needs of Chris-
tian culture, which seems to have always-already been a culture of confession 
(compare St. Augustine, although in his day the word itself was closer to “pro-
fession of faith”), even if this tendency becomes formally institutionalized only 
centuries after Prudentius.24
the hIstory oF phIlosophy as a hIstory oF alleGory
Personification allegory, which long predates the formalized university disci-
plines of debate, often figures philosophical thought as something spoken by 
the female personifications of abstract concepts to male interlocutors, who 
are often positioned as their students. There are obvious precedents for the 
philosophical dialogue in classical writing, from Plato to Cicero. Although the 
Symposium was not translated into Latin in the Middle Ages, and Socrates’ 
take-no-prisoners female avatar Diotima was replaced by the apocryphal 
stories about Socrates’ shrewish wife Xanthippe, Diotima’s distant daugh-
ters—allegorical female figures offering lessons and correction to male think-
ers—came to function as the structuring principle for works that crossed the 
divide between philosophy and literature, making massive contributions to 
both. The most significant of these figures is Lady Philosophy in The Consola-
tion of Philosophy.25
 Boethius’ sixth-century philosophical allegory The Consolation of Philoso-
phy had, if anything, even more influence than the Psychomachia on the con-
tinued use of female personifications to embody abstract concepts in medieval 
writings. Instead of staging an encounter between female beings embodying 
abstract concepts, it took a single larger-than-life abstraction, Lady Philoso-
phy, and set her up in a pedagogical relationship with a human narrator. This 
 24. Michel Zink writes, although he does not develop this theme, that “In the Christian 
world, the psychological cannot be separated from the moral nor from the eschatological” 
(Zink, 105).
 25. While The Consolation of Philosophy is generally considered a work of philosophy, it is 
written in the hybrid poetic style known as prosimetrum. This is a style of combining prose with 
poetry: Lady Philosophy voices a number of poems as part of consoling Boethius, which are 
interspersed with prose discussions between the two. See Bridget K. Balint, Ordering Chaos: The 
Self and the Cosmos in Twelfth-Century Latin Prosimetrum (Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 
2009).
1hierarchical mode characterized a series of later medieval works, including 
the debates between the Body and the Soul, explicitly establishing the “didac-
tic” dimensions of sowlehele through the paradigmatic pairing of teacher and 
student.
 For medieval philosophers, thinking is something that happens in a situa-
tion that is at least figuratively dialogic, which means that thinkers are always 
nominally dependent on the figures of their interlocutors, often allegorical or 
allegorized as their students or their teachers. This is yet clearer from the later 
twelfth century on, as dialectical forms come to dominate the medieval uni-
versity. The development of the quaestio and quodlibet modes, in which pos-
sible objections (from named or nameless other philosophers or philosophical 
positions) are listed and refuted, produces the fiction that the author is, at all 
times, responding to the objections and queries of an interlocutor—although 
such a person might not exist, or might well have written his treatise centuries 
before.26 In philosophical treatises, the names of male authors become synec-
dochal for their own thought. For instance, it is still conventional to note, in 
the present tense no less, that “Aristotle says,” or even that “Aristotle argues” 
(or “Barthes says,” or “Barbara Johnson argues”) when indicating some part of 
the written work attributed to that author. However, in allegorical philosophi-
cal dialogues, the author’s thought is not always spoken by the figure that bears 
the author’s name, even though we now discuss words spoken by Socrates as 
Platonic thought, and words spoken by Lady Philosophy as part of Boethius’ 
philosophical system.27
 26. Alastair Minnis defines the quaestio as a pedagogical process undertaken by a master, 
as if teaching a student. However, in his Medieval Literary Theory and Criticism c.1100–c.1375: 
The Commentary Tradition, ed. A. J. Minnis and A. B. Scott, with assistance from David Wallace 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), he offers a brief and useful definition (212), and plentiful examples 
of entirely textual disputations that do not seem to have even the remotest origins in the class-
room. The quaestio or disputatio seems to be a faux-oral form that performs a fiction of pres-
ence. The origins of the learned quaestio are, of course, in university lectures, where a professor’s 
interlocutors (and straw-man questioners) would be his students, but the written form of such 
disputations certainly brings the dead as well as the living to philosophical account. The quodli-
bet, by comparison, seems to be a mode of topicality. Biannual disputational festivals (at Advent 
and Lent) would be open to the public and cover topics suggested by audience members; this 
was called an a quodlibet disputation. The improvisational answering of these questions con-
stituted something of a public ordeal, and lists of both questions and answers were included in 
manuscripts. Anthony Kenny and Jan Pinborg, in a survey-type article, write that “both types 
of disputation, in the words of P. Mandonnet, were the academic equivalent of the medieval 
tournament-at-arms” (“Medieval Philosophical Literature” in The Cambridge History of Later 
Medieval Philosophy, ed. Norman Kretzmann et al. [Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press 1982], 22). For a survey of this model’s development, see also Anthony Kenny’s chapter 
on disputations in that same volume. 
 27. Helen Solterer, in The Master and Minerva, notes that one exemplary medieval master 
philosopher described himself as dedicated to the goddess of wisdom, Minerva; she notes in 
passing, “intellectual traditions in Europe had long typed knowledge as a woman (scientia), 
 In contrast with the male authors, the female speakers of medieval per-
sonification allegory are the embodied bearers of the authorial position: The 
words placed in the mouth of the figure that represents “the author” would 
not be sufficient without the words of the female personification, even if the 
author’s actual position is worked out between the two protagonists. Lady Phi-
losophy represents a major aspect of Boethius’ philosophical enterprise, while 
“Boethius,” the character in The Consolation of Philosophy, represents another. 
When medieval thinkers wanted to cite Boethius on fortune or predestination, 
they cited words that had been placed in the mouth of Lady Philosophy just 
as often as or, indeed, more often than they cited words spoken by the figure 
named Boethius in the Consolation.28 Is Lady Philosophy anything more than 
Boethius in drag? Is she really permitted to be female? I argue that Boethius 
uses the sheer awesomeness of Philosophy’s grand stature to make her into 
something more than himself, and that he makes her just female enough that 
her gender makes a subtle but significant difference, adding a sheen of philo-
sophical irony to what she says. Here is the incredible oddness, which did not 
fail to strike the French and English writers of subsequent centuries who were 
influenced by Boethius: The authorial persona and its attendant authority is 
split between a female and a male character, or several of each.29
 Medieval personification allegory grapples with a number of major phil-
osophical questions at every turn. It can hardly help itself, since its origin 
and initial purpose were, in part, the writing of philosophy such as Boethius’ 
and its highest form, wisdom, as a female deity (sapientia)” (Solterer, Master and Minerva, 29). 
Solterer goes on to say that, for Abelard, “the bellicose and the feminine come together in the 
form of the disputation. Under the aegis of Minerva, verbal battles are to be waged. That Abe-
lard chooses this goddess as mentor shows how the scholastic activity of disputing comes to be 
figured through women. But if intellectual mastery is represented in part through the feminine, 
where do women figure in?” The present study intends to contribute, in part, to the very long 
answer to this question in its own terms. Solterer’s study is, finally, more concerned with French 
literature and with the figure of female respondents such as Christine de Pizan, and answers 
the question in terms of such “real” women; at the same time, it helps us understand, with fine 
nuance, not the unanswerable question of whether “real women” benefited or were harmed by 
these representations, but “how medieval debates over the injurious power of representation 
were articulated through gender” (Solterer, 216).
 28. In a sense, Geoffrey Chaucer translated the “Consolation of Philosophy” twice: once as 
his relatively faithful Boece, and once when a crucial piece of Boethius’ reasoning is translated 
as a speech by Troilus in Troilus and Criseyde. The former document, naturally, includes Lady 
Philosophy as a character, but the latter (far more famous and significant) puts Philosophy’s 
words into Troilus’ mouth, undoing the original transvestite drama, wherein Boethius wrote his 
own philosophical ideas as words spoken by this grand female figure.
 29. Steven Justice has noted that “medieval commentators recognized the Boethian peda-
gogue as a faculty of the narrator’s soul or of his literary activity. . . . Abelard says that Boethius 
speaks to Philosophy ‘as someone speaking to himself ’” (“Quasi . . . aliquis secum loquens,” 
Peter Abelard, Expositio in hexaemeron, PL 178.760). “The Genres of Piers Plowman,” Viator 19 
(1988): 296, fn. 27.
1Consolation. But personification allegory was not developed as just a passive 
vehicle for something like the popularization of philosophy. Its form has an 
impact on its content in a number of significant ways, which even carry over 
into those vernacular allegories that are not explicitly concerned with philo-
sophical matters.
 The Consolation of Philosophy begins with Lady Philosophy driving away 
the Muses that had been consoling Boethius, dramatically staging a rejec-
tion of the arts in favor of her own philosophico-poetic artistry.30 To drive 
away the Muses is to exchange one kind of female figure for another (another 
kind of swap of Xanthippe for Diotima), but it is also, in the context of this 
early moment in the Consolation of Philosophy, a statement about the allegory’s 
genre refashioned in a dramatic mode. The first way personification allegory 
transforms philosophy follows directly from what was discussed earlier: Medi-
eval allegories stage the scene of philosophy as a dramatic disputation, adding 
detail for emphasis, amusement, and, perhaps, as a reenactment of the peda-
gogical scene they so often reference. Philosophy is often written as a peda-
gogical mode, very obviously designed to impart or make memorable certain 
specific lessons (memento mori chief among those taught by the Body/Soul 
debates) and to translate theological concerns into a more dynamic mode. 
Given how many philosophical and theological treatises are written as dia-
logues (from Augustine’s “On the Free Choice of the Will” or “The Teacher” 
to David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion), it is clear that such 
translations do not necessitate simplification, but that the incorporation of 
narrative into the lesson or treatise transforms the pedagogical scene into one 
that asks questions about the nature and limits of pedagogy, of what kind of 
self there is and, therefore, what it can be taught.
 In addition to its role as an important example of allegory’s philosophical 
potential, Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy demonstrates a way in which 
allegory functions as a staging ground for an issue whose significance waxed 
and waned but remained persistently central in the Middle Ages: the debate 
about the limits and possibilities of free will in a God-ordered world. Personi-
fication allegory is such an apt mode for discussing this issue because of the 
specific limits imposed by allegorical characterization. Even a female Reason 
is not really free to be unreasonable, except in philosophical satire.
 Allegorical characters do not have free will, but they often exist as a way of 
thematizing the limits of the will’s freedom. The question of human freedom 
of will in a context of divine omnipotence and omniscience—the liberty to 
 30. For some of the discussions of Boethius’ prosimetrum as poetry—discussions that tend 
to imply the joke that Philosophy did not drive the Muses away successfully, nor did she want 
to—see Seth Lerer, Boethius and Dialogue: Literary Method in the “Consolation of Philosophy” 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), and Gerald O’Daly, The Poetry of Boethius 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991).
choose sin or salvation, known as liberum arbitrium—was a major philosophi-
cal and theological concern throughout the Middle Ages.31 It appeared in alle-
gory as the question of adhering or not adhering to generic conventions: Must 
a character named Kindness always be fully and adequately kind, a character 
named Sloth never, ever do anything that isn’t characterized by laziness, and 
so forth? The Consolation of Philosophy culminates in a famous discussion 
of free will in the context of God’s omniscience and foreknowledge of events 
in human history.32 And yet the words about freedom of the will, attributed 
to Boethius, are spoken by an allegorical personification, Lady Philosophy, 
a character who must, of necessity, conform to her named nature and enact 
philosophical thinking at all times. She persuades Boethius that God functions 
on an eternal plane, where time functions differently and things that happen 
in a certain causal order for human beings have always-already occurred to 
a divinity who lives in an eternal present. The section of the work that deals 
most explicitly with the problem of the freedom of the will is repeatedly sepa-
rated out and cited (most famously by Chaucer in Troilus’ despairing mono-
logue in Troilus and Criseyde).33
 Lady Philosophy is the prototypical tutelary allegorical figure, setting the 
pattern for many to come, from Bernardus Silvestris’ Noys to Langland’s Holy 
Church. Boethius does not have to highlight the irony that his Consolation of 
Philosophy’s Lady Philosophy is utterly bound to speak philosophically and 
wisely—that she is not free to do otherwise. Other medieval authors think 
through this problem for him, and stage it again and again in their allegorical 
disputations.34 Lady Philosophy speaks at great length, after all, about a human 
free will that she herself is utterly denied by her named nature’s predetermined 
imperative to be wise and decorous, and, indeed, pointing out such constraints 
seems to be part of Boethius’ project in the Consolation. Lady Philosophy even 
 31. For a clear summary, see John M. Bowers, The Crisis of Will in “Piers Plowman” (Wash-
ington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1986).
 32. See Chaucer’s Boece in The Riverside Chaucer, 3rd ed., ed. Larry D. Benson (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1987), 395–470. See also Rita Copeland, Rhetoric, Hermeneutics and Trans-
lation in the Middle Ages: Academic Translations and Vernacular Texts (Cambridge, UK: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1991), 142, in which Copeland argues that the Boece aims to replace 
the Latin Consolation as the academic referent of Chaucer’s own Troilus, in the same way that 
Chaucer aims to replace Boethius as an auctor. 
 33. See Geoffrey Chaucer, “Troilus and Criseyde,” in The Riverside Chaucer, ed. Benson, 
Book IV, lines 953–1085. This passage paraphrases and adapts prose 2 and 3 in Boethius’ Con-
solation of Philosophy. In the Explanatory Notes to this passage, Stephan A. Barney points out 
the striking and witty omission by Chaucer of Boethius’ defense of the will’s freedom, leaving 
this Boethian passage, and Troilus, in a philosophically unnecessary state of despair about the 
inevitability of fate (“Troilus and Criseyde,” in Riverside Chaucer, Bk. IV, l. 1048).
 34. In his translation of The Consolation of Philosophy into Anglo-Saxon, King Alfred re-
names her “Wisdom,” a male character. See King Alfred’s Version of the Consolations of Boethius 
Done into Modern English, with an Introduction, trans. W. J. Sedgefield (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1900).
1tells Boethius, who wonders about this freedom, that “it would be impossible 
for any rational nature to exist without it.”35 Although she is the very personi-
fication of a rational nature, however, Lady Philosophy is fully delimited by 
her name.
 This delimitation by name is something that critics of allegory have seen as 
problematic. Angus Fletcher worried that “an allegory of Justice, for example, 
will omit the contingencies that make a nonrepressive, tolerant justice so dif-
ficult to achieve. It omits the human detail.”36 Continuing to think about the 
particular example of Justice, Gordon Teskey wondered, “what sort of body 
does Justice have?”37 He perhaps answers his own question when he restates it 
a few pages later: “What is the stuff out of which Shamefastness is made? She 
is made of her gender.”38 Perhaps this is true of Shamefastness, but can this be 
true of every single female allegorical personification, and does the “gender” 
that makes up the substance of these personifications change from figure to 
figure?
 The complicated negotiation of gendered embodiment within a discourse 
of universals is evident even in The Consolation of Philosophy’s early medieval 
dialogue. The bodies of allegorical figures can be described in terms of how 
they take up space, what they are wearing, how beautiful or terrifying they 
might appear. But a basic aspect of how they must be described is through 
the gender their bodies take on. When Lady Philosophy enters the cell where 
Boethius is poetically lamenting his fate (and drives away the Muses that had 
been keeping him company), she is described as “awe-inspiring . . . her eyes 
burning and keen beyond the usual power of men.”39 Philosophy’s height 
seems to change over time, and on occasion she seems to pierce the very 
sky and, inconveniently, become “lost to human sight.”40 Unlike many of the 
 35. Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, Bk. V, prose 2, 149, l. 3. “Est, inquit; neque enim 
fuerit ulla rationalis natura quin eidem libertas adsit arbitrii” (Anicii Manlii Severini Boethii 
Philosophiae consolatio, ed. Ludovicus Bieler, Boethius, Opera I Corpus Christianorum, Series 
Latina, 94 [Turnholt, 1957]).
 36. Angus Fletcher, Allegory: The Theory of a Symbolic Mode (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1964), 29, fn. The same example is also taken up in Gordon Teskey’s Allegory and Violence 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).
 37. Teskey, Allegory and Violence, 21. Teskey goes on to argue that “the event of self-predi-
cation, whereby Justice is said to be just, leaves a residue that is not justice but the thing in which 
Justice must inhere in order to be true of itself.” 
 38. Teskey, 23.
 39. Boethius, trans. Watts, 35. “oculis ardentibus et ultra communem hominum valentiam 
perspicacibus” (Colore vivido atque inexhausti vigoris, quamvis ita aevi plena foret ut nullo 
modo nostrae crederetur aetatis, statura discretionis ambiguae; Boethius, ed. Bieler, De conso-
latione Philosophiae, Bk. I, prose 1, l. 5).
 40. In Boethius, ed. Bieler, “Nam nunc quidem ad communem sese hominum mensuram 
cohibebat, nunc vero pulsare caelum summi verticis cacumine videbatur; quae cum altius caput 
extulisset ipsum etiam caelum penetrabat respicientiumque hominum frustrabatur intuitum.” 
female figures that followed her, Philosophy is not described from head to toe, 
a rhetorical trope called effictio and used to excellent effect in the romances 
of the Middle Ages for ladies both beautiful and loathly. Philosophy’s highly 
symbolic dress, though described at some length, is hard to visualize. The 
color of what she is wearing is difficult for Boethius to determine, because in 
order to emphasize the neglect that philosophy suffers in his age, her raiment 
seems to be covered in dust, and has been torn “by the hands of marauders.”41 
Despite all of this pointed avoidance of physical specificity (unto a sort of sur-
real vision of a body constantly in metamorphic flux), the sole stable physical 
quality of Lady Philosophy is her gender.
 Lady Philosophy embodies the contradictions of female personification 
in a way that later readers seemed to notice. Besides the way in which Jean 
de Meun’s Reason and, later, William Langland’s Holy Church respond to 
this convention, translators of Boethius dealt with the problem posed by 
her femininity—in one famous case, by the simple process of eliminating it. 
King Alfred, in his Old English translation of Boethius, took it upon himself 
to regender her as the masculine (and also less overtly scholarly) Wisdom 
(Gesceadwisnes), whereas “Boethius” becomes Mind (Mod). Of course, we 
cannot know why this was done, but it is hard to miss that this is a switch 
that makes the space of philosophy male only. Centuries later, Piers Plowman 
enacts a similar sort of switch when a female character named Anima in that 
poem’s B-text version becomes, in its C-text recension, a character named 
Liberum Arbitrium: curiously, both Lady Philosophy/Wisdom and Anima/
Liberum Arbitrium are characters who discuss the possibilities and limits of 
the will. A key aspect of these Old and Middle English transformations of the 
discussion of free will is that they are conducted by male speakers, a product, 
as the rest of this book argues, of a desire to eliminate the feminine from 
psychological models of the self. In the tradition to which both Alfred and 
Langland are responding, however, Philosophy is female and bound to her 
named nature beyond any freedom to choose or deviate. Given that medieval 
femininity was fenced in by constraints, using a female personification to 
figure a lack of freedom seems only natural; using that female being to figure 
a lack of freedom and to discuss the complex limitations and possibilities of 
free will in the abstract, universal sense is an ironic paradox bordering on 
brilliance.
 The problem of Philosophy’s free will or lack thereof can be understood, 
in part, through the medieval debate about predication, a debate that Boethius 
De consolatione Philosophiae, Bk. I, prose 1, l. 2.
 41. Boethius, trans. Watts. In Bieler, “Eandem tamen vestem violentorum quorumdam 
sciderant manus et particulas quas quisque potuit abstulerant” (De consolatione Philosophiae, 
Bk. I, prose 1, l. 5).
1freely entered into in another of his philosophical works, this time a non- 
allegorical one—his commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge.42 The problem of 
predication is the question of whether, as Plato and neo-Platonists would 
argue, there exists a universal quality, say, “chairness,” that transcends the 
particulars of any given chair. Thinkers such as the fourteenth-century phi-
losopher William of Ockham maintained, on the contrary, that “universals are 
nothing more than names—naturally significant general concepts, primarily, 
and secondarily the conventional signs corresponding to them.”43 Predication 
was a major issue to medieval thinkers. Whether universals did or did not 
exist outside of philosophical debates, allegorical writing guarantees that they 
do exist as literary categories.
 In personification allegory, names are precisely one and the same as the 
categories they describe, with the word Justice naming and describing the char-
acter Justice. Personifications of abstract concepts are these concepts in their 
universal expression, and yet by being brought into a narrative scene, they exit 
the timeless realm of abstraction and begin to function in the sublunar, mortal 
world. They take up bodies, and so might be imagined to suffer the limitations 
that bodily capacity poses. Grammar or convention or the history of dualism 
compels personifications to take up female bodies, thus becoming susceptible 
to a limitation that complicates their functioning as a universal. This compli-
cation, of course, is an effect of this highly gender-inflected culture: Barring a 
burning bush, anything that speaks is a “he” or a “she,” and being a “she” never 
manages to be neutral, even if, as Boethius established in the sixth century, she 
is Philosophy.
the RomAn	De	lA	RoSe  and how Gender Matters
Despite a powerful discourse that considers the gender of allegorical personi-
fications as the arbitrary accident of Latin grammar, medieval authors were 
not entirely blind to the implications of their practices around gender. Even 
if Prudentius and Boethius were quite subtle in the ways they played with the 
 42. I am referring here in very shorthand form (because to give the discussion justice would 
be a chapter in itself) to the debate that was inaugurated by Isagoge and continued through 
the fifteenth century; the first few centuries of this debate are well encapsulated in Paul Vin-
cent Spade’s edition of Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals: Porphyry, Boethius, 
Abelard, Duns Scotus, Ockham, ed. and trans. Paul Vincent Spade (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 
1994).
 43. The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. Norman Kretzmann et al. 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 1982), 434. 
gendering and embodiment of personifications, by the twelfth century Jean 
de Meun had noticed and humorously deplored some of the implications of 
using female figures to represent the reasonable, the rational, and the philo-
sophical.
 The Roman de la Rose demands to be read as a psychological allegory, and, 
insofar as it contains a series of characters that seem to represent the differ-
ent states of mind possessed by a single person, it is one (even if not a work 
of psychological aid as such). The psyche being allegorized is not the male 
narrator’s, however, and this poses a problem. The poem is an anatomy of a 
female being, the Rose, whose being, as Guillaume de Lorris informs us early 
on, represents that of a lady whose identity is being concealed. The different 
manifestations of the Rose encountered by the Lover are aspects of the self that 
deal with the social world only. The Roman de la Rose contains nothing that 
would tell us about the relationship of the Rose’s will to her soul’s immortality, 
about her psyche apart from its relational aspects. Consequently, the Roman 
de la Rose does not offer a psychology that can be used to describe and diag-
nose the relation between the different sins of a single confessing subject, say, 
or what a woman or man is in the privacy of his or her own soul—the battle 
of an individual’s personal psychomachia. Such a description is not the poem’s 
intent, and for the purposes of this study, these limitations prevent it from 
being usefully read as a work of sowlehele in the way that debates between the 
personified Body and Soul of a single being might be, even if they are written 
in Latin.
 In his portion of the Roman de la Rose, during a pivotal scene that parodies 
the teacher-student model made famous by Boethius, Jean de Meun playfully 
works through the implications of using female allegorical figures to advance 
a (male) author’s intellectual agenda through a marked exaggeration of one 
character’s femininity. In this scene, the Lover hears the lessons of Reason, 
Jean de Meun’s version of Lady Philosophy. But this Reason, who should be 
advising the lover to be reasonable, per her named nature, is gradually over-
whelmed by the Lover’s attractiveness and offers herself as his paramour, a 
replacement for the Rose after which he quests. She is, of course, in the process 
offering him the option of being a lover of the rational, but the flirtatiousness 
of the tone is hard to miss:
Nevertheless, I don’t want you to live without a friend. If it pleases you, turn 
your attention to me. Am I not a lady beautiful, noble, fit to serve a worthy 
man, even the emperor of Rome? I want to become your friend, and if you 
wish to hold to me, do you know what my love will be worth to you? . . . I 
am the daughter of God, the sovereign father who made and shaped me so. 
1See here His form, and see yourself in my clear face. No girl of such descent 
ever had such power of loving as have I, for I have leave of my father to take 
a friend and be loved.44
This moment is a late and highly stylized development in the tradition of 
female speakers in medieval allegory, a moment of vernacular response to 
already established tendencies in the Latin authorities.
 The thirteenth-century personification allegory of the Roman de la Rose 
represents a crucial step in the development of medieval psychological alle-
gory, even if it is too busy being ironic to enact what Middle English scribes 
were to call sowlehele. Particularly in Jean de Meun’s continuation of Guil-
laume de Lorris’s allegory of love, the poem both synthesizes and parodies 
a huge swath of the Latin intellectual (and allegorical) tradition, while also 
actively engaging in the philosophical debates of its time. But despite Guil-
laume de Lorris’s promise that his allegory will represent the whole of the art 
of love, despite many characters’ attempts to advise the narrator in surviving 
overwhelming emotion, this psychology is not intended for healing. Even so, 
Jean de Meun’s playfulness about allegorical gender (in the case of Reason, and 
in the queer figure of Bel Acueil, a male entity personifying a woman’s initial 
welcoming to a man) shows that contradictions like the one between the pur-
ported irrationality of women and a female Reason were clear to at least some 
medieval authors.
 The strong associative link between “woman” and “body” was discussed in 
the Introduction; it is both literalized and upended by Jean de Meun. Female 
forms were considered apt vessels for Philosophy or Reason for reasons beyond 
Romance grammar: By becoming personifications, what were abstractions 
like “philosophy” actually gaining? It at least seems that they are gaining a 
(female) body to inhabit, in a world where flesh was endlessly analogized with 
that which is gendered female. To equate the body with femininity is to place 
it very low on any epistemological hierarchy. This had worked for as long as 
the source of all true knowledge was divine illumination, an Augustinian con-
cept immensely influential throughout the Middle Ages. However, with the 
 44. Guillaume de Lorris and Jean de Meun, The Romance of the Rose, 3rd ed., trans. Charles 
Dahlberg (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 166–67. “Ne porquant si ne veull 
je mie / que tu demeurges sanz amie. / Met, s’il te plest, en moi t’entente. / Sui je pas bele dame 
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laume de Lorris et Jean de Meun, Le Roman de la Rose, ed. Felix Lecoy (Paris: Librarie Honoré 
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rediscovery of Aristotle’s De Anima in the early thirteenth century, it suddenly 
appeared that an authority (the authority) had argued that the bodily senses 
were also a crucial source of knowledge. Aristotle’s interest in the body as a 
source of knowledge sponsored a movement in Latin-language philosophical 
circles that may have prompted Jean de Meun, ever the most ironic of ver-
nacular commentators on philosophical trends, to remember that the new 
scientific/philosophical interest in the body might have some impact on the 
conceptual understanding of “woman,” long equated with it.
 By the thirteenth century, to give the entire notion of “the body” over to the 
realm of femininity, symbolically at least, is to relinquish a necessary source of 
knowledge. This did not mean a wholesale turn toward studying the ancillary 
problem of “women,” of course—rather, it tended to result in a decoupling of 
“woman” and “body,” for many but not for Jean de Meun. According to Sarah 
Kay’s analysis of the epistemology of embodiment in the Roman de la Rose, 
it is as if Jean de Meun half-jokingly offers the following new take on the 
workings of dualism: “If women are to body as man is to mind, and the body 
is a necessary source of knowledge, then women are a necessary source of 
knowledge.” This seems to justify Jean de Meun’s explicitly sexual rewriting of 
Guillaume de Lorris’s romantic quest for the love of the Rose, and its profound 
interest in getting inside the Castle where the Rose is imprisoned, if even by 
the back door. The philosophical quest for knowing a woman and the sexual 
quest for “knowing” a woman are one in Jean’s continuation of the Roman de 
la Rose.45
 Jean de Meun is not necessarily alone in seeing the humor in medieval 
personification allegory and its generic conventions. Guillaume de Lorris’s 
section of the Roman de la Rose also tweaks the intersection of philosophy, 
psychology, and allegorical narrative, as is evident in another pivotal but small 
detail: how characters do or do not possess free will given their allegorical 
names, a question addressed earlier in terms of Boethius’ Lady Philosophy. In 
Guillaume’s portion, early in the poem, a character named Dangier (usually 
translated as Resistance) makes a small concession to the Lover. When he is 
caught and reprimanded by Shame and Fear, he is angrily reminded that he 
ought to behave as standoffishly as his name implies:
“How can you sleep at a time like this?” she said, “with all this mis- 
fortune? . . . Have you been lying down now? Get up immediately and stop 
up all the holes in this hedge; be kind to no man. It doesn’t agree with 
your name for you to do anything but make trouble. If Fair Welcoming is 
 45. Sarah Kay, “Women’s Body of Knowledge: Epistemology and Misogyny in the Romance 
of the Rose,” in Framing Medieval Bodies, ed. Sarah Kay and Miri Rubin (Manchester, UK: Man-
chester University Press, 1994; New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 211–35, 232.
1open and sweet, you are to be cruel and violent, full of offensive words that 
wound.”46
She goes on to tell a proverb about how a buzzard cannot become a sparrow 
hawk, transparently explaining that Dangier, a “villain,” cannot rise above his 
station no matter what he does. Dangier is an example of an allegorical charac-
ter who stretches the limits of his named nature until forced to snap back into 
its confines: Insofar as he is a person, and subject to persuasion and charm, he 
can be nice to the Lover, but insofar as he is an allegorical figure for the Rose’s 
reluctance to yield to the Lover, he must not. Dangier’s will is not entirely free 
because he is an allegorical character; but of course the will of a serf subject to 
a lord is not entirely free, either. The difference is of both scope and the nature 
of allegorical characterization as a literary conceit.
 What permits Jean de Meun to play in this way with the contradictions 
that structure medieval thinking is the conceptual flexibility medieval alle-
gory affords. This form has the capacity to respond to shifts in philosophical 
thinking, like the one referenced previously, in a very literal way, by dramati-
cally staging how the implications of such philosophy work. When allegorical 
figures speak, argue, or even do battle with one another, they are staging a way 
of thinking about the self by thinking about embodiment. Notions such as 
Philosophy or Liberty move from existence as abstractions to taking on some 
sort of body, as well as a moment in time and a voice.
Even before Guillaume de Lorris and Jean de Meun had created their witty 
critique of allegorical gender and the mode’s ability to limit character’s free 
will, the tradition of using female figures to represent abstractions had per-
sisted from its inauguration by Prudentius and Boethius. Philosophical alle-
gory experienced a particular flowering in the twelfth century, with a group 
of thinkers inspired by Plato’s Timaeus and one another.47 This group included 
 46. Dahlberg, 77; “Comment dormez-vous à ceste hore, / Fet-ele, par male avanture? . . . Levés 
tost sus, et si bouchiés / Tous les partuis de ceste haie, / Et ne portés nului manaie: / Il n’afiert 
mie à vostre non, / Que vous faciès se anui non. / Se Bel-Acueil est frans et dous, / Et vous, soies 
fel et estous, / Et plains de ramposne et d’outrage: / Vilains qui est cortois, c’est rage . . . .” Lecoy, 
3814–15; 3828–36.
 47. For some of the other late antique/early medieval works that also took up the conven-
tion of female tutelary figures, see Martianus Capella’s The Marriage of Philology and Mercury, 
written in the early fifth century (available in English as Martianus Capella and the Seven Liberal 
Arts, trans. William Harris Stahl and Richard Johnson, with E. L. Burge [New York: Columbia 
not only those who were directly linked with the cathedral school of Chartres 
but also those who picked up and extended their interest in humanist studies 
and literary applications of Platonizing philosophy.48 Among their many other 
accomplishments, the twelfth-century thinkers and poets whose writings and 
sometimes lives have often been linked as the “Chartrians”—Bernard of Char-
tres (although, apart from John of Salisbury’s quotations, his verifiable works 
are lost), Thierry of Chartres, Gilbert of Poitiers, William of Conches, and John 
of Salisbury—laid the foundation for a merging of philosophy, psychology, and 
literary allegory. In what follows, this book steps away from the chronological 
sequence of famous and influential works, Psychomachia–Consolation–Roman 
de la Rose, to examine works that are considerably less famous but deal very 
directly with the matter of how the self is organized, through staging debates 
between the Body and the Soul.
 The debated and useful notion that such a thing as a Chartrian “school” 
existed contributed importantly to another idea, something of a commonplace 
in contemporary medieval studies, that the twelfth century “discovered” the 
individual, to use the title of Colin Morris’s study. More recently, however, 
the argument that it was individuality that the twelfth century discovered has 
come to be replaced with the contention that what was discovered, or perhaps 
reformulated, in that era was something more like psychology, or rather ways 
of talking about the self both descriptively and normatively.49 This “discovery” 
University Press, 1977]), and Theodulus’ extraordinarily popular school text, the Eclogues, a de-
bate between Alithia (Truth) and Phronesis (Intelligence). See Ten Latin Schooltexts of the Later 
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1can be described in terms of its contribution to twelfth-century science. In Sci-
ences and the Self in Medieval Poetry, a study that examines two psychological 
allegories that offer the narrative of a single self ’s development, James Simpson 
has shown how John Gower’s Confessio Amantis as well as Alan of Lille’s Anti-
claudianus function as “psychological allegories of the individual soul.”50 Simp-
son goes on to write that “both poems are structured around a psychology, and 
both imply a very subtle psychology of learning, which profoundly modifies 
the scientific content of either poem. It is central to the argument of the whole 
book, then, that both poems are coherent psychological allegories, anatomiz-
ing and representing the education of a single soul.” Twelfth-century writers 
were certainly doing more than setting the stage for the specifically vernacular 
version of sowlehele psychology of the Middle English debates between the 
Body and the Soul, but those thirteenth-century debates would not have been 
possible without the kind of thinking about the soul and the body that was 
being done in the neo-Platonic allegories of the twelfth century.
 The earliest standalone Body/Soul dialogues on record seem to have been 
written in Old English, not Latin, as sermons and homilies. “Body/Soul dia-
logue,” however, may be a misnomer for these Old English works, “Soul and 
Body I,” “Soul and Body II,” and the “Worcester fragments”: Before the twelfth 
century, no Body actually offers counterarguments to the Soul’s accusations 
or, it seems, talks back at all.51 The earliest work that took the Body’s speaking 
hope for finding a clear moment when the notion of the individual was invented faded and, I 
believe, came to be replaced with a series of complex eruptions of rhetorics of selfhood, none of 
which could claim originary status. Ultimately, the irresolvable questions about how and when 
our notion of the self came to exist may be partially resolved through close inquiry into the dis-
ciplinary discourses (like psychology, of the medical, theological, and sowlehele varieties) that 
emerged to both describe and normalize whatever it is that persons were thinking they were.
 50. Simpson, Sciences and the Self, 13.
 51. The division and personified conflict between body and soul was also developed in the 
tradition of Christian legends and homilies, visions of dead bodies whose souls lament as they 
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College Monographs No. 8]. However, the most proximate sources for the debate are homilies: 
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See also two important Latin sources, the Nonantola version of the Body/Soul legend, originally 
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article) and a pseudo-Augustinian homily, Sermon 49 of the collection Sermones Ad Fratres in 
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Sources and Analogues of Old English Poetry: The Major Latin Texts in Translation (Cambridge, 
UK: D. S. Brewer, 1976). See also Douglas Moffat, The Soul’s Address to the Body: The Worcester 
role seriously and is therefore considered in this study as a Body/Soul debate 
was written in Latin around 1100. Hildebert of Lavardin, Archbishop of Tours, 
produced an allegorical debate between a narrator named Hildebert and his 
soul called the “Liber de Querimonia.”52 Hildebert may have been drawing 
on a much older tradition of sermon literature but fusing it with the conven-
tions of the Latin personification allegory and the philosophical work done by 
the disputational mode. The only other early debate of this kind, the twelfth- 
century Latin “Royal Debate,” also known as “Nuper huiuscemodi,” is pre-
served in a single manuscript and organized as a series of very long set-piece 
speeches rather than as dynamic interchange.53
 It is unclear whether Hildebert’s personification allegory was the first or 
one of the first full-fledged debates between the Body and the Soul, but it was 
certainly part of a very early moment in the history of this homiletic trope’s 
emergence as a popular literary/didactic hybrid genre in which the Body really 
did talk back to the Soul. Hildebert’s work also provides the most direct and 
fruitful link back to the allegorical traditions of Boethius and Prudentius. Cer-
tainly, Hildebert was known to be in correspondence with the best minds of 
his day (including Anselm of Canterbury, Hugh of Cluny, and Bernard of 
Clairvaux), and may have been particularly well-positioned to observe and 
influence the way in which thinking about the body/soul relation in the homi-
letic tradition (speaking Soul, silent Body) may have become unsatisfying. 
He was also quite aware that there was another, Boethian tradition to draw 
from to create his own work, and he did so.54 This study does not attempt to 
Fragments, ed. Douglas Moffat (East Lansing, MI: Colleagues Press, 1987), and The Old English 
Soul and Body, ed. and trans. Douglas Moffat (Cambridge, UK: D. S. Brewer: 1990).
 52. According to Bridget K. Balint’s dissertation on the “Liber de Querimonia,” the Cosmo-
graphia appears in three of the twenty-two medieval manuscripts that contain Hildebert’s al-
legorical debate between Hildebert and Anima, which represents a number of scribes thinking 
that the two works went together nicely. See Balint, “Hildebert of Lavardin’s ‘Liber de querimo-
nia’ in Its Cultural Context” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2002), 90; see also n. 65.
 53. Eleanor K. Heningham, editor of the so-called Royal debate, argues for the Royal’s pri-
macy as the first Latin debate to stage a disagreement between the Body and the Soul. According 
to her research, it is likely that the “Royal” was a major source for the “Visio Philiberti,” which, 
in turn, was a major source for the thirteenth-century English Body/Soul debates discussed 
in the next chapter. Heningham was unaware of the existence of Hildebert of Lavardin’s work, 
and it is not clear how she would have positioned her argument had she taken his dialogue into 
account: She dates the “Royal” to the first half of the twelfth century, but there is no evidence 
proving it earlier or later than Hildebert’s; my chapter discusses Hildebert at more length simply 
because he is the link between the Boethian tradition and the Body/Soul dialogues. The “Royal” 
debate, also known by its incipit as “Nuper huiuscemodi,” is edited and introduced by Hening-
ham in An Early Latin Debate of the Body and Soul (Menasha, WI: George Banta Publishing 
Company, 1937).
 54. The preceding, like most of my factual information about Hildebert of Lavardin (and a 
useful translation of his allegory), comes from Balint, “Hildebert of Lavardin’s ‘Liber de queri-
monia.’” Balint, Ordering Chaos (2009), is the revised version of this dissertation. The Latin 
1trace a tradition of influence, although Bridget Kennedy Balint has argued 
persuasively that the “Liber de querimonia” “stands at the head of a stream of 
body-and-soul debates composed in Latin during the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries.”55 Instead of engaging this claim and the developmental model such 
engagement would entail, this study looks at selected resonant moments in 
the history of the kind of disputation that was being used as medicine for 
the soul. Hildebert’s poem certainly was that, and more. According to Peter 
Orth, the debate’s editor, Hildebert’s version of the Body/Soul debate survives 
in twenty-two manuscripts, which would be a great many if it were a Middle 
English work but is not so many for a work written in Latin by a significant 
figure in the Church hierarchy. While Hildebert’s poem seems to have been 
disseminated far better than the roughly contemporary “Royal Debate” (extant 
in a single copy), it was certainly not the most popular example of its type. The 
reasons for this are, most likely, contained in the allegory’s rather surprising 
and convoluted plot, which revolves almost entirely around the politics of 
allegorical gender.
 Hildebert of Lavardin’s “Liber de Querimonia” is a hybrid of the homiletic 
Soul’s lament and the scene of a narrator consoled by a tutelary female figure 
embodying some abstraction. This new strain of poetry depicting the contents 
of the self as divisible into a Body and Soul was written in part as tribute to the 
dialogic allegorical structure of the Consolation of Philosophy, which, accord-
ing to Balint, was the central influence on the text in terms of vocabulary and 
style. Like Boethius, Hildebert uses the prosimetrum form, alternating poetry 
with prose. Like Boethius’ Consolation, Hildebert’s “Liber de Querimonia” 
imagines the soul as a lady arrived to lecture to a hapless narrator bearing 
the name of the prosimetrum’s author. Hildebert’s narrator, rather than being 
imprisoned, has been absorbed in rebuilding his house, which had fallen 
down as a result of a fire (this circumstance and the Soul’s lamentations about 
its lack of proper lodging may be allegorical gestures toward an ultimately 
underdeveloped “body as castle” trope, discussed in a different context in 
chapter 4).56
 The “Liber” establishes itself as both like and unlike the surviving Old 
English homilies containing an address by the Soul to the Body. Instead of 
being a hulk of mute, dead flesh, the figure representing bodiliness is a living 
edition of Hildebert’s allegory appears as Peter Orth, ed., Hildebert’s Prosimetrum De Querimo-
nia und die Gedichte eines Anonymus (Vienna: Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 
Arbeiten zür mittel- und neulateinischen Philologie 6, 2000).
 55. Balint, Ordering Chaos, Appendix II, 174.
 56. Balint, Ordering Chaos, Appendix II, 174. “Incendio domus mea corruerat et reficiendi 
studio sollicitus anhelabam: ligna cedi preceperam, quadrari lapides et expensas operi pro-
videri; totus eram in hoc et omissis pontificalibus negotiis, quo in loco ponerem fundamenta, 
quantum palatia extenderem, nunc intuitu, nun arundine metiebar” (Orth, 1–5, 989A).
narrator named Hildebert. Perhaps because Hildebert of Lavardin is using 
his own name as that of the narrator, the Body makes cogent and reasonable 
arguments in its defense, using skilled rhetoric. Hildebert objects that the Soul 
“ascribe[s] the entire cause of your corruption to the exterior man. . . . [Y]ou 
have used the body as your accomplice, [ . . . ] as a master uses a slave, or as 
an artisan a tool. . . . Why then do you paint another, an innocent, with the 
dye of your crime?”57 Naturally, the Soul still wins the argument, citing the 
authority of the Church Fathers, specifically the narrative of the Fall and the 
equation of Eve with the sinful flesh: “Our flesh was tempted, woman was 
tempted . . . because of the flesh inciting and the spirit incited as though by her 
husband and spouse, that first transgression came to be.”58 Eve, the “woman” 
here, represents the original “wife” side of the pair being imagined; that “wife” 
is the body, or the flesh, and it is also, in the context of this dialogue, Hildebert, 
the narrator.
 In his prosimetrum, Hildebert of Lavardin, like Boethius before him, 
makes use of his tutelary figure’s gender as a way of making a philosophical 
point: Whether one reads the work as an interpretation of Boethius or an 
innovation similar to Jean de Meun’s coquettish Reason depends on what one 
thinks of the Consolation of Philosophy as a work of self-conscious literary art. 
However, whether imitating a subtle point unsubtly or differentiating himself 
from Boethius, who missed the implications of his own writing, Hildebert 
assiduously addresses himself to the problem posed by having the top tier of 
the hierarchy permanently occupied by a female figure. By the personification 
allegory’s end, he effectively inverses the genders of his speakers, and his Soul 
establishes herself as “husband” to the unruly and appetitive “wife,” Hilde-
bert’s narrator, Hildebert. Late in the prosimetrum, after Hildebert has become 
Anima’s “proud” wife, the allegory’s last lines look back at its beginning with 
horror in this way: “A monstrosity [comes about]: the flesh becomes hus-
band, the spirit, wife.” 59 The situation being described as monstrous toward 
the allegory’s end is actually a perfectly apt description of the quasi-Boethian 
situation (the spirit gendered female, the body somehow gendered male, and 
 57. Balint, Ordering Chaos, 181. “Hinc autem specialiter moveor, quod totam corruptionis 
tue causam exteriori ascribis homini visa . . .” (19–21). . . . “Tu autem ad ea, [que tibi ipsi noxia 
sunt], ita ministro uteris corpore sicut dominus servo, sicut artifex instrumento” (Orth, 80, 
995C–996A).
 58. “temptata est enim caro, temptata est mulier . . . ut ex subigente carne et subacto spiritu 
velut ex marito et coniuge primum illud gigneretur delictum . . . (Balint, Ordering Chaos, 184; 
Orth, 85, 998A–998B, 31, 35–37).
 59. Balint, Ordering Chaos, 190. In Latin, this line is: “Inque creando nefas caro fit vir, 
spiritus uxor” (Orth, 95, 11, 1004A). The phrase “proud wife” occurs in this passage: “. . . in 
the manner of a strict regimen or the stern and scrupulous admonishment of a husband to his 
proud wife.” Balint, Ordering Chaos, 186. In Latin: “. . . quam vel egro dieta vel superbe coniugi 
severior et morosa mariti correctio” (Orth, 90, 118, 1001A). 
1the two apparently married to one another) that began the “Liber de Querimo-
nia.” The speaker’s initial gender and marital arrangement is to be retrospec-
tively understood as a terrible perversion, while, for a contemporary reader, 
the fact that the genders of the prosimetrum’s two protagonists prove to be 
exchangeable cannot help seeming strangely, startlingly queer. This queerness 
may support the argument made in Tison Pugh’s Queering Medieval Genres 
about Hildebert of Lavardin as a poet who queers medieval genres, although 
Pugh’s argument concerns Hildebert’s lyrics and does not touch upon this 
debate.60
 According to Balint’s succinct summary of the gender problem plaguing 
the “Liber de Querimonia”: “In Hildebert’s universe, the soul must be mascu-
line in order to be virtuous; in order to reclaim virtue, Anima, the fallen bride 
of Christ, must assert authority over Hildebert, and the most effective way to 
do so is to be vir to Hildebert’s uxor.”61 The narrator, Hildebert, must undergo 
a conceptual sex-change in the course of the allegory in order for a proper 
hierarchical relationship to be established between himself (as Body) and his 
own soul. He does so, tells us that he’s doing so, and notes the strangeness of 
so doing.
 60. Tison Pugh’s chapter on Hildebert of Lavardin and two other Latin poets in Queering 
Medieval Genres (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) discusses a contradiction in Hildebert’s 
poetic corpus. Among Hildebert’s lyrics, there are some praising same-sex love (these are set 
in a classical past) and others sternly condemning sodomy. Indeed, in the poem “De mali-
tia saeculi,” Hildebert characterized same-sex desire as the “sexual incarnation of the fallen 
world . . . [which] can only be conquered by the flesh being ruled by the mind.” The poem 
reads, “Et, vice mutata, caro jam nimium dominata / Mentis ad imperium, det sibi servitium,” 
which Pugh translates as “Turn things around again, and let flesh, which has excessively domi-
nated, / Give service to the command of the mind” (Pugh, Queering, 36). Pugh is quoting and 
translating Les Mélanges poétiques d’Hildebert de Lavardin, ed. Barthélemy Hauréau (Paris: 
Pedone-Lauriel, 1882), 68–69. This Hildebert, who insists that the same-sex loving flesh be 
conquered, closely resembles the author of a marriage model for Body/Soul relations, but seems 
to contradict the Hildebert of the boy-love poems “Cum peteret puerum” (“When He Sought 
the Boy”) and “Phoebus de interitu Hyacinthi” (“Phoebus on the Death of Hyacinth”), which 
are discussed in Pugh, 33–34. Pugh argues that, though his poems about boy-love may or may 
not tell us something about Hildebert’s real and hidden desires, the celebration as well as the 
condemnation of sodomy in his poetic corpus exists because medieval writers “could have 
believed that same-sex acts were both good and bad, both salvific and damning [because] . . . a 
significant strand of biblical teaching emphasized that the mighty and powerful shall be lowered 
and the weak and helpless raised in the kingdom of heaven” (25).
 61. Balint, “Liber de Querimonia,” 66. Balint notes, “If we had begun with an appearance of 
a personified, female caro to a soul named Hildebert, all conflict would have been averted. As it 
is, though, the author reestablishes body and soul in their proper places by demoting Hildebert 
to wifely status, and restoring the soul to superiority by reassigning its grammatical gender 
and its status within the marriage metaphor,” 64. Somehow, readers of the allegory cannot help 
thinking in the subjunctive about all the problems Hildebert could have avoided—but surely he 
didn’t avoid them for a good reason. See also Balint’s more complex revisiting of this argument, 
Ordering Chaos, 89–92.
 There are a number of words for “soul” in Latin, many of which are used 
interchangeably, in arbitrary or in deliberate fashion. The main difference 
between them seems to be the gender of the nouns: In addition to anima (f), 
there are animus (m) and spiritus (m). Barbara Newman gives a very clear 
description of the convention of including only Anima in personification alle-
gory:
The semantic fields of anima (f.) and animus (m.) overlap, but animus is 
more commonly linked with the “higher” mental faculties—mind, spirit, 
purpose, imagination, courage, will—while anima is linked with the vital 
breath and the “lower” faculty of quickening the body. One might have 
expected medieval writers, with their well-known preference for the mental 
over the corporeal, to personify and valorize the animus rather than the 
anima, but they almost never did.62
In medieval Latin debates between the Body and the Soul, the Soul is most 
often referred to as “anima,” which is also true of the Latin titles given in 
manuscripts to Middle English, Anglo-Norman, and Old French Body/Soul 
debates. In addition to corpus, corporis (neut), the most frequently used word 
for “body,” there is also caro, carnis (f). These last two should map nicely onto 
the body/flesh distinction, with the feminine noun standing in for the fallible 
flesh, but, in practice, these are often used interchangeably. Latin-language 
authors, therefore, have a wide latitude in organizing the gender dynamic 
of the relationship between body and soul, and yet the most common form 
remains very stable.
 The most standard definition of the soul’s relationship with the body is 
given in a well-disseminated pseudo-Augustinian text, De Spiritu et Anima, 
most likely written by a Cistercian monk. The definition this treatise offers 
has become standard, even if the text it appears within never quite enters the 
philosophical canon: “The soul is a substance which participates in reason and 
is so fashioned as to rule the body” [animus est substantia quaedam rationis 
particeps, regendo corpori accomodata].”63 This tag seems to have been quite 
 62. Newman, 36.
 63. A. V. C. Schmidt discusses the De Spiritu et Anima as a possible source for the Libe-
rum Arbitrium section of Piers Plowman, citing its usefulness as “a kind of encyclopaedia of 
psychology, which was widely read in the Middle Ages. This highly eclectic work attempts to 
synthesize Platonic, Aristotelian, and Biblical ideas. . . . [Such works] formed one of the chief 
sources, if not the chief source, of psychological doctrine and terminology” A. V. C. Schmidt, 
“Langland and Scholastic Philosophy,” Medium Aevum 38.2 (1969): 144. Schmidt offers a brief 
analysis of De Spiritu et Anima, William of Thierry’s De Natura Corporis et Anima, and Cassio-
dorus’ De Anima. According to Schmidt, these works were such useful sources for psychologi-
cal knowledge because they were “noncontroversial” and “accessible,” and used a less technical 
1common. What is distinctive is that its choice of terminology for body and 
soul [animus (m) and corpus (n)] is not used in the literature that reflects this 
definition with the most clarity—Latin Body/Soul debates, with Hildebert’s 
“Liber de Querimonia” as just the earliest example.
 It would have been far simpler to begin with a dominating, perhaps mas-
culine Soul (animus or spiritus) who would justly rule over the narrator/Body. 
If the Soul were masculine, the Body could even be either caro, carnis (f), 
the Soul’s subservient wife, or corpus, corporis (neut); it would not necessar-
ily matter. Later medieval English authors do just this, positing a masculine 
Soul’s domination of a masculine Body and fully excluding the feminine—this, 
in fact, is the literary/linguistic development traced in the next two chapters. 
Hildebert, however, seems too committed to his Boethian modus operandi to 
begin the work with this simple arrangement; instead, he achieves the proper 
gender hierarchy in an incredibly convoluted manner whose progress makes 
up most of the matter of the “debate.”
 Why set up the task of achieving the “correct” gendered hierarchy to be so 
difficult? Not only does it prove morally unacceptable; it also seems to neces-
sitate a lengthy discussion of female sexual sinfulness. Somehow, the hetero-
sexual dyad of husband and wife seems to suggest, to Hildebert-the-author’s 
apparent discomfort, ongoing conjugal relations taking place within the self. 
Sex is a specter haunting this debate, as indeed it seems to haunt the rhetoric 
of all Body/Soul debates (notwithstanding the fact that sex with another aspect 
of oneself can, at best, be understood as narcissism). In Hildebert of Lavardin’s 
rendering of this problematic theme, Anima’s lament to Hildebert, at the alle-
gory’s beginning, is entirely about sexual sin: She complains, at some length, 
about having been prostituted by her own servant girl. In the “Liber,” whether 
because it is early or because it is idiosyncratic, that servant, the sinful ancilla, 
is the third character, a silent ill-doer in the Hildbert/Anima dialogue.64 And 
yet, as the allegory proceeds and it turns out that Hildebert is the Body of 
this put-upon Anima, his defensiveness and his eventual regret make it seem 
as though he is shouldering the blame for Anima’s mistreatment. In terms 
language. Surprisingly, he contrasts the accessibility of these encyclopedic works with “the later 
disputation-form of the scholastic writers” (which debates rather than merely asserting a set of 
theories). De Spiritu et Anima is available in English translation, appearing in Three Treatises on 
Man: A Cistercian Anthropology, ed. and with an introduction by Bernard McGinn, Cistercian 
Fathers Series 24 (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1977). De Spiritu et Anima appears 
in this collection under the title “Treatise on the Spirit and the Soul,” translated by Erasmo Leiva 
and Sr. Benedicta Ward SLG.
 64. Balint notes that “the popularity of this metaphor [domina/ancilla] to represent a 
proper hierarchical relationship cannot be overstated” and cites examples from Augustine’s In 
Epistolam Joannis ad Parthos X, Geoffrey of Vinsauf ’s Poetria Nova, and Peter Damien’s Lettre 
sur la toute-puissance divine. Balint, PhD diss., 7n.
of fault or guilt, Hildebert-qua-Body and the servant girl seem to become a 
single being, as if Body and Flesh, which begin as separate characters, come 
to be viewed as a single, sinning whole—but somehow this union permits the 
normative, divinely sanctioned economy of a “proper” marriage of Soul and 
Body (with the Soul as husband) to exist.
 In the years that followed the writing of Hildebert’s allegory, a tradition 
of Latin Body/Soul debate came into being. Some debates survive in single 
manuscript copies, such as the one that Hans Walther, its editor, titled “Streit 
zwischen Korper und Seele” (also known by the incipit “Conpar mea nobilis”) 
and the “Altercacio Carnis et Spiritus” (incipit “O Caro, cara vilitas”), analyzed 
thoroughly and well by Michel-Andre Bossy in a 1976 article in Comparative 
Literature.65 In both poems, the flesh and sexuality are inextricably linked, and 
the Soul is simply disgusted by the Body’s propensities, instead of being in any 
way implicated in them by marriage or partnership. In a way, these poems 
can be seen as participating in the tradition of Hildebert’s “Liber”; they might 
also, in naming the Body as sinning flesh, be somewhat guilty of a Manichean 
rejection of the bodily that other Body/Soul debates adamantly refuse. The 
Body/Soul debate with the greatest dissemination, however, was a peculiar 
thirteenth-century poem usually referred to as the “Visio Philiberti.”
 The “Visio Philiberti” is a hugely popular poem that richly deserves an 
entire study of its own. It survives in at least 131 manuscripts, making it a 
Latin-language best-seller, and this plentitude alone apparently poses such an 
immense challenge to editors and critics that it has hardly ever been edited 
or studied, a gap that Neil Cartlidge has recently started to remedy with his 
2006 Medium Aevum article.66 In the limited terms of this study, the poem 
 65. Michel-Andre Bossy, “Medieval Debates of Body and Soul,” Comparative Literature 28 
(1976): 144–63, 154. “Conpar mea nobilis” is edited, along with “O Caro, cara vilitas,” in Hans 
Walther, Das Streitgedicht in der Lateinischen Literatur des Mittelalters. Vol. 5, Pt. 2 of Quellen 
und Untersuchungen zur Lateinischen Philologie des Mittelalters (Munich: Oskar Beck, 1920).
 66. Neil Cartlidge argues, quite persuasively, that there are probably many more copies 
in addition to the 131 identified by Walther (Walther claims to have identified 132, but Car-
tlidge points out that one among that number is a placeholder for a missing and unexamined 
manuscript). Neil Cartlidge, “In the Silence of a Midwinter Night: A Re-Evaluation of the Visio 
Philiberti,” Medium Aevum 75: 1 (2006): 24–46. There are several fairly similar versions of the 
“Visio Philiberti.” The more popular, with 131 copies (incipit “Noctis sub silentio”) has been 
edited by Thomas S. Wright as part of the collection, The Latin Poems Commonly Attributed to 
Walter Mapes (London: Camden Society, 1841). Attribution to Walter Mapes has always been 
questioned and has largely been debunked in the twentieth century. However, a very similar 
poem, with the incipit “Vir quidam existerat dudum hermita,” was edited by Edelstand du Méril 
in Poésies populaires antérieures au XIIe siècle (Paris, 1843), 217–30. There is an also an older 
edition by Theodor Georg von Karajan, in Frühlingsgabe für Freunde älterer Literatur (Vienna, 
1839). The “Visio Philiberti” appears in partial form on the verso (164v) of a manuscript, the 
Cotton Caligula A xi, which contains a copy of Piers Plowman B that begins on the following 
recto (f. 165r). However, I have been unable to determine with any certainty whether both 
1represents a different, although related, strain of thought about the Body and 
its position vis-à-vis the Soul, a richly philosophical representation of this rela-
tionship as evinced, in part, by the long critical tradition of (falsely, scholars 
now think) attributing the authorship of the “Visio Philiberti” to significant 
British philosophers, particularly Robert Grosseteste.67
 The “Visio Philiberti” is introduced by a passage that shows up in only 
certain redactions, as a vision by a pious monk. The scene of disputation por-
trayed in it is framed by an external narrator, whose frightened and repentant 
response to the vision telegraphs the poem’s didactic intent. Yet the poem is 
less like a homily than like a philosophical debate: Soul and Body both make 
masterful use of a number of rhetorical devices in addition to the conventions 
of ubi sunt (enumeration of lost possessions and status) and other necessary 
elements of didactic deathbed situations. The gender of the Body does seem 
somewhat flexible. It is first addressed as “O Caro miserrima,” but when the 
Body responds to the Soul it is described, apparently by that third-person 
observer, as “corpus caput erigit.”68 Ultimately, however, the “Visio Philiberti” 
and many subsequent debates turn from the husband/wife model to a same-
sex economy of social differentiation and do not spend much time playing 
with the “corpus/caro” or “animus/anima/spiritus” distinctions. In the single 
descriptive model of the Body and Soul’s relationship that the poem offers, 
the Body describes itself as an ancilla and then, as a virtual synonym, as pedis-
sequa to the Soul’s (badly behaved) domina (who explains that God gave her 
the Body as a handmaiden).69 This same-sex hierarchy is very clear and needs 
poems were written in the same hand and whether there was any scribal intention to link the 
works together.
 67. This was the attribution proposed by Hans Walther (in Das Streitgedicht) and is regu-
larly mentioned by the few critics who discuss the poem, but Cartlidge says that the suggestion 
“outruns the evidence” (Cartlidge, “A Re-Evaluation of the Visio Philiberti 42, n. 21). While such 
attribution is nothing like a secure ascription of the poem to any particular author, it is one of 
the oldest and most consistent aspects of the reception history of a poem that has received little 
critical attention beyond such attribution, and it functions as a sort of vote of confidence in the 
poem rather than a genuine evaluation of its qualities.
 68. Wright, “Dialogus Inter Corpus et Animam,” in Thomas Wright, The Latin Poems Com-
monly Attributed to Walter Mapes, ll 9 and 94; italics mine.
 69. Wright: “et ut ancilla fierem tibi me donavit” (113); “si velle spiritus in opere ducatur 
/ per carnem pedissequam suam, quid culpatur?” (130–31). Cartlidge, in a discussion of the 
Body’s arguments in its own defense, finds these characterizations of the Body-as-handmaiden 
unconvincingly humble, arguing that these “images of its subordinacy are far too artful and 
overdrawn to appear as anything other than hypocritical” (Cartlidge, “A Re-Evaluation of the 
Visio Philiberti,” 34). However persuasive they might have been intended to be in terms of the 
actual debate between Body and Soul, ancilla and domina are the terms that name their rela-
tionship, as affirmed by the Soul when she counteraccuses the Body of treachery, calling her 
familiaris proditrix (“household traitor,” 156), as Cartlidge himself notes, a “distinctively ‘feudal’ 
concept” (Cartlidge, 34).
no reversing: Social class seems to have a more stable basis than the gender of 
allegorical beings.
 In place of a disputational scene in which a female personification of phi-
losophy or reason lectures a male interlocutor, Soul and Body, both female, 
struggle with the fact that they are one but separate (this contrasts with Hilde-
bert, who initially had trouble recognizing the stern Anima as his own soul). 
Michel-Andre Bossy notes that it differs from other Latin Body/Soul debates 
by presenting itself “less as a disputation between separate speakers than as a 
dialogue-in-monologue.”70 This sense of one being warring with itself, rather 
than two quite separate beings in dialogue, is the particular achievement of the 
“Visio Philiberti” as a work of psychological theory rather than an improved-
upon, more amusing homily or a new spin on Boethius or Prudentius. As Car-
tlidge argues, rather than glibly recapitulating medieval dualism, the complex 
interactions between Body and Soul “testify not to a ‘mentality’ or an alterna-
tive theology, but to the instinctive recognition on the part of creative artists in 
the Middle Ages that theology is necessarily too complicated and too heavily 
qualified to be translated, without adaptation, into forms that are also dramati-
cally effective or aesthetically appealing.”71 This poem is not a transcription of 
any particular school of medieval theology or psychology into dialogue form; 
it is a work of Latin sowlehele, which means that it attempts a balance between 
the didactic and the dramatic. Sometimes, the attempt of the “Visio Philiberti” 
to be “dramatically effective and aesthetically appealing” queers the scene that 
the poem describes, positing it as a scene of same-sex affection.
 In its first speech, the Soul accused the Body of having tainted it, of having 
dragged it (certainly a physical metaphor) toward crime: “you always dragged 
me towards ill-doing / and so we will always be in sad sorrow.”72 When the 
Body responds, it does so in the language of seduction instead of the language 
of force: “the flesh seduces the soul,” she says, and, seduced, the Soul follows 
the flesh “like a bull led to the slaughter.”73 What may seem to a modern reader 
a boggling moment of queer figuration—of a female being corrupting another 
female being—is certainly not intended to be so. The phrase “like a bull led 
to the slaughter” works to disrupt this queerness, since “ductus” (led) marks 
the bull’s masculinity, all the more so since “bos” (bull) can be a neuter noun 
 70. Bossy, “Medieval Debates of Body and Soul,” 144. Michel-Andre Bossy also writes that 
previous scholars had “slighted the dramatic suppleness and individuality of [these] works in 
order to pigeonhole them in a rigid stemma” (150).
 71. Cartlidge, 27.
 72. “Semper ad scelera pessima traxisti / unde semper erimus in dolore tristi” (Wright, 
“Dialogus Inter Corpus et Animam,” 36–37).
 73. “Eorumque blanditiis caro seducit animam / quam a virtutum culmine trahit ad par-
tem infimam, / quae statim carnem sequitur ut bos ductus ad victimam” (“Visio Philiberti,” in 
Wright, The Latin Poems Commonly Attributed to Walter Mapes, 107–9).
1but isn’t functioning as one here. However, the analogy with the bull is just 
that, an analogy. The female Soul is seduced as if it were nothing more than a 
male ox. Can this reading be intended by the author? Probably not. I’m sure 
that, instead, the economy of seduction in this passage is rendered in same-sex 
terms precisely to avoid the dangerously matrimonial language of such works 
as the “Liber de Querimonia.” Intentionally evoking same-sex relations or not, 
this queer moment is the only instance of either party in the debate using the 
language of seduction. In what proves to be a common tactic in Body/Soul 
debates, the poem quickly turns away from any mention of love between the 
two parts of the same being toward the discourse of discipline, as if the latter 
were ever entirely free of any touch of the queer.
 The Soul’s response makes use, quite precisely, of the model where the Soul 
comes to be figured as the prison of the Body, in Foucault’s famous formula-
tion, a language whose transformation back into love in the English tradition 
becomes the topic of this study’s third chapter:
When I wanted, flesh, to castigate you,
With hunger or wakefulness, or to tame you with a whip,
Soon the vanity of the world began to idolize you,
And drove you to become empty with trivialities.
And thus you took the mastery (dominium) from me,
You were my familiar betrayer (proditrix).
Through the enticements of the world you dragged me after you
And sweetly submerged me in the filth of sin.74
In this passage, which is the closest to actually discussing the relationship 
between the two beings that are really one (and is radically different from its 
Middle English counterpart, as discussed in chapter 3), the Body seems to 
have been merely distracted from the Soul’s attempts to punish/teach it. The 
language of “dragging” (traho, trahere) and of betrayal is what the Soul uses. 
It is only the detail that the Soul is submerged in sin “sweetly” (suaviter) that 
might suggest some joy being taken in the dragging process, but this sweet 
submersion is very different from the Anima/ancilla/Hildebert relationship of 
the “Liber de Querimonia.” Refusing the model of a queer heterosexuality of 
Hildebert of Lavardin’s allegory, the poems I discuss in chapters 2 and 3, in an 
apparent attempt to get away from the problematic and sexualized language of 
a marriage between Soul and Body, take up the queer same-sex model set up 
in the “Visio Philiberti.” 
 74. “Quando te volueram, caro, castigare / fame vel vigiliis, vel verbere domare, / mox te 
mundi vanitas caepit adulare / et illius frivolis coegit vacare. / Et ita dominium de me suscepisti 
/ familaris proditrix tu mihi fuisti / per mundi blanditias me post te traxisti, / etin peccati pu-
teum suaviter mersisti” (Wright, “Visio Philiberti,” 151–58).
The relationship of soul and body is something that is being imagined and 
reinvented throughout the Middle Ages, but fully articulated literary consid-
erations of this relationship thrive particularly in the thirteenth century—the 
century of the Fourth Lateran Council—and they thrive at the intersection 
of didactic literature, allegorical poetry, and pedagogical discipline. Together, 
debates between the Body and the Soul, and other descendants of the psy-
chomachia tradition, contributed to the formation of a way of thinking that 
was never as simple a dualism as these poems’ titles would suggest. Latin 
debates between the Body and the Soul dealt with the issue of the self through 
disputational allegory, which permitted them to engage the fused philosophi-
cal and psychological issues that all medieval personification allegory high-
lights. Allegory also permitted such debates to stage the problem of the self in 
terms of the gender of its component parts, a surprising development that may 
have had more to do with the history of allegorical conventions than with the 
philosophy or psychology of the person.
 Personification allegory functioned as a major mode of “doing” psychol-
ogy in the Middle Ages, giving guidance to those who, though seeking to 
understand the nature of the self, would find the more formal tools and tropes 
in academic treatments of the self excessively abstract or irrelevant. Medieval 
allegory mixes the philosophical and the psychological and permits them to 
play off one another, never “dumbing down” the ideas in question, but rather 
putting them on the stage, using performative utterance to create and delimit 
the self and its possibilities. J. L. Austin’s well-known definition of the perfor-
mative emphasizes social consent to an utterance that does what it says. Alle-
gorical personification performs in this sense, “doing” philosophy by “being” 
Philosophy, while also the using more conventional definition of performance 
as something staged. Personification allegory functions as a performative psy-
chological theory, and specifically as a theory that performs the relationship 
between the body and the soul.
 Throughout this chapter, I have been wary of any claim that allegorical gen-
der is based “merely” on the ancient structures of Romance grammar, which 
genders abstractions as feminine. In some of the earliest Body/Soul debates 
written in Latin, especially Hildebert of Lavardin’s “Liber de Querimonia,” 
and particularly in how the “Liber” differs from the later and far more popular 
“Visio Philiberti,” the playful work of gender in allegory becomes very clear. 
These works connect the Latin and the vernacular traditions by interweaving 
personification allegory, philosophy, and psychology. The informal quality of 
body/soul and afterlife theology that characterizes Latin Body/Soul debates, 
particularly the “Visio Philiberti,” marks them as works of sowlehele. In these 
1works, perhaps, we have proof that grammatical gender is more plaything than 
straitjacket to the nimble minds of Latin-language authors. The complex and 
often startlingly queer work of setting up hierarchy between Body and Soul 
through gender is possible because of the richly useful incarnational inherent 
to the Latin words for “soul” and “body,” although Middle English finds its 
own ways to create this play without gendered nouns, as the poem “Als I Lay 
in a Winteris Nyt” discussed in chapter 3 shows.
 The convention of female tutelary figures guiding hapless narrators and/
or battling evil within the self helps to install something that is figured as 
female into the very center of a certain conception of selfhood, as a voice that 
speaks within. The debates produced in this tradition had very different lev-
els of circulation—from the considerable, popular dissemination of Boethius’ 
Consolation of Philosophy or the “Visio Philiberti” to the relative obscurity of 
Hildebert’s “Liber de Querimonia.” The English works discussed in the fol-
lowing chapters make use of similar tropes and figures even as they mold the 
notion of the self into new and different shapes and hierarchies. All of the 
Body/Soul debates—Latin, Old French, and Middle English alike—share a 
central concern with how the hierarchy that places the Soul in the dominant 
role is to be maintained at every level of the allegory, with how to depict the 
utterly joined quality of the Soul/Body relation with a minimal possibility 
for slipping into a depiction of sexual sin between them. The Middle English 
debates, “In a Thestri Stude” and “Als I Lay in a Winteris Nyt,” are able to do 
so in a language free of whatever arbitrarily grammatical constraints Romance 
languages possess, because, although remnants of noun gender remain for 
centuries, Middle English authors are not in any way bound to gendering 
abstract nouns as feminine. This permits works of sowlehele to excise even 
the same-sex feminine relationship of “Visio Philiberti” and to work through 
the hierarchies of male-male power relations, setting up a homosocial world 
where the love that must of necessity exist between Soul and Body expresses 
the ambivalent and complex politics of medieval love between men. In the 
following chapters, I return to the Latin Body/Soul debate tradition as well 
as to Prudentius and Boethius as part of understanding works as diverse as a 
psychomachia-like allegory for anchoresses and a quest to know the truth by a 
person who oscillates between being a man named Will and a personification 
of the will.
 This chapter began with Barbara Johnson’s gesture toward the history of 
representations of women in allegory and, with that gesture, how the Middle 
Ages inhabit certain modern forms of thought. The medieval allegories dis-
cussed here did not constitute a sort of passive womb waiting for modern 
critical theory to inseminate it with meaning, like the chora of the Timaeus 
waits for the demiurge to create matter. My hope is that Johnson’s encounter 
with Dinshaw’s analysis of allegorical reading, and with early modern allegory 
in general, was something more than merely accidental, just as Johnson and 
I both hope, without certainty, that all those female allegorical figures are the 
products of something more telling about the status of the female body in 
culture than “mere” grammatical norms.
 In her essay, Johnson ultimately understands the workings of personifica-
tion as intimately similar to the discourses of positionality within identity 
politics, of speaking “as if ” and “for” given groups, whether minoritarian or 
majoritarian. She points out the problem of allegorical reference in the political 
sphere: Dominant groups see themselves as “personifications of the whole—
humanity, reason, law, truth—not personifications within a psychomachia for 
control of the social text” (73). In other words, one danger of allegory is that 
it will totalize and simplify instead of dramatizing the complexity of conflicts 
between groups that might or might not be fully represented by persons bear-
ing the labels of identity politics. Personification endows an abstraction with 
a body and a voice; but, as in seminal feminist works such as Denise Riley’s 
Am I That Name?: The Category of “Women” in History and in Johnson’s writ-
ings on allegory, questioning the validity of how an allegory refers and of the 
relationships it elucidates is also a crucial political activity.
 Johnson’s description of the political sphere as a “a psychomachia for con-
trol of the social text” reimagines the conceptual capacities of the psychoma-
chia and uses the language of allegory to transform, as the chestnut goes, the 
personal into the political. This analysis seems, to me, beautifully to promise 
that the work we do in seeking to understand the politics of personification in 
the Middle Ages both is important in and of itself and might prove applicable 
to discussions of modern souls and bodies. The chapters that follow are an 
attempt to read medieval allegory, the politics of gender, and the institutions of 
both philosophy and psychology in a way that neither chooses body over soul 
or modern over medieval, nor maps these onto one another. Like the optical 
illusion in which what looks one minute like a rabbit appears to be a duck the 
next, these chapters work on seeing complex things in multiple ways. Given 
time, it is possible to see both images and even to play with their necessary 
interdependence.
A dead Body lies upon a bier. Above stands its Soul, lamenting all of 
the sins committed in life by the self now split into spirit and corpse. 
Instead of lying mute as the remonstrations rain down, the Body 
responds, entreating the Soul to leave it alone with its suffering, to 
leave off its lamenting. The Body seems willing to rot in silence as 
punishment for its misdeeds in life, but the Soul—expecting pun-
ishment for the sins that Body and Soul had committed while still 
joined—continues to complain and to accuse, drawing the increas-
ingly reluctant Body into argument. At last, the Body, cold in antici-
pation of the grave’s chill, refuses to squabble further; the pitiless 
Soul, however, continues to preach at its intractably silent and prone 
mate, concluding the dialogue-turned-monologue with a sermon on 
Christ’s sacrifice and the biblical signs of doomsday.
 What does it mean to separate two aspects of a self and allow 
them to speak to one another, to accuse and blame and squabble in 
the extremity of death? The plot recounted in the preceding para-
graph is that of the thirteenth-century debate known as “In a Thestri 
Stude I Stod”1 (“In a Dark Place I Stood”), a poem that represents 
 1. The Latin rubric that prefaces this debate is “Hic incipit carmen inter corpus 
& animam” (at least in the Bodleian Ms. Digby 86), but it is conventionally known 
by its English incipit. It is listed in the Index of Middle English Verse as #1461. I am 
basing my discussion on John Conlee’s edition of the poem as it appears in Oxford, 
Bodleian Library Ms. Digby 86 (olim Bodl 1687), fols. 195v–200r in Middle English 
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an inquiry into the nature of the self through an allegorical staging of debate 
between its component parts. Although, as the previous chapter discussed, 
debates between the Body and the Soul such as the “Visio Philiberti” would 
have been available in England to the Latin-literate since the early twelfth cen-
tury, in the later thirteenth century a particularly large number of such debates 
appeared in English. In these works, the problems of gender, discipline, love, 
and hierarchy had to be worked out in order to communicate the poems’ dual 
messages, both the direct, didactic lesson about repenting while there is still 
time, and the subtext about teaching penitents about how their innermost 
selves work.
 Understanding “In a Thestri Stude” and other Body/Soul debates as 
instances of sowlehele psychology opens up their philosophical and literary 
complexity more effectively than reading them as mere dramatizations of the 
psychological systems of Aristotle or Augustine or of “faculty psychology” as 
a general category. With these Middle English Body/Soul debates, this book 
moves away from figurations of the self through female personifications, com-
mon in Latin and Romance-language allegories. In this English version, as 
exemplified by “In a Thestri Stude,” both Body and Soul are clearly male, and 
I turn now to the construction of masculine gender performance as an aspect 
of sowlehele psychology in thirteenth-century English writings.
 Debate poetry organizes personification in a dynamic mode. In examining 
it, we can observe just how one specific strain of the English textual tradition 
has represented the relationship between souls and bodies as the building 
blocks of selves, selves that are being brought into being through relationship 
with one another. Reading the disputations between Body and Soul in this and 
the following chapter helps us comprehend the concept of person, the limits of 
allegory, and the rhetoric of embodiment at this moment in the development 
of Middle English disputation.
 Body/Soul debates are consistently referred to as works that were very 
“popular” in the Middle Ages. Despite this trope of “popularity,” these poems 
have been called popular far more often than they have been studied. For 
instance, on the first page of his full-length study of debate poetry, Thomas 
Reed, Jr., calls Body/Soul debates an “inexhaustibly popular medieval subject,” 
but his study does not discuss these debates at any length.2 The two English 
Debate Poetry: A Critical Anthology (East Lansing, MI: Colleagues Press, 1991). Two other ver-
sions of the poem are extant, one in Cambridge (Trinity College Ms. B.14.29 [olim 323] fol. 29v) 
and one in London (British Library Ms. Harley 2253, fol. 57v). My translation of the poem into 
modern English appears as an appendix to this book.
 2. Thomas Reed, Jr., Middle English Debate Poetry and the Aesthetics of Irresolution (Co-
lumbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 1990), 1. Reed’s study is the first published 
full-length examination of Middle English debate poetry as such (which makes its lack of 
interest in Body/Soul debate all the more regrettable), and one of the first full-length studies 
2Body/Soul debates discussed in this chapter and the next appear in ten manu-
scripts between them, which constitutes a respectable number (by compari-
son, there are only sixteen surviving manuscript copies of Chaucer’s Troilus 
and Criseyde, the work that medieval audiences considered his masterpiece). 
The popularity of the English take on the Body/Soul debate can be understood 
as an effect of the new interest in didactic literature following the Fourth Lat-
eran Council’s injunction to confession, Omnis utriusque sexus. Unlike the 
Latin works discussed in the preceding chapter, works of sowlehele written in 
Middle English could be read by a wide audience, possibly including women. 
This poem’s final section on the signs of the Last Judgment mark it as a work 
intended to teach laypeople about sin, its consequences, and the afterlife. “In 
a Thestri Stude” was not popular by accident; it was tapping into a powerful 
need for texts explaining the self to itself. 
 Thirteenth-century Body/Soul debates such as “In a Thestri Stude” per-
form the didactic, descriptive, and literary work that mark them as both exam-
ples and particularly interesting developments of their historical moment. In 
part, this is because a number of additional debates are capable of serving as 
reference points to compare them with, like the Latin debates discussed in the 
previous chapter. Surviving works about Body and Soul in Old English and 
Early Middle English debates include graveside lamentations by the Soul (with 
the Body described as passive audience) that considerably predated 1215. 
However, it does not seem coincidental that the most elaborate and complex 
poems in this mode were most popularly diffused (and most likely produced 
as well) in the later thirteenth century. Factors other than the Fourth Lateran 
Council and its aftermaths must have contributed to these poems’ production 
and popularity, or there would have been no Body/Soul debate tradition at all 
predating 1215. But confessional culture, with its vast demand for guides and 
handbooks, took up the mode that was already in place and made of it some-
thing new and genuinely innovative.
 “In a Thestri Stude” participates in this effort to craft a workable, applica-
ble model of the self for use in thinking about sin and redemption, borrowing 
of any medieval debate poetry, sharing that honor with Hans Walther’s Das Streitgedicht in 
der lateinischen Literatur des Mittelalters (Munich: 1920). My study, on the other hand, is an 
inquiry into the possibilities of some poems that organize their psychological thought through 
debate. In that, it may be closest to extant studies of specific works that are usually categorized 
as “debates”—Wynnere and Wastoure and The Owl and the Nightingale have proven popular 
subjects—where the focus on these specific works leads their authors to readings of other debate 
poems in terms of their relevance to their objects of study. See, for instance, Kathryn Hume, 
The Owl and the Nightingale: The Poem and Its Critics (Toronto and Buffalo, NY: University of 
Toronto Press, 1975); Nicholas Jacobs, “Typology of Debate and the Interpretation of Wynnere 
and Wastoure” in Review of English Studies 36 (1985): 481–500; and Thomas Bestul, Satire and 
Allegory in Wynnere and Wastoure (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1974).
from Latin writings to create something new. Its assumptions, “mistakes,” and 
reinterpretations of doctrine participate in sowlehele psychology. The poem 
works out its own version of psychology by performing its understanding 
about the specific nature of the relationship between the soul and the body 
in a didactic context: Personification does what it describes, in the manner 
philosophers of language term a performative speech act. In some ways, the 
poem can be understood as part of the appropriation of Latin learning for ver-
nacular uses, since it translates aspects of theological psychology and of Latin 
Body/Soul debate but adapts them to the limitations and possibilities of the 
English language. In other ways, which include its dualism and its omission of 
a clearly stated provenance for the will, “In a Thestri Stude” poses a challenge 
to Latin learning. Scholarly theological and philosophical ruminations on the 
nature of the self—St. Augustine’s work on body, soul, and will, discussed later, 
serves as the privileged example—prove insufficient to explain this poem.
 Although Soul and Body (at least, at the poem’s beginning) could be those 
of any dead person, the narrative details in the Soul’s lamentation of a life 
ill-lived tell us that the dead person had been a proud nobleman who had 
loved to hunt. This character is both a conventional “type” and, to an extent, 
an individualized person with his own detailed history. Not incidentally, as 
soon as this corpse acquires a history, it becomes gendered, a nobleman rather 
than a noblewoman. By themselves, the words body and soul (and the alter-
native terms for soul used in the poem, like gost and mynde) don’t indicate 
the speakers’ genders: The fact that the dead person whose pieces are now 
interacting with one another had been male comes out in the details about his 
misspent life. “In a Thestri Stude” offers a vision of the self that does not rely 
on gender difference to establish the nature of the relationship between body 
and soul, which conventionally requires the clear dominance of the soul. This 
Middle English psychological allegory imagines the different aspects of the 
self as staunchly, clearly male, a possibility that Latin- and Romance-language 
allegories could not entertain thanks, among other things, to the gendering of 
abstract nouns as female in those languages.
 What does it mean to create a literal Soul—a concept of the soul that has its 
own voice and, to a degree, its own individuality? How do we understand the 
sheer circularity of the essence of person being itself possessed of personhood? 
What does it mean to bring this Soul into discursive being by giving it a voice 
but not marking it as female the way Latin allegories do? Instead of envision-
ing the soul as an elevated female principle to be venerated like a tutelary 
allegorical figure such as Boethius’ Lady Philosophy, the Soul of “In a Thestri 
Stude” is neutrally male. Its participation in the category “male” functions 
as the unmarked and universal common denominator between the debaters, 
since the Body, too, seems to be male in this dialogue. The apparent maleness 
2of both debaters avoids the issues of heterosexualized hierarchy within the 
self encountered by Hildebert of Lavardin in his debate. Figuring both Body 
and Soul as male also seemingly excises the problematic traces of the feminine 
from within the self, as Latin-literate medieval readers may have encountered 
it in the ancilla/domina pairing of “Visio Philiberti” and in other psychological 
allegories featuring personifications of powerful female figures. “In a Thestri 
Stude” depicts relationships within the self as occurring between male beings, 
seemingly evading the possibility that heterosexuality (and with it, sexuality 
as such) might enter the scene. Yet, without the “obvious” hierarchy offered by 
the wife/husband analogy, “In a Thestri Stude” cannot assume and must work 
to establish the clear superiority of Soul over Body. In one of few published 
discussions of the poem, Helen Philips writes that “the genre of Body and Soul 
debate itself centers on the doctrine that human identity involves two entities 
that ultimately belong to different realms of being and will separate from each 
other to face different fates,” and she emphasizes the “furious acrimony” of the 
Middle English debate, which differentiates it from its Latin counterparts.3 I 
would argue that this acrimony is a result, in part, of the absence of the clear 
gender or class hierarchies that characterized the two Latin Body/Soul debates 
discussed in the previous chapter. With “In a Thestri Stude,” we have exited 
the mannered and convention-bound world of female “allegorical goddesses,” 
where hierarchy is always-already clearly understood, and entered a homo-
social world, such as a classroom or a monastery, of male beings jockeying 
for power against other male beings where hierarchy is uncertain and either 
character could end up on top.
 “In a Thestri Stude,” like Body/Soul debates generally, produces its narra-
tive through disputation, a practice more common to classrooms than confes-
sionals. However, the Body claims repeatedly that it would prefer to remain 
silent in awaiting its own punishment, even though the disputational situation 
itself prohibits it from keeping still.4 In this “debate poem,” the act of debat-
ing seems to have been forced on one of the opponents rather than willingly 
engaged in by an equal. Although the Body and the Soul begin by speaking 
in alternating four-line stanzas, the Body speaks less than half the lines of the 
 3. Helen Philips, “Dreams and Dream Lore,” Studies in the Harley Manuscript: The Scribes, 
Contents and Social Contexts of British Library Ms. Harley 2253, ed. Susanna Fein (Kalamazoo, 
MI: TEAMS, 2000), 254.
 4. Gordon Teskey, in Allegory and Violence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 
writing of “the disorder with which and out of which allegory works,” suggests that “under the 
regime of polysemy”—which, in his account, characterizes allegory—“anything that appears 
to escape or to resist the project of meaning—passion, body, irony—is interpreted as a further 
extension of meaning” (30). Although the Body/Soul debates discussed in this chapter do not 
form a part of the canon—Teskey is mainly writing about Dante and Spenser—to which Teskey 
attributes the capacity to know the chaos of allegory for what it is, the symptomatic attempt to 
force meaning on and speech out of the Body in this dialogue seems in line with his thinking.
poem, in part because the Soul has a monologue that begins at line 53 and 
continues for approximately fifty lines, to the poem’s end. Forced to acquire a 
voice to defend itself from the Soul’s accusations, the Body nevertheless falls 
back into its materiality and, once it has said its piece, refuses to debate any 
further. Even if, as the Soul’s words suggest, it might not be aware of the full 
theological context of its situation, the Body, taking its turn, indicates that it 
knows its own fate clearly enough.
 Although “In a Thestri Stude” offers clear moral warning, insisting that 
wrongdoing is severely punished, it also presents a meditation on the nature 
of the self and of sin, on the provenance of the will, on how a life can be 
understood when viewed in retrospect. Debates between the Body and the 
Soul, in any language, are often self-reflexive about their form, perhaps as a 
consequence of their way of splitting the self into speaking pieces through 
allegory, as the preceding example of the reluctantly speaking Body suggests. 
This poem can also be understood as part of the development of personifica-
tion allegory as a tool for thinking about the parts of the person; the compli-
cated division of labor between Body and Soul being debated in this poem 
invites introspection while offering to organize the shape this introspection 
will take. This chapter’s examination of the kinds of narration, temporality, 
and voicing this poem performs will help work through the poem’s peculiar 
sort of psychological didacticism, aiming to understand the ways in which 
the psychological models provided in the biblical, patristic, and ancient Greek 
writings about the soul that came down to the thirteenth century both can and 
cannot account for this debate’s surprising dynamics. What follows is a discus-
sion of the implications of the depiction of the split self in “In a Thestri Stude” 
drawing on a close reading of the poem. I then address the way in which this 
poem can be read as a particular kind of psychological allegory, arguing that 
the poem’s form and content are both implicated in the history of allegorical 
representations of the self, and develop some of the implications of what it 
means to imagine that self ’s parts as all male, with maleness functioning as a 
human universal as well as a specified human history.
From the poem’s first, titular line, the poem’s narrator is located in a specific 
albeit unspecified place, a dark that gives inexplicable access to the dead being 
and its parts: “Hon an βester stude I stod an luitel strif to here” (“In a dark 
place I stood, a little argument to hear”; “In a Thestri Stude,” 1–2).5 The poem’s 
 5. In translating the Middle English phrase, I have preserved the awkwardness of the 
2“little strife” takes place at an interstitial moment between the lifetime when 
Soul and Body were united as a single person who made choices, owned pos-
sessions, and acted as a unified being (and, as such, confessed and possessed a 
faith) and the moment of dissolution that will follow after the dialogue ends. 
In the dialogue’s aftermath, the person that Body and Soul had been when 
alive is utterly sundered. The broken parts suffer separately and continue to 
function apart, only tentatively awaiting reunion at Judgment Day.
 The narrator of the poem makes a single full appearance, in the work’s first 
line, as the “I” who stands in the dark place. This first line locates the narrator 
spatially but provides neither context nor body for this speaker, and what fol-
lows does not clarify whether the narrator stood in this place in order to hear 
the argument, or overheard this argument by fortuitous accident. Is this hear-
ing, in other words, an act of the will or a vision sent by divine intervention? 
The fact that this poem is not a dream vision, as so many medieval allegories 
are, is noteworthy.6 If it were a vision seen in a dream, the Body and the Soul 
of the narrator would also be split, the Body sleeping and the Soul witnessing 
a dialogue. As it is, someone whose body and soul are still united becomes a 
witness—whether by choice, by chance, or by divine intervention—to the dis-
solution of someone whose Body and Soul have separated and are struggling 
with one another. The narrator-as-eavesdropper, standing in darkness, offers 
little commentary on what is overheard, but that one line situates and frames 
the debate that follows as a drama mediated by an observer.7 In that sense, the 
dialogue is theater, performed for an audience of one. In that sense as well, the 
duality of having two active speakers in a debate is somewhat undermined, 
because a third party is observing and thereby triangulating the powers at 
play. This triangulation is echoed, as I discuss in a subsequent section, in the 
absent presence of a solution to the debater’s problems: the faculty of the will, 
which would seem to be the most plausible solution to the problem of guilt’s 
provenance that the poem’s debaters are trying to solve.
Body’s self-referential “mi” and “me,” which underline the Body’s continued tendencies toward 
greed, even in death. Citations from the poem will henceforth include line numbers only.
 6. Helen Philips notes that it may as well be one: “The speeches and debates of Body and 
Soul take place in a realm beyond that of normal human time and space, but, as is common 
with medieval literary visions, they are not necessarily explicitly designated as dreams. . . . [T]he 
dark place in which the narrator stands at the beginning of ‘In a Thestri Stude’ is unspecific 
and suggests not only the nighttime when dreams come and the darkness of the grave, but also 
that indefinite mental area where vision and allegory are enacted” (“Dreams and Dream Lore,” 
253–54).
 7. This detail differentiates this particular debate poem from those that appear as proto-
dramas, lacking a framing device and organized exclusively as exchanges between speakers, and 
causes this poem (as well as its near-contemporary, “Als I Lay on a Winteris Nyt”) to read as if 
it were a dream vision, offering the obvious comparisons to the far more elaborate and complex 
(and also simply later) works such as Piers Plowman and Chaucer’s Parliament of Fowls. 
 Of the two debaters witnessed by the narrator standing in his or her dark 
place, only the Body is situated in space: “βer hit lai on βe bere” (“there it lay 
on the bier”; 2). Only this story’s third character, the Soul, makes its appear-
ance exclusively as a speaking voice; this Soul is referred to by both the Body 
and itself as “gost” throughout the poem, and three times as “wrecche gost.”8 
“In a Thestri Stude” proceeds as a discussion between Body and Soul without 
much apparent narratorial intervention, with the exchanges that follow lim-
ited to one four-line stanza per speaker until the lengthy final monologue. At 
first, it is the narrator who establishes the speakers, repeating the formula “βo 
spac the gost” (3 and 13) or “βo spac the bodi” (9 and 17). However, as the 
argument between Body and Soul develops, the Body and Soul themselves, 
rather than the narrator, begin to inform the reader of who is speaking, by 
beginning their brief speeches by addressing one another. One knows it is the 
Soul speaking when the speaker’s angry reply begins with the word “Body.” For 
example, the Soul tells the Body, “Bodi, thou hauest liued to longe” (“Body, you 
have lived too long”; 20). This device contributes to the many ways in which 
the very structure of the dialogue thematizes the Soul and Body’s interdepen-
dence. Like “Dame Sirith,” which accompanies this dialogue in one manu-
script (Digby 86), “In a Thestri Stude” comes to resemble a play in rhyming 
verse, performative in the sense of being theatrical as well as of bringing into 
being the parts of the self it names.
 The poem never quite becomes a play, however. Although scribes some-
times insert marginal notes or use red or blue ink for one line or along the 
margin to mark a change between one speaker and the other, this is ultimately 
more a means of assisting the oral reading that any medieval work would 
entail than an essential gesture, since each speaker either refers to his inter-
locutor or to himself in the first line of each speech, invoking the identity of 
the listener as a means of establishing the identity of the speaker. The dramatic 
mode of the disputation thus remains firmly in the narrative dialogue mode. 
It is based on brief exchanges rather than narrative description. Consequently, 
 8. Gost is a word that goes back to the 1100s—it appears in the Bodleian Homilies—that 
means, according to the Middle English Dictionary, “(a) The soul of a dead person; also, the 
spirit of Christ descending into hell; (b) a damned soul, whether in hell or returned to earth; 
also fig. an emaciated or tortured person; (c) a dead body . . . and 3(a) The soul of man, spiritual 
nature; the soul as distinguished from mind, the emotional nature; the life principle in man.” In 
the Anglo-Norman version of this sort of poem, the author seems to have had trouble imagin-
ing a creature that is always and entirely a voice as the representation of the Soul, and instead 
portrays it as “de petite figure estoit la criature / e estoit la chaitive tote verte comme chive” (“the 
creature was a small figure / and that fellow was all green as a chive,” lines 7–8) (“Un Samedi Par 
Nuit,” in Thomas Wright ed., The Latin Poems Commonly Attributed to Walter Mapes, London: 
Camden Society, 1841, ls. 16). See chapter 3 for an extended discussion of this work, and also 
chapter 5 for a discussion of Piers Plowman B’s Anima, whose surreal physical presence is more 
like the Anglo-Norman “criature” than the invisible voice of the Middle English soul. 
2Soul remains intertwined with Body in the dialogue’s form. In other words, 
each speaker’s self is established, to signal the reader as to who is speaking, by 
establishing who its Other is.
 The third presence, our increasingly silent narrator, completely ceases to 
speak by line 20, yielding the floor to Soul and Body. One might wonder if this 
is partly because his (or her) own integrity as a whole being, a Body and a Soul 
that are united and working as one, is undermined or at least threatened by the 
separability of these two. Another possibility, one to which I will return, is that 
the convention of this dialogue demands that there be two—and no more than 
two—presences in the darkness. Although the “I” of “In a Thestri Stude” is that 
of the narrator, the dialogue he recounts demands his silence in order to work 
as a dyadic (rather than triadic) structure. Limiting the number of speakers in 
this rather pointed way is part of what makes this poem so different from a 
simple dramatization of theological psychologies of the self and its parts. It is 
a simplification of those far more complex structures, certainly, but it is also 
an effective didactic dramatization.
 The Soul of “In a Thestri Stude” is a taunting, mocking one, whose first 
question to the Body—“wi liggest βou nou here?” (“Why are you now lying 
here?”; 4)—pretends that death as such is a punishment for the Body’s sins, 
rather than an inevitable end to which all mortal bodies (and souls) tend. The 
Body shows a similar ignorance of mortality: “I vende mi worldes blisse me 
wolde euere I-last,” it replies (“I thought my worldly bliss would last forever for 
me”; 10), in a line where the repetition of “my” and “me” seems to emphasize 
the false pride of individualism, since it is coming from one half of what had 
been a whole being. The Body had lived, we discover in reading the debate, in 
a sort of eternal present. The Soul, however, whose speech detailing the largely 
terrible events of “Domesday” occupies more than a third of the poem, after all 
debate has been concluded, seems to exist in both the retrospection of regret 
and dread of a future it knows through prophecy, and never shares the same 
moment in time as the Body.
 Throughout the dialogue, the Body’s dread of its fate is manifested in the 
specific details it offers about the debaters’ present situation, offered to coun-
ter the details the Soul offers about their past life together. In response to the 
Soul’s taunting question, “Wer is βI muchele pruide, βI ve[i]r and βI gris / βine 
palefreis ane βI steden and βi pourpre pris?” (“Where is your overweening 
pride, your rich furs / your palfreys and your steeds and your purple opu-
lence?”; 14–15), the Body answers, “ibounden beβ mine honden, min eien 
aren me hud” (my hands are bound, my eyes are hidden”; 19). Whatever limits 
have been imposed on it by the fact that its Soul is gone from it seem to be 
forcing the Body to think in the present, rather than to see the present as a 
continuity with the past—while the Soul, bearer of the intellect of this now-
dead man, demands to narrativize their predicament, seeking explanations for 
the arbitrariness of individual human action and of human suffering.
 As they are represented in “In a Thestri Stude,” Body and Soul are so sepa-
rate that their temporal locations are out of sync. If the poem is performatively 
producing a certain notion of the self by naming its parts and having them 
speak, that self is being given a disjunctive temporality. The poem allegorically 
enacts the disjunctive time of the self as part of its theorization of a split and 
disunified subject. The interdependence of the Soul and Body pair is made 
obvious by this division. Without the Body, the Soul doesn’t have a grounding 
in the present; without the Soul, the Body cannot imagine the passage of time. 
Both the desire to imagine the two united and the impossibility of their union 
are staged by their dialogue. The psychology of the poem is not limited to what 
the Soul or the Body says; it is also inherent in how each says it.
 Philosophers and theologians wonder how spirit and flesh can coexist, 
being so different; one answer this particular poem gives has to do with the 
two not really coexisting after all, because they do not function on the same 
temporal plane. Allegory has the opportunity to enact temporal disjunction 
as a detail of character development and yet, by making it a detail rather than 
the point of the poem, to avoid making too much of this difference. Body and 
Soul meet, after all, in their dark place, and although they cannot come to an 
understanding—in part, because of the psychological effects of living in dif-
ferent perceived times—it can be shown that one of them is right and one is 
wrong, that there is a better and a worse time to be inhabited for purposes of 
sowlehele.9
 The narrator establishes the scene of the debate and, essentially, sinks into 
the background. However, one intervention by the narrator seems intended to 
establish that the Soul is right and the Body is wrong, an apparently gratuitous 
signpost declaring a premature winner. Following the Body’s first retort to the 
Soul’s accusations (the Body simply notes that it had expected its worldly bliss 
to last forever and that it is now bound to the earth by its own sins), the nar-
rator remarks, setting up the Soul’s reply: “βospac βe gost mid rute red after 
ful” (“Then the Soul spoke with right counsel instead of foul”; 13). One way to 
read this intervention is as a simplifying didacticism: This is a debate, but the 
winner is known in advance. But this intervention occurs in line 13, nothing 
 9. Philips also notes the importance of temporal distortion in the poem: “The message of 
the urgency of penitence and reform that is expressed through this device of the soul trying to 
penetrate didactically the body’s unresponsiveness is also expressed through a manipulation 
of time (past, present, and future) in the text. . . . Since Body and Soul signify two aspects of 
those who receive the teaching, the fictional ‘now’ of their exchange represents the future of the 
living audience. It is that time after death when bodies and souls can speak in some symbolic, 
archetypal space about their real theological relationship, seen now tardily in its full clarity for 
the first time” (258).
2like it appears later in the poem, and its force is ultimately lost. The Body does 
not debate the Soul in any conventional way, by making logical claims about its 
innocence. Instead, the “counsel” that the narrator has described as “foul” con-
sists of a series of statements by the Body about its condition: It cannot escape 
the place where it lies, it awaits its own dissolution, worms treat it as prey, its 
new house is made of mere mud, and its woe is enough that it cannot be more, 
no matter how much the Soul chides it. These are not arguments of the kind 
made by philosophers in the course of a real debate, but they are arguments 
of a kind just the same. The Soul speaks of consequences and shared histories, 
the Body states the bald facts of agony, voicing the suffering of matter rent 
from spirit and stranded in its own materiality.
 Although its tone is accusatory in a much simpler sense (sins were com-
mitted, punishment is coming), the Soul’s accusations against the Body also 
constitute a lament rather than an argument about the nature and division of 
blame. It is the Soul who details hell’s dooms and who will endure its pains, 
although the suffering that awaits the Soul is, according to its own doctrine, 
the fault of the Body. It is also a lesson. The Body was the one who thought 
that its worldly bliss would last forever. (The fact that a Body could “think” or 
“surmise” at all is in itself an oddness that characterizes the poem.) The eternal 
present of the Body’s conception of time has joys and dangers, and the dangers 
are significant. Sowlehele allegory takes its narrator outside space and time to 
experience memento mori as a dark place. The limits of temporal joy are evi-
dent at the moment of death; the ignorance of one who is unaware of them is 
being corrected by the Soul for the Body’s and also for the reader’s benefit.
In its accusations and laments, the Soul taunts the Body with all the things he 
has lost, as if only the Body had owned lands and enjoyed the hunt, as if the 
Body, without the participation of the Soul, has passed false judgments (“false 
domes to deme, to chaungen two to fiue”; “False judgments to judge, to give 
two in exchange for five”; 7) and stolen from the poor (“poure men to βreten, 
binimen hem here heritage”; “threaten poor men, deprive them of their inheri-
tance”; 31).10 These apparently arbitrary details perform an expository func-
tion: They tell us that the corpse must once have been a male member of the 
nobility, locating him as something more specific and identifiable than a sort 
of Everyman composite figure, although these details are far from offering the 
 10. The tone of the Soul’s complaint, from the first accusatory verse onward, is similar to the 
tone of complaint poetry of this period, including the quasi-legal plaint of Pees against Wrong 
in Passus IV of the C-text of Piers Plowman.
reader anything like a conventional literary “character.” Philips connects this 
detail, made manifest in the Soul’s ubi sunt (literally, “Where are they now?”) 
taunts to the Body, to the genre of “mutability literature”—a literature about 
how the mighty must inevitably fall—which, she writes, “is one of the areas 
of medieval culture that provides a vehicle for criticism of the rich and pow-
erful.”11 The social “fall” of the Body from greedy nobleman who mistreated 
his subjects to a corpse lying cold and miserable in the small, uncomfort-
able “house” of the grave charts its movement from “false” elevation to “true” 
debasement. The man had been guilty of pride, had owned a fine house and 
horses—all of which this individual had enjoyed entirely too much. All of 
these actions and possessions are listed as though they pertained exclusively 
to the Body, and implied no involvement on the Soul’s part, although it is also 
clear that the Soul was present to witness every act—and the Soul seems to 
enjoy detailing all these lost riches.
 Both Soul and Body, but particularly the Body, have moved to a lower 
place in the social hierarchy upon death. In this way, this English poem might 
recall the “Visio Philiberti,” discussed in chapter 1, in which the Body is rep-
resented as the (female) servant of its mistress, the Soul, although the Latin 
Body is always ancilla, and the Body only becomes “lowe” as the consequence 
of a fall: “ful lowe shalt thou fallen for all thin heie parage” (“you have fallen so 
low, for all your high status”; 32), and again, “Ful louue shalt though fallen for 
alle thine bores” (“so low shall you fall for all your high bowers”; 47). Within 
the male same-sex hierarchy of “In a Thestri Stude,” the Body is not figured as 
a servant, but as a fallen nobleman, an echo of postlapsarian humanity more 
generally. Insofar as the Soul’s ubi sunt passage enumerates the kinds of pos-
sessions and powers the dead man held, it becomes clear that both Body and 
Soul lament a precipitous fall in status as part of mourning their (collective) 
death.
 The Body, perhaps because it cared deeply about social status, repeatedly 
calls the Soul “wrecche,” a common general term of abuse whose literal mean-
ing emphasizes its object’s poverty. A wretch is a bad man, but, specifically, a 
poor bad man, which is not what the nobleman had been in life but seems to 
be what the Soul has become in death. The Body repeatedly tells the Soul to 
“wende awei nou, wrecche” (“go away, you wretch,” 25; and again, “wrecche 
gost, βou wende awei,” 33), until the Soul responds that “Uuas I neuere wrecche 
bote βoren βin heuele redes” (“I was never a wretch but through your evil 
counsel”; 37). The Soul emphasizes the sense in which the Body is the more 
fallen of the pair by acting as the Body’s guide to the ways of death, offering 
instruction about hell and its pains while keeping itself remote from involve-
 11. Philips, 256.
2ment with the choices and chances that had characterized the life of the person 
they had been together.
 Although the pious reader would presumably get the message that caring 
too much about material goods is a symptom of fleshly lust, it is quite clear 
that this Soul is unjustly denying its own involvement and guilt. Present-day 
readers might even psychologize its behavior as being “in denial.” The Soul 
can’t possibly be as sinless as it claims to be. Indeed, the speaking Body is pre-
sent in this dialogue in part as a tool for overcoming the Soul’s hypocrisy and 
overcoming its claim to be genuinely separate from desire. Even as it insists 
on its own “superior” position, the Soul—lamenting that it awaits punishment 
for the Body’s sins—is implicated in the acts of its inferior. The Soul is forced 
to “descend” to the level of the bodily just as the man who used to unite Soul 
and Body as one is forced to “descend” into a poverty he had once despised. 
Most of the burden for this loss is borne by the Body, whose newfound poverty 
is made quite clear in the dialogue: It complains that, lacking its prior rich 
clothes, its sides are cold where it lies.
 The Soul preaches to the Body as if it were a priest telling a dead or dying 
person what awaited him or her. If it were truly a priest, of course, the Soul 
would be speaking from a position of authority and with some objective dis-
tance, using more explicitly the language of confession and penance. The Soul, 
taking on a preacher’s role, is in an oddly self-reflective position, since it is 
actually engaged in telling the Body about the fate that awaits its own self—
after all, death is the fate of all bodies, while hell, the Soul’s next destination, 
is reserved for sinners. The Body would be rotting now no matter what it had 
done in life; but the Soul implies that it is an innocent, being taken to hell in 
punishment for another’s sins, much like Christ, whose role in the dialogue I 
discuss later.
 The Body is wholly given over to the caprices of the natural world, to its 
own bodiliness. As the unlocated narrator listens in the dark, the Soul piles 
detail upon detail in reconstructing the shared past and dreading the sepa-
rated future of the now-split self. The Body, in its turn, refuses to budge from 
its present state, manifesting a will surprisingly different from that of its own 
Soul, and willfully, arbitrarily, insisting on silence. However, the Body seems 
aware of an immediate future for itself—a vividly physical future, its own dis-
solution. In a transparently didactic gesture by the poem’s author, the Body 
seems capable of understanding that other bodies will also meet its fate. As 
the Soul taunts that it will no longer be able to commit the unjust and bullying 
acts it had enjoyed in life, the Body responds:
Wrecche gost, thou wen away, hou longe sal βis strist laste?
Wormest holdeβ here strif and here domes faste;
I-mad hoe habbeβ here lotes mi fles for to caste;
Mony fre bodi schal rotien, ne bid I nout nou βe laste.” (25–28)
Go away now, wretched ghost, how long shall this strife last?
Worms are holding their own strife, rendering their own stern judgments,
They are casting their own lots for my flesh;
Many free bodies will rot, I shall not be the last.
Here, the Body begs to escape the debate that compels its speech, asking the 
Soul to leave it to the impinging worms. These “worms” are anthropomor-
phized as rational persons (capable of passing judgment on the Body) and 
imagined as being, at the time of the dialogue, in the process of casting lots. 
This gambling echoes the Gospel account of the Crucifixion, and the brutal 
materialism of soldiers casting lots for Jesus’ garments: Even in its biblical 
allusions, the Body is bound to the mundane and worldly rather than to the 
transcendent. Like Jesus’ garments, flesh is regularly figured as a garment for 
the soul, but here, the “my” of “mi fles” references the Body’s entire being, 
rather than a discardable object. To itself, the Body is merely the object of the 
worms’ callous gambling, not the creature on the cross whose body as well 
as soul will be resurrected. Personification gives the flesh-garment speech, 
and what seems like fear of its own incipient partition. Is the Body exonerat-
ing itself in this allusion to biblical suffering, or is it simply echoing in its 
own abasement the humiliations heaped upon Christ, whose very humiliation 
enables mankind’s redemption and the promise of eventual bodily resurrec-
tion, even for such bodies as this, at a future time beyond the Body’s own 
capacity to imagine?
 In the end, the Body refuses to speak further, because, as it says, no matter 
how much the Soul chides it, its woe is enough that it cannot be more. With 
the important exception of its prophecy that it shall not be the last body to 
meet this fate, the Body seems largely confined within its own present. The 
underlying assumption behind its words might be that the bodily as such has 
no history except insofar as it is registered and mediated by the Soul, which 
is the part of the self that is capable of grasping consequence and temporality. 
The Body’s silence, of course, is just the opening the Soul then needs to launch 
into its long monologue on the signs of Doomsday, an event located in the 
future but capable of fulfilling everything about the past.
 “In a Thestri Stude,” like all debates of this tradition, asks questions about 
selfhood that render the obvious answers less than obvious. In place of and 
anterior to a self engaged in projects of self-fashioning, defined as a nego-
tiation between presenting the self to the world and the constraints imposed 
on such presentation, this poem offers the self as something that is being 
2performed relationally, and in continual flux—a contentious, interdependent 
self based equally in the material and the spiritual worlds, split and adversarial 
and somehow unimaginable as the ethical whole, although it apparently func-
tions as one for purposes of punishment.
Although every generation reads the Middle Ages anew, and historical distor-
tion is as fruitful as it is inevitable, we must continue to ask after what medi-
eval writers and readers thought they were doing, as far as we can determine 
it. Having read “In a Thestri Stude” as a modern reader might, we can also ask 
how the poem might have been read by its Middle English audience. One way 
to answer this question is to examine the manuscript tradition, the choices 
made by scribes and compilers that expressed their own notions of where this 
poem might fit in the world of medieval writing. As with “Als I Lay in a Win-
teris Nyt,” this poem appears in manuscripts that combine the didactic with 
the pleasurable, sentance with solas. As a piece of writing, “In a Thestri Stude” 
serves (mostly) the same didactic needs as countless even less canonical devo-
tional texts that list vices and virtues and prepare the parishioner for a proper 
confession. But this particular work is not always found next to the devotional 
materials, just as it is seldom grouped with other “debates,” even though con-
temporary scholarship studies it as such. (See John Conlee’s influential edi-
tion/collection of medieval debate poetry, which includes a rich selection of 
Body/Soul debates.)12 Insofar as scholars try to figure out the intended uses 
of a medieval work by its manuscript location, “In a Thestri Stude” is rather 
confusing.
 The debate appears in three manuscripts: Oxford, Bodleian Library, Ms. 
Digby 86 fols. 195v–200r; Cambridge, Trinity College Ms. B.14.39 fol. 29v; 
and London, British Library, Ms. Harley 2253, fol. 57 v. Although this is fewer 
than some other debates (“Als I Lay” appears in seven), Chaucer’s House of 
Fame, for instance, also survives in no more than three manuscripts. Although 
“In a Thestri Stude” is seldom placed next to lyrics, romances, or other, more 
obviously “protoliterary” works in the manuscripts where it appears, the poem 
was being placed next to satires of higher learning and understanding in the 
vein found in “Goldiardic” Latin poetry, works of amatory rhetoric, and even 
works resembling French fabliaux, such as “Dame Sirith.” Unlike “Als I Lay,” 
which is more or less clearly positioned in a way that confirms its relationship 
with what medieval writers often termed as texts devoted to sowlehele, “In a 
 12. Conlee, 1990. 
Thestri Stude” is found right after a French debate between two ladies about 
love and fidelity in Digby 86,13 whereas in Harley 2253, the manuscript featur-
ing the famous Harley Lyrics, it is next to a poem on Jesus’ descent into hell.14 
These two manuscripts represent two very different understandings, indeed, 
of where the work belongs, thoroughly testifying to its complexity.15
 Digby 86 works as a representative example of how “In a Thestri Stude” 
seems to function in its manuscript context. It is not a work of high theology 
or philosophy; instead, it is dropped into a popular context where its didactic 
effectiveness echoes that of some other works, but where it also interacts with 
works written in a less didactic mode.16 Along with “In a Thestri Stude,” Digby 
86 contains several other debate poems, including “Dame Sirith” and “The 
Thrush and the Nightingale”—works primarily concerned with heterosexual 
amatory matters, and therefore including female characters and/or discussions 
of women. Despite the relatively secular nature of the poems in the vicinity of 
“In a Thestri Stude,” Digby 86 cannot be mistaken for an entirely secular col-
lection, either. The manuscript begins with lists of the Seven Sacraments and 
the Ten Commandments in Anglo-Norman, and a few turned pages after “In 
a Thestri Stude” would bring a reader to a rather lengthy text of “Orationes 
devotae” in Latin.
 Works like “In a Thestri Stude,” with their inevitable ubi sunt passages 
enumerating all that a given life contains and all that death has now taken 
away, serve as warnings and reminders, and are therefore perhaps well placed 
 13. The debate that immediately precedes “In a Thestri Stude” is the Anglo-Norman love 
debate (“Ci commence lestrif de ii dames”), one of the relatively few instances in which the 
actual term amour courtois is used in medieval literature, according to Neil Cartlidge, who 
cites the lines “Mes quant ele ad lez lui soun courteis ameour, / Meuz en poest counsentir feble 
meinteneour” (55–56), in “Aubrey de Bassingbourn, Ida de Beauchamp, and the context of the 
‘Estrif de deus dames’ in Oxford, Bodleian library Ms. Digby 86,” Notes and Queries 47:4 (Lon-
don: December 2000): 411–15. For a discussion of this poem, see also Marilyn Corrie, “Further 
Information on the Origins of Oxford, Bodleian Library, Ms. Digby 86,” in Notes and Queries 
46: 4 (London: December 1999): 430–34. The contrast between a courtly love debate and “In a 
Thestri Stude,” an allegorical debate wherein the traditional female personifications are avoided 
in favor of male/genderless speakers, is a sharp one. 
 14. The manuscript also contains some saints’ lives and fabliaux in Anglo-Norman, as well 
as the Harley Lyrics, dated from around 1340, and is sometimes described as one scribe’s opin-
ion of what is “best” in the Middle English and Anglo-Norman literary works available at the 
time. Consequently, the genres of this anthology range very widely.
 15. The poem’s third manuscript appearance is in Trinity College B.14.39, formerly Cam-
bridge Ms. 323, a mixed Latin/English manuscript (with some French, but not much), which 
begins with a poem about how a scribe, addressed in the second person, was going to learn how 
to write and avoid sin at the same time. The work in English that precedes “In a Thestri Stude” 
is titled “Hawe on God in [to?] Warchipe”; so here, as in the Harley manuscript, “In a Thestri 
Stude” is being included in a sowlehele context. 
 16. According to John Conlee, “Digby 86 is the handiwork of the Dominican friars of 
Worcestershire; it contains more works in French than in English, and more secular works than 
religious ones” (Conlee, 238).
2in the midst of the relative frivolity of other debates, such as the one that 
precedes “In a Thestri Stude” in Digby 86; its sharp contrast with works like 
that courtly debate echoes the way its male same-sex pairing changes the tra-
ditional use of female personifications to represent abstractions discussed in 
chapter 1. In Digby 86 as well as the other manuscripts where it appears, “In 
a Thestri Stude” appears with works both devotional and amatory. It seems to 
me that such a mixed vernacular textual environment would be particularly 
useful in fostering the kind of playful philosophical inquiry that characterizes 
the poem.
 The question that “In a Thestri Stude” insists upon is this: Whose fault is it 
that the Soul, denied heavenly bliss, is carried off to hell at the poem’s end? The 
death of this Body, in itself, seems to be no one’s fault, but the suffering of the 
Soul begs the question of guilt. This question is a relatively new development 
in the tradition of Body/Soul debates. The two Anglo-Saxon versions of the 
debate included in the Exeter and the Vercelli manuscripts and the fragmen-
tary Old English work (whether rhythmical prose or verse is unclear) from 
Worcester, preserved in a thirteenth-century manuscript, all feature a Soul 
confident that it is in the right, and that the Body’s appetites are solely respon-
sible for the punishments that the Soul now has to endure.17 This arrangement 
may have struck its readers as rather unfair: It is as if the Soul, like the Christ 
himself, is innocently suffering for the Body’s trespasses. This analogy must 
have been sufficiently clear that it manifests itself in “In a Thestri Stude,” as 
this chapter discusses in a subsequent section.
 The surviving Anglo-Saxon poems “Soul and Body I,” “Soul and Body II,” 
and the “Worcester fragments” are not really dialogic works like the debates 
discussed in this book. The Body lies mute throughout the Soul’s speech, and 
a description of its dissolution is the only response offered on its behalf. The 
intractable materiality of the silent Body of Anglo-Saxon poetry is particularly 
striking in the Vercelli Book’s second Soul/Body poem, in which the Soul is 
that of a formerly virtuous man and will not suffer hellish torments, unlike 
the sinful souls in most of the tradition’s poems. That Soul comes to praise 
the Body, but notes, with some regret, that the Body’s fate in death, which will 
continue until the two reunite on Judgment Day, remains exactly the same as 
it would have been had it sinned throughout its life.
 The silent Body in the Anglo-Saxon poems bears a semblance to the many 
 17. For studies devoted to these poems, see Douglas Moffat, The Soul’s Address to the Body: 
The Worcester Fragments (East Lansing, MI: Colleagues Press, 1987), and Douglas Moffat, ed. 
and trans., The Old English Soul and Body (Cambridge, UK: D. S. Brewer, 1990). On the Anglo-
Saxon homilies in context, and for a summary of debates about their interpretation, see chapter 
4 of Samantha Zacher’s Preaching the Converted: The Style and Rhetoric of the Vercelli Homilies 
(Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, forthcoming).
homilies and sermons that reference the trope of the Soul’s accusation of the 
Body after death. Such nondialogic works put all the responsibility for the 
choices made by the living man or woman onto their bodies, and so, per-
versely, the dead sinner’s self becomes very clearly associated with its physical 
form, understood as that part of the self that acts. Poems such as “In a Thestri 
Stude” and “Als I Lay” feature a Body that disputes this model of Body-as-
sole-actor, which sins and goes on sinning while a trapped Soul, which appar-
ently has nothing to do with a person’s day-to-day choices, protests within. In 
pre-thirteenth-century Body/Soul debates in English, the Soul is merely the 
preacher, standing on the outside to offer smug or distressed commentary, 
powerless to act. Meanwhile, the silenced “I” of man awaits Judgment Day 
(that day whose warning signs and events the Soul’s final speech details), when 
it will once again be able to speak and shall—because, in this model, the Body 
is the seat of the self—be the one answerable to God for both Soul and Body. 
The monologic quality of the Old English poem avoids the question that will 
become central to Middle English Body/Soul debates and was key, as we have 
seen, to the Latin tradition of the same: the question of guilt’s proper assign-
ment.
At the close of the dialogue, a man’s body will be devoured by worms, but as it 
opens, the Body possesses a Soul’s capacity to reflect and to have opinions. At 
the dialogue’s end, as well, a Soul will proceed to hell, having apparently gained 
some of the Body’s faculty to suffer, to act, and, most of all, to be acted on by 
violent means. “In a Thestri Stude” draws no distinction between the parts of 
the Soul that will set off on this journey: Every part of the Soul disputed by 
the medieval philosophers of so-called faculty psychology—“agent intellect,” 
“sensitive soul,” “vegetative soul,” and so on—will go to hell together.18 Faculty 
psychology is the general term for medieval psychological theories derived, in 
part, from a reading of Aristotle’s De Anima; its adherents would understand 
the soul as separated into functions that work together to varying degrees, 
establishing a part of the soul as the section that has desires and appetites and 
 18. I derive this thumbnail summary of faculty psychology in part from the chapters on 
“The Potential and Agent Intellect” and “Criticisms of Aristotelian Psychology and the Au-
gustinian-Aristotelian Synthesis” by Z. Kuksewicz in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval 
Philosophy, ed. Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1982), and from Elizabeth Ruth Harvey’s The Inward Wits: Psychological Theory in the Middle 
Ages and the Renaissance (London: The Warburg Institute, 1975). I discuss the problem of the 
will in the context of faculty psychology in a later section of this chapter.
2sinful pleasures. That part of the soul was deemed “lower” than other parts, 
and therefore more readily corruptible—and it might be so implicated in the 
life of the body that it would remain behind at death.
 The debate between the Body and the Soul is located in a particular 
moment, as the narrator stands in the dark listening, before the Soul departs 
for hell and the Body is buried. This moment is one that is poised between 
wholeness (that of the man that was, now dead) and the final dissolution of the 
union between Body and Soul (even though that separation is also a moment 
or interval, in the sense that it will end on Judgment Day, when Soul and Body 
are reunited). To a medieval philosopher thinking in terms of faculty psychol-
ogy, this dissolution would contain a contradictory sort of implied wholeness, 
because, in the debate’s situation, all of the Soul’s faculties are speaking as one. 
The tension inherent in the Soul’s speeches—that is, the tension between a 
rigid division of labor among aspects of the self and the ambiguity about where 
the guilt for the individual’s sins lies—arises from the generic demands of the 
poem’s debating allegory as well as the debates of the medieval theologians 
who never quite agreed on how to synthesize the Aristotelian and Augustinian 
ways of dividing up the aspects of the self.
 “In a Thestri Stude” ignores and, by ignoring, manages to highlight the 
ways in which Body/Soul debates make no sense. Ontologically, the Body 
cannot speak or think; those are not faculties that pertain to it. The Latin 
“Visio Philiberti” seems to be the only Body/Soul debate in which the Body, 
trying to place blame for their mutual misdeeds on the Soul, asks it whether 
a Body could so much as speak if it were without an animating Soul. In fact, 
the Soul ought not be able to feel, absent sensory input from the Body, and yet 
it is clear that it fears the physical pains of hell, where it will achieve enough 
embodiment that it will be able to experience heat and pain.19 Caroline Walker 
Bynum, discussing the doctrinal disputes around purgatory and bodily resur-
 19. Augustine, for one, seemed confused by the generally held belief that souls experience 
incredibly physical tortures in hell: “Now since this cannot happen until soul and body have 
been so combined that they cannot be sundered or separated, it may seem strange that the body 
is said to be killed by a death in which it is not abandoned by the soul but remains possessed 
of soul and feeling, and endures torment in this condition. For in that final and everlasting 
punishment . . . we correctly talk of the ‘death of the soul’ because it no longer derives life from 
God. But how can we talk in this case of the death of the body since it is deriving life from the 
soul? For otherwise it cannot feel the bodily torments which are to follow the resurrection” 
(St. Augustine, City of God, Bk. XIII, ch. 2. Trans. Henry Bettenson [London: Penguin Books, 
1972], 511). In Latin: “Quod cum ante non fiat, quam cum anima corpori sic fuerit copulata, ut 
nulla diremptione separentur; mirum videri potest quo modo corpus ea morte dicatur occidi, 
qua non ab anima deseritur, sed animatum sentiensque cruciatur. Nam in illa poena ultima ac 
sempiterna . . . recte mors animae dicitur, quia non vivit ex Deo: mors autem corporis quonam 
modo, cum vivat ex anima? Non enim aliter potest ipsa corporalia, quae post resurrectionem 
futura sunt, sentire tormenta” (De civitate Dei, ed. B. Dombart and A. Kalb, 2 vols. [Stuttgart: 
Teubner, 1981, 1993], 1:557–58.
rection, noted that “preachers, hagiographers, and schoolmen saw nothing 
fundamentally inconsistent in depicting the bodily tortures of disembodied 
spirits although they sometimes admitted it was odd.”20 Body/Soul debates 
such as “In a Thestri Stude” are precisely those texts in which the “oddness” of 
disembodied spirits’ experience of torture is being worked out and worked on, 
and being turned into allegorical narratives with psychological aims.
 A debate such as “In a Thestri Stude” is, among other things, a philosophi-
cal inquiry, an inquiry far less formal than those of hagiographers or school-
men but one that is flexible and nuanced enough to permit interrogation of the 
oddness of spirits undergoing bodily suffering, and the even greater oddness 
of the speaking Body. One reason for the poem’s productive muddling of con-
cepts may be quite simple: To rigidly posit soul/body dualism was, after all, to 
participate in the Manichean heresy. Even though Western Christianity often 
slipped into a sort of demonization of the bodily, during the Middle Ages and 
afterward, the fact of Christ’s incarnation and the sanctification of the bodily 
persisted, as we have seen in Prudentius’ Psychomachia. To posit a Soul and a 
Body that share certain qualities and are even capable of loving one another, as 
we will see in chapter 3, is to heighten drama, to stage an interesting thought 
experiment, and to avoid any hint of a heretically rigid dualism.
 The relationship between Body and Soul, which forms the drama at the 
center of the poem, is riven by the urgency of the question: Which part of the 
self must assume responsibility for sin committed in life? Knowing whom to 
blame for the Body’s and Soul’s collective doom seems crucial to both, even 
though they now exist on the far side of life, in a time when all they can do is 
look into a future composed entirely of punishment for their past. If the Body 
had been figured as sinful and lustful female flesh, it would have been easy to 
say that it bore the responsibility for trapping the Soul within it as in a prison. 
If a clear dynamic of dominance had been established from the start, in which 
the Soul would have been leading and directing the Body’s actions as a ghost 
in the machine, their sins would have clearly been the Soul’s fault. “In a Thestri 
Stude” lacks these simple solutions. Philosophically speaking, what the dia-
logue really needs is a third debater, the will. Since at least Augustine, medieval 
philosophers had believed that sin originates in the will (or, possibly, in the 
willing aspect of the soul), rather than in the body as such. However, there are 
a number of reasons, including linguistic ones discussed later, for omitting the 
will from this dialogue, including the conventional rhetoric for dialogues and 
debates (which holds that they contain two and only two speakers) and an old, 
pre-philosophical tradition of splitting the self into two and only two parts. A 
 20. Caroline Walker Bynum, The Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity, 200–1336 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 281.
2number of overlapping conditions, as well as a desire for narrative elegance, 
seem to require that, in “In a Thestri Stude,” the will, and attendant guilt, are 
passed back and forth in a quarrel about where they belong.21
 Body/Soul debates such as “In a Thestri Stude” thematize the tension 
between Aristotelian understandings of their relation, in which the soul is 
seen as the form of the body, and the view that the body is a shell animated by 
the soul, associated with Plato and medieval neo-Platonism. The neo-Platonic 
version, generally linked to Plotinus, posits higher and lower souls, and only 
the lowest soul interacts with the body. Medieval Aristotelians, too, divided 
the soul into its component faculties, but they were also guided by Aristotle’s 
own writing into a productive confusion about the relationship of soul and 
body.
 In an influential passage in Aristotle’s De Anima (in the Latin version pro-
duced by William of Moerbeke, available to medieval readers by the 1270s, 
according to Ivo Thomas, who introduces its modern edition), Aristotle won-
ders about the separability of soul and body:
Therefore it is evident enough that the soul is inseparable from the body—or 
certain parts of it, if it naturally has parts; for it is of certain bodily parts 
themselves that it is the act. But with respect to certain of its parts there 
is nothing to prevent its being separate, because these are acts of nothing 
bodily. Furthermore, it is not clear that the soul is not the “act” of the body 
in the way that a sailor is of his ship.22
 21. How much well-known medieval writers such as Chaucer and Gower knew about 
scholastic theories of the self remains an unresolved debate in itself, and we know infinitely less 
about the anonymous author of “In a Thestri Stude.” One view, held by one of the few critics 
who have written about Body/Soul debates, argued that neither a background in the Church 
Fathers nor formal theological training was available to the anonymous authors of these poems; 
they draw instead, he maintains, on “common sense,” partaking of the debates of their times 
(which had much larger concerns in mind, like the resurrection of the body). Robert W. Ack-
erman, “Debates of the Body and Soul and Parochial Christianity,” Speculum (1961): 541–65. 
For a more recent and optimistic approach to just how aware medieval poets might have been 
of the burning theological issues of their day, see Jim Rhodes, Poetry Does Theology: Chaucer, 
Grosseteste and the Pearl-Poet (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001).
 22. Aristotle’s De Anima in the Version of William of Moerbeke and the Commentary of St. 
Thomas Aquinas, trans. Kenelm Foster and Silvester Humphries (London: Routledge 1951), 
174, II.i.242–44 (according to the traditional divisions within editions of Aristotle, this section 
would be numbered II I 413a 7–9 in any modern edition of the Greek text). Thomas Aquinas, in 
his commentary, clarifies—to a degree. “As to Plato’s opinion that the soul is the act of the body 
not as its form but as its mover, he [Aristotle] adds that it is not yet clear whether the soul is the 
act of the body as a sailor of a ship, i.e. as its mover only” (Aristotle’s De Anima, 178). James of 
Venice made an earlier (but apparently unedited) translation of the De Anima that, according to 
Dod, was “widely circulated in the thirteenth century” Bernard Dod, “Aristoteles Latinus,” The 
Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1982), 46. See also Dod’s “A Table of Medieval Latin Translations of Aristotle’s Work,” pp. 74–79, 
The analogy of a sailor sailing a ship is a metaphor of containment—the soul 
carried through space by the body, contained within it—but this figure is itself 
working in the service of a technological metaphor. The ship might be thought 
to be the act of the sailor because the sailor directs its movement, but Aristotle 
seems to assume that it is the sailor who is the act of his ship, and, therefore, 
permits the possibility that consciousness is a function of embodiment. The 
double negative of Moerbeke’s version mires us in Aristotle’s confusion, which 
even Aquinas (and the several other philosophers who, according to Edward 
Mahoney in the Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, commented 
about and used this analogy) could not fully clarify.23 The relation between 
soul and body is so unclear, in fact, that most Christian philosophers con-
cerned with salvation subdivided and redivided the soul (which already came 
down to them somewhat subdivided and complete with faculties, from both 
the Platonic and the Aristotelian traditions) to make it clearer which part stays 
behind and which part goes to Heaven or to hell—a division that “In a Thestri 
Stude” simply ignores, at the price of other kinds of confusion.
 “In a Thestri Stude” foregrounds the complexity of drawing distinctions 
between form and content and renders them difficult to maintain by giving a 
voice to the Body and rendering the Soul vulnerable to what is portrayed in 
the poem as a physical form of suffering—the heat of hellfire. Thus, while such 
poems are rich in their implications for histories of psychology, their richness 
is also that they form a neglected aspect of the history of allegory through the 
complicated nature of their personifications. They are useful in demonstrat-
ing the ways in which allegory (in its many modes) and personification (in its 
endless variety) were places for performing intricate and ambivalent thinking 
about the self in the England of the later Middle Ages.
 If “In a Thestri Stude” were a debate written by philosophers, whether 
some stripe of Aristotelian or neo-Platonist or some adherent of the slightly 
different Augustinian interpretation of the divisions of the self—if, in other 
words, this was an orthodox work of philosophy—the speaking parts would 
be almost endlessly multiplied; subsections of subsections of the soul’s being 
would be brought in to speak their parts. This is, incidentally, something that 
seems to happen at a particular moment in Piers Plowman, as discussed in 
chapter 5: Anima in B.XV and Liberum Arbitrium in C have moments of 
stating all of their names and all of their functions at once, and the confusion 
of these moments in both the B and C versions is an important indicator of 
of that same article, which lists 144 surviving manuscripts of James of Venice’s translation and 
268 surviving manuscripts of William of Moerbeke’s.
 23. Edward Mahoney, “Sense, Intellect and Imagination,” in Norman Kretzmann et al., eds., 
The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1982), 612, fn 42.
2how poorly this sort of direct application of faculty psychology to a latter-day 
psychomachia really works. What is particularly interesting about “In a Thestri 
Stude” is that it is not such a poem, and yet it does not lack for careful philo-
sophical thought on the topic of division and subdivision of the self.
 Even without going into the full complexity of a philosophical treatise, a 
working definition of what a soul or what a body is needs some explanation of 
where desire, appetite, action, and choice are located. “In a Thestri Stude”—a 
work of sowlehele largely intended to be useful rather than philosophically 
interesting and not committed to a particular school or view of what human 
beings are—still sees the self as profoundly characterized by inner rifts and 
tensions. The problem of guilt, the poem’s central disputed matter, begs the 
question of the will’s location, since the will functions as a sort of third party 
to the dialogue, passively being passed back and forth between the debating 
pair.
 How to answer the question of guilt that the dialogue poses so urgently? 
Rather than choosing between blind obedience to an Aristotelian or Augus-
tinian reading of the debate and an assumption that the author was ignorant 
of patristic writings, I want to seek the middle ground, or perhaps the entirely 
other ground, that the poem makes available. Medieval writings about psy-
chology set out a series of theological explanations of the relationship between 
soul and body that cannot fully account for the sort of relationship depicted 
in this poem and, as we will see, in “Als I Lay.” As a consequence, although 
I have tried to understand the poem in Aristotelian terms, and am about to 
turn to examining it in terms of St. Augustine’s writings about the will, I ulti-
mately find these authorities insufficient. My concern, therefore, is not just 
with whether this debate is or is not Augustinian in its psychology of the will, 
but rather with the ways in which it uses the abilities of the vernacular to 
think through problems that Augustine had considered and other schools of 
philosophy and theology were also considering at that time. The real problem, 
as it turns out, is not just including the will but also translating “will” into 
English.
“In a Thestri Stude” functions as a debate precisely because it elides the prob-
lem of the will: If the provenance of the will were crystal clear, Body and Soul 
would have nothing to argue about, and yet will, though never mentioned, 
is ever-present. Instead, the poem hinges on the difficulty of theorizing the 
capacity for free choice that medieval philosophers call liberum arbitrium. 
This is one of the keys to understanding the peculiarities of style and form 
that characterize the poem, and perhaps even the diversity of the works placed 
beside it in manuscripts. While “In a Thestri Stude” permits certain fairly 
conventional rhetorical gestures that also occur in sermons and homilies (the 
preaching on the signs of Doomsday, for instance, and the ubi sunt formula), 
it also offers an opportunity to think through the distribution of powers and 
punishments among the faculties that make up the self.
 The attempt to understand the relationship of soul and body to the will 
and, ultimately, to salvation occupied a great deal of space in medieval phi-
losophy and theology, including some crucial chapters on this topic in Augus-
tine’s City of God.24 There, Augustine explains that “the first death consists of 
two, the death of the soul and the death of the body; so that the first death is 
the death of the whole person, when the soul is without God and without a 
body, and undergoes punishment for a time.”25 What is this “whole person,” 
and what comprises such a person? As we shall shortly see, even Augustine is 
not entirely sure. Here, Augustine embeds his discussion of what death sepa-
rates and destroys in a discourse on the first human beings and the meaning 
of their disobedience in the Garden of Eden: 
[There] the soul, in fact, rejoiced in its own freedom to act perversely and 
disdained to be God’s servant; and so it was deprived of the obedient service 
which its body had at first rendered. At its own pleasure the soul deserted 
 24. In his introduction to Three Treatises on Man: A Cistercian Anthropology (Kalamazoo, 
MI: Cistercian Publications, 1977), Bernard McGinn summarizes the debates surrounding 
Augustine’s views about the relationship of body and soul, which seem to have changed a great 
deal over his lifetime—and even over the course of the argument made in City of God. McGinn 
believes, with O’Connell, that Augustine initially accepted but eventually rejected Plotinus’ 
neo-Platonic model of higher and lower souls in favor of a biblical view, which McGinn char-
acterizes as “the historical materiality of man” (8). McGinn concludes that Augustine “failed 
to systematize the two understandings of man to which he was heir” (9). He also notes that 
misreadings of Augustine on this matter were common, and often considered orthodox in the 
Middle Ages. According to Beryl Smalley’s summary account of Augustine’s view on this mat-
ter, The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages (Oxford: Clarendon, 1941), Augustine “defines 
man as ‘a rational soul which uses a body,’ with the accent on the transcendence of the soul; 
so the spirit transcends the letter; their connexion [sic] is tenuous and artificial, depending on 
the mechanical rules of allegory” (10). The definition Smalley attributes to Augustine is Plato’s 
(from I Alcibiades 129 e), and was cited by Plotinus, as McGinn points out (McGinn, 8). That 
tenuousness of the body/soul connection—like the arbitrariness of the relationship between 
the signifier and the signified—would have left the Soul and Body of “In a Thestri Stude” with 
nothing to say to one another at their journey’s end.
 25. St. Augustine, City of God, Bk. XIII, ch. 12, trans. Henry Bettenson (London: Penguin 
Books, 1972), 522. “Quonium prima constat ex duabus, una animae, altera corporis: ut sit prima 
totius hominis mors, cum anima sine Deo et sine corpore ad tempus poenas luit; secunda vero, 
ubi anima sine Deo cum corpore poenas aeternas luit.” Augustinus Hipponensis, De Civitate 
Dei, CL. 0313 SL 47, ed. B. Dombart and A. Kalb. Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina (Turn-
hout, Belgium: Brepols, 1955).
2its superior and master; and so it no longer retained its inferior and servant 
obedient to its will.26
This moment, one of many when Augustine positions himself in the ongoing 
debate about the status of the Soul/Body relation, is particularly interesting in 
the connection it implies between servitude and selfhood. The Soul is God’s 
servant, and is disobedient and thus, punished, loses its disciplinary grip over 
the one who once was the servant’s servant, the Body. Even more relevant to 
this discussion is how Augustine’s discourse highlights the absence of a signifi-
cant third element from the Middle English Body/Soul debate—the will.
 The poem’s view of the workings of the will and the sinful appetites differs 
in a fundamental way (either through rejection or through ignorance) from 
the descriptions of the appetites in medieval philosophy and in the complex 
of theories that this chapter has termed faculty psychology. One basic way in 
which it differs is that medieval philosophy was fascinated by the role of the 
will in sin. By the fourteenth century, some philosophers “sought to attribute 
to the human will a wide variety of cognitive activities that included judg-
ment, evaluation, and a sort of discursive reasoning.”27 By this time, the Will 
might have merited a role of its own in an allegory (as, arguably, it does, in 
both “Sawles Warde” and Piers Plowman, discussed in the second half of this 
study), and the absence of a character named Will to blame in “In a Thestri 
Stude” is a problem as well as a driving force in the poem—without Will to 
blame, Body and Soul try to figure out which of the two parts of the self is 
at fault. Of course, everything to do with the different powers of the self was 
hotly debated throughout the Middle Ages, and a plethora of theories were 
advanced—but it is clear that our anonymous author was not trying to deal 
with these large issues head-on, even if he or she was asking similar ques-
tions. The ways in which “In a Thestri Stude” deviates from faculty psychol-
ogy might be understood as the product of ignorance on an author’s part, or 
of imagined ignorance on the part of the author’s intended audience, but the 
fact remains that they offer a somewhat different view from the one readers of 
medieval psychological writings might expect.
 26. Augustine, City of God, Bk. XIII, ch. 13, 522. “Jam quippe anima libertate perversum 
propria delectata, et Deo dedignata servire, pristino corporis servitio destituebatur: et quia 
superiorem Dominum suo arbitrio deseruerat, inferiorem famulum ad suum arbitrium non 
tenebat” (Augustinus Hipponensis, City of God).
 27. John Bowers, The Crisis of Will in Piers Plowman (Washington, DC: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 1986), 53. A footnote on this page indicates that this notion was 
anticipated by Peter John Olivi (1248–98). Bowers’s study offers a wonderfully succinct sum-
mary of the development of the Christian doctrine of the will from the letters of Paul through 
the writings of St. Augustine and the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas; see especially his chapter 
2, “Complexities of the Will.” 
 The status of the will is never named as a problem by either speaker in “In 
a Thestri Stude,” and yet it is undoubtedly the series of willed acts performed 
by the now-dead knight that pose such a problem for the Soul’s salvation. But 
what part of the knight performed those acts, and is that the same part that 
now bears responsibility for them? The Soul of “In a Thestri Stude” seems 
to accuse the Body of having possessed the will and the appetites of the per-
son now dead; the Body chose wrongdoing, and the Soul, allegedly innocent, 
could do nothing to stop it. Now that the Soul is being punished, it can take 
revenge only by taunting the Body on its bier.28
 The dyadic structure of “In a Thestri Stude,” and the consequent necessity 
of more than one occluded third party or term (the narrator as well as the 
will), testify to a linguistic problem Middle English authors encountered in an 
interesting way: the difficulty of translating a Latin philosophical vocabulary 
into the vernacular. Just as the term Soul is ambiguous (is it anima or spiritus, 
the “rational” or the “sensitive” soul that is speaking to the Body?), it is dif-
ficult to express will in its volitional rather than its futural sense in English. 
Even if this sense of the word will exists (as it does, even in Old English, in the 
verb willan), it does not map fully onto the Latin philosophical vocabulary. 
After all, it is possible to “have all one wills (wants)” or to say “I will (intend 
to) do this”; the word will can translate as sexual desire, power of free choice, 
or intent, but it is not exactly the same thing as the verb volo, velle, volui or 
the noun voluntas, voluntatis. Voluntas indicates the desiring part of the soul, 
often translated as “will,” but the English word will is also used to translate 
liberum arbitrium, the freedom of the will in general, and turns out to be less 
precise than either of the Latin terms.29 This is a matter of available English 
 28. Anne Middleton has noted that the real problem in Middle English may be not the lack 
of a term for “free will” or “free choice” (liberum abitrium) but the way in which the term free 
is associated with the term noble, a sociolegal status distinct from bond-man or bond-servant 
(Anne Middleton, private communication). 
 29. The meaning of voluntas, voluntatis and its relationship to Middle English literature are 
most clearly presented in James Simpson’s discussion of Piers Plowman: “Christian philosophers 
inherited from classical philosophers a division of the soul into a cognitive power and an affec-
tive power: into a part of the soul which thinks, and perceives the truth on the one hand, and a 
part which feels, and desires the good, on the other. Common Latin terms for these two basic 
parts of the soul are ratio for the thinking part of the soul, and voluntas for the desiring part. 
When these terms are translated into the vernacular, there are different words used for both of 
them, but ‘will’ is the term most often used in Middle English for voluntas. In a late fourteenth-
century text, The Cloud of Unknowing, for example, the author states that the soul has ‘two 
principal worching myghtes, reson and wille’ (ed. Phyllis Hodgson, London: Oxford University 
Press, EETS. 1955, p. 115). He defines ‘resoun’ as a ‘myght thorough the whiche we departe the 
iuel fro the good, the iuel fro the worse, the good fro the betir, the worse fro the worste, the betir 
fro the best’ [116]; and ‘wille’ he defines as a ‘myght thorou the whiche we chese good, after that 
it be determined with reson; & thorow the whiche we loue God, we desire God, & resten us with 
ful liking & consent eendli in God [116].” James Simpson, Piers Plowman: An Introduction to the 
2vocabulary and usage only, since, clearly, most if not all English authors 
were reading Latin works, even if not necessarily works of Latin philosophi-
cal debate about the nature of the will. “In a Thestri Stude” does not use the 
Boethian language of free will, which becomes so important in later English 
writings. Although Thomas Usk, in the late-fourteenth-century Testament of 
Love, manages to distinguish between free choice and free “arbitrement,” a 
century earlier (and earlier, also, than Chaucer’s translation of Boethius and 
his Troilus and Criseyde, with its consideration of the role of the will), “In a 
Thestri Stude” does not deploy this language.30
 In Middle English, the word will means both the act of choosing and, 
potentially, the thing that is willed.31 This sense of the will does not function 
successfully as a philosophical term, and, lacking such a term, the allegories 
that contain discussions of the will or of the self ’s capacity for free choice (and 
allegorical characters very much invite such discussions) perform complex 
maneuvers around the problem of willing and choosing. The Latin voluntas, 
however, is always a part of the self and never refers to that outside thing 
being desired, and perhaps this is why medieval philosophers tended to think 
in terms of the more separable, abstractable term liberum arbitrium when 
considering the freedom of choice some faculty of the soul possessed. At any 
rate, neither of the Latin terms voluntas or liberum arbitrium exactly coincides 
with the scope of the other, and neither precisely coincides with the scope of 
the English term will.
 “In a Thestri Stude” is marked in multiple ways by the problem of the will. 
The capricious choices the self makes in life (for which the Soul blames the 
Body) reflect its freedom to exercise the liberum arbitrium, the free choice of 
the will—a freedom that expresses the often capricious freedoms of the self as 
arbiter. These are aspects of the poem’s mode of personification that mark its 
attempt to do psychology informally and in the vernacular, performing psy-
chology as a byproduct of philosophy, literature, pedagogy, and preaching. “In 
B-text (London: Longman, 1990), 95, citing Hodgeson, 1944.
 30. See Thomas Usk, The Testament of Love, ed. R. Allen Shoaf (Kalamazoo, MI: Western 
Michigan University [TEAMS], 1998). 
 31. The Middle English Dictionary lists both: “1(a) The appetitive and volitional faculty of 
the soul;—often as contrasted with reason, imagination, etc.; also in fig. context; also person.; 
volition; also, the soul in its appetitive operations.” And “3(a) That which one wants or requires, 
a desire; also in prov. expressions; also, that which suits one’s pleasure; don (werken) ~; haven 
~.” I thank Steven Justice for a useful discussion on this topic. Hannah Arendt notes this about 
the English word will: “The strange ambivalence of the English language, in which ‘will’ as an 
auxiliary designates the future whereas the verb ‘to will’ indicates volitions, properly speaking, 
testifies to our uncertainties in these matters.” “These matters” are the way in which the will is 
“our mental organ for the future as memory is our mental organ for the past,” an understanding 
that, Arendt notes, she does not share with the large number of philosophers who see “the will” 
as an illusion. Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
1978), 13.
a Thestri Stude” is a work whose fundamental conflict and narrative develop-
ment are both created out of the building blocks of philosophical, theological, 
and didactic thought. Because it inhabits thought in a dynamic way, it cannot 
be reduced to “merely” enacting philosophical ideas, but making philosophy 
speak is part of what the poem accomplishes.
 “In a Thestri Stude” permits the Soul to put the blame of earthly sin on the 
Body instead of on the will, but according to Augustine, it is not the Body’s 
lusts that corrupt the Soul. Rather, it is something that Augustine can locate 
within the Soul—the will. In his Confessions, Augustine considers the problem 
of the will at some length. “The mind gives an order to the body and is at once 
obeyed, but when it gives an order to itself, it is resisted,” he writes, and we 
might consider the Body/Soul debate as a kind of corrective to this model.32 In 
explaining how the mind might not be able to control the self, Augustine has 
recourse to the concept of the will (in just the place where the Soul reverts to 
blaming the Body):
The mind orders itself to make an act of will, and it would not give this order 
unless it willed to do so; yet it does not carry out its own command. . . . For 
the will commands that an act of will should be made, and it gives this com-
mand to itself, not to some other will. The reason, then, why the command 
is not obeyed is that it is not given with the full will. . . . So there are two 
wills in us, because neither by itself is the whole will, and each possesses 
what the other lacks.33
Augustine’s two wills name a fissured, split self centuries prior to the Body/
Soul debate’s emergence as a genre. One can speculate that the possibility of, 
indeed the necessity for, debate poetry as a genre comes out of this passage. 
Augustine seems to be theorizing that debate as a practice is always-already 
located in the voluntates (literally, “wills”) since they are always at least double 
if not multiple. However, Augustine’s description of the split will depicts a 
process that remains internal to what medieval readers would call “the Soul” 
and therefore avoids the entire tricky question of the Body so oddly addressed 
by “In a Thestri Stude,” where the Body is assumed to have something like a 
will of its own.
 32. Augustine, Confessions, Bk. VIII, ch. 9, trans. R. S. Pine-Coffin (New York: Penguin 
Classics, 1961), 172. “Imperat animus corpori, et paretur statim: imperat animus sibi, et resisti-
tur.” Augustinus Hipponensis, Confessionorum libri tredecim CL.0251. Corpus Christianorum, 
Series Latina (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 1955). 
 33. Augustine, Confessions. “Imperat animus ut velit animus, nec alter est, nec facit 
tamen. . . . Quoniam voluntas imperat ut sit voluntas, nec alia, sed ipsa. Non utique plena im-
perat, ideo non est quod imperat. . . . Et ideo sunt duae voluntates, quia una earum tota non est, 
et hoc adest alteri quod deest alteri” (Augustinus Hipponensis, Confessionorum libri tredecim).
2 One solution to seeing the will as an excluded character whose presence 
would have solved the dilemma of blame that exists in all Body/Soul debates 
would be to understand the “rational will” as standing in an equivalent rela-
tionship to sinful passions and appetites as an ideal Soul stands to its appetite- 
ridden Body. Robert Pasnau’s chapter on human nature in the Cambridge 
Companion to Medieval Philosophy contains a telling passage in which Pasnau 
explains Augustine’s writings on the will in terms of Augustine’s own reading 
of Galatians 5:17: “The flesh lusts against the spirit and the spirit against the 
flesh.” Pasnau writes that “although the Pauline text suggests that spirit and 
flesh are matched in an even fight, medieval authors tended to view the rela-
tionship between the will and the passions as asymmetrical, inasmuch as only 
the will could give rise to voluntary actions.”34 Unnoticed in this analysis is the 
slippage from the language of “flesh and spirit” into the language of “the pas-
sions and the will”; this slippage owes much to medieval commentators who, 
trying to avoid Manichean dualism, chose to understand “flesh” as “depraved 
will.”35 Medieval authors seem to have equated the body with the passions or 
appetites; a will capable of controlling the passions or choosing among them 
would stand in the same relation to the passions as the soul does to the body. 
Even though the rational will has primacy, Pasnau concludes, “not even St. 
Paul could keep his flesh from lusting against his spirit. To make sense of that 
influence, the flesh was viewed as doing its work indirectly, by shaping how the 
mind conceives of a situation.”36 A debate of Soul with its Body could thus be 
analogous to a debate between the will and the passions, even though the Mid-
dle English debates featuring a character named Will tend to characterize him 
(Piers Plowman) or her (“Sawles Warde”) or the neuter “it” (“Wit and Will”) as 
at least bumbling and at most dangerously in need of stern discipline.
 To discuss the figure of the will in “In a Thestri Stude” is to discuss some-
thing that isn’t present in the poem as a voiced character, but instead as a 
philosophical problem that the poem never succeeds in solving. The exclusion 
of the will from the Body/Soul dialogue is an effect of a literary (as well as a 
lexical or grammatical) choice. Debate poems are almost always structured 
as dialogues with two speakers taking their turns. The Body/Soul tradition 
 34. Robert Pasnau, “Human Nature,” in The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy, 
ed. A. S. McGrade (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 223.
 35. McEvoy gives the example of St. John Chrysostom’s gloss on Galatians 5:17, stating that 
St. John Chrysostom “counters their [the Manicheans’] interpretation by claiming, quite legiti-
mately, that Paul uses ‘the flesh’ habitually to mean not the body as such but the depraved will, 
so that the blame rests not upon the physical body but upon the slothful soul.” James McEvoy, 
“Grosseteste on the Soul’s Care for the Body: A New Text and New Sources for the Idea,” in 
Aspectus et Affectus: Essays and Editions in Grosseteste and Medieval Intellectual Life in Honor of 
Richard C. Dales, ed. Gunar Freibergs (New York: AMS Press, 1993), 45.
 36. Pasnau, 223.
never strays from this dyadic organization, but by confining itself to a dual-
ist model, yet trying to avoid a heretical dualism that utterly condemns the 
flesh, it becomes committed to a dual-power analysis of the living individual, 
and to an unresolvable debate about guilt. Having split the self into Body and 
Soul, the author is presented with a theological problem: Which of these two 
has actually chosen the actions that the two of them have performed in their 
mutual history of tenuous unity? Is the Soul (with no subsplit available that 
would permit a “higher” and a “lower” soul to struggle for dominance) entirely 
imprisoned in the Body’s wants, its “depraved will”? Or does the flesh ventrilo-
quize the willful choices made by its spirit’s volitional powers? The neither/nor 
nonanswer given by “In a Thestri Stude” and other poems in the Body/Soul 
tradition is philosophically unsatisfying, but it points to a somewhat satisfying 
solution: These poems are not dramatizations of philosophical stances about 
the relationship of the body and the soul, but rather appropriations of those 
stances for purposes of sowlehele. They are works whose narrative dynamism 
works in tension with a performative, didactic, and pastoral discourse aimed 
at explaining the self to itself, making selective use of medieval philosophical 
concepts but turning them to their own uses, as a rhetoric aimed to both emo-
tionally and intellectually move and thereby educate a lay public.
There is a moment near the end of “In a Thestri Stude” that helps make clear 
both the difference and the proximity between theological psychology and the 
psychology of sowlehele. This moment comes at the transition point, the break 
where the poem changes. The Body has petulantly refused to speak further: 
“βei βou chide nit and dai, ne sege ich the namore” (“Though you chide me 
night and day, I will say no more to thee”; 52). In response, the Soul repri-
mands the Body, accusing it of having never thought of God while living:
Bodi, wi neuedest βou βe biβout, βe wile βou mighttest i-wolde
Hof him βat makede ous alle of nout, wat hauest βou him I-holde?
For hore sunnen and nout ffor his his fles he solde;
Blodi he was on rode I-don, so the profete hous tolde. (53–56)
Body, why did you never think, while you had the power to have chosen to 
 do so
Of him that made us all out of naught, of all that you owe him?
For our sins and not for his he gave his flesh;
Bloody was he on the cross, so the prophet tells us.
2The Body had already alluded to the Crucifixion in the image of the worms 
casting lots, and the Soul had, in the immediately preceding speech, promised 
or threatened to call on Jesus: “To Jhesu will ich callen, he be mi socours” 
(“To Jesus will I call, he [will] be my salvation”; 48). Here, however, the Soul 
accuses the Body of having grievously forgotten about Christ. In fact, despite 
the earlier allusions, it may be that both of them have. There seems to be no 
hope for salvation in what the Body or the Soul utter in this dialogue. The 
slightest ghost of hope is retrospective: The Soul asks the Body why it hadn’t, 
when it had the chance, thought of Christ, because the moment after death is 
too late. There is, in this moment, an element of simple didacticism, as well 
as an “I told you so” sort of schoolyard taunt and the fundamental confusion 
of faculties (Why was it the Body who should have done the thinking?). But, 
most of all, there is, at last, a way out of the Body/Soul dyad in this moment, 
through an invocation of a flesh that isn’t the Body’s.
 Line 55—“for hore sunnen and nout ffor his his fles he solde”—stands out 
in the poem, and not only for the awkwardness of its doubled “his.” Christ’s 
flesh, as that which is sacrificed for the good of humankind, is the only flesh 
explicitly mentioned in the poem besides the Body’s. The doubled “his” can 
almost be understood as a separation; “his sins” and “his flesh” are so differ-
ent from one another, because Christ’s flesh has not sinned, that each needs 
its own “his” to mark it. Is he giving his flesh or selling it? The verb “sellen” 
can mean “to give” or “to sell” in Middle English; the Middle English Diction-
ary lists usage for the former as early as circa 1130 and the latter as early as 
circa 1200. My translation emphasizes the first of these meanings without, 
however, being certain that the distinction can be fully and firmly maintained, 
or that the author of “In a Thestri Stude” would want to maintain it. In this 
dialogue, Christ stands in a relationship to his own flesh that is not unlike that 
of the Soul in relation to the Body, except that his flesh is much more valu-
able, and far more meekly unresistant to being given or sold than one suspects 
this poem’s Body would be. The difference is that Christ’s flesh obeys him, as 
does his will, whereas the dilemma of the human split will is that it struggles 
between good and evil, splitting the human self in multiple ways.
 Theologically, Christ’s two natures do not map exactly onto a Body/Soul 
distinction. As early as the First Council of Nicea in 325 it had been firmly 
resolved that Christ was not merely a divine soul clothed in a human body, 
since the union between the earthly and the divine that he represented was 
more complete than such a dualism implies.37 Nevertheless, the possibility of 
 37. For discussions of the role that representations of Christ’s nature played in medieval 
culture and written texts, see Miri Rubin, Corpus Christi: The Eucharist in Late Medieval Culture 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 1991); Sarah Beckwith, Christ’s Body: Identity, 
Culture and Society in Late Medieval Writings (London: Routledge, 1993); and Caroline Walker 
Bynum, The Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity, 200–1336 (New York: Columbia 
owning and thereby selling the flesh is a reflexive relationship, and Christ’s 
reflexive relationship to his flesh participates in an economy that resembles 
that of the Soul/Body debate, modeling the ideal relation of mastery over the 
Body that should be available to a more perfect Soul.
 Christ himself is the original personification allegory—“verbum caro fac-
tum est” (“The Word made flesh”; John 1:14). In the grammar of line 55, “his 
fles he solde,” the poem also offers the fundamental principle of its own alle-
gorical construction—a relationship of a divisible two rather than an indivis-
ible two-natured unity or a relationship of three. In this context, Christ and his 
flesh can be understood as an exemplary split self being offered as a contrast 
to the split and self-berating selfhood of the dead knight. Christ is interesting 
in the context of this poem in that he is two—a self complete with detach-
able, sellable flesh, not just human melded with divine and not, most emphati-
cally, the sublime triune complexity of the Trinity’s triply split self. To think in 
threes—which would mean to include the narrator or the will in the dialogue, 
in the case of “In a Thestri Stude”—would be to involve oneself in that great, 
formal edifice, and our author neatly avoids such pitfalls by opting for Christ’s 
soul and body rather than the language of the Trinity.
 The last section of the poem details the prophesied signs of the coming 
Judgment Day, “domesdai,” a day both terrible and wonderful in that it will 
see the Soul’s reunion with its Body. When the dead shall rise up, they will 
be judged, the Soul tells the Body, using the word dome that had previously 
appeared in details about the evil judgments rendered by the nobleman they 
had been when together. The Soul’s narrative and the poem conclude with all 
souls going to heaven (presumably, all souls that are judged as good, although 
the Soul doesn’t specify) and with Satan banished. The Soul itself sighs, some-
what surprisingly (given that the prospect of being reunited after Judgment 
Day has just been discussed): “alas; / Wo werthe that ilke stounde, bodi, that 
thou boren was” (“Alas. Woe was that time when you were born, Body”; 105–
6). Even after one hundred–odd lines of this poem, it remains unclear whether 
the “you” that the Soul addresses in these words is really separate from the “I” 
that speaks, and the irony produced by this confusion is very evident. In fact, 
this ironic confusion marks the place where readerly pleasure, pleasure in the 
functioning of well-written figures, would presumably be produced in this 
poem of doomsday and of death.
The encounter between Soul and Body discussed in this chapter offers scenes 
University Press, 1995).
2of disputation, accusation, and (to an extent) confession. The self portrayed in 
Body/Soul debates like the one I have discussed is one that comes into being 
through a disputational and disciplinary relationship. It is retroactively con-
structed, referred to in the past tense after it has already ceased to exist. Per-
sonification is used, in medieval allegories, as a means of embodying abstract 
ideas. In Body/Soul debates, the abstraction being embodied is that of the 
split self itself. What the disputation performs is the splitting of what had 
been one (dead mute, and representable as real) person into two speaking, 
allegorical ones. The allegorical debate recalls a formerly living being—the 
dead man whose life is under discussion in the poem—producing his life as 
something real while bringing to speech two of his aspects. This process is how 
this debating allegory aptly figures the contradictions of allegorical embodi-
ment, its arbitrariness yet necessity, its timelessness, which is nevertheless also 
its historicity.
 “In a Thestri Stude” exists as a node on a complex intertextual network. 
Along one axis, it can be understood as part of a history of English sermons 
and homilies depicting Soul/Body conflict. Seen in this way, the innovation of 
the poem lies with the scandal of the Body that talks back, rather than lying 
prone and dead as the Soul rehearses its many regrets at the bier.38 Along 
another axis, it is possible to argue that “In a Thestri Stude” was not directly 
influenced by the vernacular traditions of English writings at all, since the Old 
English works on the Soul berating the Body had very little dissemination 
compared to works in the Latin tradition, such as the extraordinarily popular 
Latin “Visio Philiberti.”
 With this in mind, we can look at “In a Thestri Stude” in terms of its ver-
nacular innovation, at how it brings the theological problems that the “Visio” 
assumes into a new sort of focus. Along yet another axis, compared with other 
vernacular Body/Soul debates written at roughly the same time, it is a shorter 
and somewhat less sophisticated work than “Als I Lay” or the Anglo-Norman 
“Un samedi par nuit” (both discussed in the following chapter), but it is also a 
little earlier than either. The information to be gained by looking at “In a Thes-
tri Stude” along with its vernacular counterparts is the odd detail of how many 
of these debates were being produced in England, or at least were retained in 
manuscripts that both contain English-language poetry and have ended up in 
British libraries.39
 38. Scholars agree, as Ackerman succinctly puts it, that “The Old English Soul’s Address is 
not in any sense a source of the Desputisoun.” Ackerman, 543.
 39. The most elaborate, or perhaps just the best-preserved, versions of the Body/Soul de-
bate (the versions in which the Body makes an active and philosophically complex defense of 
itself, actually engaging the Soul in real dialogue) all seem to originate in England, although the 
placing of the “Visio Philiberti” in England has been disputed. It has been a critical convention 
 Throughout the Body/Soul debate tradition, whether in Old English, 
Anglo-Norman, Latin, or Middle English, a tension between linked yet sepa-
rated beings and the hyperbolic literalness of their personification are these 
poems’ two fundamental rhetorical gestures—the two jokes that make such 
poems work, rendering them popular enough to be written and rewritten in all 
those versions in all those different languages. The dialogic situation of poems 
such as “In a Thestri Stude” is not premised on a notion of self and other, 
founding the self through some sort of dialectical relation, although the poem 
might be read in concert with such notions. It is, rather, a genre of dialogue 
that queries the very location of the fissure within that peculiar unit, the self, 
asking just what the division of labor within the self might be, wondering just 
what the fissures within look like and how it is that they are produced and 
policed. Words such as self or person are relatively inadequate for describing 
the conjunction of Body and Soul, in their separated dialogic state and, pos-
sibly, even in the state to which they retroactively refer, the unity they seem to 
have had within the man who is now dead.
 What sort of psychology does this poem offer? It is a psychology after the 
fact, after death has determined the end of the story and no further suspense 
about outcome is possible. It is a psychology wherein the notion of the self is 
an anterior one—the man who once united this particular body and soul is a 
person whom the reader never encounters except in retrospective narrative by 
the two parts that death has rendered capable of separating and squabbling. 
The events, pleasures, and faults of this man’s life are narrated, with some 
nostalgia, by the Soul: The man they had been had been full of physical vigor, 
but the dead Body cannot “lepen to leiken ne to rage / Wilde beres to beten, to 
binden leounes sauuage” (“[neither] leap to play or to rage / to beat wild bears 
nor to bind savage lions [to your will]”; 29–30). They are shown to be inessen-
tial by the set piece of the ubi sunt speech, the lament about all that had been 
loved and lost in life. Even so, certain inessential aspects of that particular man 
have clearly dropped away to permit him to play the didactically necessary role 
of Everyman. Perhaps, the poem suggests, the whole cannot be mourned, had 
to associate this purported popularity with Robert Grosseteste, and, for a time, to attribute au-
thorship of the most popular Latin Body/Soul debate to him, noting that he did clearly author a 
philosophical allegory, the influential Chateau d’Amour. Although the attribution of the “Visio 
Philiberti” has been discredited, Grosseteste did make a number of arguments about the Soul’s 
care for and love of the Body that were both controversial and influential in their day, and may 
have contributed to the intellectual environment within which Body/Soul debates were being 
written in England. See James McEvoy, “Grosseteste on the Soul’s Care for the Body: A New 
Text and New Sources for the Idea,” in Aspectus et Affectus: Essays and Editions in Grosseteste 
in Honor of Richard C. Dales, ed. Gunar Freibergs (New York: AMS Press, 1993), for a discus-
sion of Grosseteste’s sometimes controversial work, which focused on the love that, specifically, 
Jesus’ soul had for his body.
2never been a whole, and only seems to have existed after it has been sundered 
and can be inferred in retrospect.
 “In a Thestri Stude” makes literal in its form and in its content many of the 
issues that are significant to Middle English debate poetry and to allegorical 
writings in Middle English in general. Analysis sheds light on the way in which 
the relationship between materiality and mind was being thought of and some 
of what could be done with such thinking, and it participates in revealing 
the kinds of philosophical and theological vocabularies available to English 
authors of the thirteenth century and subsequently. 
 This chapter has argued for the significance of the split self of Body/Soul 
debate, not necessarily as a unique work of art worthy of entrance into a liter-
ary canon, but as a work that literalizes certain kinds of thinking about the 
nature of the self that do not map onto the psychological theories we tend to 
assume were the only ones operating in the Middle Ages. The speakers of this 
disputation—not mere embodiments of then-current ideas, but clearly vehi-
cles for a process of working through some truly contentious concepts—turn 
out to be particularly apt at considering the complex role played by the oft-
troubling emergence of a conception of the will’s freedom in medieval discus-
sions and depictions of selfhood.
“For a long time,” wrote Foucault in his storyteller’s voice in History of 
Sexuality, Volume One, “the individual was vouched for by the refer-
ence of others and the demonstration of his ties to the commonweal 
(family, allegiance, protection).”1 In other words, according to this 
account, once upon a time the individual was vouchsafed by position 
within a hierarchy. This “before” section of Foucault’s story thus pos-
its a simpler time prior to subjection, specificity, individualization.2 
Although we might take issue with this portrait of “before,” it may 
not be necessary to accept it unquestioningly to fully appreciate the 
richness of the “after”: “Then, [after 1215] he was authenticated by 
 1. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, Volume One, 
trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), 58–59. This volume was 
originally published in France as La Volonté de Savoir (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 
1976).
 2. While many of Foucault’s methods and claims have been indispensable to 
historians and theorists of early modern sexuality, he has also been much criticized 
for the ways in which he imagined the sexual discourse of the Middle Ages as 
unitary. Karma Lochrie, in “Desiring Foucault” (The Journal of Medieval and Early 
Modern Studies 27:1 [1997]: 3–16), suggests that Foucault’s work on the Middle Ages 
is troubling, that “the nostalgic, naturalized, felicitous expression is as strange and 
inhospitable a formulation as the alteritist one of a unitary discourse marked by obe-
dience, avowal and self-decipherment” (10), and warns of a possible “carceral effect” 
Foucault’s writing on the Middle Ages might have; however, she agrees to salvage the 
“spirit, if not the letter of Foucault” in asking questions such as “[C]ould pleasures 
refuse the erotic idioms of medieval texts and modern readers and ‘travel’ without 
becoming simply illegible and insignificant?” (13).
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the discourse of truth [that] he was able or obliged to pronounce concerning 
himself. The truthful confession was inscribed at the heart of the procedures 
of individualization by power.”3
 Here, Foucault was not describing anything so triumphant as a rupture 
preceding the birth of modern subjectivity. In fact, he insisted in his late inter-
views on the striking and surprising continuities with Greek ascetic practices 
that his readings uncover, and detailed how confession had existed as a prac-
tice prior to becoming a required annual event. Rather than positing the birth 
of a new beast slouching toward Enlightenment to be born, Foucault offered 
an account of new processes of individualization arising out of old—processes 
that emerge through an institutional demand for a certain kind of dialogue, 
the confessional interaction that constitutes the matter of pastoral care. In the 
specific context of medieval England, such processes can be termed sowlehele, 
and one privileged example of sowlehele, the Body/Soul debate known as “Als 
I Lay in a Winteris Nyt,” can exemplify as well as complicate Foucault’s story.
 Writings that might be categorized as sowlehele arise out of the demands 
for clarification of the nature of the self in the context of medieval confessional 
culture. The unpublished fourth volume of The History of Sexuality, detailing 
the history of that culture, was to have been titled The Confessions of the Flesh 
(Les Aveux de la chair), but the kind of confession discussed in this chapter 
concerns the interplay of the flesh’s confessions with those of the soul in a 
situation where the two debate with one another after death.4 This concern 
with the body’s interaction with the spirit permits a sharpening of the concept 
of sowlehele through an encounter with Foucault’s late thought about self- 
constitution. Bringing Foucault’s engagement with confession together with 
the split self of Body/Soul debate and its specifically medieval take on psy-
chology offers a new way of understanding something Foucault seems to have 
had some difficulty with: how and where the private psyche meets the social 
world; how to describe its constitution as productive as well as subjectivating; 
and how to describe its actions without ignoring either its own agency or the 
inevitability of various kinds of “power” acting on it.
 3. Foucault, 58–59.
 4. Foucault refers to Les Aveux de la chair as “a second volume in the same series . . . [that] 
deals with Christian technologies of the self. And, then, Le Souci de soi, a book separate from 
the sex series, is composed of different papers about the self . . .” in “On the Genealogy of Ethics: 
An Overview of Work in Progress,” in Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneu-
tics, ed. Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 231. 
Thus, according to this 1983 interview, Care of the Self, presently in publication as the series’ 
volume II, was actually conceived as being volume III in the series. The materials examined in 
this volume are also discussed in “The Subject and Power,” which appears in the Dreyfus and 
Rabinow collection, too, and in Jeremy R. Carrette’s Foucault and Religion: Spiritual Corporal-
ity and Political Spirituality (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), as well as a collection 
of Foucault’s late essays selected and edited by Carrette, Religion and Culture: Michel Foucault 
(New York: Routledge, 1999).
 In his History of Sexuality, Volume One (La Volonté de Savoir), Foucault 
was focused on the institutionalization of confession in the thirteenth century. 
But he was still thinking about the constitution of the desiring subject and not, 
as later, about the intimate co-imbrication of the social and the psychological. 
With the series’ second and third volumes, Foucault had turned to examin-
ing the history of subjection—the constitution of selves by and through rela-
tions of power—through practices of care for the self, of which confession was 
to be one significant instance. What this book terms sowlehele would be an 
example of such practices, rendered specific to its English-language context 
and time, but of course this is not what Foucault worked on. That said, in 
interviews, Foucault promised that his fourth book was going to be about the 
Middle Ages, although his interest was largely in describing how early medi-
eval Christianity organized subjection in the context of divine law, confession, 
and penitence.
 As Foucault worked on the multivolume History of Sexuality, his thought 
shifted from understanding confession as a form of institutional control of 
the self toward a view of confession as a form of self-constitution intimately 
involved with the workings of (external, social) powers on the subject. “The 
self,” he writes, “has . . . not to be discovered but to be constituted, to be con-
stituted through the force of truth.”5 Foucault argued that the very thing that 
we might take as a given, the speaking “I,” has a history—and its history lies, 
at least in part, in the relationship between penitent and confessor. Critics have 
often understood Foucault’s examination of confession as a veiled critique 
of psychoanalysis, through comparisons between the scene of psychoanaly-
sis and the confessional. We might, instead, think about these later writings 
as inquiring into historical alternatives to modern psychoanalytic theory, of 
which sowlehele might be one. Foucault’s work connects contemporary criti-
cal theory and medieval cultural studies with the history of psychology at the 
nodal point of confession and the constitution of the self therein.
 In several of his dialogues, Plato referred to the body as the prison house 
of the soul.6 Foucault famously reversed this formulation in Discipline and 
Punish: The soul, he wrote, is “the prison of the body,” and, simultaneously, 
something that is “produced within the body by the functioning of a power 
that is exercised on those punished.”7 Metaphors of spatiality are productively 
 5. Michel Foucault, “About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self (1980),” in Reli-
gion and Culture: Michel Foucault, 168. See also other essays in that volume.
 6. Plato, Phaedo 81d, Phaedrus 250c. In Cratylus 400c, Socrates attributes this definition 
of the body as the prison of the soul to the Orphic poets as part of a discussion of how to define 
“body.” Collected Dialogues of Plato, Bollingen Series LXXI, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington 
Cairns (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989).
 7. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan 
(New York: Random House, 1979), 29. [Originally published as Surveiller et Punir: Naissance 
de la Prison (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1975).]
muddled here. The soul is figured as external to the body, surrounding it as 
a prison would, while simultaneously emerging from within, centered inside 
the body’s enclosure.8 Foucault’s language avoids choosing the soul or the body 
to function as an authentic core supporting a stable notion of the self, while 
keeping a dynamic tension in play between the two. Foucault’s theory lacks 
only an allegorical dialogue to clarify how the concepts of “body” and “soul” 
work to both constrain and produce one another. This chapter examines one 
such dialogue.
 The Body/Soul debate “Als I Lay in a Winteris Nyt” produces a particular 
version of the self for purposes of sowlehele through a series of performative 
speech acts, including the prosopopeia of the speaking body, discussed later, 
and a mourning for lost unity by a split subject whose duty in life had been 
to establish a proper hierarchy between the aspects of the self. The debate is 
explicitly concerned with the disciplinary relations—relations of hierarchy, 
love, and power—that most intimately characterize the subject of confession 
in relation to pastoral power. Having considered a similar poem, “In a Thestri 
Stude I Stod,” in chapter 2, I now build on that reading by taking up this longer 
and better-known English Body/Soul debate and reading it against its ana-
logues in Latin and Anglo-Norman. This examination of “Als I Lay” through 
the interplay of difference from and similarity to its analogues shows how the 
workings of texts that perform sowlehele are consistent in their approach to 
self-discipline as well as how the resources of the English language make the 
Middle English poem distinctive.
 The exact date of composition for “Als I Lay” is unknown, but it first 
appears in manuscripts of the mid to late thirteenth century.9 The poem is also 
 8. Judith Butler offers a similar analysis of the same passage in Foucault, albeit in the ser-
vice of a very different argument, when she writes about it that “the soul is figured as itself a kind 
of spatial captivity, indeed, as a kind of prison which provides the exterior form or regulatory 
principle of the prisoner’s body.” Judith Butler, The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), 85. See also Butler’s characterization of the 
consequences of this confusion: “The transposition of the soul into an exterior and imprisoning 
frame for the body vacates, as it were, the interiority of the body, leaving that interiority as a 
malleable surface for the unilateral effects of disciplinary power” (86–87).
 9. “Als I Lay in a Winteris Nyt” appears in seven manuscripts, mostly large miscellanies 
and anthologies; Laud Misc 108 (Bodl. 1486) fols 200r–203r (verses 1–48, 185–642 only); 
Auchinlech Ms. (Advocates 19.2.1), fols. 31vb–34vb; Vernon Ms. (Bodl. 3938), fol. 286rc; Digby 
102 (Bodl.1703), fol. 136 r; BL Ms. Royal 18.A.x. fol. 61v; BL Addit. Ms. 22283, fol. 80va (verses 
1–198 only); BL Addit. Ms. 37787, fol.34r. It is listed in the Index of Middle English Verse as 
#351. I am basing my discussion on Conlee’s edition of the poem as it appears in Laud Misc 108, 
with supplementary readings from the Auchinlech Ms. in Middle English Debate Poetry: A Criti-
cal Anthology (East Lansing, MI: Colleagues Press, 1991). I have also consulted Thomas Wright’s 
edition of the poem, in The Latin Poems Commonly Attributed to Walter Mapes (London: 
Camden Society, 1841). There is also an edition by Wilhelm Linow, “βe Desputisoun between 
commonly known in the critical literature as “The Disputation Between Body 
and Soul,” evidence of its role as the Body/Soul debate, standing synecdoch-
ally for the entire tradition in the minds of critics who organize anthologies or 
write about these debates. To take the example of a lesser-known miscellany, 
Laud 108, we find that “Als I Lay’” is included among works such as the South 
English Legendary, King Horn, and Havelock—works that combine religious 
instruction with narrative pleasure. At over 600 lines, this poem is longer than 
any other Body/Soul debate and quite a bit longer, as well, than most poems 
that tend to be described primarily as “debate poems.” This poem’s length is 
due, according to its editors and critics, partly to the many “confessional” 
details it offers. It also offers a larger quantity of gruesome detail (putrefac-
tion, the tortures of Hell, etc.) than most debates. The claim that this poem 
can stand in for the tradition is mingled with what may seem like a very dif-
ferent contention: that this debate is the best example, indeed the culmina-
tion, of the debate form, or at least of the small subgenre of Body/Soul debate 
(either all such debates, or possibly just these debates as they were written 
in Middle English). No lesser critic than George Kittredge called it “the best 
embodiment of the theme in any literature.”10 Even so, though several editions 
were produced in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it has not been 
the subject of much critical attention among medievalists over the past fifty 
years.
 The plot of “Als I Lay” is not very different from that of “In a Thestri Stude I 
Stod”: A body on a bier is confronted by its own soul, who chastises it for a life 
ill-lived. Over the course of an ubi sunt passage intoned by the Soul, the enu-
meration of many lost possessions describes the life of a wealthy knight. The 
Soul both accuses and preaches to the Body, and the Body eventually answers 
back to upset the Soul’s apparent certainty that all fault for a life lived in sin lay 
with the sinful flesh. In answering, the Body argues that it had been like a mute 
beast, and the Soul had infused it with its own will, and, consequently, all sins 
were the fault of the Soul’s mismanagement. The Body’s counteraccusation is 
much more philosophically coherent and affectively complex than any other 
response by a speaking body in the Middle English tradition, and so is the 
Soul’s response. Much of this chapter focuses on the specifics of the emotions 
with which both characterize the relationship between them. Over the course 
βe Bodi and βe Soule,” Erlanger Beitrage zur Englischen Philologie I (1889). A translation of this 
poem appears in John Gardner, The Alliterative Morte Arthure: The Owl and the Nightingale and 
Five Other Middle English Poems (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1973).
 10. G. L. Kittredge, “Introduction,” in Debate of the Body and the Soul, modernized by F. J. 
Child (Boston: R. E. Lee Company, 1908),quoted in Sister Mary Ursula Vogel, Some Aspects of 
the Horse and Rider Analogy in “The Debate Between the Body and the Soul” (Washington, DC: 
Catholic University of America Press, 1948), 1.
of the debate, that relationship is figured successively as that of penitent and 
confessor, student and teacher, brother and brother. While much of what the 
Body and Soul say is motivated, within the poem, by the rhetorical demands 
of the disputational scene—with details of their relationship being stated to 
prove the Body’s or the Soul’s innocence of the wrongs done by the knight they 
had been—a kind of excess builds up as relationship piles upon relationship. 
This excess offers a set of immanent theories about the kinds of relationships 
that might exist between spiritual and material aspects of the self, producing 
sowlehele. As a byproduct or intimate condition of the possibility of this excess, 
the poem also describes, as if inadvertently, several kinds of loving homosocial 
interdependence that might exist between men.
 “Als I Lay” begins to appear in major miscellanies at the end of the thir-
teenth century, and ultimately appears in more surviving manuscripts than 
any other work classified as a Middle English “debate poem.” Whatever the 
actual date of its composition, that relative popularity helps us understand it 
as an example of the writings about the confessing subject that was produced 
in the aftermath of the Fourth Lateran Council. Although Body/Soul debates 
have received little critical attention in the second half of the twentieth century, 
there is one invaluable article on “Als I Lay.” Robert Ackerman’s “The Debate of 
the Body and the Soul and Parochial Christianity” situates the poem within the 
context of vernacular and Latin works of pastoral care.11 Ackerman reads “Als 
I Lay” as a work worthy of attention in itself, for its specific rhetorical quality, 
and also as a work that “realizes the spirit of the popular Christianity of its 
day,” arguing that the debate’s implicit theological stance (regarding the Soul’s 
relation to the Body, resurrection, guilt, and punishment) is one that reflects 
lay piety and participates in parochial didacticism.12
 As I do, Ackerman considers “Als I Lay” as a significant bearer of the traces 
 11. Robert Ackerman, “The Debate of the Body and the Soul and Parochial Christianity,” 
Speculum 37 (1962): 541–65. A relatively recent but fairly technical article about “Als I Lay” 
argues that the poem’s didactic effect is partially achieved by reference to the Augustinian 
concept of the “second death,” which punishes through “an eternal mutual antagonism between 
the reprobate’s body and soul caused by the intermutative effect of their postmortem cohering.” 
Liam O. Purdon, “‘Als I Lay in a Winteris Nyt’ and the Second Death” in Mindful Spirit in Late 
Medieval Literature: Essays in Honor of Elizabeth D. Kirk (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 
46. The two articles represent a debate that this book tries to elide: Ackerman insists that the 
author of “Als I Lay” is not aware of, or at least not using, conceptions of sin and the soul from 
medieval philosophical writing; Purdon argues that “Als I Lay” is structured by the thought of 
St. Augustine. To argue that “Als I Lay” is a work of sowlehele cleaves more closely to Ackerman’s 
position, but, as previous chapters have shown, that is not the same as accusing the poem of be-
ing simple, folksy, or unlearned. The version of lay piety represented in “Als I Lay” seems to me 
closer to the theologically sophisticated but poetically and narratively driven one discussed by 
Jim Rhodes, in his book Poetry Does Theology (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 
2001).
 12. Ackerman, 544.
left by the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 and its requirement of annual con-
fession. However, Ackerman’s commitment is also to proving that “Als I Lay” 
is a superior work of literature—superior, for instance, to the “Visio Philiberti,” 
the Latin Body/Soul debate that may well have been the Middle English poem’s 
most immediate source. Ackerman’s close, comparative reading of the Latin 
and Middle English debates is invaluable, but he misses the opportunity to 
consider the implications of the “humanizing transformation” from the pur-
ported stuffy clerkishness of the “Visio Philiberti” that he claims for the ver-
nacular version. Ackerman’s rhetoric emphasizes the homely, down-to-earth 
vividness of Middle English, but he does not really explain why this should be 
more valuable in a literary evaluation than what he characterizes as the more 
explicitly philosophical Latin version. He lists three things that are “new” in 
“Als I Lay,” meaning not present in the “Visio Philiberti”: a brief reference to 
witchcraft; references to the rituals of Matins, Mass, and Evensong; and inter-
est in the trinity of “the world, the flesh, and the devil.” Every other differ-
ence that he lists is one of quantity (more discussion of putrid corpses in the 
expanded English version, more enumeration of prideful living in the knight 
now dead). However, perhaps because of the limitations of a journal article, 
Ackerman eschews extended discussion of what his own argument implies: 
that “Als I Lay” can be fruitfully read through a poetics of sowlehele.
 Although the actual term sowlehele is not used in “Als I Lay,” a close ana-
logue is: Enumerating how it never listened to its orders, the Soul tells the Body, 
“I bad the βenke on soule-nede / Matines, masse, and euesong” (“I bade you to 
think of ‘soul-need,’ / at matins, mass, and evensong”).13 To read “soul-need” 
as a category of piety is to understand this utterance as the kind of instruction 
that the poem explicitly offers by way of lament. Had the Body listened to the 
Soul’s injunction, the two would not now be damned. To take these lines more 
literally is to notice that the Soul is asking the Body to have kept to a rigid 
schedule of fulfilling needs explicitly designated as not its own—the needs, in 
fact, of the Soul. Also, it is to notice that the Soul is claiming it could influ-
ence but not cause the actions the Body took, a claim that the Body disputes 
throughout the poem. Transforming the abstract obligation to pray into a 
personified soul with its own needs and demands is a paradigmatic gesture 
of sowlehele didacticism, but that very didacticism, having created a character 
named Soul who can be judged as a personality within the poem, also under-
mines the abstract force of the law by its very narrative concreteness. The Soul 
comes off as a bit of a demanding whiner, even if, by all accounts, its claims 
against the Body are correct.
 13. “Als I Lay in a Winteris Nyt,” lines 233–34, in John W. Conlee, Middle English Debate 
Poetry: A Critical Anthology (East Lansing, MI: Colleagues Press, 1991). Henceforth, line num-
bers only will be used for quotes from “Als I Lay.”
 What Ackerman’s analysis points to (but does not describe) is a work of 
allegorical personification in English that attempts to think about the human 
self in both disaggregation and relationship. He calls this, as many critics of 
Middle English literature do, the particular sort of “psychological realism” 
evinced by vernacular writings, but the “realism” he is describing is that of 
our contemporary psychological notions, or, rather, our contemporary ver-
sion of “common sense.”14 For instance, it might seem like common sense to 
see that the Soul who laments that “soul-nede” was not met could be con-
strued as a “realistically” whiny figure. But such a reading sets a trap for the 
bad or overly literal reader, who would then miss the appropriate didactic 
lesson. This study continues Ackerman’s work, but asks, What is the specific 
nature of the sort of “common sense” on the subject of psychology being 
produced by works like this in the thirteenth century, and what does it do 
to our analysis of this work if we assume that it is worth studying (because 
Ackerman has helped establish it as such) and move forward into examining 
what kind of common sense it is representing? In other words, what kind of 
“homely realism” is this, exactly?
 At poem’s end, the Body is left to rot, and the Soul is carried away and 
tormented by devils in Hell. Neither is vindicated; neither convinces the other 
of the justice or coherence of its point of view, and both endure ignominious 
infliction of suffering apart (at least until Judgment Day, when they will be 
reunited and begin to suffer together). This is an effect of the dramatic situ-
ation of the disputation—both parts of the dead knight are eventually going 
to hell, neither is going to turn out to be “right,” and even if the Soul at times 
stands in for a sort of priest or teacher, it does so imperfectly. Poetry organized 
as a debate between two personified abstractions necessarily deals with the 
problematic relationship between the abstract and the concrete, the bodily 
and the spiritual, world and Word. Body/Soul debates in general thematize the 
distinction between form and content but render them difficult to maintain 
by giving a voice to the Body and rendering the Soul vulnerable to what is 
portrayed in the poem as a physical form of suffering—the heat of hellfire. In 
what follows, a close reading of “Als I Lay” shows how it functions as a work 
of effective sowlehele, and how its affect-rich portrayal of the love between the 
Soul and the Body exceeds its ostensibly didactic mission. That love exists to 
some degree in most versions of the Body/Soul debate in Latin and the ver-
naculars. In Middle English, it gets coded in a variety of ways discussed later, 
but each of these ways depicts male same-sex interdependence. That queer 
relationship, of male beings bound together for all time, shows how sowlehele 
can and often must be read as queer in its Middle English manifestations.
 14. Ackerman, 564.
“Als I Lay” is a poem in two unequal parts: The first concerns the debate of 
the Soul and the Body; the second, shorter section details the tortures experi-
enced at the (inconclusive) conclusion of that debate when a legion of demons 
descends on the Soul to begin its eternal punishment. The poem begins: “Als 
I lay in a winteris nyt / In a droukening bifor βe day / Vorsoβe I saugh a selly 
syt: A body on a bere lay” (“As I lay on a winter’s night / in the darkness before 
day / Forsooth I saw a wondrous sight: a body lay upon a bier”; 1–3). These 
opening lines suggest that the poem is a dream vision, although it might also 
be a vision seen in a dazed state during the night. In the third line, the narrator 
describes what he sees, the “selly syt,” without ever indicating that he (if it is a 
he) is sleeping. At the close of the debate, the narrator is still lying wherever it 
is that he lay, although now covered in a cold sweat and promising God to live 
a better life henceforth.
 Is this a dream vision, and why—in a poem that generally expands on its 
sources—is this detail left unclear and unelaborated? Staging the debate as a 
waking vision might have seemed most likely to qualify it as a prophecy worth 
heeding. The Latin Body/Soul debate that seems to be a source, or even the 
source, for “Als I Lay” is explicitly titled “Visio Philiberti,” and its beginning 
clearly establishes it as a dream. The Middle English poem resists this clarity, 
leaving open the possibility that this debate is the allegory-like somnium, in 
need of interpretation.15 By not specifying that it is a dream, the poem may 
also take on a more mundane quality, as if seeing souls speak to bodies were 
ordinary or at least possible.16 In addition, something about the confusion 
between sleep and waking in “Als I Lay” works to code, right from the start, 
 15. The somnium is one of the five kinds of dreams according to Macrobius’ influential 
classification scheme, and it is defined as an “enigmatic dream . . . that conceals with strange 
shapes and veils with ambiguity the true meaning of the information being offered” (Ambrosius 
Theodosius Macrobius, Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, trans. William Harris Stahl [New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1951], 84–85). The classification of all dreams is as follows: 
“All dreams may be classified under five main types: there is the enigmatic dream, in Greek 
oneiros, in Latin somnium; second, there is the prophetic vision, in Greek horama, in Latin vi-
sio; third, there is the oracular dream, in Greek chrematismos, in Latin oraculum; fourth, there 
is the nightmare, in Greek enhypnion, in Latin insomnium; and last, the apparition, in Greek 
phanatsma, which Cicero, when he occasions to use the word, calls visum.” Macrobius, 87–88.
 16. Something like this is noted in Christopher Cannon’s analysis of “The Owl and the 
Nightingale”: “No one has fallen asleep,” he writes, describing the beginning of that poem (ital-
ics his). “The absence of this crucial predicate for a dream vision also means that this poem not 
only presents bird speech as unremarkable, but it insists that an owl and a nightingale actually 
have something to say.” Christopher Cannon, The Grounds of English Literature (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 113–14.
the productive confusions enacted by the rest of the poem between a Soul 
surprisingly corporeal, especially when being tortured in hell, and a Body 
possessed of philosophical thought and a voice, locked in a particularly tense 
relationship even by the standards set by other Body/Soul debates.
 Unlike the Soul of “In a Thestri Stude I Stod,” who concludes the poem by 
essentially turning into a preacher and offering a sermon on Judgment Day 
(that day when Soul and Body will be reunited), “Als I Lay” concludes with 
the Soul borne away by a thousand devils to hell. Over a hundred lines detail 
the ways in which the Soul is tortured, painfully up on a Hell horse’s spiked 
saddle and set upon by devils “opon the sadil he was sloungen / As he scholde 
to the tornement” (“upon the saddle he was slung / As if he were riding to a 
tournament”; 545–46). After riding in the hunt for a while, predator becomes 
prey when the Soul is flung off the saddle and chased by the hounds “as a tode” 
(“like a toad”; 555). The punishment is appropriate for one who had been a 
knight in life but had been unable to reckon properly with the fact of embodi-
ment, with the Body in its animal capacity. This moment might actually be 
a manifestation of pointed and ironic pedagogical aptness on the part of the 
poem’s devils: Riding a devil horse as punishment might be an image that a 
former knight would be particularly equipped to understand.
 As in other Body/Soul debates, the poem’s first speech is a volley of accu-
sations the Soul launches at the mute Body. The Body is accused of having 
sinned so much through greed and appetite in life that it now deserves its 
punishment: rotting in the grave. Although other Body/Soul debates men-
tion that virtuous bodies, too, meet this unsavory fate, here the Soul seems to 
think that bodily decay is simply and entirely a punishment. This puts all of 
the arbitrary details of the Body’s embodiment in the service of moral admo-
nition. The Soul is angry that the Body’s appetites have damned them both, 
and now the Soul will have to suffer unbearable tortures in hell. It is evident 
that part of the punishment that the Body receives after death is to become 
the object of the Soul’s mockery, to hear the Soul’s ubi sunt lament, and to 
understand that, in being sundered from the Soul, it has lost the whole world. 
It is just this argument, however, that the Body eventually turns against the 
Soul: If the Body is nothing without the Soul, is it not the Soul who ought to 
be considered the responsible party when guilt is being attributed? Given the 
poem’s final section, where the Soul’s suffering at the hands of devils is detailed 
and the abandoned Body’s is not, “Als I Lay” seems, surprisingly, to accept at 
least some aspects of the Body’s argument and, at the very least, to conclude in 
a draw between the two opponents. Such an understanding, however, is neces-
sarily preliminary: The poem is framed by a debate about guilt, but its middle 
seems less about guilt and more about specifying the loving interdependence 
between the self ’s parts.
 As it begins its speech of accusation against the Body, the Soul seems to 
believe that it is in one of those Body/Soul debates in which the Body’s guilt 
can simply be assumed and will be tacitly accepted by the silent flesh. The 
Soul’s ubi sunt speech is more than 120 lines (in a poem not much over 600 
lines long) of uninterrupted accusatory monologue, which details possessions, 
friends, and even a wife, the latter two both singularly unsorry to see this 
person dead on the bier. The Soul’s speech does not concentrate on catalog-
ing the dead one’s social world alone. It enumerates, as well, pleasures taken 
and injustices done, imputed to the Body’s appetites and clearly the results of 
the dead knight’s will. The ubi sunt formula, here, permits the Soul to provide 
details that make the person who is now dead specific, individual, capable of 
unique (albeit ubiquitous) forms of sin. Foucault cited “individualization” as 
one of the effects of the new confessional technologies; this Body/Soul debate 
features a far more obviously individualized dead knight than earlier English 
and Anglo-Saxon Body/Soul debates, but the narrative thus created posits 
a self through negation, as that which is no longer, that which is now lost, 
that which deserves punishment. “Als I Lay,” like “In a Thestri Stude I Stod” 
before it, represents a moment when the literal/material (body) smashes up 
against the figurative/linguistic (soul), and both come away with pieces of one 
another. In the process of moving through “Als I Lay,” the Soul acquires a lit-
eral physical form, and the Body acquires (but, somehow, also loses) a voice.
 Narrating the lost life that had been, the Soul details items such as the lost 
home (now a grave) and the lost clothes (now a shroud), but all seem to act 
merely as a lead-up to the most surprising and poignant of the Body’s losses: 
the voice. The Body loses access to making use of the voices of others, the 
Soul points out, including those “tragetours” (magicians?, actors?) who used 
to “bere thi word ful wide / and maky of the rime and raf ” (“bear your name 
/ words far and wide / and make rhyme and verse about you”; 57–58). Ear-
lier than that, however—in fact, quite early in its ubi sunt catalog—the Soul 
demands to know “[Where is] “thi lede that was so loud?” (“your voice that 
was so loud”; 22).17 This line, which is not highlighted as the most important 
 17. The Middle English Dictionary defines “lede” in ways that conflict with the context of 
this translation. Lede is defined as “1. (a) Law, ecclesiastical system, order 2. (a) Customs, ways; 
also, behavior.” It also defines the same word as “1(a) A person, a man (b) in pl.: subjects, follow-
ers, retainers; an army; sg. servant; as form of address to an inferior: ‘My man’; (c) a prince, lord; 
God; as form of address: sir; (d) ?a lady; (e) the human race, mankind; also, one of the human 
race, a human being; ~ werk, human operation. 2. (a) A people, nation and 3. Land, landed 
property, landholdings.” In my disagreement with the MED, I have consulted two translations 
of the poem. John Gardner’s reads “boast” for lede, and F. J. Child reads “voice.” See John Gard-
ner, The Alliterative Morte Arthure: The Owl and the Nightingale and Five Other Middle English 
Poems (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1973), 161, and The Debate of the Body 
and the Soul, trans. F. J. Child (Cambridge, UK: John Wilson and Son, 1888), 10.
by any means (the Soul goes on listing the knight’s losses and documenting 
his life for another hundred lines), nevertheless grows in importance over the 
poem’s course, because it names something “Als I Lay” accomplishes that very 
few other poems of the tradition have. It is also repeated, in a way: The Soul 
tells the Body that “hi mouth is dumb, thin ere is def ” (“Your mouth is dumb, 
your ears are deaf ”; 246). The Soul thus enumerates the ways in which the 
Body has lost access to its own senses in being sundered from the Soul.
 The Rhetorica ad Herennium, long attributed to Cicero and one of the 
most popular rhetorical treatises of the Middle Ages, defines how the category 
of “voice” functions in relation to allegory in the Middle Ages.18 It defines the 
trope of prosopopeia (which it terms the somewhat less used Latin conforma-
tio) as that which “consists in representing an absent person as present, or in 
making a mute thing or one lacking form articulate.”19 The absence mourned 
here, I would argue, is the wholeness that never was, a single being, indivis-
ible or at least undivided. Instead, Body/Soul debates, in whatever language, 
install the split of the subject into its entire history, whether detailed by the 
Soul claiming to have been a passive observer or by the Body claiming to 
have been an automaton. In “Als I Lay,” the two mourn their lost unity rather 
than deploring it. The structure of any Body/Soul poem, therefore, is that of 
prosopopeia—aspects of a dead knight, normally incapable of speech, brought 
into dialogue with one another. In “Als I Lay,” as in few poems of the tradition, 
when the Body does lift up its head and speak, its voice—a groaning, ghostly 
voice—seems loud enough to rebut the Soul.
 The Soul’s accusations argue that the Body, by virtue of being bodily, is 
the carrier of sin, an accusation that relies on the assumption that embodi-
ment implies materiality, and materiality implies appetite and sin. However, a 
pure version of this view—embodiment as purely evil—would be Manichean, 
 18. Gordon Teskey, writing of the politics of allegory, suggests that “the very concept of the 
body as something that has a private interior and a public exterior is created by the voice. It is 
the voice that gives the body an inner sanctum where deliberation can occur and whence speech 
can issue[;] . . . without voice the body is meat” (Allegory and Violence [Ithaca, NY: Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 1996], 124). The politics of the self as discussed in this chapter permit the body to 
have a voice, but never permit readers to forget the body’s proximity to meat, the tentativeness 
of its possession of a voice.
 19. Rhetorica ad Herennium, Bk. IV, trans. and ed. Harry Caplan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, Loeb Classical Library, 1954), 66. James Paxson offers an excellent reading of 
this passage as a definition that also renders the term almost impossible to define; see his The 
Poetics of Personification (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 14–15. Accord-
ing to Paxson, Quintillian’s Institutio Oratoria is to be given credit for first naming the trope of 
personification prosopopeia. His study argues that what literary critics tend to subsume under 
the category “allegory” should rightly be termed “personification.” While I am using prosopo-
peia in this chapter to name the explicit thematization of speech by a literally inanimate being, 
Paxson’s study traces the history of the trope back to the etymology “prosopon + poein,” “to 
make a face” (Paxson, 18), seeing it as a far larger category.
dangerously heretical, and contrary to the incarnational philosophy underpin-
ning Christian belief. Whereas medieval works, including those Old English 
Body/Soul debates in which the Body lies silent and accused, occasionally 
seem to slip into this view, in “Als I Lay,” the Body is given the opportunity to 
respond persuasively and defend itself thoroughly. Its speech is also marked, 
right from the start, as both spectacular and spooky:
The bodi βer it lay on bere The body, there it lay upon the bier
A gastlich βing as it was on, A ghastly thing as it was
Lift up his heued opon βe swere; Lifted up his head upon its neck;
As it were sike it gan to gron [And] began to groan as if one who is 
   sick.
(139–42)
This transition from the Soul’s speech to the Body’s recapitulates the poem’s 
fourth line (“a body on a bere lay”), and, in effect, begins “Als I Lay” again. The 
Soul’s enumeration of the dead knight’s life had relied so heavily on lists of the 
typical things all who are dead must lose (love, joy, possessions) that its speech 
was almost ordinary. The Body’s slowly rising head—why detail that it raised 
its head “upon its neck” if not to slow down the process of its rising?—returns 
the reader forcibly to the horror of dead things speaking. The Body’s utterance, 
however, is neither pathetic nor horrifying; it is surprisingly reasonable.
 Unlike the Body of “In a Thestri Stude I Stod,” whose response to the Soul 
is largely a complaint, pointing to the profoundly different worldview pos-
sessed by flesh without its spirit, this Body seems to understand time and cau-
sation in the same way as the Soul, or a whole human philosopher, might. The 
Body responds by arguing that the Soul was granted the knowledge of good 
and evil even before birth. The Soul was responsible for all the choices the self, 
now dead, had made in life, the Body argues, and its knowledge renders the 
Soul responsible for the well-being of the self that death has divided:
For God schop the aftir His schaft For God shaped you after his image
And gaf the bothe wyt and skil; and gave you both wit and skill;
In thi loking was I laft in your keeping [lit: looking, imp. 
   guidance, direction] was I left
To wisse after thin oune wil to direct/teach according to your 
   own will
(185–88)
The Body’s response insists that the Soul had a pedagogical, rather than a pas-
toral, romantic, familial, or friendly, responsibility to guide it (although all of 
these options are attempted by one debater or the other over the course of the 
poem). At this point in the dialogue, this view of authority seems fully in line 
with conventional representations of feudal lordship: The Soul was a paternal 
figure imbued with the knowledge and responsibility to guide those who are 
less fortunate.
 Here, prosopopeia is a voice that marks the rhetorical transformation that 
is taking place when (normally) mute matter begins to interact in the world 
of the dream. This version of the prosopopeia is perhaps closest to the one 
mournfully described by Paul de Man as that which “makes accessible to the 
senses, in this case the ear, a voice which is out of earshot because it is no 
longer alive.”20 In both ancient and contemporary formulations, prosopopeia 
makes a process rather than a product into a trope. In itself, this trope’s pres-
ence at the very heart of the poetry of disputation underlines the ways in 
which the subject that it describes is one engaged in an uncertain process of 
becoming, rather than a stable or unitary entity.21 Prosopopeia is undergoing 
an ironic twist: The two voices that speak, those of the Body and the Soul, are 
audible to one another because both are equally dead. This doubled prosopo-
peia is audible to a single other party, the poem’s narrator.
 The workings of prosopopeia in the poem are complicated, somewhat, by 
the Soul’s repeated figuration of the Body as a sort of beast, usually a horse.22 
Immediately before the Soul names the loss of its voice among its many losses, 
it compares the Body to a lion: The knight used to ride high on his horse, “as 
a lyun fers and proud” (“as a lion, fierce and proud”; 20). But even though, in 
 20. Paul de Man, “The Epistemology of Metaphor,” in Aesthetic Ideology (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 24.
 21. The voice played a significant role in medieval preaching and in pedagogy as well. 
Kenny and Pinborg point out that the prolegomena to textbooks often included a note on the 
significance of oral instruction, frequently citing Pliny’s statement that “the living voice affects 
the intellect much more than the reading of books.” The selection Kenny and Pinborg give, 
taken from Radulphus Brito, ca. 1300, goes on to gloss the Pliny passage, “And he [Pliny] gives 
the following justification for his contention: the teacher’s pronunciation, facial expressions, 
gestures, and whole behavior make the pupil learn more and more effectively, and what you 
hear from another person is situated deeper in your mind than what you learn by yourself ” 
(Radulphus Brito, Proemium in Parva Mathematicalia, Ms. Bruxelles, B. Royale 3540–47, f. 2f, 
cited in Anthony Kenny and Jan Pinborg, “Medieval Philosophical Literature,” in The Cam-
bridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. Norman Kretzmann et al. [Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982], 16).
 22. In a published 1948 dissertation on the subject of this poem, Sister Mary Ursula Vogel 
examines “Als I Lay” in terms of what she describes as an ancient analogy, that of the Soul/Body 
being compared to a rider and his horse. In her analysis, Vogel also argues and demonstrates 
that the poem does not fit well with Thomistic doctrine in depicting the split and independent 
soul and body, a neo-Platonic conceit she attributes to Augustine; but it does accord with St. 
Thomas Aquinas’s philosophy in according most of the blame for the knight’s damnation to the 
Soul. See Vogel, Some Aspects of the Horse and Rider Analogy.
its pride, it enjoyed riding on a horse and being known as a great knight, the 
Body also was a horse, or, rather, became one in the process of yielding to sin. 
The Soul describes its relation to the Body as a pedagogical one—“To teche 
were βough me bi-taught” (“You were taught to learn from me”; 217)—and 
it names the rival teacher—“the qued” (“evil”; 218)—and notes that “Wiβ βi 
teβ βe bridel βough laught” (“with your teeth you caught the [evil’s] bridle”; 
219). This is not a simile. In life, the Body was not like a horse; it acted as if 
it were a horse, and is transformed into a horse by the Soul’s performative 
speech—or by the devil’s seduction. Within the same few stanzas, the Soul 
also describes the Body as having ignored its teachings when, in its youth, it 
“renne aboute and breyd wod” (“ran about and brayed like a madman”; 228). 
This bridle-bearing Body described by the Soul in its counteraccusation is 
less than human, and the previously loud voice has become an animal noise, a 
madman’s shout, and might not deserve the dignity of a hearing in the context 
of the debate. This, however, is the Soul’s rhetoric.
 The Body fully responds to the Soul by reinvoking and turning the rheto-
ric of animal innocence around. It wishes that it never had become human: 
“I schole haue ben dumb as a schep . . . That et and drank and lai and slep” 
(“I would have been dumb as a sheep / That ate and drank and lay and slept”; 
281–82). It goes on to argue that, if this were so, it might have been slain but 
it would not have gone to hell after death (an assertion that contradicts the 
Soul’s lament that it, alone, is going to hell while the Body rots in comparative 
peacefulness). In the context of the poem’s debate, these two rival sets of claims 
seem to cancel each other out: The Body continues to be permitted to debate, 
since it is not understood as simply or primarily an animal physicality, and the 
Soul is still not unequivocally to blame for the ills that have befallen this ill-
matched pair. However, the question of the status of the Body’s voice has been 
rendered in a manner that continually troubles the poem.
 This study is invested in returning “body studies” to the concept of the 
soul, but in the Middle Ages, the problem was quite the opposite. “Soul” was 
all: “Als I Lay” (along with a very few other poems) explicitly brings the con-
cept of the body into sowlehele psychology. The Body’s voice, when it reasserts 
one, is a groan, “as it were sike it gan to gron” (“began to groan as if one who is 
sick”; 142). This spooky groan reinforces the vulnerability of bodies, how they 
are subject to illness and physical pain. And yet, even if it speaks as one who is 
sick, the Body’s rebuttal insists on the interrelatedness of Soul with Body, and 
on the Body’s essential humanity. It claims that the relationship between these 
two characters is—and has always been—love and fellowship, complaining 
that “me thought min hert brast / When deth so diolfuli me drap” (“it seemed 
to me that my heart had burst / When death so cruelly took me”; 147–48). The 
Body of “Als I Lay” and its analogues frequently resorts to a sort of irony to 
point to its own bodiliness—after all, the Body is the one who possesses the 
heart, and it is likely that (at least in the understanding of medieval medicine) 
the heart did, precisely, burst at the moment that death came to it. But beyond 
the joke that the Body is embodied, through the Body’s words the claim is 
made that, in this relationship, it is the Soul that has callously and cruelly 
neglected the Body’s well-being. The love and fellowship asserted by the Body 
has, among its other functions, the capacity to defy the Manicheanism that one 
might read into the rigid slash that divides “Body” and “Soul” in the term I am 
using in this book, “Body/Soul debate.” The Body’s speech insists that Body 
and Soul are joined, in love if not as a single being, and that their relationship, 
and relative guilt, must be worked out from that perspective.
 The extraordinary thing about the Body’s voice—simultaneously described 
as lost and yet, somehow, made present as part of the dialogic situation of “Als 
I Lay”—is how it contradicts, or perhaps just radically reworks, the famous 
discussion of voice in Aristotle’s De Anima II. In that much-commented-upon 
text, Aristotle (who has been discussing the different senses and their relation-
ship to the soul) states quite explicitly, “Voice is the particular sound made by 
something with a soul.”23 Aristotle expands on this a little:
Voice is the sound of a living thing. No inanimate being utters voice, though, 
by analogy, the flute and the harp are said to “speak”; and, so, too, other 
inanimate objects which sound with duration, harmony and significance. 
The resemblance arises from voice also having these qualities. [ . . . ] It is 
necessary that air enter when [an animal] draws breath. Hence a striking by 
the soul (in these parts) upon air inhaled through the windpipe is voice.24
However, traditionally, animals do not have souls yet have something like 
voices, which leaves open the possibility that the Body is a kind of speaking 
animal. Bartholomaeus Anglicus, in his De Proprietatibus Rerum, talks about 
the voices of birds and animals as well as of rational men.25 In “Als I Lay,” the 
voice is not the sole provenance of the Soul, but is rather shared equally. As 
an authorial decision, this one, first and foremost, permits the dialogue to 
 23. D. W. Hamlyn, trans. and notes, Aristotle’s “De Anima” Books II and III (Oxford: Clar-
endon Press, 1968). Essentially the same wording is used in W. S. Hett’s 1935 Loeb translation 
of De Anima, and in Richard McKeon’s Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: Random House, 
1941).
 24. Aristotle’s De Anima in the Version of William of Moerbeke and the Commentary of St. 
Thomas Aquinas, trans. Kenelm Foster and Silvester Humphries (London: Routledge, 1951), II, 
466–69, 476–77.
 25. Bartholomaeus Anglicus on the voices of animals is discussed, translated, and quoted 
in Cannon, The Grounds of English Literature, 117. Cannon consulted and translated Bartholo-
maeus, De proprietatibus Rerum (Basel: Ruppel, ca. 1468), fols 8v–9r.
happen. If the Body genuinely couldn’t regain its voice, this poem would be 
no different from the Old English graveside lamentations of sinless or sinning 
souls.
 Whereas the discourse of confession presumed that there is a soul to be 
penetrated and explored for its innermost secrets, “Als I Lay” figures the body 
as an additional vessel of secrets and assertions, one that might be compared 
with the psychoanalytic model of the unconscious but does not fit comfortably 
into Freudian parameters. The self ’s conscience or its will, the part of greatest 
concern to moral thought, could be imagined to belong anywhere, or even 
split in half, since it could be contained within the body or the soul. Neither 
Body nor Soul in “Als I Lay” constitutes an individual in and of itself, and the 
“truth” they produce, in dialogue, is profoundly undecidable. No one “wins” 
the disputation, although this disputation is implicated in establishing and, 
possibly, destabilizing a hierarchy between its two speakers.
 In an article that suggests uses for Foucault’s late thought on confession 
in an analysis of the psychoanalytic scene, Judith Butler points out that the 
production of the voice can belong to the body: “speaking is a bodily act. It 
is a vocalization; it requires the larynx, the lungs, the lips, and the mouth. 
Whatever is said not only passes through the body but constitutes a certain 
presentation of the body. . . . [S]peaking is a sounding forth of the body, its 
simple assertion, a stylized assertion of its presence.”26 Butler’s reading of the 
physicality of speech is contrary to the Aristotelian model, but closer to the 
kind of speech heard in “Als I Lay”: a speech that confesses the Body’s actions 
and constitutes a postmortem action by the Body. Butler is writing about the 
psychoanalytic scene, which is quite different from the medieval vision dis-
cussed in this chapter but shares with it an interest in confession, self-consti-
tution, and what it means to converse, if only with oneself. The prosopopeia 
of the speaking Body and Soul is, at its core, a sort of analysis of the “powers” 
that make up the self as it is understood in sowlehele psychology. It is also the 
discourse of the individual coming into being through narrative—in this case, 
a narrative in which power is exercised by one aspect of the self over another.
Gender and pedaGoGy In the thIrteenth Century
The Cambridge History of Medieval English Literature contains an article by 
Rita Copeland and Marjorie Curry Woods about the intersection of “Class-
 26. Judith Butler, Undoing Gender (New York: Routledge, 2004), 172. “Bodily Confessions” 
is the revised version of a paper given at the American Psychological Division Meetings (Divi-
sion 34) in San Francisco, CA, in 1999.
room and Confession” in the thirteenth century. This article is premised on 
the argument that “both on historical grounds and in cultural terms, peda-
gogical texts and classroom practices have their natural counterparts in con-
fessional texts and practices.”27 Copeland and Curry Woods discuss the way 
in which the idea of disciplina, defined as “the regulation of knowledge and 
the regulation of the self, whether through the rigors of the classroom or of 
penitential practice,” linked pedagogical and pastoral discourses and acted in 
the lives of thirteenth-century persons.28 This is clearly medieval studies done 
in a Foucauldian vein. “Als I Lay,” too, uses the language of the classroom to 
enact the work of educating the penitent for confession. Although didactic 
works are not generally known for their subtlety, as this section will show, 
this allegory uses figures drawn from pedagogical disciplina in order to enact 
confessional discipline.
 One way in which the discourses of classroom and confession were linked 
in the Middle Ages was through the education of clerics, the process of disci-
plining schoolboys and forming their characters. In the late 1950s, when the 
coeducation of boys and girls still seemed new, Walter Ong inaugurated a dis-
cussion of the ways in which medieval and Renaissance classroom discipline 
and the learning of Latin functioned as a “puberty rite.” Drawing on then- 
current anthropological studies, Ong made a case for understanding the dis-
tinction drawn between Latin and vernacular as a distinction between the all-
male environment of the school and the world of home, family, and mother.29 
More recently, and with a great deal more detail, Ralph Hanna discusses the 
formation of what he calls “a Real Man” in English schooling during the Mid-
dle Ages, a contentious situation between master and student in which the 
student is regularly beaten.30 Although Hanna’s reading is primarily concerned 
with evaluating the roles of female allegorical personifications in Piers Plow-
man, the allegory discussed in chapter 5, the tools and tropes of his analysis 
 27. Rita Copeland and Marjorie Curry Woods, “Classroom and Confession,” in The Cam-
bridge History of Medieval English Literature, ed. David Wallace (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 376. The texts discussed in this article include only one disputa-
tion—the prose Dives and Pauper—and the article does not deal with any works that dramatize 
confession in a problematic way, as “Als I Lay” does. Copeland and Curry Woods cite a number 
of discussions that suggest priests and parishioners participated in a system of pastoral power, 
and “the template which could provide the pattern for their (the priests’) role was often to be 
found in the situational context of the classroom” (400).
 28. Copeland and Curry Woods, 377.
 29. Walter Ong, “Latin Language Study as Renaissance Puberty Rite,” Studies in Philology 
56 (1959): 103–24.
 30. Ralph Hanna III, “School and Scorn: Gender in Piers Plowman,” in New Medieval Lit-
eratures, Vol. III (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), citing Whittinton, a basic book by 
the thirteenth-century grammarian John of Garland, EETS, OS 187. See J. N. Adams, The Latin 
Sexual Vocabulary (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 14–15.
illuminate the depiction of pedagogical discipline and gendered hierarchy in 
“Als I Lay.”
 According to Hanna’s reading of the surviving records of a grammar school 
at Wotton (established in 1384, much later than “Als I Lay” first appeared in a 
manuscript), the formation of the “real” man depends on a kind of disciplina 
that relies on the beating of boys. In other words, he describes corporal pun-
ishment as an inherent, essential part in the formation of medieval masculin-
ity (or, at least, of clerical masculinity). Thus far, Hanna is fully in accord with 
Ong’s analysis. In Hanna’s more linguistically specific account, the struggle of 
wills between master and student tends to be resolved through reliance on the 
virga, a word whose polysemy Hanna notes—the whip or rod that is referred 
to in schoolboy exercises as “my maysters doughter.” No doubt, virga evokes 
virgo (“virgin”), in the minds of at least ill-trained Latinists, which accounts in 
part for that reference. According to Hanna, “the whip is the one girl in a boy’s 
life (and his master’s accomplice).”31 The polysemy grows even more confusing 
when we note that virga was a word current in the Middle Ages both for the 
whip or rod used to beat schoolboys and, like rod, for penis.
 Discussing a woodcut popular in printed grammar texts, Hanna describes 
an illustration. It depicts a “transaction between master and boys. The consci-
entious instructor is separated from his admiring flock not just by the book, 
that source of expertise which he passes on, but also, surmounting all, by the 
corrective rod.”32 The rod is described in typically antimarriage schoolboy 
exercises punning on virga/virgo (and written by these same masters) as the 
one girl that boys should or do have contact with; of course, the word for rod, 
the thing schoolboys fear, is also a word for a significant aspect of the school-
boy’s anatomy. One might even suggest that it is the possession of a penis that 
permits a child to become a schoolboy and become subject to the corrective 
rod; it is certainly what defines him as a possible candidate for “clergie”—the 
learning that leads to ordination.
 Although the status of having been whipped as a boy is that which charac-
terizes a Real Man, Hanna goes on to argue, the humiliation of being whipped 
demasculinizes the nascently masculine young boy, producing, if nothing else, 
some real rage against the castrating female, both whip and wife. While, for 
Hanna, this explains something of the misogyny of medieval texts, this story 
of quasi-castration by an object that bears the name of “penis” also describes a 
kind of split within the boy’s self, between his punishable nature and an aspect 
of his bodily self. Disciplina functions, in Hanna’s account, as the mechanism 
of a kind of splitting, a dividing of self from self, rendering ambivalent the 
relationship between the boy and that aspect of himself that bears the name of 
 31. Hanna, 221.
 32. Hanna, 220.
virga—and which both qualifies him for and subjects him to specifically cleri-
cal discipline.
  In “Als I Lay,” we have observed the manner in which the means of cor-
rect training is exemplified in the Body/Soul relation, in life (especially in 
childhood) but also after death, in that moment of remonstration. The boy 
grows into a man through his encounter with disciplinary pedagogy as well as 
through the practices of confessional subjection and the complex process of 
splitting, self-beratement, and self-love that seems to be its not entirely nega-
tive consequence. The speaking woman—the virga, here imagined as Lady 
Philosophy or any other tutelary female figure—is noteworthy largely by her 
absence from the scene of “Als I Lay”: The dialogue’s world excludes female 
allegorical personifications. Significantly, the split self of this Middle English 
allegory is engaged in a particular kind of dialogue—not, say, a discourse of 
courtly romance or the kind of tutelary scene featuring an “allegorical god-
dess,” but a discourse of a complex kind of self-love. Although it is easy to see 
that the term self-love might have something to do with what psychoanalysis 
has termed narcissism and (as countless critics have pointed out) linked explic-
itly with homosexuality, this medieval poem seems to be actively and literally 
staging this dynamic. We might not be able to understand that the self can 
have love for itself without recourse to twentieth-century terminology, but 
this poem enacts such love in its own way, and “narcissism” doesn’t begin to 
describe it.
 Insofar as Body and Soul are posited as separate from one another in order 
to enable any Body/Soul debate, their dialogue tells a story of a complicated 
love and partnership between two entities that are fundamentally one, who 
love and hate themselves by loving and hating each other. Hildebert of Lavar-
din staged this through a marriage metaphor; the author of the “Visio Philib-
erti” imagined it as the intimate relationship of mistress and servant. All of 
these retain the female element. Middle English allegories, such as “In a Thes-
tri Stude” and “Als I Lay,” tend to posit relationships within the self as purely 
male. (A significant and illuminating exception is “Sawles Warde,” discussed 
in the next chapter.) “Als I Lay,” more than its slightly earlier Middle English 
counterpart, posits the relationship between these male aspects of the self as 
love, and becomes implicated—intentionally, or only in the retrospective eye 
of the beholder—in a kind of queer self-love. (Indeed, it seems to ask, is not 
the very notion of love, not only discipline, of the self for itself fundamentally 
“queer”?)
 It is also marked by another sort of queer hierarchy whose queerness is best 
understood in contrast with the poem’s analogues: “Un Samedi Par Nuit”—an 
Anglo-Norman poem that exists in a single manuscript (Ms. Cotton Julius A. 
VII), and may have been a source for the Middle English one—and the very 
popular “Visio Philiberti.” “Als I Lay” is roughly twice as long as the “Visio 
Philiberti,” but, as we have seen, the Latin poem is the basis of many of its 
rhetorical moves, and the popular Latin debate may also be the basis of “Un 
Samedi Par Nuit.” All three poems describe a graveside disputation between 
a Body and a Soul, in which blame is passed back and forth; all three of these 
poems subdivide the self in order to better understand it; and all three func-
tion as works of sowlehele. There are, however, differences that matter between 
these related poems—largely, differences in how they manage the gendering of 
hierarchy and the specifics of interdependence. The differences between the 
Middle English poem and its counterparts in other languages are symptomatic 
of the particular ways in which writers who chose to write in English or to 
translate into that tongue chose to describe the confessional subject’s consti-
tuting parts.
 In “Visio Philiberti” (as discussed more fully in chapter 1), the Body is 
the Soul’s ancilla, deserving and demanding better training and more punish-
ment:
Deus te creavit, God created you
et bonam et nobilem,  good and noble,
sensuque dotavit, and endowed you with senses,
et ad suam speciem pariter formavit, and shaped you in his image,
et ut ancilla fierem  and as a maidservant
tibi me donavit he gave me to you,
ergo si tu domina creata fuisti . . . therefore, if you were created as
   the mistress . . . 
“Visio Philiberti” (110–14)
The Latin poem also establishes a static relationship of class hierarchy, with the 
Body playing the role of servant, but without the romantic coding of courtly 
love. There is a brief moment of same-sex corruption, when the Body admits 
that “the flesh seduces the soul.” And, seduced, the soul is rendered animal-
like and follows the flesh “like a bull led to the slaughter.”33 For most of the 
poem, however, the hierarchy between Corpus and Anima is based in class 
difference, and the moment of corruption stands out specifically as a terrible, 
perhaps even terrifying, reversal of the proper order (as in the other, less popu-
lar Body/Soul debate, Hildebert of Lavardin’s “Liber de querimonia,” in which 
the Soul is briefly, “shockingly” stuck in what is coded as the improper role of 
wife to Hildebert/Body’s “husband”).
 33. “Eorumque blanditiis caro seducit animam / quam a virtutum culmine trahit ad partem 
infimam, / quae statim carnem sequitur ut bos ductus ad victimam” (“Visio Philiberti,” 107–9), 
discussed in context in chapter 1 of this study.
 There is a moment of class distinction in “Als I Lay” as well, but it serves 
mostly to clarify that both speakers in the dialogue are clearly marked as male. 
It is very brief: In describing the suffering caused by the Body, the Soul says “I 
βolede βe and dide as mad / To be maister, and I βi cnaue” (“I suffered you and 
did as I was made / letting you be the master, and I your servant”; 335–36). In 
contrast with the mostly stable class difference between Corpus and Anima, 
the Middle English poem cannot seem to find one consistent way to organize 
the “obvious” hierarchical superiority of the Soul, and is left with present-
ing multiple options to describe the relationship of Soul and Body, options 
that permit ambivalence regarding relative guilt or innocence, and a narrative 
frame capable of affecting the poem’s moral and didactic effect: teacher/stu-
dent, rider/horse, brother and brother, master/servant.
 In “Un Samedi Par Nuit,” “L’ame” appears “estoit essue, ce me ert vis tote 
nue / En guise d’un enfant” (“The soul was sitting, to my view it seemed entirely 
nude / In the likeness of a child . . .”).34 One wonders, at first, whether this is 
the innocent little child within a sinning man, or whether the Body, coded as 
female because it is flesh, has somehow given birth to its own soul as its child. 
However, the dialogue reveals that, here, “un enfant” is a term for young female 
figure, a figure capable of being inserted into an amatory discourse.35 She is 
referred to as “petite figure” (“Samedi,” 7), and sternly addresses the Body in 
the masculine, calling it “chaitif maleurez” (“miserable wretch,” “Samedi,” 26). 
At the level of the courtly discourse of the Anglo-Norman version, the Body 
plays bumbling suitor to the Soul’s fine lady.
 As a suitor, the Body is gendered male, and subordinate to the (female) 
Soul insofar as both participate in a discourse of courtly love, which reverses 
the usual hierarchy of the sexes in favor of courtly service:
Je ere jadis ten serf, I was once your serf,
par toi iere vermef; To you I seemed as vermin;
je ere ton soumier, I was your pack-horse,
T estoies ma dame, You were my lady,
Si me carchas la soume, Thus my carcass bore a load
 34. “Un Samedi Par Nuit,” in Thomas S. Wright, ed., The Latin Poems Commonly Attributed 
to Walter Mapes (London: Camden Society, 1841), lines 5–7.
 35. This kind of language is common to medieval English as well—A Pistil of Susan features 
the word “fode” to describe both children and young women, indiscriminately, to the point that 
it can be difficult to tell which of the two protagonists (the poem features both a child and a 
young woman) is being discussed. First edited by Hermann Varnhagen in Das altfränzosische 
Gedicht Un Samedi Par Nuit Erlanger Beitrage zür englischen Philologie, Vol. 1 (Leipzig, 1889). 
The other editions are Poésies populaires latines antérieures au douzième siècle, ed. Edélstand 
Du Méril (Paris, 1843), and Theodor Georg von Karajan, ed., Frühlingsgabe für Freunde alterer 
Literatur (Vienna, 1839).
que je ne puis soufrir, which I could suffer no more,
le quer me fist partir. the heart of me went away.
(161–64)
The difference between Body and Soul is a difference of social class as well as 
of gender, although courtly love poetry could use the figure of hard labor to 
express the courtly work noblemen might do for the ladies they serve. To have 
the Soul represented as female organizes the text of that debate in the terms of 
gendered hierarchy, and the Soul impersonates an allegorical goddess/harsh 
mistress to the Body, who is playing the chevalier. This is, in part, a result of 
the gender of the nouns for soul and body in Anglo-Norman. In languages in 
which nouns are gendered, ame and anima are female, and this establishes a 
seemingly natural hierarchy within Body/Soul poems in these languages. In 
Middle English, in which nouns are altogether uninflected by gender, other, 
less “natural” or socially defined hierarchies than those between males and 
females need to be established when hierarchy appears necessary. In the par-
ticular case of Body/Soul debates, the lack of noun gender helps produce a 
particularly interesting set of competing discourses for same-sex hierarchy.
As it turns out, figurations of same-sex interdependence are at the very heart 
of medieval English confessional culture. The Middle English Body’s speech, 
in which it responds to the Soul’s accusations, rejects the position of sinner 
silently hearing a list of its sins. In it, the Body steps, briefly, outside the bounds 
of the poem’s narrative situation, and foregrounds the didactic genre in which 
the poem is written—in effect, pushing against the confessional nature of the 
scene. The form of “Als I Lay” is very obviously didactic—but here, the Body 
makes it clear that the relationships of the poem’s protagonists, the relation-
ships that form its content, are also based on a didactic association. The Body, 
refusing blame for the wrongs of the knight it had been, argues that the Soul 
was entrusted, in effect, with being the Body’s teacher and it therefore should 
not be blamed for its actions:
Ne toc I neuere wyche craft I never knew any craft
Ne wist I hwat was guod nor il, Nor did I know what was good or evil,
Bote as a wretche dumb and daft, But was like a wretch, dumb and deaf
Bote as thou taughtest ther-til  Except when you taught [me 
   otherwise].
(189–93)
This description of the Body/Soul relationship by the Body marks a significant 
turn in the poem, a turn toward a more explicit (and yet more confused) dis-
course on the Body and Soul hierarchy. Had Body and Soul been “squabbling,” 
rebutting one another’s arguments as equals? That would be wrong, especially 
if the Soul is the Body’s confessor. No, says the Body, emphatically. One is the 
other’s master, and therefore the responsible party when guilt for a life ill-lived 
is being divided up.
 When the Soul counters the Body’s refusal to be blamed for the dead 
knight’s sins, it does not entirely deny the image of itself as teacher but, rather, 
complicates it. Both Soul and Body were born of woman, says the Soul, and 
fostered together, and the Body carried the Soul about (as a stronger sibling 
might bear a weaker) since the Soul could take no actions by itself.
Abouten, bodi, thou me bar; Around [the world], Body, you bore 
   me;
Thou mostist nede, I was withoute You needed to, I was without
Hand and fot, I was wel war. Hand and foot, as I was well aware.
Bote as thou bere me aboute Unless you carried me about,
Ne might I do the leste char; I could not do the least of tasks;
Thorfore most I nede loute, Therefore, I necessarily had to bow 
   down
So doth he that non other dar. As one who dares do nothing else.
Of a wymman born and bredde, Of one woman born and bred,
Body, were we bothe tvo: Body, were we both, the two of us:
Togidre fostrid fayre and fedde Together fostered well and fed,
Til thou couthist speke and go. Until you could speak and go.
Softe the for loue I ledde, Gently I led you, for love’s sake,
Ne dorst I neuere do the wo . . .  Not daring ever to do you woe . . . 
(290–303)
This extraordinary passage is, in some ways, the poem’s point. Seldom is moti-
vation discussed so specifically in the Middle English literature of the thir-
teenth century. This practically is a psychology, one of feudal domination and 
interdependence. The discourse of pedagogical discipline is here transformed 
(almost like the transformation that Foucault traces in Discipline and Punish, 
from punishment as spectacle to punishment as the carceral). In place of that 
which the Body asks for, a pedagogy marked by punishment, the Soul tells a 
story of training through love.
 From its position of powerlessness, the Soul claims to have led the Body 
gently, not daring ever to do it woe because “to lese the so sore I dredde” (303). 
Based in this new insight, the Soul goes on to redescribe the dead knight’s life, 
which it had already described in some detail during the poem’s first lines. 
The new story is of a Body that had been willing to obey its Soul, its confessor, 
when it was young—a time when it was often beaten; the Body describes itself 
as having been “betin and birst” (308). Once grown stronger and older and no 
longer subject to the beatings that a child receives as a matter of course, this 
Body, a foster-brother, had began to disobey the Soul, and “al thin oune wil 
thou dist” (“you did all [according to] your [own] will”; 312).
 According to its own narrative, the Soul was ultimately doubly powerless, 
both in its impotent position of being borne in the Body’s “brest” (320) and 
as a result of the tie of affection binding it to be kind to the Body. The Body 
seduced it, the Soul claims: “I sau βe fair on fleychs and blod, / And al mi loue 
on βe I kest” (“I found you fair in flesh and blood / and all my love on you 
I cast”; 313–14). Is it narcissistic for the Soul to find its own Body beautiful? 
Here, the relationship really is of a split self, but one that has, at least at some 
point in the past, been capable of self-love, whether this might be understood 
as the height of psychological health (as in the modern world) or the depths 
of deluded sin.
 The Body, in its response, does not deny the loving relationship of the 
narration, but argues only that the Soul ought to have punished it more: Had 
it asserted itself, the Body would have met more of the “soul-nede” (233, dis-
cussed previously). Love and discipline characterize the psychology of this 
poem, which explores so many possibilities of the sinning self ’s relationship to 
itself. The word subject, in the sense of “subjection” (which was certainly all it 
meant in Middle English), seems not so strange now as a term to describe this 
particular representation of psychological theorizing.
 To have characterized the relationship between Body and Soul as a queer 
one, I have shown how the poem figures a series of hierarchies between the 
two beings as same-sex male relations (when it is not figuring the Body as a 
beast to be ridden, its own sort of queerness). These homosocial bonds of love 
do not negate the explicitly named heterosexuality of the knight now dead. The 
Soul’s taunting ubi sunt speech mentions the wife as one of the dead knight’s 
losses (the Soul alleges that she will not mourn long), and also implies that the 
knight might regret the loss of other, extramarital romantic opportunities: “Ne 
nis no leuedi bright on ble / βat wel weren i-woned of βe to lete, / That wolde 
lye a night bi βe” (“There is no lady fair of face / that was accustomed to allow 
you to do so / that would now lie a night beside you”; 249–51). The Soul seems 
to think that it is the Body that engaged in carnal acts, not itself, and the Body 
does not argue.
 The Body does not discuss ladies or wives. It does, however, offer a speech 
that echoes very precisely the one made by the Soul to name and ever more 
precisely characterize the relationship that had existed between them. At this 
point in the dialogue, the reader may feel that reading the poem is like being 
stranded in the car with a couple having a spat. The Body redescribes its rela-
tionship with the Soul in similar terms:
Were was I bi wode or weyhge Where was I ever by wood or by way
Sat or stod or dide ought mys, Sitting, standing or doing amiss,
βat I ne was ay under βin eyge? That I was not also under your eye?
Wel ough wost βat soth it ys. You know well that this is true.
Weder I ede up or doun Whenever I went up or down
That I ne bar βe on my bac I bore you always on my back
Als βin as fro toun to toun I was also yours going from town to 
   town
Alse though me lete haue rap  Else you would let me have bangs and
 and rac.  blows.
βat tou ne were and red roun Without you there to advise me
Neuere did I βing ne spac. Never did I think nor speak.
Here βe soothe se men mouen Here look at the truth that all men mourn
On me βat ligge here so blo  On me that lies here so black and blue.
 and black. 
For al βe wile though were mi  For all the while that you were my 
 fere  mate
I hadde al βat me was ned . . .  I had all that ever I needed . . . 
(261–72)
The difference between the Body saying that it bore the Soul on its back wher-
ever it went and the Soul saying that the Body had borne it about is a slight 
yet telling one: In the Body’s speech, the Soul is rider or ruler, whereas in the 
Soul’s, the Body rules the material world in which the Soul is too crippled to 
take action by itself. The Soul is the panoptical prison of the Body, according 
to the Body; the Body is the jail from which the Soul has always dreamed of 
escaping, according to the Soul. Love and aggression appear in both passages; 
the Body mourns the loss of “mi fere” (“my mate”; 271), while the Soul regrets 
that love kept it from sufficiently disciplining its brother.
 An analogue to the relationship between the Body and the Soul in “Als I 
Lay” can be found in one of Foucault’s descriptions of his view of power, in 
a late interview in which Foucault argues against the simplifications of crit-
ics who imputed to him a view of power as evil. In his argument, Foucault 
offers two examples. One is that of the sexual or love relationship, offered as 
an example of power exercised in a “sort of open strategic game, where things 
could be reversed.” The other example he offers is that of “the pedagogical 
institution”:
I don’t see where evil is in the practice of someone who, in a given game of 
truth, knowing more than another, tells him what he must do, teaches him, 
transmits knowledge to him, communicates skills to him. The problem is 
rather to know how you are to avoid in these practices—where power can-
not not play and where it is not evil in itself—the effects of domination 
which will make a child subject to the arbitrary and useless authority of 
a teacher, or put a student under the power of an abusively authoritarian 
professor, and so forth. I think these problems should be posed in terms of 
rules of law, of relational techniques of government and of ethos, of practice 
of self and of freedom.36
There are, therefore, two kinds of relationships based in power imbalances that 
Foucault offers as instances of “nonevil” relations in this interview—the ama-
tory and the pedagogical. They are ultimately not so very different from one 
another, and they are certainly, in Foucault’s conception, potentially labeled 
by that slippery, complicated label, “queer.” These two kinds of nonevil power 
relationships, which might actually be one kind, are also the two kinds of 
relationship being portrayed when the relations between parts of the self are 
allegorically represented in this thirteenth-century debate poem.
 The allegorical structure of “Als I Lay” imposes discipline and confession 
on a corpse, too late to do much good except as a negative example to oth-
ers. This belatedness cannot save the Soul from the hell to which it is car-
ried before the poem’s end. This leaves the reader to ask whether the poem’s 
didacticism might be conceptually posed as morally endangering. Might the 
splitting of the self into two quarreling components, and the Soul’s “bad” or 
failed pedagogy, somehow reflect on the fact of pedagogy and its attendant dis-
ciplina being imperfect ways to mold selves? “In a Thestri Stude I Stod” seems 
to be more conscious of the always-already-present reality of sin, whereas this 
poem’s focus on the rhetoric of the Body/Soul quarrel displaces the focus from 
such questions. After several centuries of poems in which Souls lament their 
sins in life and expect death, does this particular thirteenth-century version 
of the debate admit to the mode’s triteness and underline it as a kind of com-
mentary (either unwitting or deliberate) on the limits of pedagogy?
 The Soul suggests that the relationship it had with the Body when they 
were united as a self was based on love. The Body suggests that their relation-
ship had been pedagogic, including the physical punishments that pedagogy 
entailed in medieval classrooms. In both cases, the relationship is produc-
tive and formative, and not one of domination. The Body is not produced in 
 36. Michel Foucault, The Final Foucault, ed. James Bernauer and David Rasmussen (Cam-
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response to “the arbitrary and useless authority” of the teaching Soul. Rather, 
the self is produced as a subject through the encounter between the amatory 
and the pedagogical, the Body and the Soul. A significant difference from 
Foucault’s account here is that were the sexual forms of the love relationship 
a factor, in the thirteenth century they may have been viewed as evil (and 
would be subject to being confessed)—but the relationships posited in “Als 
I Lay” imply a kind of innocent connection in which the love is only ever 
of the entirely caritas variety. This relationship is “brotherly,” “filial,” rather 
than erotic or even parental (or if parental, it’s unclear which is the parent, 
which the child, since the Soul did the training but the Body did the carrying 
about). The queer pairing of Body and Soul, useful for depicting their mutual 
reproaches as both love and aggression, need not be “gay”—it would be absurd 
to imagine the literal coupling of the self ’s parts—but it is loving, admiring, 
and aggressive in ways that tend to characterize romantic love, and here the 
love is between two male figures who ultimately blame their damnation on the 
love between them.37
  What we encounter in tracing the relationships of hierarchy, love, and 
power in “Als I Lay” are as follows: (1) accusation, remonstration, and berate-
ment for the first 200 lines of the Soul’s ubi sunt speech; (2) prosopopeia, the 
Body’s rebuttal, which describes the relation between Soul and Body in peda-
gogical terms and poses a retroactive demand for punishments that should 
have occurred but did not; (3) the Soul’s response, which posits a relationship of 
interdependence through foster brother love—a relationship that is, in essence, 
kinship without consanguinity, bearing with it an entirely different kind of 
ethical demand, and a far more equal relationship than that between student 
and teacher; and (4) the Body’s recapitulation of the narrative of love and 
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discipline between Body and Soul, which ends by detailing how lost it is with-
out its mate.38 By tracing the differences among these relationships and those 
that are posited in their counterparts, we can see the specificity of Middle 
English literary approaches to the psychology of hierarchy.
Disputation is a crucial technique for thought in the pedagogical, philosophi-
cal, and literary practices of the Middle Ages. In his Historia Calamitatum, 
Peter Abelard, one of the twelfth century’s great philosophers, tells how he 
“preferred the weapons of dialectic to all the other teachings of philosophy, 
and armed with these . . . chose the conflicts of disputation instead of trophies 
of war.”39 Abelard then proceeds to narrate a life history marked by constant 
engagements with and victories over elder masters of argument. Although 
Abelard’s description primarily applies to the university-educated, Thomas 
Reed, Jr., writing on the institutional context of debate poetry, affirms that 
“by the middle of the thirteenth century, students were instructed through 
disputation, examined through disputation, and, upon graduation, obliged to 
begin their statutory two years of teaching by riding out as presiding master a 
forty-day flood of disputations.”40 Although the debating style of debate poems 
in general, and this debate between the Body and the Soul in particular, are 
far from being records of classroom interaction, this is nevertheless a genre 
produced by authors who may very well have participated in and witnessed 
disputation-as-war, and knew how to enjoy—and to produce—a well-made 
rhetorical point, whether in sermon or in treatise.
  “Als I Lay” is a disputation that allegorizes the different emotional stances 
available to student and teacher, foster brothers, mates. In describing what 
it means to be subject to classroom discipline (whether sufficient or insuffi-
cient), it dramatizes the split and self-berating nature of the confessional self. 
It, and “In a Thestri Stude I Stod,” are both didactic poems, since they threaten 
damnation with the aim of teaching virtuous living. But in addition to being 
didactic works, they are also works whose form—the memento mori instruc-
tions of the Soul in particular—is explicitly pedagogical, as if in the moments 
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of the Soul’s preaching, the audience and the Body are equated, all subjected 
equally to the discipline of pastoral pedagogy, and therefore brought into the 
reversible relationship of power enacted in the dialogue.
 Works of sowlehele are intended to urge proper confession, and to teach 
layfolk (and those who care for the souls of layfolk) how to organize their own 
understandings of themselves so that their confession might be effective, thor-
ough, and appropriately contrite. In the thirteenth century, those who grew 
up to offer pastoral care would have been trained through similar pedagogical 
methods of discipline and punishment that this poem names as insufficiently 
administered but necessary. Priests and confessors had been rendered subject 
to a master’s discipline, both internal (in learning to act as docile students) and 
external (in being punished when internal discipline was insufficient). Incul-
cating such a stance in others would have seemed an appropriate way to teach 
them to confess in ways that would seem effective and appropriate to such 
priests, who both authored poems like the one discussed in this chapter and 
benefited from their existence in their work on the souls of parishioners. “Als I 
Lay” is, therefore, a text inscribed with the marks of an author who had under-
gone a certain kind of pedagogy. With its didactic mode, it functions at the 
intersection of pedagogy and pastoral care. It describes how the self is trained 
into selfhood (an analogy to both the teacher/student and the foster brother 
relationship), specifically through a display of how the sinful self might have 
trained itself to be better.
 The textual production of a comprehensible body by means of a disciplin-
ing/disciplined soul cannot but recall the Foucauldian postulate that “the soul 
is the effect and instrument of a political anatomy; the soul is the prison of the 
body.”41 For those who have read Foucault and those influenced by him over 
a period of years, this statement may not seem surprising; it takes a medieval-
izing gesture to remember that, originally, the body was supposed to be seen as 
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the one to imprison the soul. To read Body/Soul debates is to revisit and, to a 
degree, amplify and revise the Foucauldian approach to the problem of body 
and soul, knowing that these texts are anterior to the time Foucault is theo-
rizing but wondering whether the structures he finds in the classical prison 
might not have been established in popular sermonizing poems such as those 
I consider here.
 In “Als I Lay,” the Soul is the prison of the Body, literalizing Foucault’s 
gesture, but the Body is also the prison of the Soul, and who imprisons whom 
cannot finally be decided. Foucault’s reversal of something that seems to have 
been a generally accepted “original” formulation—the Body as prison house of 
the Soul—is thus only partly accurate as a description of the disciplinary rela-
tion of these thirteenth-century poems. His discussion of discipline, however, 
lacks the dimension of love as the condition of Body/Soul connection that the 
Soul’s discourse introduces, and therefore does not describe the willing subjec-
tion to a certain model of the self that the anonymous thirteenth-century poet 
depicts. The contradictory process of loving self-subjection described in “Als I 
Lay” and visible in its narrative strategies is illuminated by Foucault’s formula-
tions, but, of course, cannot be fully explained in terms of his thinking.
 Judith Butler, an astute reader of Foucault as well as herself a critic con-
cerned with the constitution of subjectivity, has written in The Psychic Life of 
Power about the split nature of the subject and its affective relationship to the 
power that works on and within it. In that study, she examines the paradox 
of Foucauldian subjection from a psychoanalytic (often, but not exclusively, 
Kleinian) perspective: In her description, it is characterized by dependence 
and ambivalence and a kind of helpless love. In her introduction, Butler notes 
that Foucault writes relatively little about psychic subjection, that he “does not 
elaborate on the specific mechanisms of how the subject is formed in submis-
sion.”42 Her book works to elaborate those mechanisms, which Butler terms 
passionate attachments.43 Butler writes that:
power that at first appeared external, pressed upon the subject, pressing 
the subject into subordination, assumes a psychic form that constitutes the 
subject’s self-identity. The form this power takes is relentlessly marked by 
a figure of turning, a turning back upon oneself or even a turning on one-
self.44
Given their didactic intent, it is easy to imagine that works of sowlehele were 
meant to be read over and over again, and so, close to the end of this chapter 
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about “Als I Lay,” let us look back at the poem’s beginning. Following the fram-
ing, when the narrator has described his or her vision of the Body lying on 
the bier, he or she turns to the Soul, without describing it except through 
its behavior as it leaves the Body but cannot truly leave it: “Wan the gost it 
sholde go / Yt biwente and withstood, / Bihelod the bodi there it cam fro / So 
serfulli with dredli mod.” (“When the ghost should have gone away / It went 
[instead] and stood nearby / Beheld the body that it came from, / Sorrowfully, 
with dread-filled mood”; 9–12). The turning of the self upon itself described 
by Butler, above, is a turn the Soul made at the very beginning of the poem. 
Its inability to leave might be, to a pious reader, a symptom of its disorder, its 
excessive love for its Body, but it is also the enabling fiction that initiates the 
dialogue. Someone rereading the poem—having already experienced its end, 
this turning in on itself by the Soul, which is both the disciplining power and 
the object of discipline at the poem’s end—might also read the Soul as a figure 
for how love and interdependence structure this medieval self, in a surprising 
continuity with the modern subject described by Butler in her rewriting of 
Foucault, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Freud.
 Although Foucault is often read as a theorist positing a hopelessly oppres-
sive and repressive power, his later work emphasized how the self is consti-
tuted through language in ways that are not entirely negative—that, indeed, 
cannot be reduced to poles as simple and opposed as “positive” and “nega-
tive.” We often forget that, even in History of Sexuality, Volume One, Foucault 
wrote against what he called “the repressive hypothesis” (it often seems as if 
we read Foucault as positing more and more repression when his late argu-
ments’ punch line always seemed to be the productivity of power relations) and 
that the discourse of confession was, particularly late in his career, as much 
about the history of conscious self-construction through language as about 
oppression by pastoral power. Foucault’s late work, and Butler’s reading of it, 
fits better with this chapter’s reading of “Als I Lay” and with how this poem 
does the work of sowlehele, although the violence that characterizes the poem’s 
end complicates any straightforward view of “positive” or “productive” power. 
After all, the person being produced at poem’s end is, literally, dead, even as 
the readers, whose experience of reading is also a disciplinary production, are 
learning presumably valuable lessons and being “produced” as contrite sub-
jects who imagine the mapping of their selves as bodies and souls just so. The 
surplus produced alongside such mappings, the queerness at the heart of the 
Body/Soul relation, might also be installed in these imagined medieval readers 
along with this contrition, whether it is welcome or not.
 Body/Soul debates like “Als I Lay” and its counterparts are tremendously 
concerned with pedagogy as such as part of their content as well as in their 
didactic form, and specifically, with the limits of the interpellating power of 
pedagogical punishment (that of hell as well as that of beatings received by 
schoolboys). In other words, “Als I Lay” (in this case, differing from its coun-
terparts because it lacks “natural” hierarchies or static noun relationships to 
fall back on) uses metaphors or analogies, like those of classroom interaction, 
to tell its didactic story. These analogies are embedded in a narrative that 
relies on a dialogic rather than a monologic mode to both mourn a wholeness 
and unity between “mates” and show that such no wholeness may ever have 
truly existed. Such a mode of sowlehele is capable of simultaneously teaching 
the reader and critiquing the scene of teaching. In doing so, the debate repre-
sents the processlike nature of sowlehele psychological theory as a mode that 
describes, produces, and disciplines selves in ways intimately implicated in 
gender and sexuality, even or especially when that gender is male.
 “Als I Lay” very clearly intends to preach to both the Body and the reader 
through the Soul’s words, and it ends with the terrified narrator waking up, 
resolving to live well, and thanking Christ for the mercy that had thus far 
shielded the narrator from the fate of the punished Soul. Even with this final 
modeling of reader response for, presumably, its “real” readers, the didactic 
strength of “Als I Lay” is less than that of other, not so debate-driven, Body/
Soul disputations, poems in which the Soul’s authority is more definitely 
established. The poem’s narrative drive—the debate genre’s demand that both 
speakers have a chance to make their arguments, the characteristics assigned 
to the personified beings Body and Soul—complicates the poem’s ostensibly 
didactic intent, because both disputants are given a measure of truth to work 
with.
 The encounter between Soul and Body offers a scene of disputation, accu-
sation, and confession, representing the self as split, self-berating, and negoti-
ating relationships of power and hierarchy between its parts, as we have seen 
over the course of this and the previous chapters. The self portrayed in Body/
Soul debates is one that comes into being through a dialogic splitting, through 
dialogue rather than through soliloquy (as it had, in a way, for Augustine and 
would for Hamlet). The relationship between aspects of the self is founded 
in sharp dispute, and characterized by imperfectly administered pedagogical 
discipline, the kind of discipline discussed by Butler and the late Foucault, as 
formative and productive even as it inevitably and perhaps painfully divides 
the self from itself to enable its rather queer self-understandings.
 Although it is true that the body is born of sin in Christian theology, the 
Body of Body/Soul poetry seems to be born at the moment of death, at the 
moment of rupture from the Soul. In the narrative of “Als I Lay,” it seems as 
though the Body is a being of arbitrary freedoms, born from the failures of 
punishment, supervision, constraint. This being can never be whole, but can-
not exist as just a creature of appetite. The failure of the Soul’s punishment is 
theologically explicable in terms of the philosophical underpinning of Body/
Soul debates as a whole, discussed in the previous chapter, but in “Als I Lay” 
those terms are simultaneously narratively occluded and dramatized (shown 
rather than told).
 The Body’s existence within the narrative requires the presence of the Soul, 
its failed attempt at discipline, to be able to come into being and form a self. A 
simply material body would not qualify as a “self,” and can function as a sem-
blance of selfhood only through dialogue with the Soul. If Body and Soul had 
appeared in a static image or as a metaphor, the discipline imposed on both 
(abandonment to hell’s demons or the cold earth) would function in a simple, 
complete way. Because the debate has a plot, with characters and personalities, 
its narrative both disrupts and ornaments its didacticism. The anonymous 
authors of these works seem to almost take pleasure in showing that one of the 
narrative possibilities of the dialogue is its capacity to represent a psychology 
based simultaneously in medieval “common sense” and on a queer relation-
ship of the self to itself.
Commonplace understandings of the relationship between sin and 
self in the Middle Ages often use the metaphor of the castle keep.1 
The Seven Deadly Sins batter at the walls of the self like an attacking 
army, and the walls either hold or they do not. Implicitly, the body 
is not only a building of stone; it is also a vessel, delicate, breakable, 
housing a soul that ultimately belongs to God. The body is a fragile 
and penetrable barrier between the soul and the evils of the world.
 Such metaphors about the relationship of the self to sin have a curi-
ous quality, distinguishing what the self is from what it is not through 
metaphors of place: specifically, through the distinction between what 
is inside and what is outside the self. This system resembles, without 
being identical to, the workings of Body/Soul debates—for instance, 
their figurations of the soul as prison of the body or of the body as 
imprisoning the soul. The force of the sins and vices pressing on the 
outside of the delicate vessel that is “man”—or, in the case of the early 
thirteenth-century prose allegory “Sawles Warde,” the subject of this 
chapter, “woman”—must be counterbalanced by virtues on the inside 
of that vessel, pressing outward into good works.
 1. The metaphor of self as castle/vessel can be found in a number of medieval 
texts that seem to have been written with the aim of spiritual direction. See the 
excellent and thorough study by Christina Whitehead, Castles of the Mind: A Study 
in Medieval Architectural Allegory (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2003), for an 
extensive discussion of these allegories.
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 It is a wonder that the vessel doesn’t shatter, that the walls so often hold, 
that the pressures of outside and inside balance one another out day after day 
after day. That the balance is difficult to maintain is doubly true for women, 
more susceptible as medieval thinkers consider them to be to temptation, and 
it may be trebly true for the female hermits known as anchoresses. This cat-
egory of women was the assumed audience for “Sawles Warde” (“The Guard-
ianship of the Soul”), an allegory about the contents of the self and how the 
powers between them are resolved—a theme that resonates deeply with sowle-
hele. When the work of producing sowlehele turns to describing the female self, 
the language of subjectivity intersects with the highly gendered discourse of 
the female body and the difficult work of maintaining its purity.
 The source of “Sawles Warde” was not an address to women’s souls, 
although its English translation became one. “Sawles Warde” was adapted 
from a far shorter Latin homily, attributed in the Middle Ages to St. Anselm 
as well as, occasionally, to Hugh of St. Victor and called “De custodia interioris 
hominis.” The source homily does not bear any marks of being intended for 
female readers, or of thinking about female persons, and it is not developed as 
an allegory, although it uses some allegorical personification.2 In the process 
of becoming an English-language work, the homily was transformed into a 
female-centered allegorical narrative. The religious practice of the anchoress, 
which involved lifelong enclosure in a cell built into the wall of a church, is 
precisely the sort of self described by metaphors of assault from without and 
treasure within: It is plausible to imagine that it is her self being described as 
a battered but intact vessel.3 While she is defined by the uniqueness of her 
chosen isolation, the anchoress’s self is offered as a model to be imitated by 
secular women, who ought to hope to resemble her even if they cannot fol-
low her into the solitude of pure devotion. Placed alongside the other works 
comprising the Katherine Group, a collection of texts possibly intended for 
a readership of female religious—particularly alongside the Ancrene Wisse, 
the “Guide for Anchoresses”—“Sawles Warde” is clearly positioned as part of 
an unusual attempt to address women, and to offer them succor in times of 
trouble and self-doubt. As such, it is an allegory about the process of guarding 
(“warde”) the female soul.
 When Soul and Body talked to each other in now little-known Middle 
English Body/Soul debates, they split the self in order to provide readers with 
 2. The Latin original is edited and published in R. W. Southern and F. S. Schmitt, eds., 
Memorials of St. Anselm, in Auctores britannici medii aevi (Oxford: Oxford University Press for 
the British Academy, 1969), 354–60.
 3. Some scholars avoid the term anchoress, since it is a modern invention. The Middle 
English Dictionary suggests ancre, which can be applied to female and male anchorites alike. 
However, anchoress is the term conventionally used in the scholarship about these works, as its 
gender inflection helps to mark and to circumscribe the gender of these works’ addressees.
a didactic—but also dynamically narrative-based—view of the self ’s compo-
nents, a model I call sowlehele. This psychology, however, was by no means 
confined to such debates. Better-known allegorical works also offered sowle-
hele, often as an explicit part of their project. This chapter looks at an instance 
of sowlehele from a new angle. Instead of through allegories that eliminate 
the female figure from within the self, such as “In a Thestri Stude I Stod” and 
“Als I Lay in a Winteris Nyt,” it considers an allegory whose purpose seems 
to be to anatomize, comprehend, and discipline women by populating the 
self with primarily female figures. “Sawles Warde” describes and disciplines 
the female self, and in so doing works out a differently gendered model of 
sowlehele, which can be developed through examining the productive tension 
between the model of “warding” the soul offered by the allegory’s title and 
the use of the term sowlehele within the allegory (spelled, in “Sawles Warde,” 
as sawle heale, highlighting the term’s similarity to the allegory’s title), as well 
as by examining the work’s narrative of a self populated with female figures. 
This chapter argues that “Sawles Warde” is an allegory about the necessity of 
guarding the soul as a specifically female-oriented mode of sowlehele, that, as 
a consequence, it provides a way of understanding how gender is performed in 
medieval psychological thought, and that this work is an allegory for what was 
being conceived in the Middle Ages as the distinct nature of the female self.
 The narrative of “Sawles Warde” begins by describing the self (“seolf the 
mon”) as a household shared by a married pair, Wit and Will.4 Within the 
home of the body, the wife, Will, threatens to stir up trouble by encouraging 
the servants to follow her caprices, while interlopers and occasional visitors 
from without undermine any sense in which this self might be considered 
hermetically sealed within its house. The home of Wit and Will, one sees 
immediately, is less like the anchoress’s quiet cell and more like an ordinary 
layperson’s house, with all of the associated problems of maintaining a spiritual 
life in the context of the bustle of daily comings and goings. To maintain some 
semblance of order, the home is under the guidance and guardianship of God’s 
four daughters—in this version, Warschipe (Prudence), Gastelich Strengβe 
(Spiritual Fortitude), Meaβ (Temperance), and Rihtwisnesse (Justice)—lent 
by God as Wit’s helpers. Two visitors arrive and are permitted entry into the 
otherwise closely guarded keep: Fearlac (Fear) arrives from hell to narrate its 
horrors, while Liues Luue (Love of Life) details the joys of heaven; both per-
sonifications are referred to as “he,” and thus add to the allegory’s population 
of male figures, which would otherwise be limited to Wit. Along with the two 
 4. “Sawles Warde,” in Medieval English Prose for Women: From the Katherine Group and 
“Ancrene Wisse,” trans. and ed. Bella Millett and Jocelyn Wogan-Browne (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1990), 86, line 8. Subsequent citations are given in text, and refer to the Middle English 
text; translations used are by Millett and Wogan-Browne, unless otherwise noted, and appear 
on the facing page of their edition.
visitors, the long-term guests who are God’s Daughters fundamentally disrupt 
the balance of power in the household, and so unseat Will from her rule over 
the servants/senses.
 This book began with a consideration of female personifications in Latin 
allegory and the psychological work that they do, and fail to do, in the Middle 
Ages. Those allegories contained female personifications, but their goal was 
the rehabilitation of a male narrator (Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy) or 
the salvation of a universal “Mansoul” (the title of Prudentius’ Psychomachia 
being “Fight for Mansoul” in Thompson’s Loeb translation). These were alle-
gories containing women but intended to discipline the souls and bodies of 
a mostly male, Latin-literate audience. Two chapters have now examined the 
ways in which the linguistic possibilities of Middle English caused the per-
sonifications that populate psychomachias to be remade as male, in at least 
some Middle English allegorical debates. For two chapters, the marked gender 
category has been “male,” and so has the kind of discipline (that of the school-
room, for instance) invoked therein. This chapter turns now to an explicitly 
female allegorical world.
 The last two decades have seen a great deal of writing about female reader-
ship and Middle English writings addressed to women.5 This scholarship has 
often stressed how the rhetoric used in many such texts insists on embodi-
ment as a necessary condition for salvation: It is through the body that the 
presumed-female audience of such works might sin, but if it does not sin, it 
is through the deprivations of that same body that this audience will be saved 
and sanctified. Such thinking relies on the association of women with the 
 5. For a series of useful articles in dialogue with one another about the Ancrene Wisse, of-
ten in relation to the Katherine Group, see Catherine Innes-Parker, “Fragmentation and Recon-
struction: Images of the Female Body in Ancrene Wisse and the Katherine Group,” Comitatus: 
A Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies 26 (1995): 27–52; Sarah Beckwith, “Passionate 
Regulation: Enclosure, Ascesis, and the Feminist Imaginary,” South Atlantic Quarterly 93 
(1994): 803–24; Jocelyn Wogan-Browne, “Chaste Bodies: Frames and Experiences,” in Framing 
Medieval Bodies, ed. Sarah Kay and Miri Rubin (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 
1994), 24–42; and Jocelyn Price, “‘Inner’ and ‘Outer’: Conceptualizing the Body in Ancrene 
Wisse and Aelred’s De Institutione Inclusarum,” in Medieval English Religious and Ethical Litera-
ture (Essays in Honor of G.H. Russell), ed. Gregory Kratzman and James Simpson (London: D. S. 
Brewer, 1986), 192–208. Recent full-length studies concerned in whole or in large part with the 
Katherine Group include Elizabeth Robertson, Early English Devotional Prose and the Female 
Audience (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1990); Anne Clark Bartlett, Male Authors, 
Female Readers, and Middle English Devotional Literature (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1995); as well as the classic study that turned medievalists’ attention to the psychological impor-
tance of the Ancrene Wisse as a part of the then-new argument about the “discovery of the indi-
vidual in the twelfth century,” Linda Georgianna’s The Solitary Self: Individuality in the Ancrene 
Wisse (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981). Works published prior to 1996 are 
included in Bella Millett’s Annotated Bibliographies of Old and Middle English Literature Volume 
II: “Ancrene Wisse,” The Katherine Group, and the Wooing Group (London: D. S. Brewer, 1996). 
body as a locus of sin, an association that incarnational theology questioned in 
works such as the Psychomachia, but did not eliminate. It is impossible to read 
such works as “Sawles Warde” without experiencing this association anew, yet 
this emphasis on the bodily can draw the attention of present-day readers 
away from the work’s overwhelming emphasis on the soul, that precious thing 
contained within every single human body, even the distractingly vulnerable 
bodies of women. Where scholarly disagreement over writings intended to care 
for medieval women’s souls and bodies has existed, it has centered on what it 
means for a rhetoric concerned with women’s bodies to be used in the spiritual 
address to women: Does it condescend, demean, discipline? Or is it a form of 
affirmation for women’s specific ways of interacting with the bodies they live 
in? What about women’s souls: Given that “the soul” has often been figured as 
female, anima, but that the “rational soul” is necessarily male, animus, what 
can writing intended to teach women about their own souls tell us?
 This chapter does not choose between the options of resistance and recu-
peration so often posed in regard to the works of the Katherine Group and 
Ancrene Wisse as much as examine “Sawles Warde” as a work of sowlehele and 
an allegory that performs the workings of the soul within the self. Near its 
conclusion, “Sawles Warde” gives instructions for its own use: “βus ah mon 
te βenken ofte ant ilome, ant wiδ βulliche βoghtes awecchen his heorte, βe 
i βe slep of gemeles forget hire sawle heale” (106, 33–34).6 In the Millet and 
Wogan-Browne facing-page edition of the poem, these lines are translated: “We 
should all meditate often on this theme, and with such meditations awaken 
our hearts, which in the sleep of heedlessness forget the soul’s salvation.” The 
phrase used by the anonymous author of “Sawles Warde” and translated as 
“the soul’s salvation,” however, is a variant spelling of this study’s organizing 
principle, sowlehele, revealing that this allegory’s didactic project is of a piece 
with that of other works discussed in this study, but in a differently gendered 
mode. Does the allegory of “Sawles Warde” fit with or offer an exception to 
this book’s argument about sowlehele as a pastoral, performative mode whose 
didacticism is somewhat undermined by the exigencies of narrative and of 
gendering allegories?
 A closer look at these lines in context shows that their purpose is to 
describe the usefulness of “Sawles Warde” to its readers. Certainly, that pur-
pose is pastoral: These lines establish the allegory’s purpose through the meta-
phor of awakening the heart from a dangerous sleep. The soul and the heart 
 6. R. M. Wilson also uses the spelling sawle heale (two words) in his edition: The Royal 
manuscript has the line, in his edition, on page 40, lines 387–88, in the Cotton Titus Ms. 381; 
the Bodley manuscript breaks off at line 365, the last two leaves of Bodley 34 being lost. Wilson 
annotates this line only to point out that “hire is the correct form, since sawle is feminine. C his 
shows decay of grammatical gender” (79).
are to be understood as separate from one another, with the heart identified 
as the subject of an action and the soul as that action’s object. A closer look at 
these lines, however, also clearly shows that the allegory’s didacticism is, even 
in these closing lines, inextricably intertwined with the complexities of gen-
dered grammar and figural language, including the inadvertent or deliberate 
use of gender-inflected nouns (discussed in more detail later). In the sentence 
“βus ah mon te βenken ofte ant ilome, ant wiδ βulliche βoghtes awecchen 
his heorte, βe i βe slep of gemeles forget hire sawle heale” (106, 33–34), the 
neutral “mon” is used, and “mon’s” heart is “his heorte”; yet with the thoughts 
that awaken this masculine/neutrally male heart, the man must not become 
too idle to care for the self, a self that is described as “hire sawle.” It is unclear 
whether the feminine pronoun for sawle is a retention of the Old English femi-
nine gender for the word, a way of indicating the plural souls of all readers 
(hire can be a feminine singular or a universal plural, so the author could be 
changing from “his heart” to “their souls”) or a referential switch to point spe-
cifically toward the soul of the anchoress. This confusion of gendered nouns is 
being exploited for rhetorical effect, so that all persons (“mon,” the universal 
masculine) understand that they must meditate and awaken their hearts so 
that they might not forget to heal their souls. What we see in the preceding 
passage may be neither slip nor error, and it cannot be entirely explained as 
an anachronistic cleaving to the Anglo-Saxon tongue. A discussion of gram-
mar in “Sawles Warde” later in this chapter offers evidence for the possibility 
that it is linguistic play. “Sawles Warde” was written at a moment when noun 
gender was both a plaything and a tool for English writers, a possibility for 
creative invention rather than a rule. “Sawles Warde” is explicitly a work of 
sowlehele—it even tells us that sowlehele constitutes its purpose—but it is also 
a work whose plot, characters, and linguistic play complicate the concept’s 
definition.
 As “Sawles Warde” offers sowlehele to its readers, it does so with a spe-
cific twist that distinguishes it from the similar work of Body/Soul debates: 
Instead of avoiding figurations of the female as Middle English works tend to 
do, this one focuses on female figures and addresses its rhetoric to a female 
audience—at least overtly. Does this exception to the observed tendency in 
Middle English works to eliminate the female from within the self prove or 
disprove the existence of that tendency? Reading “Sawles Warde” as a theory 
of the self as female—which, in the allegory, seems to mean that it describes 
a self that needs defending as much as it needs healing—one might suppose 
that it is for women only, segregated from the universal applicability assumed 
in Body/Soul debates. What does it mean if guarding the explicitly female 
soul—as the title of the narrative would have it—is actually a method of sowle-
hele? Certainly, “Sawles Warde” shows us what sowlehele does that faculty 
psychology tends not to do—rather than offering a static self, a self in which all 
the functions are clearly delineated and stable, “Sawles Warde” puts the parts 
of the self that it describes into dialogue. Although the work may have been 
intended for anchoresses, as we shall see, it offers a much broader and more 
provocative view of medieval theories of the self than that seemingly narrow 
audience would imply, just as the enclosed and seemingly circumscribed life of 
the anchoress was supposed to open up onto a larger view of eternity.
Medieval writings for a female readership are frequently addressed to the 
female recluses called anchoresses, a category of women whose religious devo-
tion made them particularly significant. The anchoress is doubly locked in: 
She is locked into her cell, in safe but perhaps occasionally claustrophobic 
enclosure, and she is locked into her female body, inherently sinful within but 
also assailed by temptation to sin further from without. And yet she is a vessel 
capable of withstanding attack from outside, so much so that her real work 
becomes caring for the precious treasure, the soul enclosed by the body. In her 
solitude, she is powerful, but she is also susceptible to error. The anchoress is 
in an extraordinary position, as “anchor” of the church in which she dwells, 
and yet her body, enclosed in its solitary cell, renders literal the metaphor of 
the self enclosed in its prison house of flesh and becomes a figure for any soul’s 
vulnerability, solitude, and need to resist attacks from temptation and sin. 
According to this model of the self, sin is not only or always a slip or malfunc-
tion within; it is also a failure of defenses without.
 The best-known, best-disseminated, and most thoroughly discussed work 
written for female recluses in the thirteenth century is the Ancrene Wisse, 
the “Guide for Anchoresses,” a manuscript accompanied by the works of the 
Katherine Group, including “Sawles Warde” in one of the collections in which 
it appears. The Ancrene Wisse elaborates the spiritual and institutional circum-
stances of a group of enclosed women, ones evidently well-known to the cleri-
cal male author. While much of the prose treatise consists of direct instruction, 
describing what the anchoress ought and ought not do, the seventh chapter is 
an allegory in which the soul is directly figured as a lady who lives “in-with an 
eorthene castel . . . mid hire fan biset al abuten” (“within an earthly castle,” or 
“within a castle made of earthly materials,” who is “beset all around by her ene-
mies”), until she is saved by a “mihti king” who finally dies in the battle against 
her foes.7 At this, the narrator puts the question to us, “Nere theos ilke leafdi of 
 7. Ancrene Wisse, ed. Robert Hasenfratz (Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute Publications, 
uveles cunnes cunde, yef ha over alle thing ne luvede him her-efter?” (“Would 
not this lady be of a foul kind of nature, if she did not love him henceforth over 
everything else?’).8 Because of the thematic and physical relationship between 
the two manuscripts, the scholarship on the Ancrene Wisse sometimes is appli-
cable to “Sawles Warde” as well; “Sawles Warde,” however, considers the idea 
of female selfhood more directly, and thus is more illuminating to my project 
as an example of specifically female sowlehele.
 “Sawles Warde” appears in three manuscripts, always grouped with a series 
of other works also written in West Midlands speech known as the AB dialect, 
the dialect of the Ancrene Wisse, which appears with it in Cotton Titus D 18. 
In addition to this one appearance with the Ancrene Wisse, “Sawles Warde” 
also shares stylistic features with the longer work that sometimes cause critics 
to think they had the same author.9 This group of works associated with the 
Ancrene Wisse is known collectively as the Katherine Group and includes three 
lives of virgin martyrs (Katherine, Margaret, and Juliana), as well as a prose 
discussion of why virginity is preferable to marriage, called “Hali Maiβhad” 
(“A Letter on Virginity” or “Holy Virginity”), and “Sawles Warde.” It has been 
argued that “Sawles Warde” is “the climactic and key work of the group” and 
that this work “is in some ways a precursor to the morality play in its dra-
matization of a struggle between Wit and Will and the parallel psychoma-
chia between virtues and vices.”10 In its three manuscript appearances, “Sawles 
Warde” is placed once at the very beginning (Royal 17 A) and once at the very 
end (Bodley 34) of this grouping, and once at the beginning of the Katherine 
Group but after a copy of Ancrene Wisse (Titus D.18). Critics have speculated 
that these placements mean that the text played the role of a sort of morality 
decoder ring in relation to the mysteries of the Group as a whole. In agreeing 
with this assessment, I understand “Sawles Warde” as a work that tells its read-
ers what they ought to see when they look within, specifying an inner world 
whose dimensions and inhabitants seem, to the work’s author, to be suitable 
for female readers.
 The early thirteenth century, with its efflorescence of writings intended 
to aid the understanding of the self by laypeople and the clergy who minis-
tered to them, saw a great deal of new writing for and about women. Rather 
surprisingly, at about the same time as Middle English allegories turned aside 
2000), pt. 7; 379–80.
 8. Ancrene Wisse, 380.
 9. The manuscripts of the Katherine Group are Ms. Bodley 34, in which “Sawles Warde” 
appears as ff 72r–80v; Ms. Royal 17. A. 27, in which “Sawles Warde” is ff 1r–10v; and Ms. Cotton 
Titus D. 18, with “Sawles Warde” on ff. 105v–112v. 
 10. Diane Mockridge, “The Order of the Texts in the Bodley 34 Manuscript: The Function 
of Repetition and Recall in a Manuscript Addressed to Nuns,” Essays in Medieval Studies 3 
(1986): 207–18.
from the Latin conventions of depicting all abstract concepts as female figures, 
more women began to read in Middle English. Even the metaphors of the self 
as castle or vessel discussed earlier help demonstrate a different way of think-
ing about women in this period: as beings in need of spiritual counsel and as 
objects of psychological inquiry, rather than (no matter how subversively) as 
means to an end for the male narrator seeking self-understanding. This may 
sound like a move toward treating the female as fully human, rather than as 
either superhuman, like Lady Philosophy, or somewhat subhuman, as when 
women are equated with the sinning flesh. However, even as female read-
ers came to be addressed and taken seriously by devotional writings, they 
were subject to a new, more precise and more stringent discipline. Discipline 
becomes a means to the end of female self-making, balancing what we might 
understand as empowerment.
 The Fourth Lateran Council’s call to confession affected women in partic-
ular ways even as it brought about a certain literacy in the language of sin, con-
fession, and penance for all laypersons, regardless of sex or gender. Although 
the dates for “Sawles Warde” and the Katherine Group as a whole cannot be 
established beyond a shadow of a doubt, E. J. Dobson’s article “The Date and 
Composition of Ancrene Wisse” dates that text to at least “after the Lateran 
decrees had become known in England, even possibly after the Council of 
Oxford of 1222.”11 Jacqueline Murray has pointed out that the authors of the 
“Omnis utriusque sexus” decree saw fit to explicitly state that women as well as 
men needed to confess, and notes that “women appear to have developed early 
on a particular affinity for confession and the special relationship which could 
develop between a woman and her confessor has been attested to in the lives 
of many medieval saints and holy women,” while arguing that confessors were 
sometimes less than sympathetic to women’s concerns.12 A work like “Sawles 
Warde,” offering a model of the self as an ordinary household, populated by 
many female figures, would be a useful tool for women thinking about how to 
understand and organize their own confessional narratives of their impulses 
and actions.
 It is possible that “Sawles Warde” should be read as an address from a con-
fessor to a woman or group of women written for precisely such an end. Such 
 11. E. J. Dobson, “The Date and Composition of Ancrene Wisse,” British Academy Gollancz 
Lecture, May 25, 1966. Proceedings of the British Academy 52 (1966): 181–208, 206. See also T. P. 
Dolan, “The Date of Ancrene Wisse: A Corroborative Note,” Notes and Queries NS 21 (1974): 
322–23.
 12. Jacqueline Murray, “The Absent Penitent: The Cure of Women’s Souls and Confessors’ 
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a reading would account for the way the allegory is framed, as the interpreta-
tion of a biblical parable, and it might also account for the first-person plural 
used repeatedly throughout the work: “Ure Lauerd i βe Godspel leareδ us ant 
teacheδ βurh a forbisne hu we ahen wearliche to bitwiten us seoluen wiδ βe 
unwiht of helle” (“Our Lord in the Gospel gives us instruction and teaching 
through a parable on how we should carefully guard ourselves against the 
Devil of hell and his wiles”; 86, 1–2). The allegory addresses a collective or at 
least a pair—a knowledgeable “I” who speaks, joined in fellowship by some 
other who listens.
 That use of the first-person plural is repeated throughout the allegory, 
often pointing out things that the implied audience ought to know about their 
own selves. For instance, the clamor of the senses within us is described as 
something we have no direct access to with our own sense of hearing, but 
that our author knows about and participates in: “βah we hit ne here nawt, we 
mahen felen hare nurδ ant hare untohe bere” (“although we do not hear it, we 
can feel their din and unruly disturbance”; 86, 21–22). The narrator of “Sawles 
Warde” includes himself (or potentially herself) in the meditative task at hand, 
while patiently pointing out something that he thinks his female reader might 
have missed. If the narrator is assumed to be male, a reasonable assumption 
given the learned confessor/penitent relationship being figured here, an obvi-
ous but unanswerable question is posed: Does “Sawles Warde” describe the 
workings of a female self only, or might it also describe the imagined arrange-
ments of the inner world of the narrator/author? Is “Sawles Warde” generaliz-
able as a description of the human, not just female, self?
It seems clear by now that the variable gender of the body and the soul played 
an important role in how medieval authors constructed psychological systems. 
Murray has noted that confessional writings in the Middle Ages aided in the 
development of “a gendered soul; a soul that while perhaps not explicitly sexed 
female nevertheless carried with it the implications of being gendered female 
because it was housed in a female body.”13 Like all the works discussed in this 
book, “Sawles Warde” aims to name the aspects of the self and set them up in 
a hierarchical relationship to one another; it does not only ask after the nature 
of the self; it also describes its moral and physiological impulses, creating tax-
onomies for and relationships between them. Because “Sawles Warde” is not a 
dyadic allegory of Body against Soul, or even of Lady Philosophy instructing 
 13. Murray, “Gendered Souls,” 80.
Boethius, it sets up a series of complicated, multiple relationships, and this sec-
tion looks in turn at a number of these, examining the now-familiar concepts 
of soul and body and will as they are described in “Sawles Warde.”
 The allegory begins by quoting a parable (Matthew 24:43; Luke 12:39): “If 
the head of the household knew at what time a thief would come, he would 
keep watch and not allow his house to be broken into” (87, 1).14 The object 
being defended (“warde,” here in its sense as guard) in the allegory’s title is 
the soul; the body, if present at all, is present as an inanimate architectural 
structure that houses Wit, Will, and the Daughters of God. “Sawles Warde” 
begins by interpreting the biblical parable it started with: “βis hus βe ure Lau-
erd Spekeβ of is seolf βe mon” (“The house which our Lord is talking about 
is man himself ”; 86, 1). This phrase is as close as “Sawles Warde” comes to 
mentioning the role of the body in constituting the self: It is the frame within 
which all the events occur. The choice of phrase used in the allegory’s inter-
pretation of the biblical parable, “seolf the mon,” is surprising, given the female 
orientation of the work that will follow: “Sawles Warde” repeatedly uses “mon” 
(“man”) as its universal, and this use returns a number of times, complicat-
ing from the outset the argument that this work is specific to women’s selves. 
This phrase also makes a point of distinguishing “selfhood” from “soul,” since, 
as will be shown later, though the soul is contained within the house of the 
“seolf,” it is not identical to it in any way.
 Curiously, “Sawles Warde” is an allegory in which both the Soul and Body 
of the debates discussed in previous chapters are silent, having been rendered 
inanimate. The flesh, as the negative aspect of the body, does appear in the 
allegory: It is “flesches licunge” (“physical pleasure”; 96, 7, again on 13), a 
phrase used to designate the kinds of weapons that the Devil might use to 
penetrate the house of the self. Later, virgins are praised as particularly blessed 
because they are capable of overcoming the flesh: “the, libbinde I flesche, ouer-
gath flesches lahe and ouecometh cunde” (“those who, living in the flesh, tran-
scend its law and overcome nature”; 102, 10). Being thus blessed, these virgins 
are in heaven, and among their pleasures is a miraculous new cooperativeness 
of the body: “for hwer se eauer βe gast wule, βe bodi is ananriht wiδute let-
tunge” (“for wherever the spirit may wish to go, the body is at once without 
any delay”; 104, 27–28). Soul and Body, or rather “gast” and “bodi,” are not 
engaged in a debate here: They are, respectively, the innermost and the out-
ermost layers among the onionlike series of concentric circles that constitutes 
this allegory, and as such, they are the objects rather than the speaking subjects 
under discussion.
 14. In Latin, “Si sciret paterfamilias qua hora fur uenturus esset, vigilaret uique et non 
sineret perfodi domum suam.”
 The division of labor within the household (the large middle area between 
the inanimate body that serves as a penetrable barrier to the outside world 
and the soul-as-treasure being guarded at the household’s center) is explained, 
briefly and succinctly, at the allegory’s beginning:
Inwith, βe monnes wit i βis hus is βe huse-lauerd, ant te fulitohe wif mei 
beon Wil ihaten, βat ga βet hus efter hire, ha diht hit al to wundre, bute 
Wit ase laured chasti hire βe betere ant bineome hire ofte muchel of βet ha 
walde.
Inside, man’s reason is master in his house, and Will can be described as 
the unruly wife, who, if the household follows her lead, reduces it to chaos, 
unless Reason as master disciplines her better, and often deprives her of 
much she would like. (86, 8–12) 
 
Since what is within the house includes Wit and Will and (as it turns out in 
the next few lines) a household made up of the senses, it seems that the house 
is the body, the container for all this activity. The soul, it would seem, is split 
into many functions, which might be understood as psychological faculties, 
and the gendering of these faculties establishes both appropriate hierarchy 
(Wit above Will) and the necessity of discipline, or, as the Middle English word 
chasti implies, chastisement.
 The initial phrase, “man’s reason is master in his house,” is identical to 
the Latin source: “pater iste familias animus rationalis potest intellegi.” The 
Middle English “Wit” is a translation of animus (soul, masculine), a noun that 
functions in medieval philosophy as the term for the rational part of the anima 
(soul, feminine). In translating and transforming that source, “Sawles Warde” 
is inconsistent with another work in the Katherine Group, “Hali Maiβhad,” 
in which “Wit” is referred to as “Godes dohter” as part of a discourse about 
the preferability of virginity: “ure licomes lust is tes foendes foster; vre wit 
is Godes dohter, and ba beoth us inwith” (“our physical desire is the Devil’s 
offspring; our reason is God’s daughter; and both are within us”).15 Wit needs 
to be male in “Sawles Warde,” despite this characterization, in part because 
“Sawles Warde” is a translation, and in part because this allegory employs 
a marital hierarchy whereas “Hali Maiβhad” uses a genealogical one. It is, 
however, the Middle English author’s idea to follow this by characterizing the 
Will as the “fulitohe wif ” who reduces the household to “wundre” (86, 9–10). 
The Will is not named as a character, much less as a female character, in the 
Latin original being adapted; there, the household of the self, while headed by 
 15. “Hali Maiβhad,” in Medieval English Prose for Women, 14, lines 4–5.
“animus rationalis,” is an undifferentiated grouping of faculties, “cuius multa 
familia sunt cogitations et motus sui, sensus quoque et actions tam exteriores 
quam interiors” (“whose large family includes thoughts and emotions, sensa-
tions and actions, [which are] exterior as well as interior [in nature]).”16 The 
inclusion of this married pair does not respond to the necessities of faithful 
translation, but rather to the conceptual obligation to counterpoise a (nega-
tive) characterization of marriage to the anchoritic chastity that, elsewhere in 
the Katherine Group, has so clearly been established as the desired and supe-
rior form of life.
 The Latin original posits the interior and exterior forces as an undiffer-
entiated “familia,” but “Sawles Warde” imagines a household with servants 
and masters, reminiscent of (but more multifarious and complex than) the 
domina/ancilla model of the self from “Visio Philiberti.” The servants’ senses 
are torn between obeying master or mistress, but the tendency is for those on 
the outside (the senses) to be described as “under Wit as under house-laured” 
(“under Wit as the Lord of the house”; 86, 17), whereas the inner servants 
seem to lean toward obeying the mistress, Will, since they are described as 
always in the process of trying to please her. It is unclear what aspects of the 
self these inner servants are, since they are never given names, only the quality 
of unruliness described here. Somehow managing to think on their own, how-
ever, the inner servants “thonc to cwemen wel the husewif agein Godes wille” 
(“think to please the housewife against God’s will”; 86, 20). This line brings up 
an additional confusion: Will, the wife, is a character in need of chastisement, 
but “wille” also exists as a quality pertaining to God: “Godes wille” sets itself 
up as the antithesis of the “fulitohe Wil.” At the poem’s end, when Will has 
been thoroughly cowed, the concluding passage sets up her will against her 
husband’s: We ought to act wisely, “nawt efter βat his Wil, βe untohe lefdi, ant 
his lust leareδ, ah efter βat Wit wule, βe wise husebonde” (“not in accordance 
with the instructions of Will, the unruly lady, and our desire, but according to 
what is required by Reason”; 108, 3–5). The translation, in this case, is some-
what deceptive: We are instructed to follow “efter βat Wit wule,” or the Wit’s 
will, a complexly contradictory concept.17 It seems to be impossible to render 
“will” as entirely negative, much as the allegory establishes the necessity for 
its chastisement and control; this, too, may be a function of grammar and of 
grammatical play, in its capacity to serve and undermine didactic narratives in 
 16. Southern and Schmitt, eds., Memorials of St. Anselm, 355.
 17. In “Hali Maiβhad,” “will” is also used as a figure for sexuality, as part of a warning 
to women about the demands of the marriage bond: “heo schal his wil muchel hire unwil 
drehen . . . nomeliche i bedde he schal, wulle ha, nulle ha, βlien ham alle” (“she must often 
submit to his will much against her own will . . . especially in bed she must put up with all his 
indecencies, whether she wants to or not”). “Hali Maiβhad,” 28, lines 10, 14–15.
unexpected ways. “Will” is just too necessary a word in the English language, 
it serves too many functions, to be completely possessed by the willful house-
wife.
 The presence of Will as a character in the allegory stands out against the 
prolonged conceptual silence about the will in debates between the Body and 
the Soul, a silence we might understand anew through the word’s contradic-
tory uses in “Sawles Warde.” Since will is a faculty just as frequently gendered 
feminine as is the concept of embodiment, it is unsurprising that the psycho-
logical allegory about and for women would be the one that contains Will the 
wife. The association of women with willfulness in “Sawles Warde” parallels 
and perhaps replaces the common connection of women with the bodily. It is 
quite clear that medieval women are understood as more thoroughly embodied 
than medieval men, and that what is meant by “embodied” somehow encom-
passes the troublesomeness of sexual desire, that which allegories featuring 
same-sex pairings of forces seem to be trying to circumvent (only to end up 
with homosocial affection as its replacement). Ruth Mazo Karras’s study of 
John of Bromyard’s Summa Predicantium and Jacqueline Murray’s more gen-
eral examination of confessors’ manuals point out that women appear in such 
manuals mostly—almost exclusively—in relationship to sexual sins.18 Perhaps 
because of the presence of Will the wife as the most feminine of female person-
ifications in the allegory, the abstract body, bodiliness as such, seems strangely 
irrelevant. The role previously granted the Body of Body/Soul debates has 
been shifted over to Will and gendered feminine, but just as “the body” could 
not, for fear of falling into heretical dualism, be portrayed as pure evil, a free 
“will” is just too important, as an English word and as a philosophical concept, 
to pertain solely to a female part of the self. In this allegory’s explicit consider-
ation of its place, however, “will” and its necessary counterpart “wit” are both 
located outside (even if beside) the soul.
 The Wit/Will pairing functions as a composite of what, in other allegories, 
might be considered the soul; their conflict is being described as that which 
guides human action. They are the married pair at the head of the household, 
ruling the senses and playing host to the Daughters of God. But neither Wit 
nor Will nor their servants actually constitute the soul as such, and it is not 
they who need “warde,” the defending of the allegory’s title. Contained inside 
the house, a core around which the rest of the narrative revolves, the soul lies 
silent and inanimate, the English allegory’s still center; there is no parallel 
discussion of the soul in the Latin source.19 It is an object to be purchased as 
 18. Ruth Mazo Karras, “Gendered Sin and Misogyny in John of Bromyard’s Summa Predi-
cantium,” Traditio 47 (1992): 233–58; Murray, “Gendered Souls.”
 19. Julie Hassel has also pointed out that this is a difference between the Latin and the Eng-
lish texts: in the Latin, “what it is that the household is protecting is never named.” Julie Hassel, 
well as a treasure to be guarded: “βe tresor βet Godd Zef himseolf fore, βet 
is, monnnes sawle” (“the treasure for which God gave himself—that is, man’s 
soul”; 86, 87, 26). In the very next line, the value of the treasure is correlated 
with the price paid for it: The thieves are trying to get access to the treasure 
“that Godd bohte mid his deaδ and lette life o rode” (“which God bought with 
his death and for which he gave up his life on the cross”; 86, 28–29). The soul 
has a price, and that price has been paid; it is an object whose value is known, 
but its essence is otherwise outside the discussion at hand.
 The soul is an object of exchange and an object to be defended, but it does 
not have a speaking part. Instead, it works as a kind of surplus or excess. The 
body of “Sawles Warde” turns out to be an inanimate container, simplifying 
greatly all the complexities of the speaking body of Body/Soul debate, and, 
as it turns out, the soul, too, becomes a silent and inanimate quality. For it to 
be guarded as a treasure by them, it must not be composed of Wit, Will, the 
senses, or even the qualities of Strength, Justice, and so on, who inhabit the 
house of the “seolf.” It is radically other, deprived of a knowable personality, 
mysterious and strange, and its precise nature is left undetermined. The lan-
guage of guarding the soul-as-treasure sounds a great deal like the language of 
defending a woman’s virginity, as when, in the Ancrene Wisse, virginity is com-
pared to a balsam carried in a fragile vessel.20 Rather than speaking, fighting, 
loving, and regretting, as the souls discussed throughout this study, the soul of 
“Sawles Warde” is a passive thing to be defended, as unknowable as balsam.
The Latin work that served as the source for “Sawles Warde,” “De Custodia 
Interioris Hominis,” was not necessarily written with the confessional subject 
in mind, but its Middle English revision evidences a strong rhetorical reori-
entation of the text in the direction of explaining the female self to itself. The 
differences between the Latin “original” and its reworking run fairly deep. To 
recapitulate: In the “De Custodia,” although the narrative also centers on a 
household led by Animus Rationalis, there is no wife, much less a wife named 
Will, to contend with. The Daughters of God are not named as allegorical 
figures in the Latin; they are merely listed as presences within the self, without 
the genealogical detail. The soul is not named as an object to be defended, and 
ought not be, since animus rationalis is the term for Wit: The protected object 
Choosing Not to Marry: Women and Autonomy in the Katherine Group (New York: Routledge, 
2002), 88.
 20. For a useful analysis of the language of chastity in the Ancrene Wisse, see Wogan-
Browne, “Chaste Bodies.”
of “De Custodia” is the entirety of the house of the self, which might be the 
reason why the household section is far briefer in Latin. The English author 
interjected the responses of the listeners into the accounts of both Fear and 
Love of Life, deepening the characterizations given to the Daughters of God 
(since each responds very much in character), and there is also an expanded 
section praising the joys of virgins in heaven, which seems intended to solicit 
the attention and joyful sympathy of its intended audience of female religious, 
and a consequent diminution of discussions about the similar joy of virtuous 
monks from the Latin original.
 Many of the differences between “source” and “reworking” can be explained 
by the fact that the assumed audience of “Sawles Warde” was religious women 
and the intended audience of the Pseudo-Anselmian homily can be presumed 
to be clerical and male. The presence of a female character named Will clearly 
references common misogynist stereotypes about willful wives. Including the 
badly behaved female will as a character within the narrative invites a kind 
of negative identification, a dark mirror for women to see into and perhaps 
recognize or maybe mis-recognize themselves: Either way, description, forma-
tion, and, more than that, interpellation are taking place. “Sawles Warde,” as 
an adaptation of “De Custodia Interioris Hominis,” does this: It genders the 
rhetoric of the text, a text that had previously been vaguely universal, gender- 
neutral. What difference does Englishing the Latin homily make? Was the 
Latin homily also a work of sowlehele? It had the homiletic drive to first anato-
mize and then offer moral meanings to the self ’s parts, but it lacks the devel-
oped narrative and the even more developed allegorical qualities of the Middle 
English adaptation.
 The strength of the Middle English revision’s rewriting is particularly evi-
dent with an eye to Dan Michel of Northgate’s detailed exposition on the sins, 
the Ayenbite of Inwit, which also contains, at the end, a translation of “De 
Custodia Interioris Hominis.” Dan Michel did not seem aware of the existence 
of “Sawles Warde” when he was translating the Latin work into his Kentish 
dialect, but his taxonomy of sin is explicitly intended for a somewhat similar 
purpose: “uor enlisse men, that hi wyte hou hi ssole ham-zelue ssriue, and 
maki ham kelne” (“for English men, that they may shrive and make clean their 
own souls”).21 Any consideration of the post–Lateran IV project of producing 
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works to instruct layfolk in the care of their own souls would list the Ayenbite 
of Inwit as an example, although it lacks the narrative interest (and popu-
larity) of, for instance, the far more popular Pricke of Conscience. However, 
neither “De Custodia” nor the Ayenbite’s version of the story goes about its 
project of sowlehele in as dynamic and interesting a manner as does “Sawles 
Warde,” and neither work deviates from the male-as-universal thinking that 
has already been discussed in previous chapters of this study. “De Custodia 
Interioris Hominis” is a homily that happens to be open to transformation into 
“Sawles Warde,” an immanent theory of the female self. It is also open to faith-
ful translation by Dan Michel and, in that translation, becoming vernacular, 
remaining pastoral and didactic, but not becoming a narrative capable of hav-
ing its didacticism complicated by its own story and characters. Dan Michel’s 
translation, though clearly intended for ministering to the soul, is not a work 
of sowlehele in the specific ways the term is being used within the present 
study.
 However intimate its ties with its Latin source, “Sawles Warde” marks an 
interesting point where the cultural moment that produces sowlehele inter-
sects with another development that affects English literature and the culture 
of Britain: the disappearance of arbitrary noun gender from English. In that 
respect, translating the Pseudo-Anselmian homily into English permitted the 
translator to take liberties with the flexible tools of a language in transition and 
to create a genuinely new work (liberties that the Ayenbite of Inwit simply did 
not choose to take with the same source).
 Although the English Body/Soul debates, apparently also written in the 
West Midlands, seem to use the elimination of arbitrary noun gender as a way 
of rewriting the conventional relationship of soul and body in the language 
of brotherhood or pedagogy, turning them into dramas about male beings, 
“Sawles Warde” is very clearly a drama about the relationship between female 
beings. This is not exclusively a choice played out at the level of allegorical 
narrative: “Sawles Warde” also bears traces of noun gender, as if some aspect 
of gendering inanimate or conceptual beings as female or male is retained 
despite the changes wrought in the language between the linguistic periods 
that we understand by the terms Old and Middle English. Interestingly, the 
author of “Sawles Warde” skews noun gender considerably in the direction of 
the feminine. There are many reasons why this choice might not have been a 
choice at all, but rather a set of mistakes or carelessness about language by the 
author of “Sawles Warde.” The retention of certain aspects of arbitrary noun 
gender may also serve the purposes of this author in his or her rewriting of 
Pseudo-Anselm’s homily into an allegorical story.
 Words that have no particular gender connotation in modern English 
appear in “Sawles Warde” as feminine-gendered nouns. For instance, the 
house that the thief might break into—despite the fact that “hus” (house) is 
actually neuter in Old English—is referred to as “hire” [her] house. The lan-
guage of “breaking into” a woman is, obviously, far from neutral, and indeed 
evokes a particular kind of violence that can threaten the holy woman as ves-
sel: rape. Wilson, the editor of “Sawles Warde,” notes that this “error” appears 
in all of the manuscripts, and points out that this “hire” might be a reference 
to “sawle,” a feminine noun in Anglo-Saxon, exiting the allegory in order to 
refer to the “real” thing that the allegory describes.22 Death is also referred to 
as “she,” as in “cume Deaδ hwen ha wule, ne βurue we nowδer beon ofdred for 
hire ne for helle, for ure deaδ biδ deore Godd, ant ingong into heouene” (“let 
Death come when she will; we need not be afraid either or her or of hell, for 
our death will be precious to God, and our entrance into heaven”; 94, 19–20).23 
According to R. M. Wilson, although “death” in Old English is masculine, it 
occasionally appears as feminine in the Katherine Group, possibly because 
mors in Latin and mort in French are feminine. The grammatical rules of Latin 
and Romance languages accounted for how abstractions such as death were 
gendered in allegories written in those languages, but there is no clear reason 
to return to the Old English noun gender here, except as a reinforcement of 
the allegory’s rhetoric of being directed to a female audience and creating a 
female-centered world to do so effectively.
 The influence of Latin noun gender on English writing is very clear, and 
other critics have noted that English authors have struggled with whether 
to retain conventional allegorical female gender for personified abstractions. 
Since abstract nouns are feminine in Latin, this has been all the explanation 
most theories give for the prevalence of powerful female allegorical figures in 
medieval writing. Both Ratio and Voluntas are feminine nouns in Latin, which 
the Pseudo-Anselmian dialogue avoids only by placing an Animus (mascu-
line) that is only modified by “rationalis,” ratio in its adjectival form compelled 
to agree with its noun, as the central inhabitant and pater familias of his alle-
gory. The author of “Sawles Warde” inserted the plot about the willful wife 
rather than translating it from the source, so there the allegory is not drawing 
on its source’s use of Latin gender. In Old English, both wif and will are neuter 
nouns, which means that our English author had to make a real choice to ren-
 22. In “Hali Maiβhad,” the word flesch (neuter in Old English) is also referred to as “she.”
 23. “OE [Old English] ‘death’ is masc. But it occurs occasionally in our group as feminine. 
It is to be noted that both L. mors and Fr. mort are feminine and where the genders of nouns 
are discernible and yet different from those of OE, they seem to follow Latin or French. This 
change of gender in our group is hardly due directly to the influence of the Latin original—the 
above sentence does not occur in the Latin of St. Victor—since it is found also in AW [Ancrene 
Wisse], which is usually allowed to have been composed originally in English. Such confusion 
of gender, if due to the influence of Latin or French, is more probably a reflection of the general 
influence of a knowledge of these languages” (Wilson, “Sawles Warde,” 62, note on line 157).
der them as women, remaking what was neuter in Old English into gendered 
personification.
 The idea of woman as passive doesn’t work if Will is a woman, or even if 
Philosophy is (as I have argued elsewhere). These different choices about Eng-
lish grammatical gender create sexual difference in the Latin homily, where 
there had been none. If “woman” is not fully passive, there is a contradic-
tion immediately within the walls of the house of the self. Although there is 
no tradition that follows “Sawles Warde” in coding Will as feminine per se, 
after “Sawles Warde” it becomes implicated in gender (masculine as well as 
feminine) in a new way: Will becomes part of the process of making gender 
as such.24 Though I would insist that this move is significant, I must empha-
size that it is not necessarily progressive. “Sawles Warde” is, after all, about 
how best to keep the willful wife from misbehaving and how best to keep the 
feminine aspect of the self appropriately imprisoned. This is the contradic-
tion at the heart of “Sawles Warde” as a work of sowlehele for and/or about 
women: It is simultaneously repressive and subversive. At its most basic level, 
it retains and brings forward the powerful female figures that had character-
ized Latin allegorical writings, making them useful to a different psychologi-
cal project from that of Prudentius or Boethius, updating allegory for a new 
age of self-knowledge—an age of sowlehele, for men and, in “Sawles Warde,” 
for women.
The arrangement of the self as described in “Sawles Warde” draws a great 
deal from faculty psychology. Both wit and will are faculties in most of the 
available schemas, and the division of the senses, who function as servants in 
the allegory, also resembles the workings of faculty psychology. The allegory, 
however, translated faculty psychology into a psychology for women. As we 
have seen, the allegory’s author/translator/adapter takes up the conventions of 
Latin and Anglo-Saxon grammar and selects among them for his or her own 
purposes. At the level of narrative, the allegory does something similar: It 
uses the understood conventions of Boethian allegory, those powerful female 
personifications who instruct the hapless narrator, and combines them with 
the later medieval reimagining of the psychomachia, or sowlehele, by naming 
aspects of the self and showing them locked together in an ambivalent mixture 
of antagonism and love. “Sawles Warde” stages an encounter between Wit and 
 24. See “The Conflict of Wit and Will,” also edited by R. M. Wilson, in the same Leeds 
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Will as a married pair with the theological allegory of the Four Daughters of 
God, and involves the whole group in a dynamic narrative concerned with 
futurity and the temporality of sin and confession.
 The presence of the Daughters of God within the household of the self 
transforms the relationships within it. These personified figures, a return to 
the “allegorical goddesses” discussed in chapter 1, are a fairly common medi-
eval trope, apparently derived from Psalm 85 (Psalm 84 in the Vulgate Bible).25 
They are usually referred to collectively as the Four Daughters of God, which 
appear in Robert Grosseteste’s Anglo-Norman allegory the Chateau d’Amour, 
in late-fourteenth-century Piers Plowman, and in the fifteenth-century play 
The Castle of Perseverance. The group normally designated as “God’s Daugh-
ters” are Mercy, Truth, Justice, and Peace, although, in “Sawles Warde,” they 
are, instead, the cardinal virtues: Prudence, Fortitude, Temperance, and Jus-
tice, this last being the only virtue repeated in both quartets.26 To render them 
as “daughters” highlights their alignment with religious women as well as their 
unmarried state.
 The Four Daughters of “Sawles Warde” are a harsher, tougher bunch than 
the original sisters of the Vulgate Bible’s Psalm 84: Peace might not have been 
 25. Hope Emily Traver, who wrote the most extensive studies to date about the Four Daugh-
ters of God trope, credits this interpretation of the psalm as allegory to a fifth-century Hebrew 
Midrash, in which a parable is linked with this psalm. In the parable, when God wants to create 
Adam but asks the counsel of his angels, Love and Justice (here, apparently angels rather than 
abstractions) speak for the creation of Man, and Truth and Peace speak against. See Hope Emily 
Traver, “The Four Daughters of God: A Mirror of Changing Doctrine,” in PMLA 40: 1 (1925): 
48. See also Traver’s monograph, The Four Daughters of God, Bryn Mawr Monographs 6 (1907). 
This is obviously rather outdated research, but it has not yet been superseded by any more re-
cent study focusing on the doctrinal genealogy of the Daughters trope. Mary Immaculate Creek 
argued that the trope is, instead, derived from a sermon on the Annunciation by St. Bernard, in 
“The Four Daughters of God in the Gesta Romanorum and the Court of Sapience,” PMLA 57: 4 
(1942): 951–65. The sermon in question is edited as “In annuntiatione Dominica Sermo Primus,” 
in S. Bernardi: Opera, ed. J. Leclercq and M. Rochais (Rome: Editiones Cistercienses, 1968), V. 
13–39. This trope makes several important appearances in medieval literature generally, and in 
Middle English literature specifically, including the Latin prose Rex et Famulus, which may have 
influenced Grosseteste’s Anglo-Norman allegory Chateau d’Amour. Both circulated in England, 
and at least the latter was translated into Middle English several times. In addition, there is the 
anonymous De Salvatione Hominis Dialogus and the Vie de Tobie of Guillaume Le Clerc. The 
Daughters of God trope is genuinely ubiquitous and cross-generic. But it is more than a single 
continuous trope or motif. In the course of its theological and literary history, it undergoes a 
significant shift: from being an origin-tale about how God decided to create man to a debate 
about the nature of the law (Old to New).
 26. In the NRSV (which is, of course, postmedieval): “Steadfast love and faithfulness will 
meet; righteousness and peace will kiss each other,” translating, from the Vulgate, “Misericordia 
et veritas obviaverunt sibi; justitia et pax osculatae sunt.” The part where Mercy and Truth are 
met, in Latin “obviaverunt sibi,” has frequently been interpreted as something other than a neu-
tral meeting, but rather as strife, followed by the reconciliation of the kiss between Righteous-
ness (Justice) and Peace.
able to put up much of a fight against thieves trying to steal the soul under 
her guard, but Fortitude (Gastelich Strengβe), the virtue that takes her place 
in “Sawles Warde,” has no trouble doing so, particularly since, with the adjec-
tival specification that her “strength” is of a “gastliche” nature, she represents 
an almost physical toughness pertaining to the spirit. “Gast” signifies a kind 
of embodied power of soul last seen, in its inverse, when the Souls of “In a 
Thestri Stude I Stod” and “Als I Lay in a Winteris Nyt” were being described 
as physically suffering at the hands of demons from hell. In “Sawles Warde,” 
the strength of the “gast” lies in its ability to defend the “soul.” The conceptual 
split implied here produces the soul as an inanimate object (a treasure to be 
guarded) shut away and inaccessible, to some degree, even to the soul’s owner, 
who must defend it without actually interacting with it as one interacts with 
a personification. “Gastelich Strengβe,” on the other hand, is a quality on loan 
from God; Wit thanks God with “glead heorte of se riche lane as beoδ βeos 
sustren, his fowr dehtren, βat he haueδ ileanet him on helpe for te wite wel ant 
werien his castel” (“with very glad heart for such a rich loan as these sisters 
are, the four daughters of God, whom he has lent him as a help to guard and 
defend his castle well”; 98, 6). The silent soul to be guarded in “Sawles Warde” 
had been bought by Christ’s death; “Gastelich Strengβe” was lent, so while 
both seem to be exchangeable objects, the latter is less firmly in the posses-
sion of the human self (“seolf the mon”) and perhaps thereby more capable of 
functioning as a personification, of speaking and taking action.
 The sort of female experience being taken up in the rhetorical force of the 
revisions made to “Sawles Warde” in turning it from a Latin homily into an 
English allegory calls on the anchoress to choose sides between two discursive 
constructions of femininity.27 This is not a new argument: Anne Eggebro-
ten has argued quite persuasively that the central conflict of the text is actu-
ally between the wife, Will, and the virgins, the Daughters of God, a conflict 
between marriage and virginity that is rendered very clearly in other works 
within the Katherine Group. Instead of the Latin version’s emphasis on a single 
pater familias ruling over unruly senses, the English version’s addition of a 
married woman, Will, offers the anchoress-as-presumed-reader a negative 
example (marriage and willfulness), which even a male or married female 
 27. See “Sawles Warde: A Retelling of De Anima for a Female Audience,” Mediavalia 
10 (1984): 27–47. Eggrebroten connects “Sawles Warde” directly to the literary tradition of 
Prudentius’ Psychomachia and argues that a major difference between the Latin “De Custodia 
Interioris Hominis” (which she identifies as by Hugh of St. Victor and titled De Anima, an at-
tribution that has since been strongly disputed) and “Sawles Warde” is the rich characterization 
given to the Four Daughters of God, connecting this with the parable of the wise and foolish 
virgins in Matthew 25: 1–13. Eggebroten’s main point is that “the real struggle [of the allegory] 
is between ‘fulitohe wil’ (the poorly disciplined will) and the four holy virtues” (Eggebroten, “A 
Retelling of De Anima,” 36).
reader would recognize as “bad” in the context given—even a married woman 
would, presumably, have an anxious time comparing her own behavior in her 
household with that of Will the unruly wife. The reader is invited to dis-iden-
tify from the married woman and choose something other than the push-and-
pull of the heterosexual marriage bond between Wit and Will.
 This, then, is the topography of the self that “Sawles Warde” offers us, and 
the anchoress, as a guide to the soul’s navigation and its eventual conquest by 
faith—a theme that appears again and again in the writings of the Katherine 
Group and in Ancrene Wisse, particularly in the allegory of its Book Seven. 
For all its complexity, the description of all these different powers balancing 
against one another in joint guardianship over the soul initially seems quite 
static. Like the maps of different faculties in Aristotle and his commentators, 
they seem to simply label the various forces that, together, make up the self. 
But in the course of “Sawles Warde,” the allegorical household experiences 
events that both interrupt and influence the routine of its inhabitants (I dis-
cuss the temporal disruption occasioned by these visits later). These events 
do not ever quite make the work a debate, as the poems discussed in previous 
chapters, but they do keep it from becoming only and always an enumeration 
of the self ’s contents.
 The allegory’s main action describes visitors who come into the house 
of the self: Fearlac (Fear) describes in gory detail the suffering of hell; Liues 
Luue (Love of Life) describes the joys of heaven. As Fearlac begins his speech, 
he tells the story of Death’s coming (while Fearlac is clearly a male messen-
ger, Death is “she” in this allegory): She brings with her “βusent deoflent, ant 
euchan bereδ a gret boc al of sunnen iwriten wiδ swearte smeale leattres” 
(“a thousand devils, and each one carries a great book written all over with 
sins in small black letters”; 90, 10–11). The “gret boc” of this description may 
resemble the very book that the reader finds before her, or remind her of other 
books she has read that enumerate the sins and their remedies.
 The devils might be said to carry books of soul injury, along with a chain 
to bind and drag those whose sins, listed in that book, show that they should 
be taken to hell:
hwuch se he mei preouin βurh his boc, βat is on euch sunne enbreuet, βat 
he wiδ wil oδer wiδ word oδer wiδ werc wrahte in all his lifsiδe, bute βat he 
haueδ ibet earβon wiδ soδ schrift and wiδ deadbote.
whoever he is able to convict with his book, which contains a record of 
every sin which that man committed in thought, word, or deed throughout 
his life, unless he has atoned for it before that time with true confession and 
penance. (90, 12–14)
These are the kinds of injunctions the Fourth Lateran Council endorses, and 
this allegory most obviously strives to be the kind of work that reminds its 
readers to atone, confess, and do penance: sowlehele, as always, under threat 
of eternal punishment.
 When, having been frightened by Fearlac’s speech, the Four Daughters of 
God talk about steps they will take to defend the household that is man’s self, 
each speaks in character: Warschipe (Prudence) fearfully prays to God and 
hopes to do well but fears the devil. Gastelich Strengβe does not fear the devil, 
but fears temptation, which is not her forte. Meaβ (Temperance) says that they 
ought to fear both the “hard” force of the devil and the “soft” force of tempta-
tion and find a middle way between them. Rihtwisnesse (Justice) sums up her 
sisters’ conclusions and fears and adds remarks of her own. Her job is to pass 
judgment, and therefore she judges that:
Nu isriht, βenne, βet we demen us seolf eauer unmihtie to werien ant to 
witen us oδer ei god to halden wiδoute Godes helpe. βe rihtwise Godd wule 
βat we demen us seolf eδeliche ant lahe, ne beo we neauer swucche, for 
βenne demδ he us much wurδ, ant gode, ant half for his dehtren.
Now it is right, therefore, that we should always judge ourselves helpless 
to defend and protect ourselves or maintain any virtue without God’s help. 
God, who is righteous, wishes that we should judge ourselves to be worth-
less and low, even if we are not, for then he judges us to be of great merit, 
and virtuous, and regards us as his daughters. (96, 30–34)
As the one personification present in traditional allegories of the Four Daugh-
ters of God as well as in “Sawles Warde,” Justice is particularly significant to 
this kind of allegory. This study’s first chapter discussed Angus Fletcher’s and 
Gordon Teskey’s writings on allegory concerning the problems with an alle-
gorical figure of Justice and considered how such a figure might be incapable 
of taking the contingency and humanity of actions into account and opt for 
an intolerable rule by absolutes. Here, Justice has said that it is right for “us” 
to misjudge ourselves, to be unjust, ordering that “we” should judge ourselves 
incorrectly. She has said that “ne beo we neauer swucche” (“even if we are not”) 
weak, God wants us to misjudge our own powers, and, if we do so, we will earn 
the right to be God’s Daughters, like Prudence and Justice and the rest. This 
is an aspect of sowlehele not encountered in the other works discussed in this 
study, a demand for humility (even at the cost of untruth) that seems to be 
directed toward reminding women to be particularly humble. The reason we 
ought to do so is that a “rihtwise Godd” (“righteous God”; the word is similar 
to the Middle English name borne by Justice, Rihtwisnesse) wills it thus. Given 
how negatively the female will has been viewed from the very beginning of 
this allegory, how strange that what God wills is this mild form of injustice, 
the pretense of weakness in his own daughters, even though the Daughters of 
God are clearly shown as quite able to protect the house of man’s self. Is the 
allegorical character, here, undermining her own named nature, or pointing 
to a deeper (but more arbitrary) conception of justice? (Is it only women who 
are being told to underestimate themselves, and are we still reaping the effects 
of such a mindset?) This might be an instance of that very phenomenon dis-
cussed in chapter 1, an allegorical personification taking the freedom to be 
other than what she is: Justice advocating an injustice—although, of course, 
this injustice is the recommendation to be humble instead of proud.
 At its ending, the authoritative voice returns to sum up what ought to 
have been learned and informs us that “βus ah mon te βenken ofte ant ilome, 
ant wiδ βulliche βoghtes awecchen his heorte, βe i βe slep of gemeles forget 
hire sawle heale” (“We should all meditate often on this theme, and with such 
meditations awaken our hearts, which in the sleep of heedlessness forget the 
soul’s salvation”; 106, 33–34). The use of “sawle heale” (here, because of the 
vagaries of Middle English spelling, two words spelled somewhat differently) 
may indicate that sowlehele is the goal of “Sawles Warde.”28 However, that gen-
eral, universal goal is complicated by the allegory’s address to women, and 
“warde” replaces “heale” as the dominant term.
 The word warde in the allegory’s title has a range of meanings: According 
to the Middle English Dictionary (MED), it can mean the relatively neutral 
“safekeeping” or the more affect-laden “anxious regard, concern, dread” and 
even “custody, confinement, house arrest, imprisonment.” It can mean guard-
ianship in the sense that a child or a woman might be considered “wards,” 
even in modern parlance, and while the MED does not clearly state which of 
these meanings might apply to “Sawles Warde,” the allegory is used as a sup-
porting example for warde in the sense of “the action of guarding . . . also, a 
period of keeping watch.”29 The warde in “Sawles Warde” characterizes the self 
 28. According to Wilson, the title “Sawles Warde” “occurs only in the B[odley 34] Ms. In 
R[oyal] and C[otton Titus], no title is given and the scribe has started with the text of the hom-
ily.” Wilson, xxxii.
 29. The full MED set of definitions for warde in slightly abbreviated form: “1a.(a) Keeping, 
care, custodial possession; safekeeping, (b) control, rule; stewardship, supervision [occas. dif-
ficult to distinguish from (a) and vice versa]; . . . (c) anxious regard, concern; dread, fear; (d) in 
prep. phrases used adjectivally: [ . . . ] orderly, well-behaved; . . . hard to maintain or control; not 
of [ . . . ] of knights in battle: in disorder or disarray [ . . . ] 1b.(a) The action of guarding, keep-
ing watch; watchfulness, vigilance; also, a period of keeping watch or guarding, a watch; also 
in fig. Context [ . . . ] (b) custody, confinement; house arrest; imprisonment [occas. difficult to 
distinguish from sense 3.(d)] [ . . . ]1c.(a) Formal guardianship of a child, minor, or other such 
person; also, responsibility for raising and training a young person, tutelage; in ~;(b) control, 
or the right of control, of the property, with its revenues, of a deceased tenant, often implying 
it describes in a paranoid manner, as always awaiting attack, and as a series 
of layers to be peeled back or penetrated in order to reach the treasure of the 
soul at its center; the point of the watch-keeping period it describes is that it 
does not, ought not, end during the lifetime of the allegory’s addressee. Some-
where in the tension between “warde” and “heale” lies the specificity of this 
allegory: Women’s souls are more apt to need protection from invasion by sin, 
making use of a chastity model, rather than subjected to discipline, as in the 
teacher/student model that dominated allegories about the soul from Boethius 
through Hildebert of Lavardin and “Als I Lay in a Winteris Nyt.”
“Sawles Warde” brings together the famously static aspects of allegory, its 
capacity to serve as a kind of anatomical or genealogical chart—here is the 
will, represented through its marriage with wit—with a more dynamic nar-
rative. In this work, the care for the self is figured through an allegory about 
kinship and gender dominance; a struggle for power enters into the time of 
the self. This may be why the work contains odd temporal markers, moments 
when the eternal present of the self ’s inner landscape (a static model) gives 
way to narrative, to event. Ruth Evans, among others, has noted the odd tem-
poral quality of virginity as a category in the Middle Ages. In addition to offer-
ing at least a “fantasy of escape from the human condition,” she writes, “the 
strange temporality of virginity shakes the foundations of linear chronology, 
calling into question the properties of ‘before’ and ‘after.’”30 The allegory of 
“Sawles Warde,” with its presumed address to virgins, literal or figurative, has a 
complex relationship with time, in ways both similar to and different from the 
kind of time depicted in Body/Soul debates discussed in previous chapters.
 Following the description of the Daughters of God in “Sawles Warde,” 
something very odd happens to the story. This is approximately fifty lines into 
the text, and the set-up (house, wife and husband, and servants, Daughters of 
God) seems essentially stable. The content of the self has been described, and 
guardianship of the minor heir; also, the revenues derived from the heir’s holdings during such 
guardianship; ?also, control of properties and revenues by knight service; ~ and mariage; ~ mar-
iage, the right to exact a levy upon the marriage of a minor or other dependent, or the revenue 
thus derived; (c) a child, minor, or other person under the tutelage or formal guardianship of 
another; a person under the care or control of another; ?also, the subject or vassal of a ruler. 
2. A behest, command; a charge, responsibility. 3.(a) A guarded or fortified area, stronghold; a 
guarded or secured section of a castle; a guard post; also, a fortified encampment; a siege forti-
fication; also in fig. context 4.(a) A body of guards, an armed guard.”
 30. Ruth Evans, “Virginities,” The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Women’s Writing, ed. 
Carolyn Dinshaw and David Wallace (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 27.
although it seems clear that Wit and Will are engaged in a continual power 
struggle, rather than narrating any particular moment of struggle, the allegory 
has depicted the way in which the presence of the Daughters of God frighten 
the members of the household into obedience. Just as it seems that the con-
tents of the self have been adequately described, the allegory turns: “As βis is 
ido βus, ant is al stille βrinne . . .” (“When this has been completed and all is 
quiet inside . . .”; 88, 25).31 Suddenly, the temporal signature of the allegory 
shifts away from the eternal present as Time itself seems to enter the scene, in 
the guise of two messengers warning of the self ’s future. It quickly becomes 
clear that the allegory’s first fifty lines (expanded from approximately twenty-
five in the Latin original) had been a task waiting to be completed in order 
for the future to enter the allegorical scene. This is the moment when Fearlac 
(Fear), who has been to hell, arrives to narrate for the household just what 
happens there to badly guarded souls.
 Here, in a tiny throwaway moment, is something really crucial about what 
works of sowlehele can do, with their narrative dynamism and their conse-
quent implication in cause-and-effect temporalities. Rather than offering a 
completely static self, a self in which all the functions are clearly delineated 
and stable, “Sawles Warde” begins with a description of what the parts of the 
self might be, engages those parts in a dialogue with their own future, and 
then puts them into dialogue with each other. This allegorical shift through 
time in turn proves capable of influencing the distribution of powers within 
that initially static self. No matter that this future, described by Fearlac in the 
lines that follow, could potentially be one of hellish torment (or, as the next 
messenger, Love of Life, tells the ladies when he appears, it could be a heav-
enly reward for all the travails of virginity). What is most important is that 
this self contains its own dynamism. “As this is all done,” the text tells us, as if 
the self has just been adequately arranged and put away for the night through 
the allegorical description that we have been reading for fifty lines, “and all 
is still inside,” and then Fear enters in, and with Fear enters Time. The verb 
tenses shift: It is suddenly noticeable that the allegory had, to this point, been 
written in the present tense, because Fearlac’s and Liues Luue’s tales of visits 
to hell and heaven (which are related to the possible futures of the self being 
depicted in “Sawles Warde”) are narrated in the past, but depict the self ’s pos-
sible futures.
 There is some argument among the Daughters of God as to whether both 
visitors can be present within the self. In the aftermath of Fearlac’s speech, Will 
is already utterly cowed (“βe willesfule huswife halt hire al stille,” or “the will-
 31. In Latin, “His ita dispositis . . . aliquos debet Prudentia introducere nuntios.” R. W. 
Southern and F. S. Schmitt, eds., Memorials of St. Anselm in Auctores britannici medii aevi 
(London: Oxford University Press for the British Academy, 1969), 356.
full housewife remains quite silent”; 98, 9), so the goal of frightening the self 
into proper behavior is already accomplished. Rihtwisnesse (Justice) argues 
that it is not right for the house to hold both, since Love of Life should, liter-
ally, cast out Fear when he arrives. This view of what comes into the self, fear 
and joy, is about futurity, since both of the messengers bear tales of what will 
happen after death.
 In an article about the Katherine Group as a whole, Sarah Salih has made 
the apt observation that “gender in these legends is a continuous process, not a 
fixed state.”32 What does it mean to talk about gender as a continuous process, 
and virginity as a disjunctive temporality (one that takes place within or apart 
from the process of gender)? To use time as a way of understanding gender 
and the highly gendered concept of virginity in this way is to examine these 
categories through the theory of performativity. The last decade’s develop-
ments in the theory of sex and gender have understood it as something that 
takes place in time because it is intimately involved in temporality as iteration. 
It can be argued that previous theories of gender, such as the classic feminist 
distinction between sex and gender that posited sex as biological and fixed 
whereas gender is contingent and potentially fluid, posited gender, at least, as 
a category implicated in historical time. To now see both sex and gender as 
markers of temporality is also to see the temporal work of “Sawles Warde” for 
what it is: a work of sowlehele that uses the specific situation of the female self 
to explore the tensions between cyclical and eschatological time.
 The historical working of gender in “Sawles Warde” has been evident 
throughout this chapter: The allegory, deeply implicated in the views of gen-
der and spirituality common to its moment, counterpoises the time of virgin-
ity (the Daughters of God) with the performance of married conflict within 
a context that seems, at least initially, to give a static map of the self ’s work-
ings. Elizabeth Robertson writes that the changes made from the Latin text, 
the Pseudo-Anselmian homily, to the English version called “Sawles Warde” 
transform it from “an abstract, hypothetical consideration of the emotions the 
anchoress must control [into a] pointed example of an emotional process she 
must repeat daily.”33 “Sawles Warde” has a narrative, not just a description of 
the self ’s powers in relation to one another, and its narrative transforms the 
time of the self from a static situation—that of the anchoress in control of her 
soul—into an iterative practice, that of the anchoress trying to maintain con-
trol. The iterability of this control (which, of course, highlights the many ways 
in which what must be repeated is also vulnerable to the “broken telephone 
 32. Sarah Salih, “Performing Virginity: Sex and Violence in the Katherine Group,” in Con-
structions of Widowhood and Virginity in the Middle Ages, ed. Cindy L. Carlson and Angela Jane 
Weisl (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), 111.
 33. Robertson, Early English Devotional Prose, 128.
effect”—to slippage and error over time) is reflected in the complex temporal-
ity of the work. That complex temporality, in turn, codes the specific value of 
virginity, the ways in which it disrupts regular time.
 The movement from a static time of the self to narrative time, and, with it, 
past and future, over the course of “Sawles Warde” enacts a conception of how 
the self relates to itself that works to produce sowlehele in its audience, among 
other things by instituting a practice of recursive mediation that returns again 
and again to the same point but also moves forward in time. It is possible that 
this conception of meditative time is particularly relevant to the self of an 
anchoress, whose time, as described in the Ancrene Wisse, is supposed to be 
essentially cyclical, a daily repetition of a set series of devotional tasks. How-
ever, it is not only the anchoress who might be accustomed to living essentially 
in the kind of eternal present created by the cyclical repetition of tasks: Agrar-
ian time functions in a similar fashion, if with variations over the course of 
the seasons. The cycle, for all, is punctuated by religious holidays, often ones 
that mark the major events in the life of Jesus Christ, and by exhortations to 
remember the looming danger of hell and the promise of heavenly reward. 
“Sawles Warde” captures this rhythm in a way that a strictly philosophical 
work could not have done.
What “Sawles Warde” offers this book’s argument is a sort of counterexample: 
a thirteenth-century English work that most emphatically does not exclude 
women from the inner world. Middle English Body/Soul debates clearly gen-
der both participants as male, and “Sawles Warde,” and its psychomachia-like 
figuration of the flux of powers within the self, comes closest to including 
female participants in an explicitly didactic psychological allegory. Unlike 
most other works discussed in this study, “Sawles Warde” does not eliminate 
the feminine or the marital from its arsenal of available metaphors; but also 
unlike those other works, “Sawles Warde” has the disciplining and educating 
of female persons as an explicit goal. From early Christianity onward, women 
were included in the universal category of mankind insofar as they could be 
considered rational beings. “Sawles Warde” works through that description of 
women by imagining what would happen if “woman” were to contain Ratio-
nality as a personification within her very being. Gender makes a distinctive 
difference to pastoral care as depicted in “Sawles Warde”; when a psychologi-
cal allegory does use female-marked beings to figure the relationship of the 
self to itself, certain kinds of figures, languages, and perhaps temporalities of 
the psyche emerge into view, complicating the picture of queer male solidarity 
depicted in previous chapters.
 “Sawles Warde” is an allegory in which the self is literally haunted by numer-
ous female figures, but in ways that are significantly different from how earlier 
Latin allegories, such as Prudentius’ Psychomachia, depicted such haunting. 
A central characteristic of the allegory is its depiction of a self that seems 
to be radically, dangerously permeable—with the implication that, when not 
invaded, that self has the potential to be a whole, enclosed and protected by 
the body. Even though the dreaded entry of sins is possible, the defended edi-
fice described in psychological metaphors of enclosure and assault (whether 
romance metaphors of the lady’s castle assailed by the lover or any number 
of similar religious figures) has a beginning and an ending, a sort of edge for 
sins to bump up against that is palpable even—perhaps especially—when it 
is imperiled. Elaborate metaphors like this one tell us about medieval psy-
chologies and the nature of the self they describe by narrating the defensive 
measures required to protect it. The next chapter looks at Piers Plowman, a 
far better-known work that also contains an allegory of the Four Daughters of 
God, but in a minor way. The complex theory of the self in that allegory also 
hinges on allegorical gender in important ways, but, unlike “Sawles Warde,” 
Piers Plowman’s Will is gendered male.
A distrust of established pieties is endemic to Piers Plowman. Never 
certain of its own conclusions, repeatedly overturning achieved 
insights, this work unmakes the very possibility of certainty, even 
as its protagonist, Will, stubbornly interrogates nearly everyone in 
his path in search of answers. While Will searches for truths about 
life on earth, the poem’s allegorical frame seems to be on a quest of 
its own, seeking after a better way to work with the conventions of 
personification. Piers Plowman is largely organized through a series 
of disputations, encounters between speakers linked through vertical 
or horizontal relations of power and interdependence, and in this it 
borrows from the tradition of psychomachia, even in the name of its 
protagonist.1 It is a far longer work and much more ambitious than 
 1. Piers Plowman is in many ways a poem that exceeds any kind of catego-
rization, but examining it as a personification allegory with a narrative organized 
through a series of debates clarifies some persistent quandaries that the poem poses 
without ignoring its conceptual difficulty. My concern in this chapter is not whether 
Piers is a debate; it is what happens to personification allegory and to the debate 
form when Langland tinkers with it. Thinking about debate as one of the genres of 
Piers Plowman, the critic is implicated in almost a century of discussions about the 
genre of the poem. See the work of T. P. Dunning, Piers Plowman: An Interpretation 
of the A-Text (London: Longman’s, 1937), esp. 169–70, and Morton Bloomfield, 
Piers Plowman as a Fourteenth-Century Apocalypse (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 1962), 10, 21. This chapter’s concern with the episodic and generic 
self-overcoming that characterizes the narrative progress of the poem shares much 
with an essay by Steven Justice that considers the genres of the “Visio” (the first 
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the Body/Soul debates discussed in previous chapters. It was also written as 
much as a century later than they were. However, in its outsized ambitions, 
Piers Plowman takes up and resolves every one of the topics discussed in previ-
ous chapters, from the role of allegorical female advisers to the queer relation-
ships within the self. A version of Piers Plowman is included in the Vernon 
manuscript, the one whose scribe labeled it “a book of sowlehele.” This chapter 
examines the poem’s work on the self as this entire book has examined it—in 
terms of gender, desire, the difficulties of establishing stable hierarchies—but 
although reading Piers Plowman helps us understand sowlehele psychology, 
the poem cannot ever be read as any one thing.
 Piers Plowman begins by using many female allegorical personifications 
as interlocutors linked by relations of power with the main character (who 
himself seems to oscillate unpredictably between being an allegorical figure 
of “the Will” and being a man named William).2 But, gradually, the ranks of 
seven passus of B). In it, Justice posits a journey from estates satire to consolatio to debate, and 
then onward to something that resembles confession manuals and a sort of informal typologi-
cal writing. See “The Genres of Piers Plowman,” Viator 19 (1988): 291–306. For a more precise 
discussion of the poem as engaged in a project of self-overcoming, see Anne Middleton’s “Nar-
ration and the Invention of Experience: Episodic Form in Piers Plowman,” in The Wisdom of 
Poetry: Essays in Early English Literature in Honor of Morton W. Bloomfield, ed. Larry Benson 
and Siegfried Wenzel (Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute Publications, 1982), 91–122. See also 
Elizabeth D. Kirk, The Dream Thought of Piers Plowman (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1972), 41–42, on the dispute between Conscience and Meed as a formal debate, and Stephen 
Barney’s “Allegorical Visions,” in A Companion to Piers Plowman, ed. John A. Alford (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1988), 117–33. In a book that treats all of Piers Plowman B, James 
Simpson has a section on “academic debate” in the third vision, examining the way in which 
these passus “deconstruct” academic debate, seeing Will’s combative encounter with Scripture 
as “an inspired act of reading, which underlines the necessity of understanding truth in the self.” 
See James Simpson, Piers Plowman: An Introduction to the B-Text (London: Longman, 1990), 
136; for the whole discussion, see 132–36.
 2. The formal interrogation of how Will functions as both a personification of “the will” 
and (or, at times, instead of) as a narrator named Will seems to have its origins in D. W. Rob-
ertson and Bernard F. Huppé’s book, Piers Plowman and Scriptural Tradition (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1951). See also John Bowers, The Crisis of Will in Piers Plowman 
(Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1986), especially the chapter titled 
“Complexities of the Will,” which understands the nature of the narrator in terms of the his-
tory of the concept of the will in medieval philosophy. For more recent treatments of Will as 
“will,” and the question of Will as subject, see David Lawton, “The Subject of Piers Plowman” 
(The Yearbook of Langland Studies 1 [1987]: 1–30); and two essays by Anne Middleton: “Wil-
liam Langland’s Kynde Name: Authorial Signature and Social Identity in Late Fourteenth-Cen-
tury England,” in Literary Practice and Social Change in Britain, 1380–1530, ed. Lee Patterson 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), and “Acts of Vagrancy: The C Version ‘Autobi-
ography’ and the Statute of 1388,” in Written Work: Langland, Labor and Authorship, ed. Steven 
Justice and Kathryn Kerby-Fulton (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997). See 
also James Simpson, “The Power of Impropriety: Authorial Naming in Piers Plowman,” in Wil-
liam Langland’s Piers Plowman: A Book of Essays, ed. Kathleen Hewett-Smith (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2001), and “Desire and the Scriptural Text: Will as Reader in Piers Plowman,” 
5female characters dwindle, making way for a mostly male cast of personifica-
tions. The poem’s move to eliminate female interlocutors in favor of male ones 
raises a larger question, which the poem poses both implicitly and explicitly 
throughout. This is the question of whether women, as such, might be neces-
sary to men, and Piers Plowman leaves open the surprising possibility that 
women might not, despite their crucial role in propagating the human species, 
be necessary after all. Ultimately, the poem seems to demonstrate that loving 
relationships between men are the path to a bearable sort of interdependence. 
This conclusion opens up many possibilities for interpretation, including that 
of a queer reading of Piers Plowman.
 In turning to Piers Plowman, I examine a work considered “canonical” 
in medieval literary studies, unlike the works discussed in previous chapters. 
However, the difference between Piers and the Body/Soul debates of chapters 
2 and 3 is not really so great. Each of these works puts different aspects of the 
self in dialogue with one another, although, more like “Sawles Warde” than “In 
a Thestri Stude I Stod,” Piers Plowman is explicitly concerned with the specific 
position of the will in the landscape of the self. Many times longer than any 
vernacular work discussed in this study, Piers Plowman takes up a great many 
more themes and characters, but the specific stakes of its psychological alle-
gory might actually be comparable to those of “Als I Lay in a Winteris Nyt” 
or the “Visio Philiberti”: Over the broad scope of the entire work, Piers Plow-
man asks the question of the “interlocutor,” of what it means to need another 
being in order to understand something or get somewhere, at both formal and 
narrative levels. In other words, the allegory can be read as a series of formal 
experiments in types of allegorical disputation, between aspects of the self as 
well as between personifications of social and psychological concepts—taking 
the kinds of questions Body/Soul debates ask in new directions and giving 
them new scope and scale.
 Significantly, for the purposes of this study, the interlocutor being sought 
in Piers Plowman does not seem to be a heterosexual romantic partner or, at 
least at first, a single partner at all. The author we call Langland is not particu-
larly invested in the conventions of courtly love, and Will’s perfect interlocutor 
is neither a lovely nor a loathly lady, although Lady Meed initially appears to 
be both. Like the popular debates that shy away from positing Soul and Body 
as a married couple, and unlike “Sawles Warde,” with its married pair of Wit 
and Will, marriage is not a central metaphor in Piers Plowman—but, by rea-
son of this allegory’s far larger scope, over the course of the narrative there is 
time to posit marriage as a possible metaphor, and then to reject it. Although 
in Criticism and Dissent in the Middle Ages, ed. Rita Copeland (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996).
Piers Plowman has sometimes been considered fundamentally uninterested in 
women because of this marked absence of a love narrative, this is not the case. 
Gender matters in the poem because it indexes an issue ultimately even closer 
to the poem’s heart: One of the persistent philosophical, social, and economic 
concerns of Piers Plowman is the necessity of dependence on another being.
 In both the B and C versions of Piers Plowman, the narrator spends several 
of the early passus of the poem seeking knowledge through listening to single 
speaking figures, such as Holy Church. Then, for several passus, we are within 
the mixed allegorical/“real” world of the field of folk, where Hunger and Truth 
make their appearances, along with some “real” women voicing worldly com-
plaint. Later, Will debates with a number of allegorical characters, both male 
and female, many of whom are shown in married pairs. In such cases, one per-
sonification represents a particular “power” and the other the object on which 
the power works; for instance, “Clergy” is the personification of the group 
whose work is the understanding of Scripture. Scripture, however, represented 
as a shrewish wife, is among the last of the full-fledged female personifications. 
As the poem moves into its last third, very few female personifications remain 
for the narrator to interact with or witness. This is, in part, because the action 
moves to a clerical high-table scene, the feast of Patience, where women are 
excluded, and then on to Faith and Hope, who (although typically depicted 
as the female sisters of Charity) appear here as Old Testament patriarchs. By 
this point, the logic of the poem has gradually eliminated the need for female 
persons to serve as Will’s interlocutors, creating instead a same-sex economy 
of recognition.
 The major exception to the dwindling numbers of female personifications 
in the later passus of Piers Plowman is the appearance of the Four Daughters 
of God, conventional tutelary figures with a long tradition in medieval writing. 
Although these are tutelary figures, they do not actually interact with Will. 
Their gender is also something less than stable. In the aftermath of the Har-
rowing of Hell and their own reconciliation, Peace sings, Justice speaks, and 
Truth puts a few remarks in, but Mercy, the first of the Four Daughters, does 
not speak. Instead of her, we hear from Love, a male personification that had 
previously been referred to as Peace’s lemman (lover). This replacement of the 
female by the male could be an oversight, of course (although it occurs in both 
the B and the C versions of the poem). But it may also be an example, in minia-
ture, of the procedure for eliminating female tutelary figures that characterizes 
the poem as a whole.
 The poem asks its questions about interdependence in a variety of ways. 
What does it mean to live with the possibility of procreation and the many 
ethical demands of the “active” (as opposed to the celibate, “contemplative”) 
life? What does it mean to depend on women to continue the human race? 
5In asking such questions, Piers Plowman takes up a psychological insight that 
was crucial in this study’s analysis of the two thirteenth-century Body/Soul 
debates: that the self as imagined in sowlehele psychology is fundamentally 
split and dialogic, open to its own otherness rather than closed as a window-
less monad. Piers posits human interdependence as a condition that recurs at 
every level: between self and God, self and community, self and romantic part-
ner, and, in a profound and surprising way, a relationship of interdependence 
between different aspects of the self, working with and against one another—a 
psychomachia without, quite, the necessity of battle. The poem’s gradual trans-
formation away from female personifications traces the differences between 
male same-sex and heterosexual love in its persistent search for a less onerous 
form of interdependence. The transformations of gender in Piers Plowman, 
however, stand for something beyond themselves, as an allegory ought. In 
addition to commenting on the nature of gender and sexuality, they comment 
on and complicate psychological understandings of how the self lives its rela-
tionship to itself.
 The literary form that permits this philosophical experimentation is that 
of personification allegory. The author of Piers Plowman is simply freer than 
his Latin predecessors to play with the gender of personification. In English, 
it would not be grammatically odd for his Philosophy to be a man, even if this 
would depart from the Boethian allegorical tradition. Whether exploiting this 
freedom deliberately or accidentally, Langland creates an allegory that makes 
full use of the flexibility offered by the disappearance of what is called “non-
natural” noun gender from the English language. As a consequence, the inter-
section of grammatical rules (or lack thereof), gender, and interdependence 
is even more complex and unstable in Piers Plowman than in its predecessor 
allegories.
Although critics have often emphasized the view that the literary convention 
of a female tutelary figure representing an abstraction such as Philosophy or 
Music is merely an accident of grammar and therefore to be dismissed as mere 
accident, some recent scholarship in Piers Plowman studies has considered 
the implications and meanings of the many female speakers in medieval Latin 
and vernacular writings.3 In “Gender and Personification in Piers Plowman,” 
 3. For general studies of female tutelary figures in the writings and imagery of the Middle 
Ages, see Marina Warner, Monuments & Maidens: The Allegory of the Female Form (New York: 
Atheneum, 1985). See also Barbara Newman, God and the Goddesses (Philadelphia: University 
Helen Cooper noted Langland’s tendency to transform abstractions that ear-
lier authors had gendered female into male figures: “[G]iven the freedom to 
choose what sexual form his personifications will take, over and over again 
it is the male of the species that he chooses.”4 Even Will, who, in Piers Plow-
man, serves as the narratorial stand-in for the author, could easily have been 
gendered female and portrayed as a woman—as he actually is in “Sawles 
Warde.”5 Cooper has argued that one reason the personifications are male 
is that they are faculties of Will’s own person—his Conscience, his Reason—
that might be best presented as male figures. Such an analysis understands 
the grammar of personification in the poem as something other than arbi-
trary, since recognizing that a male personification is best for representing 
a male person assumes a motivated connection between allegorical gender 
and poetic meaning. Whereas Cooper’s reading remains crucial, it can be 
usefully rethought in terms of the poem’s process—specifically, in terms of 
the process by which male personifications become more prevalent over the 
course of the poem.
 The process of inviting the male onto the scene and disinviting the female 
happens gradually over the course of Piers Plowman. It seems that the author 
chooses to begin with the accepted approach to personification, all the bet-
ter to demonstrate how it can be changed. The first of the personifications 
to interact with Will in his dream on the Malvern Hills is Holy Church, the 
personification of Ecclesia—a female tutelary figure very much of the type of 
Boethius’ Lady Philosophy. Holy Church quickly establishes that her job is 
to personify authority, and immediately takes up a tutelary position toward 
Will, rebuking and mocking him in a manner familiar from allegories high 
and low.6 From the beginning, the poem is in familiar territory for readers 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2003), and From Virile Woman to WomanChrist: Studies in Medieval 
Religion and Literature (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995).
 4. Helen Cooper, “Gender and Personification in Piers Plowman,” Yearbook of Langland 
Studies 5 (1991): 31–48, 33. It has been a trope in studies of Piers Plowman over the past decade 
that nobody writes on gender in the poem. Be that as it may, Cooper’s article began an impor-
tant discussion, which was continued with a special issue of The Yearbook of Langland Studies 
(Vol. 12, 1998, included many articles cited throughout this essay) and several full-length stud-
ies in recent years, all citing Cooper as inspiration and inaugurator of the discussion. 
 5. Elizabeth Robertson’s analyses of the relationship of Will and Study, and of Langland 
to his Latin antecedent, have implications for any discussion of Will’s gender: “By representing 
the central protagonist of the poem, Will, normally identified as female, as male, one might 
argue that Langland offers finally Woolf ’s androgynous vision of the self, one in which male 
and female are in balance. And when Will is in balance, Will can achieve what Lady Mede can-
not: agency as a subject” (Robertson, “Measurement and the ‘Feminine’ in Piers Plowman: A 
Response to Recent Studies of Langland and Gender,” in William Langland’s “Piers Plowman,” 
ed. Kathleen Hewett-Smith [New York and London: Routledge, 2001], 192).
 6. Ralph Hanna, “School and Scorn: Gender in Piers Plowman,” in New Medieval Lit-
eratures III (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), gives useful historical background to 
5of Latin or Old French/Anglo-Norman allegory. Although it changes almost 
immediately, Will’s role as a speaker in Piers Plowman begins by establishing 
him within a gendered exchange of tutelary dialogue inherited from the tradi-
tion of Latin poetry.
 Even as Will begs Holy Church for answers, a contrasting figure appears in 
response to his expressed wish to “know the false,” a figure that both provides 
partial answers to his questions and serves as a long and important digression. 
Whereas Boethius’ Lady Philosophy drove out the Muses who had been such 
dangerous distractions for the imprisoned philosopher, Lady Meed appears at 
Holy Church’s direction. Meed is not brought in by Holy Church as an inter-
locutor for Will—she is, instead, a negative example or object lesson intended 
to teach Will to “know the false.”
 Feminist critics have long noted that Meed, whose possible marriage to 
Fals Fikkel-Tongue threatens the very fabric of the society seen in Will’s dream, 
literalizes discussions of the “traffic in women.”7 Meed actually is Woman as 
an object of exchange, consolidating or threatening the bonds between men, 
a personification of reward, functioning as currency in exchanges between 
those in power; as such, she prefigures but does not participate in the homoso-
cial exchange between Will and his Latin-named double, Liberum Arbitrium, 
discussed in this chapter’s final section. Meed is the progeny of the strange 
understanding the humiliating and difficult position of the male student vis-à-vis the imaginary 
female instructor-as-disciplinarian, noting that the schoolmaster’s whip was often referred to as 
“the schoolmaster’s daughter.” Hanna takes note of the rhetoric within surviving schoolbooks 
about the evils of marriage (which threatens the young cleric with the loss of clerical status). 
Within this context, Hanna goes so far as to explain the relative sparseness of female figures 
in the poem following the traumatic encounter with scolding Holy Church as an avoidance, “a 
swerve designed to suppress the memories of abuse one hears here” (Hanna, 223). I agree with 
Hanna’s conclusion that “the poem’s learning is staunchly gendered, as one would expect, as 
male, but a maleness particularly insecure” (227).
 7. Gayle Rubin’s influential feminist critique of male social bonds constituted through the 
exchange of women can be found in “The Traffic in Women: Notes on the Political Economy 
of ‘Sex,’” in Towards an Anthropology of Women, ed. Rayna Rapp Reiter (New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1975). Discussions of Piers Plowman that cite Rubin’s work include Clare Lees, 
“Gender and Exchange in Piers Plowman,” in Class and Gender in Early English Literature, ed. 
Britton Harwood and Gillian Overing (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), and 
Elizabeth Fowler, “Civil Death and the Maiden: Agency and the Conditions of Contract in 
Piers Plowman,” Speculum 70 (1995). They also include the article by Susan Signe Morrison 
and Susan Baker, “The Luxury of Gender: Piers Plowman B.9 and The Merchant’s Tale,” in Wil-
liam Langland’s “Piers Plowman”: A Book of Essays, ed. Kathleen M. Hewett-Smith (New York: 
Routledge, 2001), an essay that first appeared in the Yearbook of Langland Studies special issue 
on “Gender and Piers Plowman” by the Yearbook of Langland Studies (Vol. 12, 1998). Interest 
in Lady Meed has been so acute that discussions of this figure have formed the bulk of work on 
gender in Piers Plowman, and I suggest that such work would benefit from taking into account 
where the poem goes with its complicated understanding of the female after its admittedly rich 
and complex beginning.
coupling of Fals and Amends, a “mixed marriage” of apparent opposites that 
binds them together as one another’s peers: the first instance of how kinship 
bears a particularly philosophical weight in the poem.8
 Meed is bound to her named nature, bound to serve as an object of 
exchange. However, she is also, at least somewhat, a figure imbued with 
agency: Her consent, like that of any woman entering a marriage, is required 
by law; she attempts (however incorrectly) to support her argument with scrip-
tural authority; and her will stands as a question within the text. The contrast 
between Holy Church and Lady Meed is also a contest, since, although only 
Holy Church directly interacts with Will, and the two female personifications 
do not directly dispute with one another, they do vie for Will’s and the reader’s 
memory and attention. The performance and undoing of gender in Piers Plow-
man does not end with this female pair. These two female personifications, 
rather than serving as basis and structuring trope for the rest of the poem, dis-
appear and are replaced by new interlocutors and debaters for Will. But their 
pairing does set up the convention of female tutelary figures as a significant 
aspect of the dream vision. As it turns out, this convention is set up in order 
to be overturned.
 By the end of its first two passus, Piers Plowman has presented thesis and 
antithesis, the positive and negative faces of femininity. Although Meed is 
unusual in being a personification allegory that seems to strive for something 
like self-determination and ownership of texts and means, the poem has not, 
by the point at which it leaves her, strayed outside the framework of conven-
tional personification allegory as inherited from earlier Latin authors. It is 
what the poem does next that retrospectively transforms the beginning of 
Piers Plowman into just one of several in a series of experiments in thinking 
through the possibilities of gender in allegory.
 The presence of both Meed and Holy Church in the allegory gives the 
reader an opportunity to expect female personifications. And it sets up the 
reader to experience their removal as a disruption of the norm. The most 
obvious result of such a disruption is that capital-T “Truth” (this poem’s initial 
quest and question), as well as other large answers, are always kept beyond the 
narrator’s reach—Holy Church can’t simply tell Will how to find the truth (or 
to know the false, his initial, modest goal) in the way Philosophy could tell it 
to Boethius. Holy Church tells Will to love the truth instead, something that 
 8. This issue is usefully summed up by John Bossy, with some reference to Piers Plowman, 
in a much-cited study about marriage and baptism as “rites of passage” in fourteenth-century 
England. According to Bossy, “one might deduce that, in this society, the kin-relation was taken 
as the model of all affective social relations.” See “Blood and Baptism: Kinship, Community and 
Christianity in Western Europe from the 14th to the 17th Centuries,” in Sanctity and Secularity: 
Studies in Church History 10, ed. Derek Baker (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), 134.
5can presumably be accomplished without ownership or attainment. An almost 
secondary effect of this relationship is that the position of the female tutelary 
figure as Man’s natural Other, the feminine voice to which he can turn for suc-
cor as well as discipline, is at first offered as a possibility, then interrogated, 
experimented and toyed with—and then displaced. Langland gives us female 
speakers, and Langland takes them away.
 Cooper has argued that the choices of gender for Langland’s personifica-
tions are “never casual,” but, instead, reflect his embeddedness in fourteenth-
century English life, including its “structures of patriarchal dominance.”9 More 
recently, Elizabeth Robertson has argued that Langland’s representation of 
gender and personification “exposes the fault lines of gender stereotypes”10 as 
much as that representation complies with patriarchy. In other words, he is 
describing a situation rather than recommending that it continue. She argues 
that the just society that Langland’s poem demands would include women as 
well as men, undifferentiated, since the significant question for him is not the 
status of women as such (certainly not as courtly romantic objects or even as 
personifications) but the proper and appropriate conduct of human society 
and the search for salvation and connection with the divine.
 Given such an understanding, refusing the figure of the female tutelary 
personification would also mean—although Robertson never quite says this—
refusing to elevate Woman just as one refuses to markedly debase her. This 
view is also implicit in an article by Susan Baker and Susan Signe Morrison, 
analyzing the role of gender in the poem.11 A reading extrapolating from Rob-
ertson’s “just society” or Baker and Morrison’s “dissolving gender boundaries” 
would view Langland’s relatively sparse use of female figurations as a pointed 
refusal to play with what had by then become the easy trope of either debased 
or elevated femininity (sometimes both at the same time), the courtly, philo-
sophic, and didactic examples of which are legion. Although the poem has 
elements of social satire toward its beginning, these elements gradually give 
way to other sorts of concerns, and “real” women become gradually less and 
less relevant, just as female personifications do. By setting up his readers to 
expect allegorical female figures and then proceeding, for thousands of lines 
 9. Cooper, 46.
 10. In “Measurement and the Feminine,” Elizabeth Robertson argues that “in his repre-
sentation of Gluttony, Langland draws on negative stereotypes about the feminine in order 
to explore the nature of sin; these negative qualities of excessiveness and dilatoriness do have 
the potential, however, if not to challenge social injustice, at least to call attention to the social 
definitions of gender roles. Elsewhere in the poem, the potential of the feminine to be liberatory 
as well as disruptive is more fully articulated” (181).
 11. Susan Baker and Susan Signe Morrison argue that, though Langland is not indifferent 
to questions of gender, the teleology of his vision is that “gender essentially becomes moot, as 
kinship bonds and gender and class boundaries dissolve” (66).
toward the middle and end of the poem, to have Will dispute with male per-
sonifications instead, Langland voids his poem of a certain affective charge. He 
removes the possibility of a specific sort of flirtation with and within hierarchy, 
posing for himself the greater challenge of establishing relationships between 
speakers without reliance on the built-in hierarchies of gender.
 Notoriously, Piers Plowman never abandons a train of thought; it sim-
ply adds another and then yet another. Female personifications do not sim-
ply disappear from the poem after the troublesome incident with Meed (and 
the experiment with female tutelary figures and their doubles) is concluded. 
Although there are fewer female personifications engaged in disputation than 
there might have been, the voices of many female figures echo through the 
poem. There are female speakers who want to know how to help plow the 
field that Piers must plow for Truth, and wives and mothers who need justice 
or food. Even female personifications of important abstractions make an even-
tual return after Will’s discussion with Holy Church is concluded.
FaMIlIes, dyadIC struCtures, and splIt selves
Over the course of the poem, relationships between abstractions (and to Will) 
are established through the manipulation of genealogy rather than through the 
tutelary dialogue of Holy Church or the debates about Meed’s parentage and 
her marital prospects. A number of abstractions act only as figures marked by 
relation to other abstractions, and Will is capable of apprehending certain con-
cepts only through understanding the kinship relationships between them.
 A striking instance of the way in which genealogy forms relationships 
occurs in B. V/C. VII, when Piers gives Will and the rest of the pilgrims direc-
tions to Truth. As a means of avoiding the Seven Deadly Sins during his quest, 
Will is advised to be or perhaps to become kin to the seven virtues, represented 
as seven sisters who serve as porters and guards in the Castle of Truth:
And ho is sib to this seuene, so me god helpe
Is wonderliche welcome and fayre underfonge
Ho is nat syb to this seuene, sothly to telle
Hit is ful hard, by myn heued, eny of yow alle
To geten ingang at eny gate, bote grace be the more.12
 12. William Langland, Piers Plowman: The C-Text, ed. Derek Pearsall (Exeter, UK: Univer-
sity of Exeter Press, 1978; 1994), C. VII, 278–82, very similar to the same passage in B. V, which 
appears on 625–29. Further citations will appear in brackets within the text, listing version, 
passus, and line number.
5 What does it mean to be told to be kin?13 Although it might be literally 
interpreted as just a way of saying that one ought to be on intimately good 
terms with the virtues, the figure of kinship is a powerful one to invoke in this 
poem. In this passage, to be kin may mean always-already to have had a kin-
ship relationship with these virtues—to be able to trace distant genealogical 
connections, figuratively speaking, between one’s family and theirs, if we are to 
think this metaphor through. One of Piers’s listeners, a “cotte-pors,” is imme-
diately anxious and exclaims, “By Crist, . . . y haue no kyn there” (C. VII, 283). 
His worry is taken up by one sinner and then another, until Piers attempts to 
reassure all by promising that Mercy and her son also dwell with these sisters 
and are related to all who are sinners, and even possess the capacity to urge the 
guards to let such sinners into the castle of Truth.14 In the B-text, a “commune 
woman” (this term is usually understood to mean “prostitute”) responds to 
this reassurance by promising to follow Piers, and avers that “thow shalt seye 
I am thi suster” an echo of Sarah’s words to Abraham as they entered the land 
of Egypt.15
 Here, the figuration of kinship has moved from a convenient way of 
expressing the necessary always-already quality of virtuous living—it must be 
as natural as blood ties, and as omnipresent—to a figure of radical interdepen-
dence and voluntary choice. Sinners need the intervention of Mercy to enter 
the tower of Truth, just as Will needs his interlocutors to achieve understand-
ing. In both cases, the goal can be achieved only through interaction with 
another. This way of portraying dependence expresses the poem’s interest in 
human interdependence and describes a self dependent for its capacity to act 
and to be in the presence of another capable of engaging in dialogue and form-
ing ties with it.
 It is relatively hard to dream up genealogies where every relevant concept 
is brother and sister; relations between concepts are often described through 
the conceptually simpler technology of making kin—through marriage. In the 
poem’s third vision, Wit (the husband of Will in most allegories where Will is 
represented as female, such as “Sawles Warde”) appears as a character who is 
married to Study, and a bit of a shrew. After condemning, with a ferocity that 
might almost be jealousy, Wit’s attempts at teaching Will, Study calms down 
 13. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, since the time of Beowulf, “sib” in English 
has meant “related by blood or descent; akin,” “kinship, relationship,” as well as “peace, amity, 
concord.”
 14. In his edition of the C-text (Pearsall, 1978), 144, 289n, Pearsall suggests that Mercy is 
here being identified with the Virgin Mary.
 15. William Langland, The Vision of Piers Plowman, A Complete Edition of the B-Text, 2nd 
ed., ed. A. V. C. Schmidt (London: J. M. Dent, Everyman’s Library, 1978; 1995), B. V, 642. Fur-
ther citations of the B-text appear within the text in brackets, listing version, passus, and line 
number.
and is pleased by Will’s words of flattery, ultimately sending Will off to visit 
her kinsman, Clergy, and his wife, Scripture.
 When Will encounters Dame Study, femininity as such—having appeared 
as motherly Holy Church and whorish Meed, as well as tale-spinning Pride—
takes on a third sort of stereotype, that of shrewish wife. Her speech is entirely 
embedded in the context of her relation to Wit and her kinship to Clergy. The 
burden of her argument is ultimately that Wit should be careful about showing 
holy writ to laypeople like Will; in her advice, however, Study makes it very 
clear that she is bound to thinking in genealogical, relational models, just as 
those who look at Meed in the first several passus of the poem are bound to 
consider her nature as determined by one branch or another of her parentage, 
as well as by whom she might marry. Scripture, to whom Study sends Will, is 
recommended to Will as one who is “sib to the seuene ars and also my suster 
/ And Clergies wedded wyf ” (C. XI, 98–99).16
 Married pairs, such as Scripture with Clergy and Wit with Study, work 
as one another’s foils and best interlocutors. These pairs are not romantic on 
a fin amours model. Instead, it seems that one personification represents a 
particular “power” and the other the object on which the power works—for 
instance, the way that Clergy generally works on understanding Scripture. The 
couple, although somewhat unified in its interaction with Will, is nevertheless 
a pairing of two disparate (but perhaps difficult to separate) forces, a sort of 
synergy. In the relationships between Clergy and Scripture, and Study and 
Wit, the two speakers are very different, but also quite intimately connected, 
and any attempt to separate them and to measure the differences between 
them once and for all would be complex, inconclusive, and, very possibly, 
acrimonious.
 These related figures, which are also figures in relation with one another, 
are significant and respected, but they are also always intermediary and their 
advice carries Will only so far. The poem’s initial tutelary dialogue—between 
Holy Church and Will—does not bring Will the answers he seeks. Married 
pairs, the dyadic and heterosexual coupling of two kinds of powers, give him 
 16. In his analysis of this section in the B-text version of the poem, James Simpson has writ-
ten that “these figures do form a coherent group; they have a set of relations between themselves 
which suggests this coherence,” and yet he also writes about how insufficient Will finds this 
group’s advice—the B-text version contains an almost 100-line rant by Will about how little he 
has learned from Scripture and Clergy. “Study represents the grammar school, the preliminary 
educational system. . . . Clergy, as “cosyn” to Study, does represent . . . the institution of univer-
sity theological learning” (Simpson, Introduction to the B-Text, 1990), 106. Simpson goes on to 
explain how “clergy” can mean “knowledge, learning, doctrine” according to the Middle English 
Dictionary. “Scripture is being used in a specific way, adduced in academic debate. . . . [She] 
occupies a middle ground between . . . two extremes of the purely dogmatic instruction and 
intimate, allegorical understanding; Scripture is being used actively by Will, but the scriptural 
texts are being used as counters in theological, academic arguments” (107).
5directions that lead him forward, but they, too, turn out to be insufficient for 
his quest’s fulfillment.
 By creating married personifications (not newlyweds like Martianus 
Capella’s Philology and Mercury, or pairings like Meed’s parents, Fals and 
Amends, or Sloth and Wanhope in C. XXII, but long-term married couples) as 
a means of thinking through the relationships between institutions of learning 
and learning within them, Langland works through a new and different way of 
presenting a sequence of instructors. In this section of the poem, the process 
of Will’s instruction, the narrative progress of the quest, and the encounter 
between him and the tutelary figures is particularly nonlinear, in a way that 
Will finds rather frustrating: “‘This is a long lesson,’ quod I, ‘and litel am I the 
wiser!’” (B. X, 369) he says to Scripture.17 This encounter with powers that are 
distinct but joined becomes a recursive and interwoven academic dialogue, 
one whose complexity partially reflects the entwined nature of these figures’ 
genealogical relationships. Langland’s choices in presenting these personifica-
tions also reflects a vision of what it means for two or more persons or powers 
to exist in an interrelated state, as one another’s peers and partners within the 
dialogic situation of horizontal interdependence. Apparently, what it means is 
that such bonds, and the persons who inhabit lives bounded by such bonds, 
can be helpful, but are necessarily limited. The problematic, complex inter-
dependence between and within persons modeled by Body/Soul debates is a 
problem to be solved: Langland solves it by passing through and out of mar-
riage as a model. Here, the version of sowlehele psychology enacted in the 
poem becomes the work of finding independence even in contexts of radical 
dependency.
 Nearer the poem’s end, Liberum Arbitrium in passus XVIII of the C-text 
shows Will the Tree of Charity. It is clear that the apple representing virginity 
is sweeter than that which represents marriage, even though marriage seems 
to be required of adult human beings who are not committed to the clergy (C. 
XVIII, 80–100).18 Marriage is depicted, typically, as problematic—the wicked 
 17. James Simpson discusses Will’s response to Scripture in “Desire and the Scriptural Text: 
Will as Reader in Piers Plowman,” in Criticism and Dissent in the Middle Ages, ed. Rita Copeland 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996). For him, this moment is a particular 
instance of Will as reader, and of Langland’s “voluntarist hermeneutics,” and a turning point 
away from the despair that characterized Will’s response to many of his interlocutors’ teachings 
in earlier passus of the poem.
 18. Late in the poem, when he encounters the Tree of Charity, Will sees three kinds of ap-
ples on that tree and asks his guide, Liberum Arbitrium, “sethen ther aren but tweye lyues / That 
oure lorde alloweth, as lered men us techeth, Activa Vita and Contemplativa Vita” (C. XVIII, 
81–83). Liberum Arbitrium replies that the apples affirms the existence of three states—virgin-
ity, widowhood, and marriage; in his notes to the text, Pearsall point out that Will’s question 
reflects ignorance (either strategic or real) about the third option, the “mixed” or “apostolic” 
life. Given the three apples and the trinity of Dowel, Dobet, and Dobest, the tension introduced 
wife is listed as one of the three things that are capable of driving a man from 
his home. This appearance of the wicked wife trope is part of an extended 
simile of the temptations of the world, the flesh and the devil, and the wife is 
presented as a stand-in for “oure wikkede flesche” (C. XIX). Here, the feminin-
ity of the flesh is assumed and utterly conventional. To be bound in marriage 
is to be bound to the flesh—as Actif demonstrates when he refuses to follow 
Piers on a pilgrimage to truth, using the excuse that he has recently wedded 
a wife, in C. VII. That trope of “uxorem duxi” as harmful excuse names the 
potential drawback of the married state. Even as the married state is under-
stood to be necessary for the propagation of kind, it remains profoundly trou-
bling to Will and to many of his interlocutors—even, to a degree, his married 
ones. Interdependence is terribly important in this poem; it is also, as these 
passus make very clear, terribly problematic—particularly the kind of interde-
pendence produced by the married state, which seems, at best, a transitional 
state, a phase out of which the maturing self must grow.
the Goddess nature and the probleM oF sex
Will’s stipulated ignorance, his position as a curious and almost naïve narra-
tive center, is presented early in the poem when Will admits that he has “no 
kynde knowing” (C. I, 136). His lack of “kynde knowing” directs the poem’s 
narrative development as a series of imperfect understandings amended by an 
ever-growing cast of irritated tutelary figures.19 It might also stand in for Will’s 
inability to think about his own psychology in purely academic terms, his 
by Will’s pointedly ignorant assertion of two kinds of life is an interesting one—possibly a void 
demanding to be filled, like so many of Will’s frustrating questions are, and possibly, also, a 
way of putting thinking organized in threes up against thinking organized in twos (which the 
disputational situation of the text tends to be but isn’t always).
 19. Mary C. Davlin writes that “kynde knowing” is best translated as “divine wisdom,” 
arguing that “in kynde, with its wealth of ‘natural’ connotations, Langland found an array of 
interacting meanings perfectly though paradoxically suited to suggest the kind of knowledge 
called gnosis sapientia in the Church tradition.” See Davlin, “Kynde knowing as a Middle English 
Equivalent for ‘Wisdom’ in Piers Plowman B,” in Medium Aevum 50 (1981): 8. Elizabeth Kirk 
disagrees, seeing the term kynde knowing as “an attempt to coin a vernacular equivalent for the 
theological term ‘natural knowledge.’” See Kirk, “Kynde Knowing as a Major Theme in Piers 
Plowman B,” Review of English Studies n.s. 22 (1971): 1–19; 37–38, fn. 18. In “Langland’s Kynde 
Knowing and the Quest for Christ,” Modern Philology 80 (1982): 242–55, Britton J. Harwood 
discusses the concept of kynde knowing as a version of “notitia intuitiva, one of the terms es-
sential to philosophy for the previous hundred years” (245), a concept that Harwood describes 
as “intuitive cognition”: “‘Notitia intuitiva’ included the certain, immediate knowledge of the 
mind’s own acts.” See also Harwood’s Piers Plowman and the Problem of Belief (Toronto: Uni-
versity of Toronto Press, 1992).
5need to develop his own version of psychology—a personal, individual take on 
sowlehele in the context of confessional culture as a whole—out of the givens of 
quotidian existence, particularly of the natural world represented by the term 
kynde. Sometimes, the problem of lacking “kynde knowing” becomes, in the 
way of personification allegory, the problem of not yet having been introduced 
to the character named Kynde.
 Kynde, one of the crucial personifications in this poem, appears in the 
immediate aftermath of Will’s encounter with the two married pairs.20 As a 
character, he is an important instance of Langland’s pointed refusal to rely 
on “allegorical goddesses”: This father figure clearly takes on the role that 
allegories from Martianus Capella through Alan of Lille’s Plaint of Nature and 
Chaucer’s Parlement of Foules assigned to a female character, a goddess of 
bountiful fertility named Nature.21 Here, Langland is making a different point 
 20. Kynde as a personified character is referred to repeatedly throughout the text but ap-
pears with a speaking role only three times. In passus IX, it is he who encloses the soul in the 
castle of the body, an allegory that will be discussed in a later section. In addition to the sec-
tion where Kynde offers the vision of Mydelerthe, he is also called on in passus XX when the 
Antichrist comes and Conscience counsels all to shelter in Holy Church and cry out to Kynde 
to defend them. Hugh White has made a full-length study of notions of “kynde” in Piers Plow-
man in Nature and Salvation in “Piers Plowman’”(Cambridge, UK: D. S. Brewer, 1988), which 
examines this character (and the notions of kynde knowing and kynde wit) far more carefully 
than the scope of this chapter permits.
 21. J. A. W. Bennett surveys the literature about Natura and Kynde in his appendix, “Na-
tura, Nature, and Kind,” to The Parlement of Foules. He notes that Chaucer’s use of “kinde” for 
“natura” may reflect “the example set by the Alfredian translator of Boethius.” See Bennett, The 
Parlement of Foules: An Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon, 1957), 207. Mary Clemente Davlin 
has a very useful discussion of Langland’s use of Kynde instead of Natura, and of the word’s 
etymological connections: “The Natura of earlier literary and philosophical convention is the 
intermediary of God, and with him the creator of earthly things. . . . In Piers Plowman, the 
personification is no longer named ‘Natura,’ but the Middle English equivalent, Kynde (a word 
related to ‘genus,’ ‘genealogy,’ ‘generation’ and ‘gender’ as well as ‘generous’ and ‘genial’; to French 
genre and Italian gentilezza.) Kynde is conventionally associated with creation, fertility, growth, 
sex, experience, love, Reason, and God, and with nature in the sense of birds, beasts, grass, and 
flowers. . . . [I]t is associated with sickness and death as well as with creation. . . . Moreover, 
Langland makes two major changes in the convention, by changing the sex of Nature from 
feminine to masculine and by identifying Nature (natura naturans) with God Himself. Whereas 
previously Natura was ‘vice regent’ or ‘vicaire of the almighty Lord,’ Kynde in Piers Plowman 
‘under one aspect’ is God Himself.” Mary C. Davlin, “Kynde knowying as a Middle English 
Equivalent for ‘Wisdom’ in Piers Plowman B,” in Medium Aevum 50 (1981): 5–17. See also Brian 
Tierney, “Natura id est Deus: A Case of Juristic Pantheism?” Journal of the History of Ideas 24 
(1963): 307–22, an article that contains useful background material about the philosophical 
and political theories that undergird the medieval understanding of “Nature” as another name 
for “God.” Hugh White (1988) discusses the influence of and differences from the Chartrian 
and the juristic understandings of Natura manifested by Langland’s Kynde, but argues that 
Langland’s character “is indeed something rather strange and apparently new in medieval po-
etry” (67) because it leaves no space between God (who is always good) and Nature (which at 
least occasionally manifests in defective beings or behaviors). White notes that the conflation of 
the two in Kynde make questions about the provenance of evil particularly sharp, particularly 
in the vision of Mydelerthe, discussed in this section of my chapter. For White’s analysis of how 
than his predecessor-allegorists, even as he is dealing with some of the same 
questions. He has taken up that character and removed her neo-Platonic his-
tory, reattaching the powers of Natura to a creation deity who is the Father.
 Kynde appears to Will in a dream within his dream to show him the won-
ders of the natural world.22 Through him, Will is granted access to a vision 
that permits him to witness the rational design by which the world is run, 
and he is all the more dismayed and surprised by the irrationality of human 
behavior—specifically, human mating—in comparison with the orderly mat-
ing of beasts.23 The schematics of faculty psychology would not help explain 
this irrationality, since, in that schema, the appetitive faculty (the one get-
ting human beings into sexual trouble) is one that is shared by animals and 
humans. Within the dream of Kynde, Reason appears to tell Will that “no 
creature under Crist can formen hymselven” (B. XI, 387). The word formen, 
here, emphasizes the simple fact that creatures are made, and reminds Will 
that they are made by God.24 Although formen denotes the creation of a self 
in the context of divine omnipotence, however, it can also mean that creatures 
are doomed to have been formed as a consequence of sexual congress. Human 
beings are thus doubly made, both by God (“under Crist”) and by the poten-
tially sinful interaction of their parents.
 The problem of interdependence is not just located within human society; 
it is also inherent in the human relation with the divine. In addition to needing 
one another in life, sublunary creatures are fundamentally dependent on the 
intervention of a power that, while intensely personal, is inexorably located 
outside the self of any single being. In its larger context within Will’s dream 
Langland creates and partially resolves these questions, see 73–78.
 22. The context for Kynde’s appearance in the poem varies in the two versions that include 
it: In the B-text version of the poem, this appearance immediately follows a speech by the 
Emperor Trajan, the “righteous pagan.” In the C-text version of the poem, the vision of Kynde 
and Mydelerthe takes place when Kynde comes to Clergie’s rescue. In the C-text, the vision is 
seen by Clergie, not Will, although it is Will who responds to it. Since in that version, the vision 
comes in the context of Will’s discussion with Rechlessnesse, Will may be having this dream of 
Kynde under the aegis of that character.
 23. This is the section of the poem that most resembles the garden of the Parlement of 
Foules, where Chaucer sees the natural mating of birds on the day prescribed by Nature. Will 
sees birds and beasts, each paired with their “make.” In Chaucer’s allegory, complications arise 
in the mating of a higher class of birds, in a transparent allegory of social hierarchy. In the 
natural world shown by Langland’s Kynde, the mating of beasts and their mates is entirely 
unproblematic. These beasts do not seem to take on an anthropomorphic role or stand in for 
human behaviors, except insofar as they are being compared to humankind and described as 
exemplary.
 24. In the Middle English Dictionary, this line is used to gloss one of the meanings of the 
verb formen, in a case where the verb is taken to mean “(b) to give life to (someone), create (a 
person, a soul).” Other lines of Piers Plowman define related meanings: “5. To inform or instruct 
(someone), to train or educate, to guide or advise; to give instructions; to develop (manners or 
habits), to learn,” and also, “6. To be constituent parts of (a whole), to form.” Both (5) and (6) 
offer examples from Piers Plowman B to demonstrate their meaning.
5vision, this phrase participates in a continuing concern about the fact that all 
creatures are formed by one another: influenced by one another, mated with 
one another, and born of mothers. This is the very concern evinced in “Als I 
Lay in a Winteris Nyt” over the interdependence within the self, which can 
now be understood, as perhaps it always ought to have been, as worry about 
interdependence in general, in a context where—to simplify greatly—the kind 
of individualistic selfhood touted as that of the Enlightenment subject coexists 
and uncomfortably clashes with other models of the self, inducing a kind of 
vertiginous sense that the subject somehow ought to be independent but can-
not find a way to live cut off from others.
 The discussion of human and animal formation that follows this descrip-
tion of human interdependence confirms that human beings have a particu-
larly troubled relationship with one another and with the divine. “Man and his 
make [mate] y myhte se bothe” (C. XIII, 138) characterizes in the singular the 
relationships between human beings, emphasizing the centrality of the male 
subject and the secondary quality of “his” (necessarily female?) mate. Two 
lines later, however, we are thrust out of the imaginary dyad’s brief domestic 
bliss, and human interrelatedness is once again subjected to critique: Now in 
the plural, “men” are the ones who “mede toke and mercy refusede” (C. XIII, 
141). The world of “men” is situated in opposition to the world of beasts and 
characterized by an unnatural refusal of mercy. But there’s more to this pas-
sage still: Both “meed” and “mercy,” qualities to which “men” are said to have 
a relationship, have appeared as characters in the poem prior to this passus. 
Indeed, Lady Meed herself appeared amid a complicated marriage plot. Con-
sequently, what men “toke” or “refusede” in line 141 can be understood as both 
a set of qualities and a bride. The poem has moved from a singular “man” to 
a generalized “men,” and from the initially idyllic dyad of “man and his mate” 
to a refusal of mercy, which can be understood as an unreasonable rejection 
of dependence on the grace of an omnipotent God, or even a rejection of the 
often surprising capacity for grace inherent in one’s fellow human beings—a 
refusal of “men’s” capacity for dependence on an Other.
 In Will’s vision of Kynde, the ideal natural world necessitates strict gender 
segregation, untainted by unseasonable desire. It is governed by time, divided 
into “mating time” and “non–mating time,” a sort of natural universal that 
humans ignore. Nonprocreative sexual urges are, surprisingly, products of 
advanced culture, not of nature, and beasts live more sexually orderly lives 
than man does in this version of the human/animal divide:25
 25. This is an important trope about animal purity: M. Teresa Tavormina, in Kindly Si-
militude: Marriage and Family in ‘Piers Plowman’ (London: D. S. Brewer, 1995), cites Jerome’s 
Adversus Jovinian 1.49 (PL 23:293–94), Lombard’s Sentences 4.31, and Gratian’s Decretum C.32 
q.4 c.5, because each contains “a model of animal restraint in sexual matters . . . the model 
especially stresses animal abstinence during pregnancy” (181).
Resoun y sey sothly sewe alle bestes
In etynge and drynkyng, in engendrure of kynde.
Aftur cors of concepcion noon toek kepe of other,
As when their hadde roteyed anon they reste aftur;
Males drow hem to males amorwenynge by hemsulue,
And femeles to femeles ferddede and drowe.
Ther ne was cow ne cow-kynde that conseyued hadde
That wolde bere aftur bole, ne boer aftur sowe.
Ther ne was no kyne kynde that conseyued hadde
That ne lees the lykynge of lost of flesch, as hit were,
Saue man and his make; and thereof me wonderede
For out of resoun they ryde and rechelisliche taken on,
As in derne dedes, bothe in drynkyng and elles.
(C. XIII, 142–54)26
The beasts highlight a tension in human beings between the active and the 
contemplative lives, in other words, between family life and the sex-segregated 
(but not procreative) lives of monks and nuns. Beasts can manage to be wholly 
virtuous and sex-segregated, mating only in the prescribed and appropriate 
seasons, even when living the active life. Among animals, unlike humans, a 
life of heightened virtue is accessible to all, rather than only to members of 
the leisured elite or religious groups. All animals are capable of withdrawing 
into same-sex groupings, and living in those groupings is the natural way. 
Homosociality, in other words, is more natural than lustful heterosexuality. 
The option of choosing pure homosociality interrupted only by necessarily 
procreative mating with the opposite sex, as animals do here, seems not to 
exist for human beings.
 Here, man—particularly the dreamer, Will—suffers over how beings are 
formed in a way that beasts need not, because man knows that what he is 
doing is wrong, whereas the beasts neither do anything wrong, nor know what 
wrong is. The poem seems to take the view that “man” alone is constituted so 
as to be able to experience his own contingency, to know himself as needy and 
mortal in ways unavailable to beasts. Hence man’s awareness of the source of 
his misery is, at the same time, his joy and liberation from bestial “kynde.”
 Witnessing with envious dismay the rational order of animals, and under 
the sponsorship of misbehaving Rechlessnesse, Will turns to reproach Reason 
 26. Pearsall notes Kane-Donaldson’s reading of “amorwenynge” (in the morning”) in their 
edition of the B-text is “al mornyng,” (all mourning), “referring to the notion post coitum est 
omne animal triste” (“after intercourse every being is sad”) but disagrees with this “anthropo-
morphic view of animal sexuality” (Pearsall, 229, 149n).
5(oddly, not Kynde, although he is witnessing Kynde’s showing) for not having 
watched over human beings more firmly and kept their activities more ratio-
nal. Reason angrily replies that it is his, Reason’s, job to be patient with things 
as they are and to endure, and that therefore he shouldn’t be criticized by Will. 
Within this angry retort, Reason insists that “no creature under Crist can for-
men hymselven” (B. XI, 387), emphasizing the fact that humankind ought not 
blame its misfortunes on Reason or on Kynde because man’s suffering self 
had been created by God for a reason (but in no way by Reason). According 
to Reason, the unchanging reality of existence is that man is made to suffer 
because he cannot either make or mate with his own self.
 In the way of this poem’s progress through digression, the vision of Kynde 
and of mating briefly becomes a discussion of salvation, but then, of neces-
sity, returns to the problem of kynde from another angle, moving from the 
spectacle of beasts to the question of that which God requires from man. God, 
according to Reason,
 . . . bad every creature in his kynde encreesse,
Al to murthe with man that moste wo tholie
In fondynge of the flesh and of the fend bothe.
For man was maad of switch a matere he may noght wel asterte
That some tyme hym bitit to folwen his kynde.
Cato acordeth therwith—Nemo sine crimine vivit!
(B. XI, 398–402)
In this passage, the necessity of procreation among creatures in general and 
man in particular is cause to pity man’s inability to escape both temptation 
and the injunction to procreate. The sexual union is expected to comfort man 
in his temptation-ridden existence, even as “the flesh” appears as one of those 
temptations that cause his woe. Here, Langland indicates that the procre-
ative urge is not a curse but, as for other beasts, a pleasurable mitigation of 
one’s mortal state, which is simply misused and perverted by human beings. 
Although this natural process is a basic need and comfort humans and animals 
share, its unnatural mistiming by human beings threatens to become, with the 
citation of Cato, a sinful, almost criminal (crimine, as in line 402 above) activ-
ity, although one of a criminality that is almost universal. Man is simultane-
ously free and compelled; made so that he cannot escape sin, he nevertheless 
chooses the moment when he will follow and take pleasure in his particular 
kynde, committing his own particular crime, which enables him to propagate 
his own kind in a manner that follows Kynde’s universal injunction.
 Here, Kynde becomes a governing aspect of humankind, something inter-
nal rather than external to the self; this figure represents species, natural prin-
ciple, and a temptation of the will all at the same time. Within the poem, 
realization of these words’ truth awakens Will, blushing, from his dream 
within a dream. The fact that man was made of “swich a matere” binds him to 
kynde, forcing man to participate in marriage and procreation, even if mar-
riage is always inherently viewed as a problematic state of being. Though the 
married state is understood to be necessary for the propagation of kind, it 
remains profoundly troubling to Will and to many of his interlocutors, even, 
to a degree, his married ones. Celibacy would be a blessed relief, but given the 
inescapability of interdependence, it seems to be an option for only a privi-
leged few. In other words, women cannot be eliminated from life as from the 
poem, but their presence can be diminished. In a work that acknowledges 
the necessary demands of kynde even as it rails against them, the necessity 
of female tutelary figures—a necessity that generations of Latin writers had 
established as a formative fiction—is both very obvious and, over the course 
of the poem’s progress, radically questioned.
 Piers Plowman is more interested in gender as a primary mode of struc-
turing relationships of interdependence between persons (as in hierarchies 
between men and women, kinship and marriage relations, and so on) than 
in the categories of male and female in and of themselves. Gender is inter-
esting only insofar as it dictates the kinds of interdependence available to a 
given person or persons. Langland is particularly concerned with how human 
beings, possessors of rationality, act irrationally: Those whose work involves 
careful attention to the seasons somehow fail to mate in the correct seasons. 
The separation of female and male beasts can also be read in relation to a ques-
tion about who might be the best interlocutor posed by the poem. The ethical 
injunction to keep “male” and “female” in separate spheres within the specific 
discourse of Kynde is, in a general way, reflected in how disputations change 
over the course of the poem. Ultimately, the male narrator, like the male ani-
mal, will also find his best company in chaste communion with others who 
are most like himself, likely those of his own sex: Although homosexuality is 
normally coded as utterly unnatural in medieval writings and in commonly 
held interpretations of the Bible—and is often even called “unkynde,” the very 
opposite of the Kynde dominating this section of the poem—Piers Plowman 
has shown here that human heterosexuality is comparatively unnatural as 
well.
 The tutelary figures that largely structure the narrative progression of Piers 
Plowman are gradually fragmented by the impact of the poem’s narrative in 
increasingly complex ways—ways that this chapter, indeed, this book, can 
only begin to survey. The shifting of interlocutors as Will struggles toward 
knowledge does more than offer multiplicity and keep at bay the quest’s end. 
Will’s journey gradually fragments the very nature of the disputational scene. 
5Toward the end of the poem, recognizing the limits of the dialogue form, the 
most conventional mode of literary instruction in the Middle Ages, Langland 
dissolves it, opting for something more radical: He represents the monologue 
of man speaking with himself.
b-text and C-text
Many of the personifications who teach and harangue Will resemble him 
in some way. In fact, they act as his mirrors, reflecting back at him some of 
his own qualities in a somewhat distorted way, from their position as sepa-
rate beings. Others can be understood (as Helen Cooper, among others, has 
argued) as faculties of Will’s own soul, essentially the same as he but capable 
of independent functioning; indeed, Will himself could be a faculty of some 
other, unnamed soul. In this work, faculty psychology functions usefully as a 
generator of personifications to advance the narrative: Piers Plowman incor-
porates faculty psychology, but cannot ultimately be limited to it. This work, 
which contains multitudes, manages to contain both distinct traces of faculty 
psychology and the performative, didactic, pastoral, and gendered qualities 
that comprise sowlehele psychology.
 To get to the poem’s end and the partial fulfillment of his quest that this end 
and its vision of Christ represent, Will must engage figures that are increas-
ingly like him in their nature. Will’s most perfect interlocutor is one so com-
pletely suited to him that his appearance can only be described as “soothly but 
as myself in a mirour” (B. XV, 162). This figure is so close to Will that he even, 
in the C-text version of the poem, shares Will’s name, with a Latin twist. Only 
a figure of that sort—Will’s other self, his clearest mirror image—seems capa-
ble of leading Will out of the deepest quagmire of his confusion, toward the 
Tree of Charity and the vision of the coming of Christ. As Teresa Tavormina 
has written, “love and likeness go hand in hand for Langland. In fact, the 
ambiguity of the phrase ‘lik to hymselue’ may be intended precisely to unite 
the two syntactic possibilities.”27 Will’s best interlocutor, this other self, will 
prove “same” enough for narcissistic self-love and “other” enough to permit 
the homosocial relationship in which learning happens best. As it turns out, 
given the gradual disappearance of female personifications and the troubling 
character of marriage and procreation within the poem, Will’s most significant 
double, the self outside his self that is nevertheless nearest to him, has to be 
male.
 27. Tavormina, 54.
 That which is within or equal to the self, as it turns out, ought not be 
female (although at times it seems as though it is). The transformations under-
gone by the figure of “the soul” help explain this principle of self-sameness. In 
describing the structure of the soul, Langland follows in miniature the poem-
wide pattern described in this chapter: He first offers a structure of conven-
tional, female-personified allegory, and then disrupts it, setting the stage for 
a male interlocutor to arrive. The first model of the soul that appears in Piers 
Plowman is a static, architectural allegory—Castle Caro, where Anima, the 
Soul, dwells under the tutelage and guidance of Dobest and the protection of 
Inwit. The castle itself is made of earth, air, wind, and water joined together. 
Together, these elements constitute the generalizable human body. The logic of 
this allegory describes that body as essentially inanimate—the elements joined 
together stand for the stones and other materials that make up a castle’s walls, 
while the body represented by these walls is merely a thing, like wind, water, 
or the walls themselves.28 This body seems to be genderless—but it is inhabited 
by figures both female and male.
 Within the enclosure of the body dwells its animating principle, a female 
personification complete with kinship and social ties. Anima is the lover of 
Kynde, the power that joins man with woman in such endlessly problematic 
ways. Anima, the soul, is coupled with the very principle of coupling—an 
indication of how deep the significance of interdependence, of sexuality and 
reproduction, goes in the poem. Within the presumptive solitude of the soul, 
within the very core of the body, dwells the necessity of interdependence, just 
as it dwelt at the place where Body and Soul met in the earlier poems. The pas-
sage describing Anima, this grammatically feminine and dramatically female 
soul, is placed within a passus that seems entirely concerned with marriage and 
the importance of gender. The (female-gendered) Soul is joined with Nature, 
although a female same-sex coupling of these principles has been avoided by 
turning the goddess Natura into the male Kynde. A female Anima, capable of 
heterosexual union with Kynde, is clearly an authorial choice. Grammatically, 
 28. Tavormina’s observation about the relationship between Kynde and Anima encapsu-
lates an idea that informs this chapter’s approach to the poem as a whole: “Important to Wit’s 
characterization of Kynde’s love for Anima is the phrase ‘lyk to hymselue,’ since it can be taken 
to modify either ‘lemman’ (Anima is a lemman like Kynde himself) or ‘louith’ (Kynde loves An-
ima as he loves himself). Although the two possibilities are logically distinct, they may well not 
be mutually exclusive. . . . In fact, the ambiguity of the phrase ‘lik to hymselue’ may be intended 
precisely to unite the two syntactic possibilities” (54). This ambiguity characterizes much of the 
poem, and in particular Will’s relationship to Liberum Arbitrium, who is also very much “lik to 
hymselue.” For a consideration of the relationship between Inwit and Anima, the reason and the 
soul, and how both relate to the will in the Castle Caro allegory, see Bruce Herbert, “A Will with 
a Reason: Theological Developments in the C-Revision of Piers Plowman,” in Religion in the 
Poetry and Drama of the Late Middle Ages in England: The J. A. W. Bennett Memorial Lectures, 
Perugia, 1988, ed. Piero Boitani and Anna Torti (Cambridge, UK: D. S. Brewer, 1990). 
5the option of the Latin noun animus (m) always exists. The marriage metaphor 
allows Langland to describe two things that are related to and dependent on 
one another, but fundamentally separate, and to dramatize the interdepen-
dence of concepts and persons alike. As always, however, he finds that inter-
dependence, no matter how necessary, is also limiting, and moves away from 
this vision of the radical dependence on the Other, this radical dependence on 
the female.
 After hundreds of lines, Will encounters Anima once again. This time, 
instead of living as a lady with a lover within castle walls, Anima is represented 
as an almost hallucinatory image:
I seigh, as it sorcerie were, a sotil thing withalle—
Oon withouten tonge and teeth, tolde me whider I sholde,
And wherof I cam and of what kynde.
(B. XV, 11–14)
Anima’s knowledge turns out to be soul-knowledge rather than mind-knowl-
edge. Anima (rather than, say, Reason) is the one who tells Will where he’s 
from and where he’s going, and reveals his own “kynde” to him. Anima is 
transformed from the female lover of Kynde (a sort of female tutelary per-
sonification without a speaking part) into something entirely different, this 
incredibly odd, almost ghostly thing. She goes from being an embodied and 
romantically placed concept to being disembodied or very differently bodied.
 Perhaps, doctrinally speaking, the soul ought to be incorporeal and not 
a lady in a castle, but the phrase used to describe this incorporeality of the 
new Anima is a complexly suggestive one. For instance, the word anima is 
a feminine noun in Latin, but is this thing being described still female? This 
Anima is referred to as a “thing” on line 11, and it seems to have become a 
male personification (“hym” and “he”) by lines 14 and 15. Even then, however, 
Anima is only partially male, since (as we shall see later) its names for itself 
include a number of traditionally female ones. Given the indeterminacy of 
the figure’s gender in terms of pronouns used about it and the names it gives 
itself, it seems possible to read Anima as, among other things, a lower bodily 
orifice. James Paxson has argued that Anima’s toothless speech is that of a 
phantasmagoric vagina, although it could just as easily be interpreted as an 
anus, although Paxson doesn’t entertain this rather queer possibility.29 Perhaps 
 29. See James Paxson’s “Gender Personified, Personification Gendered, and the Body Figur-
alized in Piers Plowman,” The Yearbook of Langland Studies 12 (1998): 65–96, 85. In this article, 
Paxson sets up a series of provocative equations that work to describe the cultural context in 
which the personifications of Piers Plowman were created, offering a new model to explain the 
gender of allegorical personification.
what is important to draw from any interpretations of Anima as some part 
of the human anatomy is that Anima’s is a type of allegorical body or object 
that seems radically and challengingly open. Whether ghostly disembodied 
creature or orifice, Anima seems to have the capacity to shift from signify-
ing femininity (as Kynde’s lemman and as penetrable orifice) to becoming a 
masculine thing, marking the place where male figures and bodies supplant 
female ones, by, among other things, encompassing the feminine and then 
moving beyond it.
 Will’s peculiar vision of the personified soul does not turn into a tutelary 
figure like Holy Church or Dame Study. Instead, it seems to speak for and 
as the soul (though whether as Will’s soul, the soul of “mankind,” or some 
abstraction that is neither, is uncertain). Though it possesses a voice, Anima is, 
in effect, shapeless; it is composed entirely of essential functions distinctively 
human without seeming to be human itself. When Will interrogates this fig-
ure, honestly unsure whether it is a friend or foe, Anima offers a long series of 
names that describe him/it:
“The whiles I quykne the cors,” quod he, “called am I Anima;
And whan I wilne and wolde, Animus ich hatte;
And for that I kan and knowe, called am I Mens;
And whan I make mone to God, Memoria is my name;
And whan I deme domes and do as truthe techeth,
Thanne is Racio my righte name—‘reson’ on Englissh;
And when I feele that folke telleth, my firste name is Sensus—
And that is wit and wisdom, the welle of alle craftes;
And whan I chalange or chalange noght, chepe or refuse,
Thanne am I Conscience ycalled, Goddes clerk and his notarie;
And whan I love leely Oure Lord and alle othere,
Thanne is ‘lele Love’ my name, and in Latyn Amor;
And whan I flee fro the flesh and forsake the careyne,
Thanne am I spirit spechelees—and Spiritus thane ich hatte.
Austyn and Ysodorus, either of hem bothe
Nempnede me thus to name.”
(B. XV, 23–38)30
In this list of Anima’s names (which are essentially the same as those of Libe-
rum Arbitrium in the C-text, as I discuss later), the authoritative naming is 
 30. A. V. C. Schmidt’s article “Langland and Scholastic Philosophy” (Medium Aevum 38 
[1969]: 134–56) contains an appendix that examines each of the names of Anima in the B-
text, tracing the differences between the Latin and the English versions and what these might 
mean.
5in Latin while the description of function is largely in English. The litany of 
names has a probable source in Pseudo-Augustine’s De Anima, but, here, it has 
been moved into the context of a personification allegory where, as a series 
of names spoken by a character, it takes on an entirely new set of meanings: 
What does it mean for a single voice to personify so many concepts? Some of 
the names seem female, or would be female were this a Latin poem, and oth-
ers seem male. The retention of Latin nouns in what is largely a translation of 
a Latin text genders the proceedings, highlighting gender instability as part of 
what seems to be a project of highlighting instability and multiplicity as such.
 In the B-text of Piers Plowman, where the speaker of these multiple names 
functions under the general rubric of “Anima,” this act of multiple self-naming 
crafts a transition from the previously female character of Anima (the one in 
the Castle Caro), a more traditional allegorical figure resembling didactic alle-
gories such as that of the Ancrene Wisse, to a different, perhaps entirely new, 
allegorical mode. After all, embodying its name is what a personification does. 
But how can any being remain a personification and at the same time embody 
so many names? The multinamed complexity of this figure marks the Soul 
within man as something other than purely female—as containing a compos-
ite of masculine, feminine, and neuter nouns. Will, our one particular “man,” 
is confused by all of this and persists in asking questions until he is accused of 
being one of Pride’s knights for wanting to know “the cause of all hire names” 
(B. XV, 45; note that “hire” is “her,” temporarily specifying Anima’s gender as 
female). It is as if delving into these names, and with it, Will’s or the reader’s 
descent into the very stuff of personification allegory, is not an admirable or a 
useful task to take on. This very rejection of analysis is, in itself, a final farewell 
to a traditional approach to personification allegory. Paxson has written that 
the character of Anima is “a metapersonification—an embodiment of the idea 
of embodying abstractions.”31 I agree, and would argue that this way of “doing 
personification” in the poem actually signals nothing less than the most pro-
found and basic transformation of how the gender of personification allegory 
works: not exactly androgynous, but somehow male, female, and both all at 
once. The figure of Anima changes the nature of the kind of body an allegori-
cal figure can possess, dissolving the necessity that the process of personifica-
tion involve some sort of embodiment.
 The role of this strange new Anima is to direct Will beyond himself, toward 
Charity. In response to Will’s boundless curiosity, he replies:
“Therefore by colour ne by clergie knowe shaltowhym nevere
neither thorugh wordes ne werkes, but thorugh wil oone,
 31. Paxson, 85.
And that knoweth no clerk, ne creature on erthe
But Piers the Plowman.”
(B. XV, 209–12)
Charity, the object to be known according to this passage, is an allegorical 
character that never speaks for itself but can be described by Anima. This 
character is never properly personified, never becomes Will’s interlocutor, but 
it does appear later in the poem as a tree, a manifestation of a different kind of 
allegorical genre altogether. Only through the will can charity be known (not 
through any act of speaking, arguing, or learning), and, of course, Will is the 
one privileged to see the Tree of Charity in his dream, on his readers’ behalf.
 In the B-text version of the poem (and not in the C-revision, which contains 
Liberum Arbitrium as Will’s double, as I discuss later), Will’s knowing and the 
knowledge adduced of Piers are connected in a circular relationship that relies 
on Will’s double nature, as person and as personification. As a person, Will 
needs Piers in order to know Charity, and the content of Piers’s knowledge, 
the “fre liberal wille” (B. XV, 150), is “the will.” Will, in responding to this 
definition, finally names himself: “[M]y name is Longe Wille” (B. XV, 152). 
What Will asks, while naming himself, is where he might find someone who 
can teach him about Charity: “Where sholde men fynde swich a frend with so 
fre an herte?” (B. XV, 151). Anima responds that Will can find such a friend in 
Piers: “Ac Piers the Plowman parceyveth moore depper / What is the wille, and 
wherfore that many wight suffreth” (B. XV, 199–200). What Piers knows seems 
to be the nature of Will, which Will himself doesn’t yet know, but somehow 
must come to know. This is a relationship of epistemological interdependence 
that recalls Reason’s admonitory words: “[N]o creature under Christ can for-
men hymselven” (B. XI, 387).32 Instead of organizing knowledge and the goal 
of a narrator’s quest through an amatory model (as when Christ woos the Soul 
in many allegories or as the moment when whom Meed marries truly matters), 
here Langland has rewritten the organization of the literary/spiritual quest 
as a search for reciprocation: for a peer, and not for a wife as such. The kind 
 32. James Simpson has written about this ambiguous interdependence, albeit with a dif-
ferent set of questions in mind; he has considered this passage in terms of its biblical context: 
“[T]he logic of the passage is strangely circular, however: Will can know charity (which Anima 
has defined as a ‘fre liberal wille’) only by knowing Piers, since Piers knows the will. Will, that 
is, can know charity only by knowing the figure who knows him. Has Langland simply lost his 
way? Not at all: the biblical text from which Langland takes his inspiration here, I Corinthians 
13, is as much concerned to define what charity is as to define how one might know it; Paul 
defines full understanding in terms of knowing to the degree that one is known by a principle 
outside the self. . . . Just as Paul, then, defines perfect knowing as knowing to the degree that one 
is known, so too does Anima define the knowing of charity as being both active and passive, or 
as active in being passive” (Simpson, Introduction to the B-Text, 185). 
5of interdependence that Will needs is, ultimately, to join with another male 
figure. Although interdependence is unfortunately necessary, the harshness of 
that necessity can be mitigated by finding a free-hearted friend.
 Whereas in the B-text, Will encountered Anima in all its hallucinatory, 
orifice-like dimensions, the C-version offers instead Will’s meeting with Libe-
rum Arbitrium, who changes roles from B, giving up his work at the Tree of 
Charity (see B. XVI, 16–17) and instead assuming Anima’s very own lines.33 
But who is this Liberum Arbitrium, this even-more-purely-male character, 
uncontaminated by association with Anima, the girl in the castle?34 He is Will, 
but with a twist: He now incorporates a faculty that our Will lacks. He says so 
himself—he is “a will with a resoun.”35 Perhaps it is the Latinity of his name 
 33. In a study of the changes between the B- and the C-text versions of Piers, E. Talbot 
Donaldson argues that Liberum Arbitrium has his origins in Bernard of Clarivaux’s views (or 
someone influenced by that school), being “that part of man which bears the impress of the 
image of God to which man was created” (Piers Plowman: The C-Text and Its Poet [New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 1949], 189). This enigmatic character seems to have been particularly 
popular with medieval audiences in his C-text incarnation, despite Donaldson’s assertion that 
Liberum Arbitrium “would win no popularity contest for characters in Piers Plowman” (188). 
According to Kerby-Fulton and Justice, “medieval readers, for reasons unknown to us today, 
were particularly taken with this passage in Langland: the scribe John Cok extracted it for John 
Shirley; the Anglo-Irish artist of Douce 104 chose to illustrate it, and in Book III of the Testa-
ment Usk attempted to combine this image of liberum arbitrium as a spiritual lover with the 
image of the secular lover, a combination awkward indeed (at least in Usk). But the Douce 104 
artist did exactly the same thing when confronted with the passage: he portrayed Langland’s 
Liberum Arbitrium as a handsome young lover”; see Kathryn Kerby-Fulton and Steven Justice, 
“Langlandian Reading Circles and the Civil Service in London and Dublin, 1380–1427,” in 
Wendy Scase, Rita Copeland, and David Lawton, David, eds., New Medieval Literatures (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1997), 67–68. Although Kerby-Fulton and Justice do not give a reason for Liberum 
Arbitrium’s popularity, they note the fact that it is sometimes extracted with fragments of Troi-
lus and Crisyede also concerned with the question of the freedom of the will. 
 34. Britton Harwood offers the possibility that Liberum Arbitrium is simply a figure for the 
soul, and offers five ways of conceiving Liberum Arbitrium as a concept: Two of these notions 
regard Liberum Arbitrium as being of either will or reason, notions that he rejects for their 
incompleteness. Liberum Arbitrium in Piers Plowman makes it quite clear that he functions as 
a will with a reason, after all. Other options include Liberum Arbitrium as a separate faculty, a 
faculty that serves “to account for choice by coming between the reason’s judgment of the good 
and the will’s desire for the good—yet one composed of reason and will” (Piers Plowman and 
the Problem of Belief, 105). Yet other possibilities suggest that Liberum Arbitrium represents all 
of the powers of the soul lumped together and, as the image of God in humankind, also as a 
kind of habitus, not merely as a power of volition. 
 35. Schmidt highlights two possible understandings of liberum arbitrium, “the theory that 
liberum arbitrium is one faculty of the soul and the theory that it is all faculties of the soul” 
(“Langland and Scholastic Philosophy,” 139). The correspondence between Anima’s speech 
and Liberum Arbitrium’s convinced Schmidt that, in both cases, it is the soul speaking; he 
understands the revision as, in the B-version, “one term served for the part and the whole”; 
in C, however, “Liberum Arbitrium, while remaining quite clearly a part of the soul, becomes 
the spokesman for the whole soul.” Schmidt argues that Langland had come to see Liberum 
Arbitrium as the “essence” of human nature—a sort of synecdochal logic by which Liberum 
that gives Liberum Arbitrium the extra gift of “resoun” that renders him capa-
ble of serving as a guide for Will.36
 Whatever the cause, his is a Will that incorporates another allegorical 
character, Reason, someone we have been hearing from since the early passus 
of the poem (he would normally be a female figure, as in the Roman de la Rose, 
but is represented as male in Piers Plowman). Liberum Arbitrium appears in 
the C revision as the more reasonable, more knowing equivalent of the narra-
tor, himself split into as many pieces as Will might be if he were a human self 
with a variety of competing, complex faculties, incorporating more powers 
than Will has been able to include within himself. The C-text version of Piers 
Plowman offers Will tutelage by his closest male double, his slightly more 
masculine and Latinate superior.
 It is as Will’s double that Liberum Arbitrium can expound to Will the 
meaning of charity and lead him, ultimately, to the poem’s climax, which 
includes the coming of Christ and the Harrowing of Hell. Will is led to the 
poem’s end, in the C-version, by his other self. In Langland’s consideration of 
how gender and interdependence works, this self cannot be associated with 
the female: the term liberum arbitrium is neuter, neither entirely masculine 
nor feminine. Escaping the gender seesaw of Anima/Animus, Liberum Arbi-
trium achieves a perfect balance. But since English grammar demands that a 
personified, neuter abstraction become either a “he” or a “she” through the 
act of speaking, this Latin-neuter person becomes a “he” when he functions 
in a Middle English poem, as in Will’s response to the character’s first words: 
“Thenne hadde y wonder what he was, that Liberum Arbitrium . . .” (C. XVI, 
161, my emphasis). Although Boethius presents the voice of his own inner-
most philosophical reason, his calmest and most transcendent faculty, as a 
stern female speaker, centuries later, Langland shies away from incorporating 
Arbitrium is the part permitted to stand in for the whole. This has come to be one of the ways 
in which critics deal with this character’s confusing growth in significance between B and C. 
Lorraine K. Stock suggests that Langland renames the character between the B- and C-versions 
because “Langland’s emphasis on the negation or submission of one’s will in order successfully 
to achieve the contemplative state required in C an allegorical personification of that correct 
direction of the voluntas, who would vividly exemplify that principle of spiritual reform for the 
character Will, here standing for the universal human will” (Lorraine Kochanske Stock, “Will, 
Actyf, Pacience, and Liberum Arbitrium: Two Recurring Quotations in Langland’s Revisions of 
Piers Plowman C Text, Passus V, XV, XVI,” in Texas Studies in Literature and Language 30 (1988): 
461–77, 472.
 36. Schmidt’s commentary on Liberum Arbitrium suggests that Langland may have thought 
the term liberum arbitrium untranslatable into Middle English, just like anima. However, it 
might also be possible that Langland was employing the rhetoric of untranslatability deliber-
ately; to think about why Langland uses Latin in this way (whether for alienation, authority, the 
impression of striving for philosophical accuracy, actual striving for philosophical accuracy, 
or to take his manipulation of Latin-and-English personification to another level) would be 
another study altogether.
5the female as an essential aspect of the male. Will’s most useful and intimate 
Other turns out to be, and must be, a Latin-named Will.
 Piers Plowman concludes with the male allegorical figure of Conscience 
heading off to seek out Piers the Plowman, perhaps thereby to repeat the cycle 
of seeking and finding the double, the perfect interlocutor who, alone in all 
the world, can lead one to knowledge of the ultimate. Although the alterna-
tive offered to active heterosexuality throughout Piers Plowman is, of course, 
celibacy, that state is envisioned by the poem as a relationship between a man 
and his (male) double. This double might represent a quality that is already to 
be found within the male seeker, but the goal of the quest that he has under-
taken is to find a way to externalize, then encounter, and then begin to love 
this previously internal quality: to eject an aspect of the self in order to learn 
to internalize it all the more thoroughly. Such a relationship entails a homoso-
cial, nonsodomitical, probably asexual avoidance of the female rather than an 
active desire for the male. The female to be avoided is, of course, “merely” any 
female personification, but now that gender has been revealed as a dramatic 
factor in allegorical plot, avoidance of female personifications may indeed 
mean something about avoidance of female persons, and vice versa. This 
interpretation of Piers Plowman, like that of “Als I Lay in a Winteris Nyt” in 
chapter 3, insists that putting something into the category of “queer” does not 
necessitate an insistence on anything resembling contemporary formations of 
gay or lesbian desire.
 Piers Plowman sets up a system in which the question of the Will is cen-
tered on a male narrator and his masculine alter egos. And yet, the poem 
is not only or merely exclusionary. Rather, it seems to struggle with its own 
desire to exclude the feminine. After all, Piers Plowman is structured in such 
a way that we begin and end with female personifications (Holy Church, Lady 
Meed, and, close to the end, the Four Daughters of God) and with the prob-
lems of Kynde and kynde, of what it means to live in the world as a sexed and 
gendered being, in an interdependent relationship with one’s fellow creatures. 
Langland gradually disentangles himself from these female personifications, 
but he also starts out by tangling with them at great length. At first, we are set 
up to expect female personifications like those we would see in all the other 
great medieval allegories. Undermining that tradition with the apparent goal 
of moving toward a better and more reasonable way to live and love, Piers 
Plowman proceeds from that inaugurating moment to offer us an alternative 
to the conventional tutelary dialogue. In its stead, the poem offers its readers 
the silence of the soul in communion with itself, a silence broken only by the 
monologue of man communing with his own male self.
The selves discussed in Body/Soul debates are always dead. That’s 
why they find themselves capable of separating from one another 
enough to engage in debate. Indeed, to study the Middle Ages at all is 
always to study writings by and about people who are centuries dead. 
We reach back in time and find only disembodied words. And yet, 
these words speak to us about the very stuff of embodied life: love, 
sex, hunger, dirt, death, decay. To study medieval literature, in this 
context, can cause us to fantasize more than a little bit about access 
to those long-gone bodies, to dream that they will someday look up 
and speak to us in their groaning, ghostly voices, as the Body in “Als 
I Lay” does in response to the Soul’s accusations. We may imagine 
that these words about what the body speaks might grant us access 
to bodies themselves, but of course they do not—our knowledge is, 
as ever, mediated by and produced through discourse, including the 
discourse of mind/body dualism.
 When I started writing this book, an important goal was to criti-
cally interrogate the colloquial understanding that medieval persons 
strongly divided the concept of “body” from that of “soul.” I was 
hoping, thereby, to push against casual or unthinking contemporary 
views that support such dualism, up to and including earlier femi-
nist affirmations of the “woman = body” equation, an equation that 
threatens to strand “femininity”—and, conceptually, woman—on 
one side of a rigid binary. To write about debates within the self, thus, 
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seemed, paradoxically, to be a way of actually affirming that self ’s wholeness, 
its unalienated totality. 
 As I continued to work on this project and realized that, in examining 
medieval psychological thought, I was encountering the medieval psychologi-
cal practice of sowlehele, it became particularly important to acknowledge the 
complex role of love and interdependence within the self as a crucial aspect 
of sowlehele narratives. The body had to be something other than a prison for 
the soul in order for the two to ever have functioned as one; it had to be loved 
as well as disciplined. That, at least, is how the medieval story goes when a tale 
has to be told about the relationships between interrelated aspects of the self. 
Rather than writing against dualism, then, I came to produce a book about the 
difficult integration of the material world with the world of the immaterial (I 
hesitate to call on “the spiritual”) when both are available to us only through 
narrative and its various conceptual limitations.
 Since beginning this book, I have also had occasion to confront the mean-
ing of just how separate body and soul can be from one another, something 
I might have denied during the early years of my research. When this manu-
script was essentially complete, my father suffered a massive stroke that left 
him effectively brain dead. Walking into the hospital room where he lay, I 
was overwhelmed by the sense that he was gone although his heart continued 
to beat with the help of machines. I would have said that the things about 
him that mattered, my father’s personality, his gallant spirit, were gone and 
that what remained was nothing at all. He had urged us to let him go with-
out a fancy send-off: After all, he wouldn’t be there to enjoy it, he would say. 
Encountering his empty body, I was overwhelmed with the need to fit my 
hand inside his, as he had held it safely when I was a little girl. In that hospital 
room, what I experienced were both the terribly harsh reality of a separation 
between spirit and flesh and their ultimate inseparability—the way in which 
the beloved body encodes memory and love even absent mind, soul, and voice. 
To encounter such a paradox is not to resolve it but rather to accept its inevita-
bility. To have been able to understand this was, for me, the single most useful 
piece of sowlehele that this book could offer me, as its author.
 Debate poetry takes up topics of vast theological or philosophical impor-
tance, and renders them as narratives, with all the ambivalences, twists, and 
turns that narrative imposes. The poems discussed in this study should not be 
understood as simply equivalent to philosophical or theological treatises, or to 
works of self-help. Rather, they should be read as representing the sea change 
that both philosophy and didactic discourse undergo when both encounter 
the dual forces of narrative-driven personification allegory and Middle Eng-
lish vocabulary. The works discussed in this study show that the form taken 
by a philosophical/didactic endeavor can (perhaps must) inflect its content.
 The process by which medieval allegory grants the Body speech is a result 
of the allegorization of what had perhaps started out as a sermon example: the 
movement from a static moment (“imagine how your soul will address you 
after you’re dead”) to a dramatic narrative. Granting the body speech gives 
the philosophical thinker behind the poem a fair amount of pause: If the body 
is capable of consciousness, whatever is the soul for? Then again, who is it 
that generates the voice, that essential feature of the allegorical scene? Is it the 
(corporeal) vocal cords or the (incorporeal) soul? How can the self be divided 
in half if something as simple as speech is so intimately implicated in both the 
physical and the spiritual? The seeds of body/soul dualism’s breakdown are 
contained within its more literal and explicit manifestation, leaving the field 
open for works such as Piers Plowman to push the implications of the debate 
tradition to their logical extreme.
 At the outset, in this book’s Introduction, I set out a series of criteria for 
sowlehele: adapting this term to a broader set of texts rather than cataloguing 
instances when it was being used by medieval authors. Sowlehele, I argued, acts 
on the soul rather than describing it, and in this emphasis on action, it differs 
in subtle and significant ways from medieval psychology or psychologies. A 
work of sowlehele is an act of performative speech, enacting (or at least prom-
ising to enact) the soul-healing it describes. It is a didactic and pastoral work, 
more use-oriented than theoretical, yet many works of sowlehele discussed in 
this book are interesting precisely because their narrative drive and strange 
conventions around gendering aspects of the self seem to undermine or at 
least complicate any simple understanding of their didactic mission. This was 
particularly true in the works discussed in the two chapters about Middle Eng-
lish Body/Soul debates and the chapter on “Sawles Warde,” works whose very 
explicit intent was to frighten readers about hell, encourage them to dream of 
heaven, and cause them to consider the relationships between different aspects 
of their own selves.
 The three chapters on shorter Middle English psychological allegories 
are bookended by considerations of better-known medieval allegories, from 
Prudentius’ fourth-century Psychomachia to William Langland’s fourteenth-
century Piers Plowman. This rather too teleological arrangement encourages 
this book’s readers to imagine a plastic, malleable object, “personification alle-
gory,” inserted into didactic discourse around the time of Prudentius and then 
molded and transformed by centuries of works like the Body/Soul debates 
into a work as odd and surprising as Piers . . . and perhaps to insert their own 
favorite works of personification allegory and test them according to the cri-
teria of sowlehele discourse as outlined here, to see how other works might 
push against or fit tidily within this framework. Piers Plowman may conclude 
this study, but its many words are by no means the very last (chronologically 
or otherwise) on how gender, allegory, and psychology intersect. Your mileage 
in seeking other works of sowlehele, other ways of approaching the divisions 
of the self in medieval allegory, may vary, but the attempt will reveal its own 
possibilities, limitations, and innovations, I am certain.
 The book’s concluding chapter on Piers Plowman recapitulates the argu-
ment as a whole. The poem begins using classic female personifications, very 
much as the representations of allegorical women in chapter 1, and then 
gradually eliminates them, with certain key exceptions, over the course of its 
unfolding narrative. In medieval personification allegory, from Boethius and 
Prudentius onward, the balance of power between disagreeing interlocutors 
is figured through gendered hierarchies, with female tutelary figures as men’s 
superiors, as midwives to men’s thought. As Jean de Meun’s Reason reminds us 
by offering herself flirtatiously to her allegorical pupil (as discussed in chapter 
1), this is not necessarily a neutral situation. Despite Jean’s coy Reason, how-
ever, no poem before Piers Plowman pushes the implications of allegorical 
gender in the scene of disputation as far: Piers literalizes the formal difficulty 
of debating with a female personification as part of its narrative mechanism. 
Although it would be impossible to argue direct influence (whether in terms 
of the influence of the Katherine Group or the Body/Soul debates discussed in 
earlier chapters), it is implicit in this study’s structure that something happens 
to English-language allegory in the thirteenth century, something that pushes 
the working of psychological personification in a new direction, that, even if 
it does not enable or cause Piers Plowman to come into existence, permits that 
work to make sense to its immediate audience.
 The presence of the transformed and transformational figure of Anima/
Liberum Arbitrium in Piers Plowman is a particularly fraught example of the 
tendency in some medieval allegories to foreground the inherent contradic-
tions of figuring abstract ideas in and through female bodies. From the vio-
lent ladies of Prudentius’ Psychomachia to the contrast between Will-the-wife 
in “Sawles Warde” and Langland’s multiple Wills, a sort of lineage might be 
traced, an increasing consciousness (among English-language writers most 
particularly) of the literal meaning of all those women’s bodies and voices that 
populate medieval psychological allegory. Indeed, the most basic of this book’s 
conclusions, its feminist core, is that the works of sowlehele that it has selec-
tively traced gradually come to eliminate women as men’s double even as they 
worry that heterosexual interdependence with women is mankind’s inevitable 
fate.
 A complex, not at all necessarily sexual version of a queer reading of Piers 
Plowman and of this book as a whole can be offered to complement this femi-
nist reading.1 On this account, Piers and works such as “Als I Lay” offer a way 
 1. The first to offer a queer reading of Piers Plowman, James Paxson, argues that if “sod-
out of human heterosexuality’s misogynist dilemmas: not the same-sex love 
of Gay Pride or of the fight for gay and lesbian marriage, but homosociality.2 
Unfortunately for feminists and for the female figures in allegory, Langland’s 
homosociality, at least, seems to be a vision of the soul’s development without 
the need for women to triangulate the bonds between men—a recognition of 
the same, or the mirror, as the beloved.3 This homosociality is duplicated in 
the Middle English works discussed in this book, and it seems clear that the 
exclusion of women does create a space of tenderness between men, or at least 
personified male beings, that possesses its own beauty.
 Although this book has argued that one of its goals is the gradual mar-
ginalization of what had previously been imagined as female aspects of the 
self, its examination of how dualism is gendered does not simply indict the 
works discussed as misogynist. These are, rather, imaginative documents 
sternly accurate to their time and place, insistent on the unalterable and dif-
ficult “fact” that woman is not really in a position to be man’s Other, despite 
the necessity of mating, discussed in such detail in Piers Plowman at least, and 
of engaging in relations of kynde. That last work examined in this study docu-
ments an anxiety about interdependence, especially with women, and offers an 
alternative, one that had already been present, to an extent, in the thirteenth-
omy might be taken as the most palpable sign of the queer—just as personification is often 
taken as the most palpable sign of allegory . . . personification and body-centered allegory can 
be viewed as queer semiotic enterprises” (Paxson, 91). Although my argument in this book, like 
Paxson’s, is that it is possible to perform a queer reading of medieval works, I am not entirely 
persuaded by his provocative series of equations, wherein he slips between a generally accepted 
equation, “medieval allegorical personification = women,” into a new equation, “multiplicity 
of personifications = queer,” which relies on an extremely loose understanding of this term, as 
well as ignoring the boundary between a world populated by female personifications and one in 
which they have been excised. Instead of seeing feminist and queer readings as complementary, 
as Paxson seems to, I find only conflict when I try to read as a feminist (tracking the misogyny 
that goes into the making of female personifications) and as a queer theorist (tracking male 
same-sex affection in the context of a fundamental exclusion of women). See Paxson, “Gender 
Personified,” 1998.
 2. David Halpern, in How to Do the History of Homosexuality (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2002), has argued for a series of different approaches to characterizing same-sex 
affection, in order to avoid anachronism and overstatement. Halpern offers and discusses four 
provisional “pre-homosexual categories of male sex and gender deviance . . . (1) effeminacy (2) 
paederasty or ‘active’ sodomy (3) friendship or male love, and (4) passivity or inversion” (109). 
In tracking the movement away from female personification in most English works discussed 
by this book, I am looking at how they manifest relevance to Halpern’s third category. “Queer” 
is not the same as “homosexual,” of course, and Paxson’s work on the queerness of multiplicity 
does not fit any of the categories above. 
 3. In Between Men: English Literature and Homosocial Desire (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1985), Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick argued that women as the putative objects of love 
poetry, particularly in their role as the apexes of “love triangles,” actually mediate and help 
consolidate homosocial male desire. In arguing thus, she opened up a field of inquiry into the 
complexities of a same-sex desire that does not necessarily express itself through sex or explicit 
sexual longing.
century Body/Soul debates: love for and recognition by one’s male other, one’s 
other self. Allegorical gendering becomes, in the hands of English writers, a 
flexible tool for conceptualizing the complexities of interdependence.
 One of the crucial abilities of medieval allegory, as it turns out, is its capac-
ity to literalize the relationship between the material and the nonmaterial in 
the making of persons, who are imagined as the combination of base flesh 
with spiritual spark. Personification allegory gives a body to a spirit or con-
cept, literally reenacting “the Word made flesh,” but also working through the 
implications of making flesh out of a “word,” of the Body and Soul of a dead 
knight, for instance. This book examines works that literalize body/soul dual-
ism by staging disputations between the crucially interdependent characters, 
Body and Soul, in terms of some of their influential antecedents and succes-
sors as well as the philosophical and psychological work that these poems did 
and continue to do. Although many medieval and later thinkers have taken 
body/soul dualism for granted to some degree, it is not an inevitable way of 
dividing up the parts of the self. The more commonsense and “real” body/soul 
dualism feels, the more suspicious of it we might want to be. This book does 
not, could not, have the undoing of body/soul dualism as its purpose. Its far 
more modest intention has been to look at a crucial moment in the history of 
representing that particular variety of dualism to see how it was set up, reiter-
ated, and reinforced.
 Much work has been done in the last decades on the history of the body, 
about how fundamentally different the experience of embodiment has been 
in different centuries and different places. To return to the Middle Ages is 
also to return to the notion of the soul. We have not studied the soul in the 
way that we have studied the body—not recently. It has been a transhistorical 
universal or it has been an outdated ideological construct. One might argue 
that the humanities, as a whole, are ceaselessly engaged in examining the many 
permutations of what it means to possess a soul, an inner life, a narrative of 
oneself. But the fact remains that the story of the soul as a historical construct 
has largely been left implicit in the histories of subjectivity’s emergence, which 
insist, instead, on imposing a term like subject—a term that encompasses 
body, mind, spirit, and social standing—on a time that strictly distinguished 
these things and thought incessantly about how they might be distinguished 
even more finely. This book has attempted to put the “soul” back into “body 
studies,” not just through recourse to psychoanalytic theory but by examining 
the cultural work accomplished by the relationship between soul and body in 
literary and scientific works, beginning, here, with the medieval literature of 
sowlehele.
Standing in a dark place, I heard a little argument, 1
All about a body that was ungood, lying there upon the bier.
Thus spoke the spirit, with sorrowful thoughts and all downcast:
“May woe befall your flesh, your foul blood; why are you now lying here?
“While you were still in life, you were keen to sit in judgment 5
Passing false decrees, profiting by trading two for five;
Now it’s clear to me that we will never be worthy of heaven’s bliss
Sorely may I make complaint, then, about our long time together.”
Then spoke the body, so dismal, to the wretched spirit:
“I had thought that my worldly bliss would last forever, at least for me; 10
I had no [thought] of the sins that now bind me so tightly;
[But] the shackles that hold me now heavily pull me down into the earth.”
Then spoke the spirit, with right counsel after foul indeed:
“Where is your overweening pride, your richly-trimmed garments and 
 your furs,
Your palfreys and your steeds and your purple opulence? 15
Will you bring none of these along, wretch, to the place where you will lie?”
Then spoke the body, with envy of heart, lying there shrouded in sin:
“Now is this day come upon me, woe has indeed overwhelmed me.
My hands are bound, my eyes are covered up,
I think that I will remain here, in this evil that has happened to me.” 20
a p p e n d I x
translatIon by Masha rasKolnIKov
“Body, you have lived too long; may evil befall you [who are] so treacherous;
All too often, you have turned right into wrong.
While you were in this world, your words were false and treacherous;
The one thing you can be sure of now are future torments, hard and strong.”
“Go away now, wretched spirit, how long must this wrangling last? 25
As we argue, worms are holding their own debate, rendering their own firm 
 judgment,
They are casting their lots for my flesh;
Many noble bodies will rot, I shall not be the last.”
“Body, you may not leap up now to play or rage,
To beat wild bears or to bind savage lions to your will, 30
Or threaten poor men, despoil them of their inheritance,
You must have fallen very low, for all your high birth.”
“Wretched spirit, oh go away, all you know is how to chide.
I know well that I must rot here for all my pride;
Worms must eat my throat and my pale, white side, 35
My own flesh they must eat and under earth it hide.”
“I was no wretch at all except through your evil counsel.
Oh, I have such shame thinking of your sins and all your evil deeds.
For a while you were wild, now I dread you very little.
To Christ must I call now; may he remedy now my need.” 40
“Go away now, wretched spirit, with your long tale,
I have plenty of pain without you to upbraid me.
I know truly that the worms must eat me;
Yes, I know my deeds have drawn me from my proper place into this deep pit.”
“Body, where are your sunny rooms and all your towers, 45
Your beautiful clothes and fancy vestments?
So low must you fall for all your high bowers.
Now all I can do is call out to Jesus; may he be my salvation.”
“Wretched spirit, now go away, and journey where you must journey;
My pain is truly enough now, my sides are cold and bare; 50
My house is made of clay, the walls are also cold and bare;
Though you chide night and day, I will say nothing more to you.”
“Body, why did you never think, while you might have been able to,
About Him who made us all out of naught, and what you owe Him?
For our sins and not for His, He sold His flesh; 55
Bloody was He made on the cross, as the prophet told us.
“Body, if you now wish to listen, I will tell you
About two miracles and five that must happen before Judgment Day.
The man who is alive, he may see them then:
Then will the man be fortunate who contrives to escape.  60
“On the first day shall come a red dew;
It shall take away from us our joys and pleasures.
The green tree shall bleed that our Lord saw:
Then will the man be fortunate who ever had been true.
“On the second day, fire shall burn all that stands before it, 65
No water will be able to quench it, nor will anything else that comes up against it,
All this world shall be overwhelmed, all the wide lands:
Then shall our Lord see who honored his wounds.
“On the third day, flood waters will inundate all the world,
Both those who are low and those who are high will be swept away in their 
 abundance. 70
Higher than any hill [is] will they be [sent] miles into the earth.
Fortunate is the one who has been faithful all along.
“On the fourth day, a wind shall blow; it will blow so long
That castles and high towers shall fall down.
The forest will fall right onto the moor against the fierce blasts; 75
There shall each man know his [fate], and we shall know our own.
“On the fifth day it will be light; again the wind will blow,
And, I don’t think it’s good to needlessly expand this tale;
The woods will fall into the earth, the hills into the valleys
I hold him lord and sire who can survive all seven of these days. 80
“On the sixth day at the ninth hour, four angels shall appear,
And blow so hard with the horns in their hands that all the earth shall shake;
If any thing proves to be still alive in water or upon the land,
There it must rise and go to its judgment.
“On the seventh day, so the book told us, 85
From their graves every one, both young and old, must rise,
And come into the hall, to stand for harsh judgment:
It will be well for the man who has done any good.
“It won’t help you at all to argue or to carp that these judgments are harsh;
For angels must tremble whom Christ made with his own hands, 90
And the twelve apostles who once dwelled in this land,
And our dear Lady, who never loved any wrong.
“Then our Lord will call upon Saint Mary,
To bring him the rood that stood upon Mount Calvary;
They will see where his feet stand, that his side is all bloody; 95
For our souls’ food, he knowingly suffered death.
“Then our Lord will call out, without any rebuke:
‘Come, blessed children scattered all over the world;
You shall all [go] to paradise, as the prophets told us,
Whoever comes into this hall, with bliss he shall be led there.’ 100
“Then our Lord will call upon Satan the rude:
‘Fly away, foul creature, with your accursed gang.
Fly away hence, don’t stay here a minute,
But ever without end [go] down into the pit of hell pit.’”
Then the spirit said, “alack,” and after that “alas!” 105
“Woe was that moment, Body, when you were born.”
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